Nonviolence in Violence: Approaches to
International Conflict Resolution in Costa Rica

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Chapter 1

Power in Violent and Nonviolent Contexts

Overview

This dissertation will investigate the thesis that Costa Rica, due to its anomalous claims to have abolished its military power, provides a significant example of conflict resolution by negotiation and the relatively nonviolent use of power — despite problems stemming from violent conflict resolution imposed on that nation in one of the most violent areas on the planet. Under this contextual thesis, the primary hypothesis for this research will be that nonviolent conflict resolution promotes peace, security, and development, while violent conflict resolution conversely promotes war, insecurity, and underdevelopment. This hypothesis, while easily stated, is difficult to prove since nonviolence — despite such obvious and recent events as the nonviolent demise of the Berlin Wall — has been interpreted by international relations and development theorists at best as an enigma rather than as the results of a nonviolent approach.

The first chapter defines the terms basic to the hypothesis — using introductory examples from the context of Costa Rica as much as possible. These terms, taken directly from the context for the hypothesis, are war, peace, power, violence, development, neutrality, nonalignment, nonviolence, security, insecurity, underdevelopment, and conflict resolution. Contrasting definitions of power, the foundation stone of this chapter, whether characterized by violence or nonviolence, lead to a definition of armed and unarmed diplomacy.¹ These definitions prepare the way for defining neutrality and nonalignment in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The definitions are then used to elaborate upon war and peace for a state or states surrounded by intense, prolonged, and intermittent war.

The research methodology for these approaches will rely on archival and historical sources, amplified by primary source interviews on such international relations, particularly in

¹Costa Ricans use “unarmed diplomacy,” as opposed to “armed diplomacy,” as terms to distinguish what they call diplomacy from that practiced by other states (that may rely more upon complementary military and diplomatic options).
Washington, D.C., San José, Managua, and Havana. This descriptive and narrative methodology, sometimes technically called hermeneutics in international relations discourse, will be applied to the primary hypothesis that non-violent international conflict resolution has promoted peace, security, and development in Costa Rica. This primary hypothesis concerns especially the years between 1914 and 1984. Exploring this hypothesis should help as well to analyze its converse, the secondary hypothesis, that violent international conflict resolution, specifically the remilitarization of Costa Rica by the United States, promoted war, insecurity, and underdevelopment in Costa Rica in the 1980s.

To test this hypothesis and its converse, the argument that follows will address the theory, method, and outcome of international conflict resolution in the context of Costa Rica. Thus the first three chapters (Part One) will analyze the theoretical premises for conflict resolution, the next three chapters (Part Two), the methods for resolving conflict, and the last three chapters (Part Three), the outcomes of conflict resolution. This analysis of theory, method, and outcome is intended to underscore the emerging differentiation of conflict resolution in international relations. Theoretically, there are three major approaches, a world order approach, an anti-dependency approach, and a nonviolent approach, toward international conflict resolution. The first chapter introduces Costa Rica and the terms mentioned above, namely, war, peace, power, violence, development, neutrality, nonalignment, nonviolence, security, insecurity, underdevelopment, and conflict resolution. The world order, anti-dependency, and nonviolent

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2 Conflict resolution within international relations will be defined as the study and the practice of the power needed to prevent or resolve war between states. This definition derives from Bertrand Russell, Roads to Freedom, Socialism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 98 and 104-108. Russell was a founder of anti-nuclear pacifism. Reactions against Russell by one of his students, Ludwig Wittgenstein — in Tractatus (1922) and Philosophical Investigations (1953) — have helped shape the realism and neo-realism currently dominating international relations theory (to be described as the world order approach). For treatment of the research data and sources used to focus this dissertation, see Appendices B and C.

3 As found in, for example, the hermeneutics of Arne Naess, Noam Chomsky, Mohandas Gandhi, Denis Goulet, Florence Kelley, Mahendra Kumar, Sydney Bailey, Helena Tuomi, Raimo Väyrynen, Jan Tinbergen, Annette Baker Fox, William T. R. Fox, Frances Moore Lappé, Ruth Leger Sivard, and José Néstor Mourelo Aguilar. The author’s use of the term hermeneutics is derived from the cognitive mapping terminology used by Matthew Bonham, professor of International Relations in The American University. Contextual or hermeneutical thinking can be defined as the attempt “... to ‘walk around’ the totality of a situation and arrive at a strategy that is appropriate rather than universal ....” See Ursula M. Franklin, “The Second Scientist,” Canadian Forum 65 (Dec. 1985): S 3 ff.

4 The approaches as described were developed by the author and Abdul Aziz Said from 1985 to 1991, in co-creating a foundational theory course for peace and conflict resolution studies — complemented by a capstone, graduate, integrative research course — for a curriculum matrix in international relations theory, method, and practice. The descriptive terms for these approaches may vary with various viewpoints for such approaches, outlooks, or paradigms that map one’s view of reality.
approaches are built upon four core concepts embodied in the three approaches — power (a term and a concept), force, conflict, and coercion — to be discussed in chapter two.

The first of the approaches discussed in chapter three, the world order approach, resolves conflict through violence or the threat of violence under the control of a hierarchical power system. The second, or anti-dependency approach, also relies upon a hierarchical system, but prefers less violence and more democratic input in its use of power. In this context power is used to oppose dependency upon the industrialized world’s manufactured goods, including arms, paid for by raw materials from the Third World. The third, the nonviolent approach, rests on the consensual political use of power to resolve conflict. In such a hierarchy of violence and nonviolence, the United States and the Soviet Union often represent a world order approach, whereas Sweden or Tanzania might represent an anti-dependency approach and Vanuatu or Costa Rica the nonviolent approach. These three overlapping approaches operate on a spectrum or continuum of violence to nonviolence.

How we resolve what we see as conflict is a question of method. Exploration of conflict resolution methods in Part Two, the three middle chapters, will begin with the United Nations General Assembly debate on security, disarmament, and development. This triangular conflict resolution debate concerns how security, disarmament, and development are essential to each other for making peace. The debate reflects a compromise for all three of the approaches, blending security and ecological concerns with the rule of law, but does not effectively measure conflict intensity or conflict resolution potential. To measure international conflict intensity and conflict resolution potential, chapter five will introduce a quantitative indicator of social violence derived from a state’s numbers of war dead over twenty-year time spans, from 1945-1985,

5Please refer to Appendix A, An Etymology of the Three Approaches, as well as to specific references about Grenville Clark in chapter 3 for the choice of the phrase world order. Unfortunately this phrase has also been uncritically used by writers unaware of Clark’s pro-U.S., cultural biases for autarchic military security and intelligence policy-making. Future theorists more cognizant of planetary limits may well be more critical of “world”-centric theories.

6See chapter 4 for discussion of this debate. The important document for this debate is commonly called the “Thorsson Report;” see U.N., Secretary General, Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development (5 Oct. 1981), A/36/356. The three approaches, relatively violent or nonviolent, measured in chapter 5, are what might be also called independent variables for the outcomes in Part 3.

7Unless noted otherwise, all of the definitions of terms which follow will be the author’s own. Since the term Central America does not always include Panama, the terms isthmus and isthmic will be used for the states between Mexico and Colombia. The phrase Western Caribbean will denote the isthmian states and the states south and west of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, including Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic (not the Bahamas). The terms American and Americas will refer to the whole western hemisphere, including Canada and Latin America, not merely the U.S.
divided by that state’s population. Methods which are now being employed to resolve conflict in
Costa Rica will be discussed in Chapter Six.

Part Three, the last three chapters, on the outcomes of violent and nonviolent conflict
resolution, begins with an analysis of the barriers to security resulting from drugs and
militarization, highlighted by the analysis of theory and method in the first two parts. Poverty
and violence stemming from an isthmian arms and drug business (Chapter Seven) and an
international debt (Chapter Eight) have characterized much isthmian conflict resolution thus far.
However, during the late 1980s, isthmian nations began laying foundations for democratic
United Nations conflict resolution. Chapter Nine will conclude with the possibilities for conflict
resolution in the future. All three parts will focus on illustrative issues specific to Costa Rica.

Power: For Conquest or for Mutual Benefit

Historically, Costa Rica has tended toward the nonviolent side of a continuum from
nonviolence to violence, preferring neutrality over alignment or nonalignment, and unarmed,
nonviolent diplomacy over anti-dependency or world order approaches to international conflict
resolution. As one of a handful of anomalous states claiming not to have military forces, Costa
Rica has thus tried to emphasize what Kenneth Boulding calls integrative or beneficial power.
Boulding describes such integrative power as more powerful and long-lasting than the other two
kinds of power — oriented toward productive exchange (the anti-dependency approach) or
toward deter-rent and destructive threats (the world order approach). He proposes that the true
mainstream in international relations is the unarmed, neutral approach, not the other two
approaches with the disruption and destruction that they cause.8

Costa Rica’s historical isolation and peaceful cultural values have been primary factors in
its anomalous, neutral stance toward power and conflict. This neutral stance favors power
defined as the ability to effect mutual change for mutual benefit through cooperation and

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234. John Kenneth Galbraith also defined power in three ways. Harold Davis tried to equate this three-fold identity
of power with the three major concepts of knowledge, scientific, relativist or existential, and religious. See Harold Davis,
History and Power, The Social Relevance of History (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 27. For a similar contrast between
the realist or materialist stress on state foreign policy and idealist or
normative views of international responsibility, as expressed by organizations of the United Nations, see Lynn
Miller, Global Order, Values and Power in International Politics, 2d ed. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1990), 73-
97. The author is grateful to Abdul Aziz Said for insights here and throughout this chapter on the concept of power.
nonviolence, over power defined as the ability to effect conquest or control through violence. Nonviolent conflict resolution has worked well in Costa Rica, despite the ongoing wars that have clustered in the isthmus.

Costa Rica occupies an area one-third the size of Nicaragua and one-tenth the size of the whole isthmian region. The pivotal San Juan River system fed by Lake Nicaragua links northern Costa Rica to Nicaragua. Whether or not this shared river system will be developed into a conservation park, another inter-oceanic canal, or some third option, its future development will demand full international cooperation like that which makes the Canadian and United States St. Lawrence Seaway possible.

A majority of Costa Rica’s three million people, descended from Spanish Basque, Catalan, and Galician immigrants, live on a central interior plateau between 4,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level. This plateau contains the major urban centers such as the capital, San José. Historically, though, life has been less comfortable below this plateau, along the damp, humid, and malaria-prone Caribbean coast or the San Juan River further north.

According to John Gerassi, Costa Rica and Nicaragua have shared one of the most often-invaded river routes in American history. In the early 1600s, the Franciscans established small communities in Cartago, but the Indians continued to repulse settlers and gold seekers along the Atlantic Coast. By the nineteenth century, English pirates finally traveled up the San Juan River, portaging the difficult last few miles before Lake Nicaragua, to loot around that lake. But they could colonize only the eastern part of Nicaragua and Costa Rica verging on the San Juan.

With the near disappearance of its aboriginal people, Costa Rica began to resemble those American states largely dominated by people of ethnic European background, such as Chile, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina, and the United States. Due largely to the fact that it was not

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13Carolyn Hall, Costa Rica, Una Interpretación Geográfica con Perspectiva Historical (San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1984), 59-65 and 72. After 200 years of Spanish influence, the surviving Costa Rica Indians numbered under 1% of their original population. The survivors retreated into the San Juan River area and the high foothills of the Tilaran and Talamanca Mountains, a mountain range reaching over 12,000 ft. above sea level.
as internally divided along racial lines as nations like Israel and the Republic of South Africa, Costa Rica gained prestige as a “Latin Switzerland.” Indeed, from the early 1940s to 1985, Costa Rica devoted considerably more of its per capita gross national product (GNP) to education and other human needs than any of its neighboring isthmian states.\textsuperscript{14}

Within the isthmus, Costa Rica is also unusual in its access to clean water. In an era when poor water supplies correlate highly with Third World disease and mal-nutrition, Costa Rica and Nicaragua have shared the largest fresh water river system in the isthmus, leading from the largest inland lake.\textsuperscript{15} More importantly, Costa Rican ground water is not yet contaminated by the saline infiltration and surface water contamination that adversely affects health in the other isthmian states. Consequently, Third World water-borne diseases aggravated by drought are also less prevalent here.\textsuperscript{16} Costa Rica has used its water surplus predominantly to produce hydroelectric power and to raise cash crops, especially coffee, a raw resource commodity often rated second only to oil in world market value.\textsuperscript{17}

**Power for “Just War” Through Violence**

Since Costa Rica’s conflict resolution views developed within a European nation-state system, the traditional European concept of power is fundamental for understanding Costa Rican conflict resolution. In this European view, power is conceived politically as an ability to conquer and control by violence (in “just war”). Europeans called the result an international balance of power, under which conqueror nations could arrange treaties against war among themselves. This view of power has been used to justify the violent conquest of Asians, Africans, or Native Americans, peoples outside the European cultural boundaries.

As conceived in the nation-state system, this violent use of power derived in large part from the theoretical writings of Francisco Suárez in the late 1500s. Suárez defined power for “just war” to rationalize Spain’s American conquest, focused in Peru, Mexico, and the isthmus. Others, like Hugo Grotius, used Suárez’ view of power to defend European colonialism and to suppress internal nonviolent opposition to this colonialism in Europe. Grotius justified this theory by appealing to the precedents of capital punishment and male dominance in international law. The theories of Suárez and Grotius would anchor international law to “just wars.”

From the 1500s to the 1900s, states like Costa Rica upgraded state authority by institutionalizing violence through military conscription. Standing armies, once established, impelled the nation-state system toward violent conflict resolution. During the Revolutionary War in the 1770s, for instance, the United States’ Alien and Sedition Laws began to require punishment and imprisonment for people who avoided participation in military violence. Adam Smith, a representative theorist of state authority for war, praised standing armies as the best shield for civilization, though François Voltaire, a thinker closer to the 1914-1984 Costa Rican position, cursed them as “... hired murderers and the scum of the nation.”

Anti-revolutionary violence in the nation-state became grounded in military conscription, as the paid soldier came to personify violent means for civic ends. After the 1860s, writers like Francis Lieber and Elihu Root, following the violent trends originating with Suárez and Grotius, constructed international rules for war from the violent European concept of power. By the

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18 Leroy Walters, “Five Classic Just War Theories: A Study in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Suárez, Gentili, and Grotius” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1971), 233-55. Suárez established a just war ethic for the nation-state system from precedents that Augustine and Thomas Aquinas had established for the church.


20 Mahendra Kumar, Violence and Nonviolence in International Relations (New Delhi: Thomson Press [India] Ltd., 1975), 76-88 and 170-202. In contrast, ancient Hebraic views reflected an inner, nonviolent law called rach ha-lay-vay, defending the right to refuse to kill, which barred soldiers or military leaders from religious tasks that defined the Jews as a people. See Roland Gittelsohn, “Judaism on War, Peace, and Conscientious Objection,” Jewish Digest (April 1970): 51-55. Over time, state authority was to become closely identified with the power to make war, while individual authority was compartmentalized in domestic and religious spheres.


1930s, theorists like Hans Morgenthau would characterize the kind of state neutrality favored by Costa Rica as immoral, and defend nation-state violence as an evolutionary necessity.25

**Power for Mutual Benefit Through Nonviolence**

Recognition of the potential for ultimate violence which dawned in 1945 with the advent of the atomic age, began, paradoxically, to transform violent approaches to war, not only in Europe but also in war zones such as the isthmus. This awareness began to achieve critical mass with scientific discoveries in 1982, as scientists began to reject war because of the unacceptable risks that became known collectively as nuclear winter rather than war.26 Under this new consciousness, world order could not be imposed by nuclear weapons without considering the possibility of an omnicidal backlash which might also obliterate the state that had started the conflict.

This consciousness led to analytical stalemates in places where nuclear war had been considered a viable option for conflict management, such as Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Caribbean. Veiled nuclear threats in the Caribbean have echoed from the United States through Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico since the late 1940s.27 But this doubt

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27U.S. forces with nuclear capability were stationed in a Puerto Rican Strategic Air Command (SAC) base beginning in the 1940s. Puerto Rico also functioned as the center for the U.S.-dominated Caribbean Naval Command after 1939. Meanwhile the U.S. Air Force used Panama, with its crucial Canal Zone (opened in 1914), as the center for the U.S.-dominated Caribbean Air Force — at one time trying to force an agreement for “renting” one particular Panamanian base at Río Hato for 999 years. The “Gibraltar” of the U.S., its air and naval base in Guantánamo, Cuba (the oldest U.S. base overseas, opened in 1903) has linked these two air and navy commands — apparently all furnished with nuclear capability. See Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, *Política Militar y Dominación, Puerto Rico en el Contexto Latinoaméricano* (Río Piedras, PR: Ediciones Huracán, 1988), 41-43, 161-64, 170-72, 209-210, and 228. See also Humberto García Muñiz, *La Estrategia de Estado Unidos y la Militarización del Caribe* (Río Piedras, PR: University of Puerto Rico, 1988), 48-50, 57, 66, and 82; or Martin Scheina, “The U.S. Presence in Guantánamo,” *Strategic Review* (Spring 1976): 4; and Gilberto Toste Ballarte, *Guantánamo: U.S.A. al Desnudo* (Havana: Ed. de Ciencias Sociales, 1983), 87. Please see also chapters 5 and 8.
about the “deterrent” value of nuclear weapons has led others to question massive use of lethal force in the Third World. The ongoing population shifts that increasingly crowd Third World states and exacerbate conflict (and a widening poverty gap) have also contributed to the rethinking of old premises.  

Dissenting from the world order view popular during the invention of nuclear weapons (as will be shown in chapter three), Costa Rica has tried since its formation as a state in 1821 to use power as the ability to effect mutual change for mutual benefit by nonviolent cooperation.  

To illustrate this point, it may be helpful to remember India, well-known in both ancient times (for example, during the reign of Ashoka) and again in recent history (for example, during the Samaraj or 1920s-1940s independence struggle) for its innovative explorations of such nonviolent power as a tool for change. These explorations primarily tried to demythologize war by exposing the bloody reality beneath the masks of violent glory, honor, and patriotism. They began with people like Patanjali, whose 2,000 year-old works inspired Mohandas and Kasturbai Gandhi in India. Such explorations of the foundational nature of power offered democratic strategies for resolving conflicts in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. Further diplomatically-patterned explorations of this philosophical nonviolence have ranged from India’s attempts at nonaligned military power to Costa Rica’s neutrality and the abolition of its military power.  

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28Population shifts which reflected higher than usual fertility rates in zones of conflict, complicated by massive desertification, represented nonmilitary threats to security on a scale previously thought inconceivable. In spite of such ill-understood nonmilitary threats to security, about 90% of all space research in the 1980s went to arm future wars defending the nation-state system; see Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures (New York: U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1983), 19, 24-25, 36, and 59.  

29Unarmed diplomacy was apparent in Costa Rica especially from 1914-1984, the 70-year time period which will be explored throughout this dissertation — a high point being the 1948 abolition of its military power.  

30John M. Swomley, Jr., American Empire, Political Ethics of Twentieth-Century Conquest (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 17-21. See also John Swomley, Liberation Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 183-202; or the works of Frantz Fanon. These examples of Ashoka and Samaraj will be discussed in chapter 2.  

31A synthesis of this philosophical tradition can be found in Arab, Jewish, or Farsi authors like Thecla, Isaac Luria, al-Hallaj, Ibn al-Arabi, and Rabīʿa al-Adawiyyah, philosophically indebted to Indian writers like Patanjali in particular; see Aniela Jaffe, The Myth of Meaning (New York: Putnam’s, 1971), 122-27; or Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Ways and Power of Love (Montclair, NJ: Pelton Publishing Corp., 1976), 7-69, 244-61, and 356-57. For Indian intervention in Korea, the Congo, Southeast Asia (Laos and Vietnam), and Egypt (the Suez Canal), see Rikhi Jaipal, Balance of Power in the Nuclear Age (New Delhi: Allied, 1989), 74-77 and 165-201; and Rikhi Jaipal, Nonalignment, Origins, Growth and Potential (New Delhi: Allied, 1983).  

32For a concise overview, see Paul Hubers, “A Global Methodology of Nonviolence,” Gandhi Marg (New Delhi, India) 97 (April 1987): 17-19. One of the first Third World states to gain independence from European colonialism, India is projected demographically to become the 21st century’s largest state, surpassing China. See World Population at the Turn of the Century (New York: U.N., Population Studies No. 111, 1989), 8 and 52-53. Other states, like Japan, despite its constitutional law (sections 3 and 7), have opted to rebuild on past military structures.
Armed or Unarmed Diplomacy

States like Iceland, Barbados, Vanuatu, Costa Rica, and India at times, in a judicious balancing of their national interests, have applied relatively unarmed diplomacy, conflict resolution that accentuates bargaining and consensus. These states regarded armed diplomacy as violence and a threat to mutual security. Pioneers of the concept of beneficial and integrative power in unarmed diplomacy flourished during the sixth to the fifth century B.C.E., from Buddha, Pyrrho, Ezekiel, Jeremiah, Pythagoras, Mo Ti, and Mahavira Jina — to include Yeshua of Nazareth and Thecla of Konya later in the Middle East.33

One of the clearest expressions of such unarmed diplomacy came from Mo Ti, during the fifth century B.C.E. Chou Dynasty in China, in the time of the Buddha, Confucius, Lao Tse, and Sun Tse. Mo Ti rejected the world order approach of Confucius in China and Kautilya in India.34 He opted instead for unarmed diplomacy, reinforced by neutrality, nonviolent martial arts (like jiu jitsu, abbreviated as judo), an emphasis on factual analysis of history, and a deep concern for the well-being of people and the state.35 Options such as his, however, were largely ignored in the development of the European nation-state system.36

Costa Rica’s tradition of unarmed diplomacy drew from European culture what might best be identified as pre-Athenian scepticism, modified by European political philosophy. Defining themselves as searchers for unknown peace or truth, Sceptics were convinced that impressions may be either right or wrong depending on context, but not true or false in isolation. Early Sceptics opposed the Stoics and Epicureans, whose isolated “empirical” facts were fundamental to European nationalists in the realism of the 1800s and the neo-realism of the

33Kenneth Boulding, Three Faces, 234.
34In 1904, an Asian reminder of a world order approach dating from the era of Mo Ti was accidentally rediscovered in Mysore, India. This relic, an Artha Shastra by Kautilya, described upaksha, a notion contrasting neutrality — defined as non-participation by a neutral state in foreign war — with nonalignment, defined as minimal state participation in foreign war. See Girija Mookerjee, Diplomacy, Theory and History (New Delhi: Trimurti Publications, Ltd., 1973), 5-8.
36The American equivalent here may have been the native thinkers who used the Xochicalco Valley in southern Mexico, between Mexico City and Acapulco, for neutral negotiation to resolve or prevent war throughout the isthmus over a millenium ago. This valley later became the home of the Diego Rivera family, renowned for its place in the renaissance of indigenous themes in Latin American art. Visited by the author (Spring 1974). Costa Rica has functioned as another Xochicalco. For further discussion of European nonviolence, please see chapter 2 for a discussion of the Historic Peace Churches in the context of the U.N. work of Andrew Cordier.
The Sceptics also sought to undermine the cultural or linguistic bias that categorized all available data to fit the concepts and metaphors of violent power. Costa Rica’s commitment to resolve each conflict in its own context, seeking peace through negotiation instead of violent conflict, has been characterized profoundly by its roots in such scepticism. After the 1850s, Costa Rican use of unarmed diplomacy increased and brought with it a decreased dependence on conscription. Costa Rica twice mobilized about three percent of its population as a militia to deflect aggression from United States privateers, first in the 1850s to stop William Walker, and again in the late 1940s to resolve more complicated violence to be described in chapter three. But each time, in contrast to dominant trends toward a permanent war economy following such militarization and mobilization for war, Costa Rica disbanded its volunteer army afterward. Thus Costa Rica avoided the dictatorships responsible for many isthmian wars, exemplified by the Ubico, Somoza, and Hernández Martínez families respectively in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Similar nonviolent viewpoints have emerged in the United States from leaders critical of violent nationalism, with its implicit allegiance to a violent concept of power. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, contested power grounded in violence and campaigned for power as the ability to effect mutual change for mutual benefit. Searching for cooperative ways to convert nation-state power concepts toward nonviolence, kindred political theorists have thus advanced the traditions of unarmed diplomacy, such as that of India during the 1930s and Costa Rica before the 1980s.

37 Fons Elders, *Reflexive Water, The Basic Concerns of Mankind* (London: Condor/Souvenir Press, 1974), 28-31 and 274-75; and Arthur Eddington, *The Philosophy of Science* (New York: MacMillan, 1939), 208-223. The three main Greek philosophies which influenced European political philosophy were Scepticism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism. Stoicism became the philosophical foundation of the world order approach to reality, much as Epicureanism has become the root philosophy of the anti-dependency outlook. From a philosophical viewpoint, scepticism would become the hermeneutic root of nonviolence — not, however, to be confused with the popular use of the word scepticism to mean anti-clerical or anti-religious cynicism, originally derived from cynical stoic or epicurean forms of discourse.


Neutrality, Nonalignment, and Nonviolent Conflict Resolution

The options of neutrality and nonalignment within less violent conflict resolution were first applied to European political philosophy by John Bellers. Synthesizing these options, he examined their international potential in Dutch, English, Scottish, and Turkish treaties. Then, reminding his readers that the French-English wars had killed over 600,000 people, he recommended a neutral European confederation. His philosophical synthesis laid the foundations for William Penn’s Pennsylvania experiment and the League of Nations, governed by power defined as the ability to effect change for mutual benefit and responsibility.

Bellers’ philosophical insights survived as the foundational concepts for neutrality in states like Costa Rica and in organizations like the United Nations. In the United Nations, for example, conflict resolution was defined as building multiple strategies for peaceful institutions, to overcome violent weapons systems that promote anxiety as a form of deterrence. Within this overall definition of conflict resolution, disarmament was understood as reducing the quantities of military arms in storage, their levels of production, their degrees of lethality, and the expenditures to procure them. In like manner, peacekeeping actions were seen as “measures and techniques” based in conflict resolution theory “aimed at preventing, containing, moderating, and terminating hostilities.”

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40 Martin Luther King, Jr., “A Comparison of the Conceptions of God in the Thinking of Paul Tillich and Henry Nelson Wieman” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1955), 286 and 296. See also Coretta Scott King, My Life with Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Avon, 1969), 185 and 300-301, on the significance of India.


43 U.N., Secretary General, Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development (5 October 1981), A/36/356, 15.

Neutrality or Nonalignment, Their Origins and Differentiation

By definition, a neutral state like Costa Rica declines to participate militarily or economically in any foreign war. Nonaligned states, in comparison, may change their positions on a particular war or partially renounce neutrality. Nonaligned states may also seek to lessen their military and political or socio-economic and cultural dependency upon nuclear power blocks or other combinations of aggressive strategies.

Such definitions first came from a Dutch contemporary of John Bellers in the 1600s, Cornelius Bijnkershoek, who defined neutrality within international law for the nation-state system. Bijnkershoek defined a neutral state as one that limits itself to defensive war. He classified neutrality as either perfect, that is complete except for defensive war, or qualified, that is, not perfect. Even supplies sent to alleviate a foreign famine caused by a siege negated perfect neutrality.45 The Dane Martin Hübner removed the inconsistencies of this term left over from natural law theory,46 before the 1815 Treaty of Vienna defined Switzerland as neutral and established neutral river navigation rights on the Rhine and the Danube.47 Costa Rica first used Bijnkershoek’s definition of qualified neutrality to repel a takeover attempt by Guatemala after their mutual independence from Spain in 1821. In May 1863, José María Montealegre, president of Costa Rica, also invoked this neutrality to mediate an end to forty-odd years of war between Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.48 Subsequently, the definition of qualified neutrality adopted by Costa Rica became useful as a definition for neutral conflict resolution in the Organization of American States.49

In Europe during the 1800s this concept of neutrality was badly bruised by Napoleon Bonaparte, in a manner similar to later Costa Rican experiences with the United States. But neutrality survived in the Geneva Conventions for the treatment of prisoners, civilians, medical personnel, and casualties in time of war. Through the advocacy of Manuel María de Peralta in the late 1800s, moreover, the United States recognized Costa Rican neutrality in a treaty regarding the potential for a neutral interoceanic canal along the shared border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

A confluence of analogous interests strengthened the Hague Peace Conferences, which began to include Third World states like Costa Rica by the early 1900s. However, isthmian and Third World neutrality or nonalignment continued to be con-strained by states such as the United States. In 1932-1934, the League of Nations sent seventy-five Colombian soldiers to resolve a Peru-Colombia dispute. But United States actions in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961-1962), the Dominican Republic (1964-1965), and Nicaragua (the 1980s) relied mainly on violent force.

In the late 1980s the United Nations began to plan for isthmian peacekeeping. United Nations involvement was planned on 15 March 1989 in New York City, and during a preliminary 29-30 March 1989 isthmian foreign minister’s meeting in San José. The United Nations planned to deploy observers and logistical personnel along the borders of Nicaragua with Costa Rica and Honduras, and on the Gulf of Fonseca touching El Salvador. Negotiations for this intervention were handled inside the United Nations by Marrack Goulding, who along with Jean Claude Aimèe had succeeded Brian Urquhart in coordinating United Nations conflict resolution. Miguel D’Escoto (Nicaragua), Carlos José Gutiérrez Gutiérrez (Costa Rica), and

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51 “Manuel Maria de Peralta,” La Nación [NCN], 7 Sept. 1983, B 3. The author is grateful to José Néstor Mourelo Aguilar for suggesting this article and for identifying various ideas undergirding Costa Rican neutrality and human rights theory.


Roberto Flores Bermúdez (Honduras) organized support for this United Nations intervention. James Baker and Vernon Walters led the United States opposition. This unprecedented United Nations planning for isthmian peacekeeping intervention, some of which was carried out, will be discussed further below.

Conflict Resolution via Neutrality and Nonaligned Peacekeeping

Third World neutrality and nonalignment in conflict resolution, as favored by Costa Rica, were brought to life by Ralph Bunche. He worked with Andrew Cordier — personal secretary to the first four United Nations Secretary Generals — and later Brian Urquhart, to create peacekeeping mechanisms for international conflict resolution. From 1948 to 1985, over seventy percent of the total cost of the United Nations peacekeeping and conflict resolution went to efforts in Egypt, Lebanon, or the Jordan River headwaters and the Golan Heights (in Syrian or Lebanese territory). From these organizational developments emerged the first internationally-accepted adoption for peacekeeping of terms such as ceasefire (in the Security Council), truce (in the General Assembly), and armistice (among the belligerent members of the General Assembly).

Neutrality was sometimes contravened by the United States, as when it sold Costa Rica arms for its 1948 war. Negotiations on Austrian neutrality by the United States and the Soviet Union began in Europe about this time, and led to the 1955 neutralization of Austria, under a neutrality model perceived by Europeans to be close to that of Costa Rica. Unlike Austria, though, which belonged to neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor the

55“Consenso en la ONU por Fuerzas de Paz a C.A.,” Barricada, 16 March 1989, 4. Insight into the issues of conflict resolution here and below was provided by Brian Urquhart (from England) and Jean Claude Aimée (from Haiti), in their respective New York City Ford Foundation and U.N. Under-Secretary General offices, inter-views by the author (Sept. 1987). James Baker and Vernon Walters led the U.S. opposition as the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S. Representative to the U.N., respectively. Marrack Goulding (from England), led the U.N. peacekeeping attempts. Goulding was assisted by Jean Claude Aimée (also planning Lebanese peacekeeping). Brian Urquhart, although retired from the U.N. as a “scholar-in-residence” at the Ford Foundation in New York City, continued to carry on in the tradition of his U.N. mentor, Ralph Bunche. Miguel D’Escoto represented Nicaragua as its Secretary of State. Carlos José Gutiérrez Gutiérrez represented Costa Rica in the U.N. Finally, Roberto Flores Bermúdez represented Honduras as its Secretary of State.


59Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, Costa Rica y Sus Hechos Políticos de 1948 (San José: EDUCA, 1974), 246-50.

Warsaw Pact, Costa Rica stayed within the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty.  

Meanwhile, starting in the mid-1950s, the first United Nations conflict resolution experiment employing neutral or nonaligned actors developed in Lebanon. The Arab states would send the largest contingent to the first nonaligned plenary conference, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961. Cuba and a few other Latin American states represented the Americas at these meetings. As an Arab cultural and political haven, before its 1975-1976 catastrophe, Lebanon would lead in forging a redefinition of neutrality as the intellectual core of nonalignment. This nonalignment was called in Arabic Hiyad Ijabi, or positive neutralism. Challenging United States and West German intervention in 1958, this redefinition of a neutral and nonaligned coalition within the United Nations coalesced into significant Third World opposition to the arms race generated by the nuclear-armed superpowers.

The 1958 crisis over neutrality in Lebanon, a self-proclaimed neutral Third World state like Costa Rica, led to the first United Nations Security Council peace-keeping intervention. The Security Council observers sent to Lebanon eventually requested that the United States withdraw its troops. Despite setbacks, subsequent United Nations “Blue Helmet” interventions in Laos (1959), the Congo (1960), and other hot spots utilized the Lebanese example. In 1975, neutral or nonaligned states like Finland, Lebanon, and Costa Rica helped to organize a Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This conference emphasized confidence building measures for European conflict resolution, and included information sharing, pre-

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notification of military exercises, and non-interference in weapons verification.\textsuperscript{67} As will be shown, such measures were incorporated into an Arab “White Helmet” peacekeeping mission which attempted to resolve the Lebanese war in 1976, a war soon reflected in the isthmus by arms shipments and counter-insurgency techniques imported from Israel by way of Lebanon — to Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{68}

Global events affecting the nonaligned states soon came to bear on Costa Rica. Based in Costa Rica, Nicaraguan refugees promoting a 1979 revolution and post-1979 counterrevolution sought logistical support from Cuba, Israel, and Lebanon. At the same time, intense fighting overwhelmed Lebanon, to be described in Chapters Six and Seven as a major source of arms for anti-Somoza Contras — arms captured by Israel. Itself facing intervention by Contra proxy forces, Costa Rica decided to redesign its neutrality position once more. In preparation for a pioneer world conference on human rights held in December 1982, a small group of legal professionals thus began meeting to make neutrality the official position of Costa Rica.

Convened by José Néstor Mourelo Aguilar, a human rights law professor in the international relations department of Costa Rica’s National University at Heredia, near San José, this small group drew on various precedents for a declaration of neutrality. The group included Armando Arauz Aguilar, Bernardo Baruch, Enrique van Browne, Hugo Alfonso Muñoz, Manuel Freer Jiménez (a NATO and Rio Treaty expert), Carlos José Gutiérrez Gutiérrez (an international relations expert), and Luis Alberto Monge (future president of Costa Rica).\textsuperscript{69} They and other members of the group continued to meet in Alajuela, Heredia, and San José, until Monge officially proclaimed neutrality on 17 November 1983, in the San José National Theater.

Mourelo Aguilar framed his formative treatise for this proclamation with help from the classics of both Erasmus and Vegetius, as he contrasted nonviolent and world order approaches for conflict resolution. From this vantage point, he argued that war is sweet only to the ignorant, and recalled the feminist anti-war strikes in the ancient Greek play “Lysistrata.” Then he quoted


\textsuperscript{68}“Nine Points of the Riad Agreement,” \textit{Lebanese War, Historical and Social Background} (Bonn: Progress Drittewelt, Third World Magazine, 1977), 79. Please see chapter 6 for more on counterinsurgency waged from Costa Rica and on Israeli-Lebanese (Kataeb) arms shipments to Costa Rica. Chapters 3 and 6 contain information on these arms shipments and on the formation of the Arab Defense Force or “White Helmet” peacekeeping mission (1976).

successively a Greco-Roman, Euripides; an Indian, Jawaharlal Nehru; and the Chinese authors Lao Tse and Sun Tse on neutrality and pacifism. Finally, he reviewed the historical Costa Rican quest for neutrality in treaty after treaty, beginning in an 1822 treaty with Colombia, Mexico, and Spain, followed by an 1823 treaty with Nicaragua, an 1848 treaty with the Hanseatic League in Europe, and an 1855-1856 treaty with both Nicaragua and the United States — to underline what he called “Costa Rica’s pacifist past.”

Mourelo Aguilar attracted theoretical support and criticism from his colleagues. Muñoz, for example, substantiated this argument of Mourelo Aguilar, citing Cornelius Bijnkershoek and Austrian neutrality. In contrast, from a minority viewpoint, Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera, the future international relations theorist for Oscar Arias Sánchez, assailed Mourelo Aguilar. Solís Rivera argued that Costa Rica was not neutral or isolationist but interventionist, implying that it was disposed to intervene against what the United States perceived to be communism in Nicaragua. At any rate, Costa Rican leaders like Luis Monge and later Oscar Arias tried to follow three common neutrality principles. These three principles were: (1) neutrality toward international conflict, (2) neutrality predisposed toward the United States and its allies, and (3) neutrality without a standing army. In practice, these three principles summarized Costa Rica’s intended position of neutrality.

Severe opposition surfaced immediately. The day after the proclamation, 18 November 1983, 1300 United States-financed Contras attacked Nicaragua from Costa Rica. Official Nicaraguan journalists like William Robinson claimed this attack was an attempt to provoke Nicaragua into attacking Costa Rica. Fernando Volio, a prominent conservative and the Costa Rican Secretary of State, resigned a few days later, as Nicaragua led other states in supporting Costa Rican neutrality. Jaime Daremblum, an international relations professor and leading Contra supporter in Costa Rica, denounced the neutrality proclamation as a pacifist fraud.

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70José Néstor Mourelo Aguilar, “Dulce Bellum Inexpertis,” in Memoria del Primer Congreso Mundial de Derechos Humanos, Vol. 1, La Neutralidad Perpetua de Costa Rica (San José: Imprenta Nacional, 1984), 13-16; or NCN, 3 Nov. 1983, A 16. The Lysistrata strike was the creation of an ancient Greek playwright, Aristophanes.


allegedly imitating Cuba, Libya, and the Palestinians. Meanwhile, the Socialist International, which included social democrat political parties and neutral states, officially recognized Costa Rican neutrality. Austrian scholars of international law, wedged — much as were Costa Rican scholars — between capitalist and socialist forces, carefully compared Costa Rica’s Rio Treaty relationship with the United States to Finland’s military dependency on the Soviet Union. In both cases, a superpower vowed to fight military intervention in a small state which lacked the desire or the military power to reciprocate in case of attack.

Various concerns were voiced by the European neutral states over this Costa Rican neutrality. In Europe, after all, to guarantee their neutrality, neutrals had had to create a European Free Trade Association in order to trade in the European Economic Community. However, the major European concern involved Costa Rica’s third neutrality principle of unarmed diplomacy, which went beyond even Sweden’s security position toward neutrality. Unarmed diplomacy meant a step toward the full abolition of military power and a nonviolent challenge to violent power. To the north in the isthmus, the military government in Guatemala assumed another brand of neutrality in 1984. Its position was confirmed in 1986 by a pseudo-civilian government. Though its declaration arose from a social democrat party like that ruling Costa Rica, Guatemala’s neutrality declaration did not state its dependence for military security on Israel and the United States. The United States’ response to Guatemalan neutrality during this time was professed disinterest, but it opposed the neutral use of Esquipulas in Guatemala to host isthmian peace negotiations. By the late 1980s, Daniel Ortega would call for Nicaraguan

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74 Jaime Darembum, “Costa Rica No Puede Ser Neutral,” in Jaime Darembum and Eduardo Ulibarri, eds., Centro América, Conflictio y Democracia (San José: Libro Libre, 1985), 190-92. Volio refused to sign the proclamation, claiming that it was annulled by his refusal and resignation from office according to Article 140 (12) of the Costa Rican Constitution. But Volio overlooked Article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaty Law, on international neutrality, which states that such an internal defect to a presidential declaration of international neutrality does not invalidate the treaty or proclamation, unless this defect is obvious to any third party state. In other words, Volio lacked the constitutional and international legal power to validate his claims or those of Darembum. The author is grateful for this insight to Adolf Jonker, a retired Dutch diplomat residing near San José, Costa Rica (correspondence, Feb. 1990).


adaptation to the Swedish neutrality model and for Swedish verification of the Arias or Esquipulas peace plans.  

Security, Insecurity, Development, and Underdevelopment

On the basis of the terms defined so far, it is now possible to proceed to the more complex terms of security, insecurity, development, and underdevelopment. In a nation like Costa Rica, security and development are more difficult to define than neutrality, nonalignment, and conflict resolution, because security as imposed from the outside appears to have become contradictory to development in the isthmus. The economic condition of isthmian women, one possibly useful indicator of development, is hard to ascertain because the gap between rich and poor — as measured by human needs indicators evaluating access to housing, employment, health care, and education — is larger in the isthmus than in other Third World areas. Costa Rican women not only account for under a fifth of the paid labor force, but also earn under a tenth of the small, informal business sector income. They also head at least half the single-parent families, a living arrangement which culturally reinforces poverty.

Security in a state like Costa Rica includes public coordination of access to housing, health care, education, and employment, and protection from militarization or violent intervention. Conversely, insecurity means violent conditions, whether produced by arms or by socio-economic disparity. In this context, militarization is the use of killing power — which generally produces insecurity and economic inflation, instead of security — for conquest or control.

Though troubled by insecurity and underdevelopment, Costa Rica has been used by organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as a model for creating sustainable development and alternative energy sources. This search for alternative sources is

79Vera Ramírez, “Un Trabajo Teológico con Mujeres de la Base,” in Teología desde la Mujer en Centroamérica (San José: SEBILA, 1989), 154-55. The author is grateful to Janet May for insight here.  
80As noted previously, all uncited definitions like the above are new and are the author’s own. For security definitions, see also Carlos Alzugaray Treto, La Seguridad Nacional de Cuba y el Diferendo con Estados Unidos (Havana: Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales [ISRI] “Raul Roa García,” 1989), 6-7. Remilitarization,
made urgent by ongoing deforestation, since wood is the primary Third World energy source. During the Contra war, Costa Rica may have lost its northern tropical rainforests even more quickly, through herbicides, pesticides, and clear-cutting, than did Vietnam during aerial bombing and herbicidal deforestation in the United States-IndoChina War.\textsuperscript{81}

Data linking militarization, insecurity, and underdevelopment is hard to find, even in a highly literate state like Costa Rica. Causal links between militarization and underdevelopment are hard to demonstrate because data is insufficient for much Third World conflict. Some states at war, like Laos and Lebanon, for instance, took their last national censuses in the 1930s. Yet an accurate population count is the most basic requirement for even preliminary steps toward relevant analysis. In conditions of war, usable health, housing, education, and employment data are quickly outdated. For all these reasons, the data is not always sufficient for anchoring research on quantitative analysis alone. This dissertation will thus combine quantitative and qualitative assessment, the latter based on the testimony of competent observers and participants.

According to Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, a University of Puerto Rico international relations professor active in peace research, Caribbean militarization after the 1940s may have deformed development, especially in Panama, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{82} Underdevelopment in these isthmian countries grew worse after the 1940s under violent intervention of a type not found in Costa Rica, which resisted such militarization after the 1850s Rivas-Walker war. At least one Latin American researcher — one of the few to study long-term health data, that is, José Carlos Escudero — has observed that from one to three of every five Latin American infant mortalities, from 1900 to 1975, may have occurred because militarization received budgetary priority over basic necessities.\textsuperscript{83} As will be discussed, such an observation may be possible to corroborate at least to some degree within the isthmus.

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\textsuperscript{81}This is the opinion expressed by many development experts engaged in measuring such conditions, including the Global Tomorrow Coalition and, in particular, Barrie Flamm, at the Wilderness Society, during a series of telephone interviews with the author (Fall 1988-Spring 1989). Flamm was the chief U.S. AID forestry officer in Vietnam until 1975, and later worked in Costa Rica.


Development, on the other hand, can be defined as the coordination of change for culturally and ecologically sustainable access to the necessities of housing, health, education, and employment. Development can be measured by self-sufficient livelihood, participatory decision-making, and guarantees of human necessities. The United Nations characterizes development as that which, “... by overcoming non-military threats to security and contributing to a more stable and sustainable inter-national system, can enhance security and thereby promote arms reduction and disarmament.”

Underdevelopment can be defined as a denial or restriction of access to basic necessities — exacerbated by war and export-led capital flight, as well as by the structural violence of disease, hunger, joblessness, illiteracy, exile or displacement, and ecological pollution. These definitions stem from authors such as Arthur Dunham and Coralie Bryant on development potential, and from Roland Warren, Elise Boulding, and André Gunder Frank on consensus strategies.

At the far end of each side of the continuum of violence and nonviolence are the conditions of war and peace, which are difficult to define for places like the isthmus, if one

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thinks instinctively about war from a viewpoint inside the United States. As might be expected, war and peace are more immediate issues inside areas like the conflict-prone isthmus than inside the United States, where wars declined in frequency after the 1860s (despite many foreign wars). In order to include contexts where war has been incessant since 1945, war is defined as a condition marked by frequent episodes of armed, intense, prolonged, and hierarchical violence, characterized by contention and armed aggression.

Peace, in contrast, is then the wholesome condition of cooperative, irresistible nonviolence characterized by well-being and consensus (rather than the absence of war). This foregoing definition of terms should provide a transition to the next step, that of describing the concepts which comprise the three approaches to international conflict resolution. Further discussion of war and peace will require the flexible use of concepts like power — used as the foundational term and concept — as well as force, conflict, and coercion, to be described in the next chapter.

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88 These definitions are the author’s own. For other definitions of peace and war, see Random House Dictionary, 2d ed., Unabridged (New York: Random House, 1987), 1425 and 2141.
Chapter 2
Concepts of Violence and Nonviolence

The four concepts of power, force, conflict, and coercion will be illustrated in this chapter and applied throughout the rest of the dissertation, along with the terms of war, peace, power, violence, development, neutrality, nonalignment, nonviolence, security, insecurity, underdevelopment, and conflict resolution identified in Chapter One. Considering these concepts on a continuum from violence to nonviolence should prepare the way for discussing the world order, anti-dependent, and nonviolent approaches toward international conflict resolution that will be discussed in Chapter Three. The warlike character of the isthmus requires that such concepts be set in the context of geopolitical power and violence, despite the anomalous example of Costa Rica. Since another major anomalous example is that of India, also surrounded by zones of conflict historically (to be described in Chapter Three), the better-publicized example of Gandhian nonviolence in India also serves as a reference point for introducing Costa Rican-style nonviolence.

The options of violence and nonviolence in each of these concepts can be illustrated by contrasting the two perspectives within each of six general dictionary definitions. First of all, violence is defined as causing or threatening death, injury, or impoverishment in the exercise of force and power. Nonviolence, by comparison, is the use of force and power to create

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89 The dictionary definitions which follow are derived from C. T. Carr, et al., *The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 164, 178, 325, and 662. The author is grateful to Theodore Rosché and Mary Liepold for insight in this chapter. For the definition of violence and nonviolence, see also Mahendra Kumar, *Violence and Nonviolence in International Relations* (New Delhi: Thomson Press [India] Ltd., 1975), 42-47. Once again, and for the remainder of the dissertation, please note that the definitions which follow are the author’s own — by dint of necessity — if not otherwise indicated.

90 Please note that the nonviolent use of such concepts of power, force, conflict, and coercion, as found here in the dissertation, stems from such legal and political theorists as Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi coined the word satyagraha, literally meaning “truth power” or “truth force,” to denote the conceptualization of a process ending in what is sometimes called civil disobedience in the English language. Sat, the Hindi root word, is the opposite of asat, which literally mean being and nonbeing, respectively. Satyagraha describes the power, force, conflict, and coercion applied to change an opponent’s being. See Mohandas Gandhi, *Nonviolence in Peace and War*, Vol. 2 (Ahmedabad: Navijan Press, 1942/1969), 300-301 and 315-316; or Paul Hubers, “A Global Methodology for Nonviolence,” *Gandhi Marg* 97 (April 1987): 8-9. U.S. writers have, in comparison to the Third World view of a theorist like Gandhi, either described satyagraha as philosophically “holding to truth” — see Richard Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence* (New York: Schocken Books, 1966), 62 — or as pragmatically sound, interpersonal methods and results; see chapter 4 of the dissertation and Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Part 2, *The Methods*
cooperation and responsibility and to heal and overcome the damage from violence. *Power* is the ability to do or act in such a way as to influence, whether by violence or nonviolence. *Force* is the effort and strength which prompts, restricts, or determines courses of action and events. *Conflict* is the clash or struggle that occurs when force or power are opposed. *Coercion* is the application of force and power in the context of warlike conflict.

*Power* has already been defined in chapter one as differing in violent and nonviolent contexts. On the violent side of the continuum, where peace is considered a vacuum between wars, *power* is the ability to effect conquest and control through the use of force for death, injury, and impoverishment. *Force* is that which prompts or restricts behavior, or thwarts short-term group and individual attempts to break or protect the status quo. *Conflict* is the struggle and contention between opposing actors. *Coercion* is the compulsion of the defeated actors by the force and power gained through conflict.

In the nonviolent context, *power* is the ability to effect mutual change for mutual benefit through nonviolent action and cooperation. *Force*, regarding such issues as gender and economic discrimination in this chapter, is the prompting and facilitating of people and events toward self-reliant or sustainable security and development. *Conflict* is the struggle for reconciliation, or a higher balance, sometimes called a struggle for peace and justice. Historically, such conflict has included picketing, marching, fasting, the bloodying of draft files, imprisonment, exile, and even death, (for instance, self-immolation), by those people seeking to overcome violent coercion. *Coercion* is the use of force and power in conflict resolution — for example, to stop war or discrimination by improving access to housing, health, education, and employment opportunities through legal nonviolent struggle and civil disobedience — means being consonant with ends for mutually beneficial change.91

One way to understand the difference between the two contexts might be to compare ordinary hand-to-hand combat (either armed or unarmed) to judo or *jiujitsu* (unarmed by definition). Although both are powerful, forceful, conflictive, and coercive, ordinary hand-to-hand

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91 Arne Naess, *Gandhi and Group Conflict, An Exploration of Satyagraha, Theoretical Background* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974), 33-44. Naess, the mentor of Johan Galtung, emphasizes zeteticism or Pyrrhonian scepticism at the heart of nonviolence, Gandhian or otherwise. Nonviolent coercion can be measured by both
hand combat often succeeds because the opponent is intimidated by fear of pain or death. But
the first skill learned in judo, by incessant practice, is how to strike the ground correctly from
any height or angle, thus learning how to prevent pain or any other damage to oneself and one’s
opponent as much as possible. In practice this also means using the most powerful force
available, that is, gravity, to augment one’s own power to respond to one’s opponent. For
example, a judo practitioner briskly grasps and then guides the limb aimed by the opponent in a
blow, deflecting the blow in such a way as to flip or trip the opponent, without returning a blow
in violence. Thus the power of violence is turned on itself by the power of nonviolence.92

*Power, Conceptually Violent or Nonviolent*

Power in the isthmian context can be understood as either conquest and control achieved
through war-prone violence or mutual change for mutual benefit achieved through cooperation.
For the most part, the United States has taken and held control of the isthmus through violence
justified by theories like the Monroe Doctrine. This political doctrine first gained international
status through an 1850 Bulwer-Clayton Treaty with England, over isthmian passage along the
Nicaragua-Costa Rica border. The treaty superceded English and Spanish claims and maximized
United States control.93 Behind this 1850 treaty was also the pressure of United States settlers
then heading for California, who preferred this isthmian (Nicaragua-Costa Rica) border route
over crossing through Panama.94

According to the Spaniard Salvador de Madariaga, a leading historian of Latin America
and the preeminent disarmament staff person in the League of Nations, geopolitical theories of
the early 1800s like the Monroe Doctrine blinded and isolated both the Soviet Union and the
United States in their relations with states like Costa Rica. On more than one occasion, the
United States has invoked such doctrines to impede critically needed international orga-

92For more on this analogy of judo, see also Richard Gregg, *The Power of Non-violence* (New York: Schocken
Books), 44-51 and 96; or Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part 2, The Methods of Nonviolent Action*
93Andrés Bello, *Derecho Internacional* (Caracas, Venezuela: Ministerio de Educación, 1954), 25 and 194. See also
Donald O’Connor Fagon, “The Geopolitics of the Caribbean Sea and Its Adjacent Lands” (Ph.D. diss., Catholic
University of America, 1973), 120, 135, and 143-44.
94David Izatt Folkman, “Westward Via Nicaragua: The United States and the Nicaragua Route, 1826-1869” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Utah, 1966), 51-52 and 382. Shifting underwater sandbars closed this San Juan River route in
nizations. The Monroe Doctrine also justified attempts to evict England, Germany, and the Soviet Union from the Americas. Thereafter, the Western Caribbean evolved into what might be ironically called an Inter-American lake for private enterprise. Except for changes in Cuba, with a United States military base in its Guantánamo Bay, the Monroe Doctrine was not challenged to a significant extent until the 1980s Esquipulas Agreements, when unified isthmian leadership supported mutually beneficial peace plans for change.

Geopolitical Power and Violence in the Isthmus

Geopolitical creeds supporting violent United States intervention have derived essentially from the nationalist writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. A visionary architect of United States geopolitics for states like Costa Rica, Mahan based his theories on his belief that the British Empire had been built upon military sea power. Accordingly, he argued that the 1850s Bulwer-Clayton Treaty, concluding English and United States conflict over Miskitia and the San Juan River, could be a springboard to world power for the United States. Mahan may have forgotten that Horatio Nelson, for him the embodiment of English sea power, was defeated soundly by Miskitian Indians along the San Juan River as a young officer.

Over the next 150 years, three of every four United States military interventions throughout Latin America jolted the Western Caribbean. Averaging one every 21 months, United States interventions in Latin America clustered between Colombia and Honduras, in the

1866. The isthmus also served as an alternate route to rounding the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) for Europeans emigrating to the Orient and Australia.

three isthmian states of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. Mahan’s bold vision of a United States sea empire thus matured by the 1940s into a national creed, defending the right to exercise violent power in “just war” throughout the Americas.

During the 1940s war, which also involved Costa Rica, Mahan’s theory was echoed by Carl Schmitt. A leading Nazi legal and international relations scholar, Schmitt manipulated Mahan’s vision to advocate what he called a *Grossraum* (Great Power Space), a Third Reich between the Soviet Union and the United States. Schmitt proposed this third land power space to complement the United States sea power space bridging the Americas and the Soviet land power space bridging Asia and Europe. In extrapolating Mahan’s hemispheric view for Nazi purposes, Schmitt praised United States militarization where it had been the most brutally efficient, namely, in the Western Caribbean since the 1850s. Karl Haushofer, another Nazi, popularized Schmitt’s nationalist ideas with his Aryan supremacist, anti-communist, and *lebensraum* (living space) slogans. But there have also been very powerful nonviolent perspectives on power, powerful enough to endure among some of the world’s oldest surviving civilizations — in India, as will be described next.

**Indian and Costa Rican Origins of Nonviolent Power**

The nonviolent geopolitical concepts favored by contemporary Costa Rica were formed first in the early 1960s, in India, and were patterned upon Indian ideas used for conflict resolution in Southern African, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian wars. Gandhigram, a community at the center of cooperative land reform in India, held a December-January 1960-1961 world conference that called for the creation of an international peace brigade network. Using the term *sarvodaya* to denote decentralized wealth for sustainable development, the

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conference designed this network from a Gandhigram model called a *shanti sena*, or peace army. Participants included many Third World delegates, plus A. J. Muste, Jeanette Rankin, Bayard Rustin, Joseph Abileah (Israel), and Stuart Morris (England).104

At about the time that Costa Rica received its first taste of Latin American “death squads,”105 in 1960-1961, this Gandhigram conference was creating the foundations for a world peace army. Gandhigram itself had been started by Dravidian, or southern Black, Australoid Indians who shared in the leadership of the independence salt marches associated with Mohandas and Kasturbai Gandhi. Dravidian India, older and more in touch with the Jains’ nonviolent theory than Aryan Hindu India, bothered the British Raj because of its proximity to the Middle Eastern trade routes. Gandhigram prospered in this poor area of India, naturally hospitable only to vipers and scorpions. At its administrative core was a hospital named after the Jain poetess Avvai (fourth century B.C.E.) and staffed largely by male and female nurses, doctors, and surgeons from the first socialist Asian state, Kerala, in southwestern India.

Gandhigram’s people suffered repression and jail without trial from the Indian government. More than most governments, the government of India knew the power of nonviolent resistance and conflict resolution. As a result, Gandhigram’s bakery, print shop, community bank, school of midwifery, rural university, family planning center, and homespun cotton clothing factory were officially encouraged by foreign and federal aid. But its peace army was undermined by the Indian government and by nearby United States development foundations, on allegations of subversion, for fear that it threatened the priorities of the sovereign state.106

Thus, like the peace movement in Costa Rica, Gandhigram’s peace army was periodically investigated by intelligence agents bent on sabotage and espionage. The peace army’s obvious

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105Please refer to chapter six for details of what are commonly or journalistically called “death squads” — especially to the history of the Free Costa Rica Movement (founded in 1961) and the World Anti-Communist League (founded in the late 1960s) — as logistical networks supporting the Contra infrastructure in Costa Rica.

106An observation based on comments from some of the 300 core members of Gandhigram, as well as the Albert Schweitzer Foundation representative overseeing donations to Gandhigram, to the author in March 1977. See also following footnote.
medical and emergency contributions — giving aid to victims of typhoons, fires, tidal waves, and sanitation crises, as well as digging wells and building houses and roads — did nothing to assuage official anxiety. But in spite of this opposition, Gandhigram’s peace army became the heart of a growing national underground movement for land reform (*Bhoodan*) and Indian self-determination.  

At the 1960-1961 Gandhigram conference, the keynote speech was delivered by Jayaprakash Narayan, a pacifist-socialist leader active in the style of Mohandas and Kasturbai Gandhi. Narayan called for a network of world peace brigades, based on power defined as mutual change for mutual benefit and responsibility. Narayan’s proposal closely resembled Salvador de Madariaga’s previous proposal for a League of Nations peace guard. Both proposals had guided the development of the United Nations’ “Blue Helmet” peacekeeping forces.  

Martin Luther King, Jr., Julius Nyerere, and Kenneth Kaunda were co-sponsors of the event. Within a year, the peace brigade network held its first working conference in the mountains above Beirut, Lebanon, at Brummana’s Quaker and Sufi community of *Ain’ Al-Salaam* (Fountain of Peace), to discuss planning for independence in states like Zambia vis à vis conflicts in Southern Africa.  

By the mid-1960s, through coordination in Costa Rica, the peace brigade net-work spread to the Americas as a training program for civilian-based defense. The first training exercise camp held in 1966 on Grindstone Island near Ottawa, Canada, was disastrous. A role-playing game of “pacifists and soldiers” fragmented into harsh emotional trauma. According to at least

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107Ibid. Shanti Sena was headed by a woman student elected by students, since women were believed to be more adept at nonviolent politics than men. This woman student led a student council of eight men and eight women responsible for Shanti Sena. At the time of the author’s visit in 1977, the Shanti Sena included 500 students from the rural university and the Gandhigram community. See also Glenn Paige, “On the Possibility of Nonviolent Political Science,” Hiroshima University Institute for Peace Science, Research Report No. 4, Mimeo, n.d. [1985?], 28-29.


109Russell Eugene Dowdy, “Nonviolence Vs. Nonexistence: The Vietnam War and Martin Luther King, Jr.” (MA history thesis, North Carolina State University, 1983), 28-29. The author is grateful to the archives of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolence, Atlanta, Georgia, for access to this and similar materials.

two participants, these unexpectedly strong responses arose because of the intense emotions ignited for the first time by the brigade concept of power — just imported from India. In 1981, an American brigade network was organized in Toronto, Canada, to challenge United States intervention in the Western Caribbean.

The American brigades were coordinated in the isthmus from Costa Rica. The first American peace brigade went to Guatemala in March 1983, to observe conflict, report human rights abuses, and supply necessities like medical aid. This deployment coincided with the arrival of church-based Witness for Peace teams, sent mainly from the United States. These civilian-based brigades, or peace teams, were deployed inside Nicaragua and along the Honduras-Nicaragua border, but not along the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border. Apparently the latter was too rugged and dangerous, despite definite interest in the deployment of such teams expressed by Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The decision in 1984 not to risk placing the brigade teams on the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border coincided with news leaked through the national Costa Rican legislature, forecasting an imminent United States invasion of Nicaragua from Costa Rica. Fortunately, Costa Rican neutrality and repercussions from the United States’ Congressional Iran-Contra hearings outlasted plans for direct United States military intervention, such as “REX-84,” to be discussed in Chapter Six.

Force, Conceptually Violent or Nonviolent

In a context of violent power, force can be used to protect or break an existing power structure. As has been explored above and will be explained below, the history of international

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111 Theodore Olson and Gordon Christianen, Thirty-One Hours, The Grindstone Experiment (Toronto: Canadian Friends Service Committee, 1966). Civilian-based, as distinct from military-based, refers to unarmed civilian forces.
114 “Guatemala Report,” PBI, May 1985. The isthmian coordination center for these efforts was the Friends World College in Costa Rica.
116 John Trostle, Monteverde Community, near Santa Elena, Costa Rica, interview by the author, 10 April 1989. Such decisions were made by people like Charles Walker of the peace brigades’ Philadelphia, PA, office.
militarization and conflict in the Western Caribbean after 1919 predisposed the isthmian leadership toward violent force, conflict, and coercion. To counter such state violence, by the early 1940s, one of the first socialist-led coalitions to govern an American state was elected to power in Costa Rica — where, as will be shown, social conditions improved steadily. However, little else changed in the isthmus until the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution and attempts at civilian government in El Salvador in 1980. Costa Rica’s 1983 Neutrality Proclamation was followed by more isthmian militarization, as suggested by the pro-U.S. military stance of a 1984 Kissinger Commission (especially for El Salvador), the 1986 arms and drug scandals, and a 1989 Panama invasion. Continuing peace efforts promoted mutual change for mutual benefit and responsibility, despite the prevailing militarized approaches to conflict resolution.

Economic Force

The anomalous events in the 1980s stemmed from Costa Rica’s first experiment in promoting its own development, sustained for seventy years, from 1914 to 1984. This experiment in nonviolent force, which mandated sustainable economic growth for development, twice required the nationalizing of Costa Rica’s banks, in 1914 and 1948. Relatively violent counterforce by the United States to break the status quo did not restrict Costa Rica’s ability to determine its own development until that nation was partly remilitarized by the United States. This remilitarization and banking crisis, to be sketched in detail below, reinforced United States threats to invade Nicaragua and to bankrupt Costa Rica. To avoid further serious problems with the United States, in a crisis during late 1984, Costa Rica opened its banks to “free enterprise,” favoring United States businesses over those of other countries. This was the 1984 debt and Contra crisis, when Costa Rica faced outside threats of both military devastation by the Contras and economic devastation by debt.

119 The coalition, which held power through much of the 1930s and 1940s, was co-led by a Republican and Socialist Party, as will be discussed particularly in chapter 6.
120 Please see the rest of this chapter and chapters 5-7 for a discussion of the means and outcome of isthmian force and power practiced in violent and nonviolent ways.
To put this nationalization of Costa Rica’s banking system into its historical context, one should remember that Cuba did not nationalize its banks until 1960. Twenty years later, Nicaragua nationalized the Rosario Mining Company (an AMAX subsidiary) because of its violent history. Managed primarily by J. P. Morgan & Company, AMAX had had a violent history outside the isthmus as well, controlling the Rhodesian copper belt, Namibian diamonds and uranium, and the South African arms industry (ARMSCOR). Naturally, once its banks could no longer promote sustainable self-development, considerable Costa Rican zinc, bauxite, and uranium mineral deposits were available to be exploited in Rhodesian fashion.

For Costa Rica, the debt-Contra crisis was exacerbated by economic violence that had been increasing throughout the twentieth century because of skewed land distribution: At least one-half of the arable land in the whole isthmus was being cultivated for export crop production. United Brands (formerly United Fruit), Standard Fruit, and Del Monte, based in Costa Rica from 1889 to the present time, have controlled the production of such export crops and products in the isthmus. From Washington, D.C., and San José, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), specializing in labor policies for export crops, also helped to promote related mining, banking, and agricultural interests in Latin America, including those of W. R. Grace, Anaconda, and Rockefeller. AIFLD land and labor policies of long standing made working conditions harsh. On the average, Costa Rican textile workers, for example,

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122 “U.S. Business in Nicaragua,” *Multinational Monitor* 6 (April 1985): 4. One other related company was also nationalized in Nicaragua, the Neptune Mining Company, an ASARCO subsidiary.
124 For locations, see *Atlas Geoquímico de los Cuadrángulos de San José y Golfito* (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1987).
earned half the wage of their Taiwanese counterparts. This condition was compounded by denationalization in response to the 1984 debt-Contra crisis.128

According to Michael Bowker, the international events leading to this crisis began in the late 1970s, when Mexico and Costa Rica donated more food, financial aid, and development aid to help the Sandinistas to their feet than did Cuba and the Soviet Union together.129 In August 1981, United States political pressure for Costa Rican remilitarization, combined with hazardous international terms of debt and trade, forced Costa Rica to become the first Latin American state to default on its debt. A year later, its inflation was climbing three times faster than Nicaraguan inflation.130 Bank denationalization and economic dependency followed in the mid-1980s.

Women and Power, The Litmus Test of Force

Isthmian women caught more than their share of the structural violence caused by forceful United States intervention in this period, as will be described below. Historically, women in Costa Rican society may have exerted more political power before the Spanish conquest than afterwards, if power is interpreted as an ability to promote development — by effecting mutual change for mutual benefit. Anthropologists have explored artifacts from a pre-European matriarchal civilization living around the San Juan River system. Georgie Anne Geyer concludes from these artifacts that women co-managed private or domestic and public development in that period.131 After the conquest, women throughout the isthmus were subjugated under a nation-state system. In 1948 Costa Rican women regained some political power by their electoral suffrage, won before that of women in other neighboring states.132 From

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128 Tom Barry, et al., Dollars Dictators, 19-23, 105-109, and 205-206.
132 James Dunkerley, Central America, 601.
that point, illiteracy and infant mortality rates improved more quickly in Costa Rica than in the rest of the isthmus.133

But many of these Costa Rican improvements would be rolled back by the debt-Contra crisis, as remilitarization shifted economic priorities away from meeting human needs. By 1985, for example, there were only forty day care centers through-out Costa Rica, despite near-universal literacy qualifying women to work. Even when child care was not a problem, available jobs were limited, due to conditions caused by the process of remilitarization. In 1985 a national women’s network observed that the waves of remilitarization sweeping Costa Rica were promoting lawlessness, homelessness, and landlessness.134

Costa Rican women endeavored to protect their legal rights to political and economic power. But statistics showed that rural women suffered higher rates of nervios, or nervous breakdown, than rural men.135 Wage levels for women in urban work were difficult to compare with those for men on the basis of available data. However, 1983 labor statistics do indicate that half of all Costa Rican mothers, whether rural or urban, were single parents, and as such particularly prone to the structural violence of poverty, rapidly being reinforced by remilitarization.136

In neighboring Nicaragua, perhaps more like Costa Rica than any other state in the isthmus, a majority of women learned to read through literacy campaigns in the early 1980s. But the same debt-Contra crisis soon rolled literacy back under survival as a national priority.137

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137Diane Jones, “Nicaraguan Women Advance, AMNLAE Celebrates a Decade of Progress,” Frontline, 23 November 1987, 75-76.
Through various organizations, both Costa Rican and Nicaraguan women continued to organize for more responsive laws and progress over the intolerance reinforced by militarization.  

Isthmian labor statistics for men and women reflect gender differences similar to those of the United Nations, where under ten percent of representatives to the General Assembly are women, and few if any women reach high World Court or Security Council positions. A few women have reached high posts in Costa Rica, like the semi-honorary vice-presidency held by the wife of Oscar Arias, Margarita Penón de Arias. However, even in a nation like Costa Rica, which attempts to legislate equal rights for women, they are still likely to be denied policy-making employment because the power for such work is equated with military might.

Power interpreted as a mandate to restrict and influence people by violence has also been codified in American marital and cohabitation law. A man is defined in legal discourse as the one who protects a family unit. Legally, women participate as marital partners in everything but protecting the family unit through violence. In this context the political power of women is limited by low earning power, despite near universal suffrage. Although over ninety-nine percent of all women worldwide can legally vote, for example, the International Labor Organization reports that women around the world claim under ten percent of all economic income and under one percent of all economic property. But gender and power in states with a high potential for military violence remain even more difficult issues to research societally, since

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140 See the work of Oscar Arias Sánchez and Margarita Penón de Arias to promote legal and social equality for women in Costa Rica, approved by the National Legislative Assembly as Law No. 7142 (1 March 1990), in *Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer* (San José: Fundación Arias para la Paz y el Progreso Humano, 1990), 1-24; or Karen Cheney, “New Offices to Offer Protection for Women,” *TTS*, 1 June 1990, 29.
143 Two-thirds of pregnant Third World women also suffer from serious anaemia; see *Women: A World Report* (London: Methuen, 1985), 43 and 82. See also *Looking to the Future: Equal Partnership Between Women and Men in the Twentieth Century* (Minneapolis, MN: Humphrey Institute, University of Minnesota, n.d.).
women simply do not participate equitably in policy-making careers where militarization is confused with development.\textsuperscript{144}

Conflict, Conceptually Violent or Nonviolent

In a state like Costa Rica, conflict can be either a violent clash in which one actor gains and the other loses, or a cooperative effort against inimical conditions. Examples of the latter course, although they are unusual in diplomatic history, did occur in states like India and the Netherlands before the Costa Rican experiment. In India, for example, between the third and the second century, B.C.E., Ashoka ruled one state nonviolently for six decades.\textsuperscript{145} Ashoka’s India, like the government of the nineteenth-century Netherlands, enjoyed a respite from the rhetoric of war and adulation of the fatherland. In both the kingdom of Ashoka and the democracy of the Netherlands, the reminiscences of people who had wielded violent power were shunned, primarily as a nuisance to national freedom and security. Education focused upon the resolution of conflict by reconciliation and common cultural growth, not on the memories of war.\textsuperscript{146} Much the same kind of cultural milieu was created in Costa Rica before the United States attempt to remilitarize it in the 1980s.

Costa Rica and Nicaragua had tried to resolve border conflict in similarly peaceful ways. Border negotiations began through an early 1800s isthmian federation designed to replace Spanish rule,\textsuperscript{147} but these negotiations were disturbed by William Walker in the mid-1800s. Along a trail etched in blood, Walker led Morgan- and Vanderbilt-funded troops sent to build a canal along the Nicaraguan and Costa Rican border, and to encourage more slave state votes for the Confederacy in the United States Congress. The resulting Rivas-Walker war was ended

\textsuperscript{144}Women have been shunned in occupations wherever power derives from the potential for violence, especially in states with arms as dangerous as nuclear weapons, including the U.S.; see Betty Reardon, “A Gender Analysis of Militarism and Sexist Repression, A Suggested Research Agenda,” \textit{IPRA Newsletter} 21 (1983): 3-9. For accounts of women creating organizations like the League of Nations and thus the U.N., but then being denied access to the resulting power structure, see Jane Addams, et al., \textit{Women At The Hague} (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 150-59.


\textsuperscript{146}Chris Bartelds, \textit{Mondiale Vorming in het Onderwijs} (Haren, Netherlands: Polemological Institute, 1980), 19-23.

largely by military intervention from Costa Rica, which suffered the highest percentage of casualties in its military history. The war left an indelibly bitter imprint on isthmian memory.\textsuperscript{148}

Local and global resources have been mobilized for conflict in the isthmus many times since then. Nevertheless, military institutions remained weak in Costa Rica. In neighboring Nicaragua, under the Somoza family, events developed differently. The Somozas granted majority control over Nicaragua’s bank and railroad stock ownership to United States bankers and munitions dealers in 1912, thus ensuring the institutionalization of military force by the National Guard.\textsuperscript{149}

Far from these struggles in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, a September 1919 Conference at St. Germaine-en-Laye in France tried to foster an international consensus for curbing conflict in regions like the Middle East and the Western Caribbean. Although it was shunned by the United States, because of what it considered its national security,\textsuperscript{150} this conference chartered a Permanent Disarmament Commission within the League of Nations. That Commission appointed special “ambassadors” to inhibit arms financing and to confirm arms compliance with its disarmament plan.\textsuperscript{151} Mandated by its charter to constrain banks that financed war, the Commission targeted bankers like J. P. Morgan, who was then using Nicaragua as a base for selling isthmian arms, to use for military intervention and to protect systems of economic exploitation which had been based historically on war.\textsuperscript{152} But because it could not or would not risk probing deeply into the linkages between underdevelopment and militarization, the League of Nations dissolved just as it was forming its “Permanent” Disarmament Commission.

\textsuperscript{149} Jerome Davis, \textit{Capitalism and Its Culture} (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941), 217-218. The same thing happened in Cuba from the 1930s to 1959.
\textsuperscript{151} League of Nations, Committee for the Reduction of the Trade in and Private and State Manufactures of Arms and Implements of War, \textit{League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments}, Vol. 3 (1932), 802-812.
\textsuperscript{152} Mirta Muro Rodríguez, et al., \textit{Nicaragua y La Revolución Sandinista} (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales/Ediciones Política, 1984), 63-64 and 90. See also Donald Castillo Rivas, \textit{Acumulación de Capital y Empresas Transnacionales en Centroamérica} (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1980), 35, 59, 71-75, and 257.
The global significance of conflict in the Caribbean (and thus in Costa Rica) became apparent during the 1940s, when Nazi Germany sank more United States oceanic shipping in the Caribbean than in any other coastal waters of the Americas. These losses drew international attention away from the isthmus to Cuba, where United States colonial interests prevailed until the Cuban Revolution (1959) and the world Missile Crisis (1962). That crisis began in 1959 with a nonviolent general strike throughout Havana which rapidly thrust Fidel Castro into power, in the wake of guerrilla warfare, and was followed by solidarity strikes sweeping swiftly through Chile, Peru, Mexico, Panama, and Argentina.

These conflicts waged for international self-determination, and inspired by the historical example of Costa Rica, particularly from 1934-1948, were conceptualized by people like Raúl Roa Kouri. (A Lebanese Cuban and a seminal Latin American international relations scholar, Roa Kouri espoused theorists like John Bellers, but rejected Thomas Hobbes and Nicolo Machiavelli.) When such conflicts reached a crisis point, they were mediated by people like Bertrand Russell, who in the early 1960s personally helped all sides toward common ground.
After 1962, Cuban diplomacy drifted toward nonalignment, emphasizing the United Nations’ “disarmament and development” hypothesis for international conflict resolution.\(^\text{158}\) Cuban leaders like Raúl Kouri and Miguel D’Estefani Pisani discovered that inter-national neutrality, desired and exemplified by states like Costa Rica, had developed as the core of nonalignment in diplomatic history and self-determination within international relations theory.\(^\text{159}\)

A major theme in such Third World deliberations over self-determination concerned the future of Third World resources like tropical rainforests. Environmental concern continued to be an important element in these stirrings for neutrality, non-alignment, and self-determination within Third World states like Costa Rica.\(^\text{160}\) Around the same time as the abolition of Costa Rica’s military power in the 1940s, United Nations attempts to resolve conflict began, with its 1946 disarmament resolution — the first resolution passed during the General Assembly’s first session.\(^\text{161}\) As a result, university research on international conflict resolution was launched by small United Nations and International Social Science Council grants. The Inter-national Peace Research Association, for example, was co-founded with their funding in 1961. Headed first by Bert Röling of the Netherlands’ Polemological Institute, this association has been housed at
various centers in Europe and the Americas, focusing on nonviolent security alternatives and equitable access to human necessities.  

Meanwhile, by the early 1980s, Costa Rican supporters of nonviolent conflict resolution successfully established the first United Nations-associated University for Peace, UPAZ — also the first international peace research center in what will be described in chapter three as a zone of global conflict. Militarized western nations adamantly refused United Nations funding for this Third World peace research center, with grim reactions reminiscent of their refusal to acknowledge the still unsurpassed world disarmament record set by Khomeini’s $8 billion arms (orders) cut in Iran during 1979. The reasons given for denying funding for UPAZ began with defensive statements to the effect that such Third World research was superfluous, and therefore not worth funding. Meanwhile, United States’ leadership began to send its top Republican Party campaign managers to overthrow Costa Rica’s most popular social democrat political party at the polls.

Coercion, Conceptually Violent or Nonviolent

As noted above, coercion may include the use of military conflict and structural violence. In a state like Costa Rica, though, coercion may also include using means consonant with ends to prompt sustainable peace, security, and development. The constitution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council encourages the latter kind of coercion in its statement that war can be changed into peace only within our minds. Future viability of nonviolent alternatives will depend on such change.

Various traditions preceding the Costa Rican experiment brought a peaceful future closer, by the use of nonviolent coercion to effect mutual change for mutual benefit. For example,

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166 United Nations Educational and Scientific Council [UNESCO], *Constitution* (16 Nov. 1945, amended 17th sess.). The UNESCO Constitution still uses the phrase “minds of men.” But for the role of minds at war where gender
Catharis and Albigensians during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries C.E. tried to build a nonviolent city-state, with an internal police force but without a military force.\textsuperscript{167} Coercion in related nonviolent traditions has stemmed from sceptical Jainism, anarchism, Anabaptism, socialism, and various natural philosophies or religions. Whatever the case, one way such coercive options might become politically powerful in the Americas has been tested in Costa Rica.

Traditionally, Costa Ricans have elected writers and teachers over military generals for national leadership posts, including the presidency. Four outstanding Costa Ricans helped to establish this tradition between the late 1800s and the 1940s. These four were Roberto Brenes Mesén, Omar Dengo, Joaquin García Monge, and Carmen Lyra. Brenes Mesén and Lyra were creative writers, while Dengo co-founded Costa Rica’s national university system. García Monge edited \textit{Reportorio Américano}, with contributions by, for instance, Kahlil Gibran, D. H. Lawrence, Gabriela Mistral, and Pablo Neruda. Such traditions made Costa Rica a cultural center of the Americas,\textsuperscript{168} and stimulated struggles for nonviolent solutions to social problems, such as the pioneer artisan strikes for an eight-hour work day.\textsuperscript{169}

Defending human rights under such traditions, Costa Rica, Peru, Chile, Guatemala, and Venezuela co-sponsored the first international women’s conferences on human rights. The conference results were articulated by international treaties in Lima, Peru, in 1878, that discussed separate rights to conjugal property.\textsuperscript{170} Ironically, this happened during the same period in which a humanitarian United States president, Abraham Lincoln, and his Treasury Secretary, Salmon

\textsuperscript{167}Andrew W. Cordier, “The Reconstruction of Southern France After the Albigensian Crusades” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1927). His dissertation was found in the Columbia University Cordier Archival Collection. Cordier came from an Anabaptist Church of the Brethren background, through which, in the 1940s, he helped to start the first U.S. academic peace and conflict resolution program at Manchester College, North Manchester, Indiana. After the U.N., he became the Dean of International Affairs and then the President at Columbia University, while working with student leaders like Mark Rudd. See Wolfgang Saxon, “Dr. Andrew W. Cordier At 74; Columbia President and U.N. Leader,” \textit{New York Time’s Biographical Service} 6 (July 1975): 833-34; and James Gould, “Andrew W. Cordier, Model Diplomat,” \textit{Bulletin of Peace Studies} (Manchester College) 9 (May 1979): 1-4.


\textsuperscript{169}Víctor H. Acuña Ortega, \textit{Los Orígenes de la Clase Obrera en Costa Rica: Las Huelgas de 1920 por la Jornada de Ocho Horas} (San José: CENAP/CEPAS, 1986), 3-7 and 15.
Chase, were institutionalizing a national military conscription system.\textsuperscript{171} One of the few international organizations supporting states like Costa Rica was the Socialist International, of which Costa Rica was a founding member (Brussels, 1891). The Socialist International, like Costa Rica itself, was to push for parity in the economic status of women, but to contest military coercion enforced by conscription.\textsuperscript{172}

During the 1930s and 1940s other political organizations experimenting with nonviolent coercion in conflict resolution emerged in both Costa Rica and the United States. Costa Rica, for example, backed a successful nonviolent coup in El Salvador. This Salvadorean coup d’état overthrew a pro-Somoza leader, Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, armed by the United States and inimical to Indian people. Two exiled Salvadoreans in Costa Rica, José Luis Boza and Joaquín Castro Canizales (alias Quino Caso), led a coup coalition of peasants, business people, and the military from 1941 to 1944, using Gandhian strategies.\textsuperscript{173} Beginning in the 1930s in the United States, the Hopi people had also begun to lead their legislative movement for cultural freedom, abolishing the Colonial Indian Bureau (in the War Department) by 1933 and changing federal laws against Indian religious freedom by the 1940s.\textsuperscript{174}

Coercion without violence had been used traditionally in conflict resolution throughout the Americas, especially by Indian populations clustered in Peru and Bolivia. Such communal nonviolence had been cultivated by Indians of the Andean area in which Ernesto (“Che”) Guevara died, also the home of liberation theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez, both advocating the anti-dependency approach.\textsuperscript{175} Such Latin American struggle against United States-led militarization policy supported the 1962 cement workers’ militant nonviolent strike in Peru, a city in Brazil. That strike in 1962 triggered a continental trade union groundswell that would


\textsuperscript{171}\textsuperscript{171}Donnal Vore Smith, \textit{Chase and Civil War Politics} (Columbus, OH: F. J. Heer Printing Co., 1931), 43-46. Chase co-founded the Chase-Manhattan Bank. The 1863 conscription law may have been the first of any consequence for a republic since the Roman Empire; see Richard Fox, “Conscientious Objection to War: The Background and a Current Appraisal,” \textit{Cleveland State Law Review} 32 (Winter 1982): 79-80.

\textsuperscript{172}\textsuperscript{172}Karl Liebknecht, \textit{Militarism and Anti-Militarism} (New York: Dover, 1972), 91 and 158-59.


\textsuperscript{175}\textsuperscript{175}John Swomley, \textit{Liberation Ethics}, 134.
lead Brazil, Latin America’s largest state, away from military dictatorship by the 1980s.\textsuperscript{176} Contemporary versions of the same phenomena can be seen in the concept of power common to North American Indian cultures such as the Comanche, cultures which define power as shared responsibility, not only for one’s kindred but for the world at large.\textsuperscript{177}

**Structural Violence in Costa Rica from Imposed Violent Power**

Costa Rica’s history is rich in examples of violent and nonviolent coercion. Its Chanquina or Changuene Indians, for instance, fought to the death against European slavery in the 1700s.\textsuperscript{178} Still, because Costa Rica was relatively free from the *encomienda* system, with the Indian slavery, genocide, and underdevelopment that system had brought to the rest of the Americas, its living standards surpassed those in other Latin American states until remilitarization by the United States.

Costa Rican living standards began to drop in the early 1980s when Curtin Winsor, the United States Ambassador to Costa Rica, pushed to privatize its economy. He also threatened to withhold United States Agency for International Development aid.\textsuperscript{179} As much as seventy-five percent of the aid that did arrive was oriented to building a Contra infrastructure. Facing dire

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\textsuperscript{177}La Donna Harris, a Comanche, in her “Americans for Indian Opportunity” home and office weekly Thursday noon “chats” (Fall 1989-Spring 1990), attended by the author. She married Fred Harris, a Senator from Oklahoma, and contended politically as the U.S. Vice-Presidential candidate on Jesse Jackson’s ticket.


\textsuperscript{179}Miguel Gutiérrez Saxe and Jorge Vargas Cullell, *Costa Rica es el Nombre del Juego* (San José: Instituto Costarricense de Estudios Sociales, 1986), 29 and 43. The U.S. target was Article 62 of the Costa Rican Constitution, which upheld Costa Rican bank nationalization.
economic crisis in 1981, Costa Rica was coerced toward underdevelopment by this remilitarization.

Luis Alberto Monge, Costa Rica’s president during the debt-Contra crisis, accepted United States “aid” for roads and airports to ferry the Contras into Nicaragua. In retaliation, Costa Rican trade unions organized nonviolent “wildcat” strikes.¹⁸⁰ The unions were undercut by anti-union policies that broke the strikes. Conservative business organizations that had supported Somoza were funded under privatization policies,¹⁸¹ as advocated by the United States Kissinger Commission.¹⁸²

**Structural Violence Leading to Conflict from Violent Coercion**

To comply with United States conditions for aid after the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution, Costa Rican public funds were shifted from human necessities to the production of cash crops for export, compounding capital flight problems. The United States Agency for International Development headquarters in San José — funded largely by Costa Rican payments on the interest for aid grants or loans from the United States¹⁸³ — arranged these aid conditions through a covert “parallel state” set up to manage the debt-Contra crisis. Revelations about this covert coercion by John Biehl, economic adviser to Oscar Arias and architect of the Arias peace plan, forced Biehl from Costa Rica into exile.¹⁸⁴

Costa Rica continued to default on its debt through the 1980s, while United States economic coercion sustained the pressure for Contra war. Coercion by the United States Agency for International Development was directed from a multimillion-dollar, steel-reinforced heliport

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¹⁸⁰Kevin Danaher, Phillip Berryman, and Medea Benjamin, *Help or Hindrance: United States Economic Aid in Central America* (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1987), 46-49. This 75% of U.S. aid for the Contra infra-structure was designated as Economic Support Funds, a category for security assistance and so-called humanitarian assistance. Please see tables in Chapter 8 also.


¹⁸⁴Lezak Shallat, “U.S. Aid to C.R. — The Story Behind the Uproar,” *TTS*, 15 July 1988, 4. Biehl and his family were forced into exile by (death) threats to him and his family. For the covert role of actors such as the CIA in this “parallel state,” please see the sections on the CIA in chapters 3 and 8.
command center, complete with basement bunker, ground floor window slits, anti-tank fortifications, and surveillance systems, built to manage a multimillion-dollar destabilization enterprise.\(^{185}\) The enterprise resembled another alleged development model that had enabled the French to seize much of the arable land in Vietnam.\(^{186}\) As a consequence, sixty-five percent of all United States aid to South Vietnam was reported by government aid agencies as promoting militarization,\(^{187}\) ten percent less than the reported seventy-five percent dedicated to the remilitarization of Costa Rica.\(^{188}\) In sum, beginning without military power, Costa Rica underwent a kind of economic Vietnamization, enforced by “low-intensity” techniques of covert action and disinformation, instead of saturation bombing.

The examples of power, force, conflict, and coercion in this chapter have been introduced to illustrate the basic concepts of the central hypothesis and its converse, that is to say, that nonviolent conflict resolution in Costa Rica has promoted peace, security, and development, and that violent conflict resolution in Costa Rica has promoted war, insecurity, and underdevelopment. It matters how one defines the terms of this hypothesis, but also how one conceptualizes these terms in view of their relevance to the concepts of power, force, conflict, and coercion.

Next, these four concepts will be explored within the three major approaches to international conflict resolution central to the dissertation’s hypothesis, that is, the world order, anti-dependency, and nonviolent approaches. As noted in both the definition of terms and the

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\(^{185}\)“U.S. Aid Builds Its Parallel State,” *FPCN*, Nov.-Dec. 1988, 1-2. Madagascar, under similar debt strain, could not avoid a bloody coup d’état; see R. T. Naylor, “Reaganism and the Future of the International Payments System,” *Third World Quarterly [TWQ]* (Spring 1985): 674-75. Such destabilization also impaired Chile and Jamaica. For analogous Nicaraguan coercion by the Plasmaférasis Company, supplying 10% of the raw blood plasma annually used by the U.S. from 400,000 donors, see Bernard Nietschmann, *Caribbean Edge, The Coming of Modern Times to Isolated People and Wildlife* (Indianapolis, IN, and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979), 110-111. Exposure of this business by *La Prensa*, edited by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and his consequent assassination by Somoza agents led to a massive general strike which, among other events, led to the 1979 revolution launched from Costa Rica. Violeta Chamorro, widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, then acted as had Corazon Aquino in the Philippines — winning the 1990 elections in a state weary of intensive and prolonged war. See also chapters 5-7 on this intensive war.


\(^{187}\)Frank Snepp, *Decent Interval, An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End, Told By The CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 160 and 565. Total United States militarization aid sent to South Vietnam was twice the total amount sent to North Vietnam by socialist states for militarization. In Vietnam, United States aid also rarely concentrated on providing for human necessities, despite the fact that, for example, less than 2% of the Lao people had access to clean water; see “Laos,” *NIN*, Oct. 1984, 32.

\(^{188}\)Kevin Danaher, et al., *Help or Hindrance*, 46-49.
illustrations of concepts basic to the central hypothesis, these terms and concepts lie on a
continuum from violence to nonviolence. In other words, relative and contextual rather than
absolute combinations of these terms and concepts govern the theoretical application of the three
approaches.
Chapter 3

Principal Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Contemporary states use three major approaches to anticipate international conflict resolution. As theoretical maps, these approaches determine the concepts, values, and definitions which guide the power of the state toward differing outcomes. The three approaches — characterized here as *world order*, *anti-dependency*, and *nonviolence* — operate in a continuum of more to less political violence. Grouped and embedded historically in four global conflict zones, to be discussed at the end of this chapter, these three approaches may one day evolve into a now still unforeseen, more fully human, interdependent approach toward peace and conflict resolution.

The world order approach, currently more widely held than the two other approaches, begins with the premise that military might is the basis of power and the guarantor of cultural, economic, and other kinds of power. The anti-dependency approach reflects opposition to a world order outlook and the hope for liberation from the structural violence of such a world order. In spite of their differences, nations relying on both of the first two approaches customarily depend on arms and supplies manufactured by the more militarized states for security. In comparison, the nonviolent, unarmed diplomacy favored by a state like Costa Rica indicates the potential for a more integral, interdependent approach — mutual change for mutual benefit — not depending on the militarization emphasized by the first two approaches.\(^\text{189}\)

At the same time, each of the approaches has been flawed to some degree, and the more violent approaches to a greater degree, because of the greater physical danger of violence they have posed to people by war and conflict. In other words, the first approach, while it has assumed it has provided security by affirming military power, and the second approach, while it has assumed it has provided security by affirming revolutionary military power, both endanger

\(^{189}\)The anti-dependency approach acts as a mirror of the world order approach, while the nonviolent approach opposes the violence in both of the others; see Roland Warren, *Truth, Love and Social Change, And Other Essays on Community Change* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1971), 260 ff. International relations epistemology, expressed by these three approaches, has also been culturally influenced by time, chaos, quantum, paradigm, relativity, and superstring theories in the natural sciences.
peace, security, and development with their violence. The third approach, while emphasizing disarmament, may likewise tend to oversimplify its presumed rejection of all military power by affirming only civilian-based nonmilitary security — despite a need for local and state police. It is often forgotten that such police are not accustomed to warring against other states.

Theorists need these conflict resolution approaches to explain how states like Costa Rica resolve conflict. However, no single, general approach exists yet in the literature. Björn Hettne, for example, distinguished capitalist and anti-dependency options from a third eco-development option. The three are much like the three approaches under discussion. But Richard Ashley, Charles Beitz, and K. J. Holsti limited themselves to two options within the world order outlook plus a vague anti-dependency option. Third World theorists tend to stress the anti-imperialist or anti-dependency approach. Further along the continuum toward neutrality or nonviolence, William T. R. Fox, Annette Baker Fox, and Mahendra Kumar chose to compare one world order and anti-dependency option with a second, equitable, less violent option. These three approaches overlap each other considerably in the common search for one integral approach to international conflict resolution.


The World Order Approach Toward Security

As will be shown, each of the three approaches places varying priorities on violence and nonviolence, and thus on the violent and nonviolent organizations derived from these priorities. The first approach, with its reliance on military power and hierarchical organizations to exercise this military power, emphasizes militarization and counterinsurgency in its conceptualization of war. As a result, and as will be shown, the business of war and transnational corporate security may become one and the same. Thus the isthmian business of war has ranged from a world order approach imposed by Europe to that imposed by the United States.

As a highly-placed United States corporate attorney, Grenville Clark introduced the phrase “world order” into international relations discourse concerning post-1945 war conditions. Clark would influence many toward this approach. Paul Wehr, at the University of Colorado, for example, has noted that the world order approach as introduced by Clark influenced Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal, Saul Mendlovitz, and even Richard Falk. Such influence from this world order approach might also be compared with that of a similarly powerful, yet also unelected leader, Zhou Enlai, working with Mao Zedong and Zhu Deh in China. However, others would also distance themselves from the emphasis on military and intelligence matters in the world order approach, because they preferred a less violent or even a nonviolent approach as exemplified by Mohandas Gandhi and J. C. Kumarrappa in India.

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In Costa Rica, however, the world order approach, which introduced many inconsistencies into the Costa Rican preference for nonviolence, appeared with the Spanish intervention. About three-quarters of Costa Rica’s presidents have descended directly from such outsiders, via the Acosta, Alvarado, and Vásquez de Coronado conquistador families. Its national legislature has been dominated by the less powerful Hispanic and Sephardic Beck, Brenes, Koberg, Niehaus, Altmann, Hernández, and Tattenbach families. About four of every five signers of the independence charter shared these Sephardic genealogical ties. Costa Rican business leadership has also reflected this same heritage of outside influence and the liberal European ideology that accompanies it.

The Hanseatic League cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, however, oriented more to free trade without violence, were the first non-American entities to sign international treaties with Costa Rica, in 1848. Later, when England and the United States clashed over the San Juan River and Miskitia, Costa Rica collaborated in treaties with France and England to counter increasing violently United States intervention. The 1850 Bulwer-Clayton Treaty set Costa Rican territorial boundaries, while the fruit companies introduced United States’ railroads and capitalism to the isthmus. Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Cuba then led regional struggles against Western Caribbean military elites imposed by outside intervention, as Costa Rica began to be buffeted by the United States view of world order.

Although it was the first of the American states in the early 1940s to declare war against Japan, Costa Rica emerged from intense labor strikes with the first Soviet-supported American government. Costa Rica then challenged the United States’ criteria for world order by ignoring marching orders for the Cold War. In 1964, Costa Rica was the isthmian state most

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201 Jon D. Cozean, “The Abolition of the Costa Rican Army” (MA thesis, George Washington University, 1966), 36-37 and 114-122. Costa Rica was also the last American state to withdraw its declaration of war on Germany in the 1940’s.

reluctant to join the Central American Defense Council or CONDECA, dominated by the United States and intended to counter the Cuban Revolution’s demonstration effect. But, in the 1980s, Costa Rica accepted a Voice of America short-wave transmitter on its territory before other Latin American states. Such inconsistencies defied the autarchic logic of world order.

Through it all Costa Rica struggled to survive on an abstract foundation of international law, which had criminalized all war. On the one hand, for example, claiming its neutrality rights from the fifth and thirteenth Hague conventions and the United Nations charter preamble outlawing war, Costa Rica spent under one-twelfth of the annual military allocations of the other isthmian states between 1945 and 1985. But Costa Rica also acquiesced to United States’ demands, backed by Enrique Chacón (Vice-Minister of Security under Monge), to support the Contras. In so doing, Costa Rica allowed a pro-Batista cubiche (ex-Cuban) media mogul, Juan Antonio Alonzo Sánchez, to impose a conservative editorial slant on its major newspapers, and countenanced many anti-communist political organizations.

**Militarization and Counterinsurgency — Conceptualizing War**

The United States world order approach in Costa Rica was motivated by more than fear of communism or altruistic concern for the poor. Costa Rica is part of the Western Caribbean side of the Gulf of Mexico, the prime gateway for raw materials entering the United States from the Third World. Over half of the strategic oil and the strategic minerals (such as bauxite and

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nickel) bound for the United States from the Third World cross through the Western Caribbean daily — a powerful argument for intervention to insure “security.”

United States counterinsurgency forces first appeared in the isthmus during the late 1800s. In 1929, during the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover interrupted this militarization by withdrawing the Marines from Nicaragua. But after the 1940s war, the United States again stationed large naval warships on either side of the isthmus for intervention by way of Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico. In the next three decades, over one in every four United States global military interventions struck the Caribbean. The United States did not see these interventions as contrary to the Rio Treaty signed in 1947, although some Latin American governments did.

In 1962 the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., began the equivalent of counterinsurgency training, despite opposition from Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica. As befitted a neutral state, Costa Rica tried to balance its security interests by participating in the United States “Alliance for Progress.” But it counter-balanced its interests by also sheltering isthmian war refugees classified as communist. Consequently, José Figueres, then head of the ruling Costa Rican National Liberation Party, was almost deposed by the United States’ predictable reactions against any state which would harbor war refugees calling themselves communists.

In the 1980s, the United States tried to stop Costa Rican participation in the Contadora talks. For example, its State Department and National Security Council threatened to cut its aid if Costa Rica would not support war against Nicaragua. The United States also escalated counterinsurgency against Nicaragua from Costa Rica, despite official United States support for

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212 John Bell, *Crisis in Costa Rica* (Austin: University of Texas, 1971), 6, 37, and 151.
215 Gregorio Selser, *De Dulles a Raborn, La C.I.A., Métodos, Logros y Pifias del Espionaje* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones de Política Americana, 1967), 66-68. These U.S. reactions were dominated by the CIA. In Spanish the National Liberation Party is the *Partido de Liberación Nacional* or PLN.
the Contadora talks and United Nations peace efforts. Conservative Costa Rican leaders backed this counterinsurgency and belittled the Contadora talks as narcotic hallucinations that camouflaged Cuban, Grenadian, Nicaraguan, or Palestinian aggression.217

Transnational Corporate Security and the Business of War

Intervention justified by nationalist theories like the Monroe Doctrine has permeated United States decision-making in the Western Caribbean. Transcorporate interest in extracting resources from the small isthmian countries like Costa Rica had only to build on this geopolitical doctrine. The desire for a United States sea empire, reflected by associated systems of ideas like regime theory in Grenville Clark’s world order approach in the United States,218 continued to justify isthmian intervention. Theories emerged from such doctrines to justify warlike intervention that would allegedly protect the interests of United States’ transnational corporations.

Grenville Clark built a framework for these priorities on the basis of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s geopolitical theory, and put it into practice in Caribbean states like Costa Rica. Supported in the United States Congress by James Wolcott Wadsworth, Clark began by managing a military officer and counterinsurgency training camp in Plattsburgh, New York. John Pierpont Morgan financed this camp to train anti-Cuban, anti-Indian, and anti-Mexican fighters.219 According to an official biographer of Clark, the camp trained eighty-percent of the


Clark’s plan to protect the Morgan family interests called for militarizing the Western Caribbean states like Panama, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. On the basis of this Western Caribbean war experience, the Morgan bank holding corporation organized international war-making logistics policy for the United States government. In due time, Morgan’s successful $140 million gamble on arms for creating the Boer War led to control of South African gold and diamonds, which allowed it to invest another $200 million in constructing the Panama Canal, the apex of Morgan’s priorities and Mahan’s dreams. The resulting world order, based on what might be called an Inter-American (Caribbean) region, structured underdevelopment in the Western Caribbean, and made that region Morgan’s springboard to world trade.

The legal foundations for international violence based in the Western Caribbean were laid in 1917 and 1940, as Clark drafted and Wadsworth sponsored national legislation for military conscription. In the meantime, Henry Stimson, Secretary of War in both world wars, denied police protection to the major anti-war and anti-nationalist leaders like Alice Paul. They were left at the mercy of street thugs during their anti-war demonstrations. Elihu Root and the Wadsworth family launched personal vendettas as well, accusing leaders like her and Upton

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Sinclair of plotting against war, world order, and free enterprise.\textsuperscript{228} Morgan’s return on military investments, fattened by World War I, also tempted Du Pont,\textsuperscript{229} General Electric, Electric Boat (later General Dynamics), and General Motors to re-arm Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union before war in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{230}

Flanking Clark and Wadsworth, William Donovan covertly advanced these same priorities. Donovan went from engineering major New York City bankruptcy cases in the Great Depression to controlling intelligence services for international finance capital based in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{231} He litigated Morgan and Du Pont financial security interests during the 1934 Nye Munitions Congressional Hearings,\textsuperscript{232} against prosecuting attorney Alger Hiss.\textsuperscript{233} A United States Marine Major General, Smedley Butler, who had led many United States corporate isthmian interventions, was also approached covertly by Morgan and Du Pont proxies and asked to prepare to take over the White House by violence in case the Nye Munitions Hearings went awry.\textsuperscript{234}

However, the 1930s Nye Munitions Hearings finished much like the Iran-Contra hearings in the 1980s, also concerning the isthmus, with much fanfare and little change. Then Donovan organized a working basis for United States espionage and intelligence organizations according to Clark’s world order approach. He based much of his work on a treaty that he arranged with England for full United States’ control over all isthmian and Caribbean military bases. Donovan also extracted critical information from Nazi Germany for making the atom bomb.\textsuperscript{235} McCloy


\textsuperscript{229}“Du Pont I: The Case of Alfred,” \textit{Fortune}, Nov. 1934, 192 and 207.

\textsuperscript{230}Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, \textit{Munitions Industry}, 944 (3), 74th Congress, pursuant to S. Res. 206, 73rd Congress, 1936, 31-33 and 73.

\textsuperscript{231}“Donovan Picks His Staff,” \textit{NYT}, 15 May 1929, 34.

\textsuperscript{232}1,245,000 Work for Du Ponts in War.” \textit{NYT}, 13 Sept. 1934, 5.


\textsuperscript{235}Maxine Block and E. Mary Trow, eds., \textit{Current Biography, 1941} (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1941), 229-30. This working basis, first named SWANCC (Navy) and then the OSS (State Department, Office of Strategic Services) organized many private, public, military, and business (war production) groups.
and Stimson, the top 1940s policy makers in the Pentagon helped into office by Clark, dutifully carried out Clark’s and Donovan’s priorities.236

Finally, Clark assembled a National Security Committee to manage his security priorities, including the three central isthmian states.237 The resulting national security legislation, again sponsored by Wadsworth, was called the National Security Act.238 A December 1947 National Security Directive legalized covert action under this act for what became known as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.239 Two last touches completed Clark’s world order framework: (1) financial control by Morgan over the Los Alamos Sandia Laboratories at the center of nuclear weapons research, supported by security legislation like the McCarran Act,240 and (2) John McCloy’s presidential appointments to build a World Bank and a federal Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.241

But opposition continued to build from anti-dependency groups in states like Costa Rica. Their sentiments were echoed by ex-soldiers like the United States Veterans for Peace. Opposing war in Nicaragua, in the 1980s, for instance, the Veterans for Peace initially received support from Israeli soldiers refusing combat in Lebanon. Then the Veterans for Peace gained recognition by expediting large overland food and clothing shipments to the isthmus, frequently coordinated across borders of warring states through Costa Rican infrastructures.242

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236McCloy and Stimson made the decision, executed by Harry Truman, to drop atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but chose not to firebomb those supply routes to the Nazi death camps which were tied indirectly to the U.S. corporate structure. See Morgan Mintz and Andrea Kingsley, “Why Didn’t We Bomb Auschwitz?” *Washington Post* [WPT], 17 April 1983, D 1-2. See also Sidney Lens, *The Day Before Doomsday* (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1977), 51.


Emphasizing change for mutual benefit, the Veterans for Peace stressed that armed warriors can no longer protect society in an age of nuclear terror. The effects of state terrorism, whether through guerrilla, nuclear, or bio-molecular warfare, had uprooted the notion of national security through arms just as artillery once breached the walled security of medieval castles. Unifying politically with Soviet veterans, these United States veterans called for the abolition of war as their preferred approach to conflict resolution.243

The Anti-Dependency Approach Toward Liberation and Revolution

Commencing in Latin American countries like Costa Rica, which lack the capital and technology of the countries espousing a world order, the anti-dependency approach criticizes the underdevelopment inflicted under the world order approach. Leading Western Caribbean writers with this outlook have been Fidel Castro (Cuba), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Raúl Roa Kouri (Cuba), Vicente Saénz (Costa Rica and Mexico in exile), Oscar Arias Sánchez (Costa Rica), Gregorio Selser (Mexico), and Ana Sojo (Costa Rica). Other such writers have included Raúl Prebisch (Argentina), André Gunder Frank (the Netherlands), and Teodoro dos Santos (Brazil), as well as Steve Biko (South Africa), Jo Enlai (China), Teresa Hayter (England), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), and Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam). 244

However, while demanding development, such an approach has also depended on the arms needed for its revolutionary challenge from the very world order-oriented states being challenged. Current literature indicates that the militarization paradox of arms dependency habits may be even more debilitating than the previous, raw-finished commodities dependency, limited to poor terms in trade relationships. Therefore, the contemporary anti-dependency approach has not yet been able to develop durable sustainable alternatives to resolve either the

filled with food, clothes, and medicine headed for El Salvador, but blocked by U.S. customs at the U.S.-Mexican border in Texas, despite support of the Veterans for Peace by the Mexican Bishop, Sergio Méndez Arceo.


arms dependencies or related international debts, that is, the insecurity and underdevelopment promoted by such intense and prolonged conflict as that encountered in the Western Caribbean.\textsuperscript{245}

In the 1900s, as one of the states trying to avoid the militarization paradox of an arms dependency habit, Costa Rica continued to spend less than other isthmian states on arms, and more on sustainable development. Björn Hettne documented the difference and also identified four analogous developments in Ghana (1969-1979), Turkey (1920s-1950s), Mexico (1920s-1940s), and Nigeria (1984-1987).\textsuperscript{246} Some writers following Hettne’s approach have adopted a world systems viewpoint, based on the anti-dependency approach, but still linked to the world order approach.\textsuperscript{247} Others, like Patricia Mische and Abdul Aziz Said, have emphasized a creative transformation of the world order approach toward sustainable, less militarized development.\textsuperscript{248} All these insights echo Articles 23 and 25 in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, over access to necessities and protection from violent conflict.\textsuperscript{249}

\textit{The Militarization Paradox of the Arms Dependency Habit}

Rosa Luxemburg was one of the first anti-dependency theorists to analyze events such as those pioneered in Costa Rica. She observed that capital accumulation by militarization cyclically robs both workers and the means of production, such as the soil.\textsuperscript{250} Subsequently, theorists like J. Van Gelderen and N. D. Kondratieff tried to adjust her observations to explain critical trends, cycles, or fluctuations in capitalist production, interspersed with wars that increase the rate of resource extraction.\textsuperscript{251} These cycles were tuned to fifty-year time spans and

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aligned, for example, with the advent of electricity and steam power in the 1800s or with the development of telecommunication and computer technology in the 1900s. A closer look might have identified other time cycles (sometimes called historical waves or streams) in international peace, feminist, anti-imperialist, and Gandhian liberation movements in the 1900s, built upon the 1800s’ struggles for human rights and against slavery.

Even in Costa Rica, anti-dependency theorists were uneasy about causally linking underdevelopment to insecurity from militarization, although original contributors to Costa Rican neutrality, such as the afore-mentioned José Néstor Mourelo Aguilar, have fruitfully compared the nonviolent approach of Lev Tolstoy with the anti-dependency approach of Abraham Guillén. Thoroughly esteemed in Latin America as a leader, on the order of Ernesto (“Che”) Guevara, Guillén gained recognition for blaming the underdevelopment of the Western Caribbean and the Middle East on Soviet and United States militarization.\(^{252}\) Theorists of the Latin American base communities, such as Louis Joseph Lebret, also received recognition for this kind of analysis.\(^{253}\) Paul Baran, a representative theorist of analogous Neo-Marxism in the United States, explored this causation in the 1950s, but his writings appeared in print only under an alias.\(^{254}\)

Costa Rican efforts have inspired much of the Latin American anti-dependency literature. Beginning in the 1870s, for example, Costa Rican trade unions supported such early anti-dependency thinkers as Antonio Maceo, Augusto César Sandino, and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and the Cuban exiles José Martí and Julio Antonio Mella, whose travels included Mexico and the isthmus.\(^{255}\) By the 1930s, an anti-dependency-oriented trade union had formed


\(^{255}\)Vladimir de la Cruz, Las Luchas Sociales en Costa Rica, 1870-1930 (Madrid: Ruedo Ibérico, 1980), 190-91. See also Jamil Danilo Urroz Escobar, “Algunos Aspectos del Sindicalismo y Su Desarrollo en Costa Rica” (Lic. thesis,
in Costa Rica to deal with the United Fruit Company over employment-management disputes.\textsuperscript{256} 

Heralding revolutionary change to come in the 1940s, the repeated labor struggles that ensued would focus on control of the railroad, telephone, and electric power companies.\textsuperscript{257}

In 1934 intense Costa Rican trade union strikes hit the United Fruit Company, parallel to the Nye Hearings in the United States, which led to the above-mentioned, Soviet-supported government coalition in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{258} Analogous anti-dependency or liberation struggles erupted almost simultaneously between 1933 and 1936 in Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Haiti, Peru, Panama, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic (much like later eruptions in 1959-1961 and 1979-1982).\textsuperscript{259} The classic United States rationale for opposing these eruptions continued to be fear of Soviet bases.\textsuperscript{260} However, the causes lay much closer to home, since the belief that the isthmian countries like Costa Rica wanted a Soviet military base was consistent with a world view shaped by the world order approach to conflict.

The Costa Rican Revolution: Violent or Nonviolent

Under a federal socialist coalition, which criticized dependency on the United States, Costa Rica was the first isthmian nation to establish diplomatic links with the Soviet Union. Theses diplomatic relations were established in late 1944, although the first official Costa Rican ambassador did not go to Moscow until 1976, because of United States disapproval. By the early 1980s, while Costa Rica maintained its friendly relationships with the United States, one of every five Latin American exchange students studying in the Soviet Union would be Costa Rican.

Only Cuba, among Latin American countries, would be sending more students to the Soviet Union in an average year.261

These links, initiated by Costa Rica, had originated from the 1934 revolution for human rights and the satisfaction of human needs. Subsequent disagreement over threats by the United States to invade Costa Rica culminated in a 1948 war led by José Figueres and Manuel Mora. Mora, heading the incumbent socialist government forces, began the battle in control of the San José government buildings, the military barracks, the national airport, and the presidential palace. But Figueres, supported by the United States, waged a rural guerrilla war which overwhelmed Mora’s forces.262 The final 1948 offensive spearheaded by 800 Figueristas ended the revolution.263

Costa Rican socialists had introduced land reform, income taxes, social security, unemployment insurance, a minimum wage, public health care, and the right to strike. After a Nazi submarine attacked a United Fruit Company ship in Puerto Limón harbor, the Figueristas had capitalized on anti-German bias to overthrow the socialists and impound German companies. Figueres kept power by abolishing the army and retaining state welfare laws, while also nationalizing some banks. He was aided by a former conservative president, León Cortes. In addition, Figueres set a precedent for Costa Rican debt-Contra problems by taking World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans to pay for the war, and by permitting ex-Cuban, pro-Batista guerrilla camps, led by Mañuel Artíme, to operate near Lake Nicaragua.264

Following the 1948 war, United States warships continued to press Costa Rica from both sides. Quesada, a city halfway between San José and the Nicaraguan border, was occupied by pro-Somoza and pro-Batista fighters, threatening both the Figueristas and the socialists.

263 Raúl Sohr, Centroamérica en Guerra, Las Fuerzas Armadas de Centroamérica y México (Mexico City: Alianza Editorial Mexicana, 1988), 15, 201, and 141. In comparison, only 500 Sandinistas led the final assault on Managua during the July 1979 Revolution.
Fortunately, in the mid-1950s, the resulting international tension was broken by a nonviolent “brazos caídos,” or general strike, which had the effect of reconciling the United States proponents of the world order approach and the Costa Rican proponents of the anti-dependency approach.265

Costa Rica also received help from the Organization of American States, and thereafter steered its diplomacy with the Soviet Union through Paris, France.266 Revolutionary fervor abated in Costa Rica until the Sandinistas declared their provisional National Reconstruction Junta from San José, one month before the July 1979 Revolution. Then Costa Rica refused a United States request for armed intervention by the Organization of American States, and became the first state to recognize the Sandinista government in Managua.267

In response to the bombings and kidnappings that followed the anti-Sandinista Contras into Costa Rica, the Costa Rican government veered further toward an anti-dependency viewpoint and condemned the 1983 invasion of Grenada. Fearing economic Lebanonization,268 Oscar Arias opted for trade and immigration negotiations with Nicaragua. In these negotiations, Arias relied on the theory of C. Wright Mills and the support of Figueres.269 Understandably, Nicaragua still feared a counter-revolution by the same land route from Costa Rica that the Sandinistas had taken to power.270 In spite of this fear, in 1986, Costa Rica not only shouldered

265 John Bell, Costa Rica, 149-50. Bell reports that U.S. fighters joined the pro-Somoza and pro-Batista fighters against Costa Rica. See also José Ferrer Figueres, “Relaciones de Costa Rica con la Unión Soviética: Respuesta del Señor Presidente de la República Don José Figueres Ferrer, a una Carta Publicada” (San José: Publicaciones del Ministerio de Gobernación, 1971), 7; and Roberto Fernández Duran, La Huelga de Brazos Caídos (San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1983), 45-46. Quesada later became John Hull’s base, as will be discussed in chapter six.

266 Peter Shearman, “The Impact of Soviet Policy in Central America,” in Shearman and Williams, eds., Superpowers, 133.


270 For participation by fighters from France, Spain, Italy, Mexico, Colombia, and West Germany, via Costa Rica in the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution, see Alex Drehsler, “Foreigners Join Nicaragua Fight,” Union (San Diego, CA), 18 June 1979, 1.
the responsibility for peace plan proposals, but even threatened for the first time to sue the United States in the Hague for basing Contras against Nicaragua from sovereign Costa Rican territory. Costa Rica thus maintained its opposition to both the transnational business of a militarized world order promoting underdevelopment and any kind of liberation that would promote an even more severe arms dependency relationship of underdevelopment.

The Nonviolent Approach Toward Survival

One of the clearest contemporary Hispanic theories of nonviolence was articulated by Mañuel Sacristan Luzon. He believed nonviolence to be a peaceful struggle rooted in gender and ecological parity, at heart opposed to the ecological pollution produced by world order and anti-dependency policies. The heart of nonviolence was opposition to all war, even if European guerrilla forces like the Northern Ireland Republican Army continued to appropriate nonviolent tools like political fasting. According to a Mourelo Aguilar in Costa Rica or a Sacristan Luzon in Spain, the pacifist approach to power was even more powerful over the long term than the intellectual cynicism of the (world order-oriented) imperialists or the practical cynicism of the (anti-dependency-oriented) anarchists and socialists, who view the state either as a revolutionary instrument or an obstacle to revolution. In sum, instead of relying on war or militarization to prove its points, the nonviolent approach stressed a sceptical struggle for survival based in mutual change for mutual benefit and responsibility. Unfortunately, the nonviolent approach toward unarmed diplomacy, as preferred by Costa Rica, has often been obscured in theory by the violent diplomacy of the first two approaches.

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272 One indication of the kind of battle being waged by Costa Rica at this time, in the mid-1980s, may have been the fire which gutted the insides of its Washington, D.C., Embassy — a fire never quite cleared from the suspicion of sophisticated arson.

Nonviolent Scepticism for Conceptualizing Peace

Socialist and anarchist viewpoints in particular, as characteristic of the anti-dependency approach, have frequently been confused with the claims of unarmed diplomacy by states like Costa Rica. Socialists who emphasize justice may ignore the abuse of state security power (by armed advocates of world order), on the claim that war originates from capitalism. Anarchists who emphasize peace, on the other hand, may ignore violent individual (revolutionary) behavior harmful to society.\textsuperscript{274} Still, even the arch-realist of the world order vision, Thomas Hobbes, had to concede to the nonviolent premises sceptical of both the world and anti-dependency approaches, to the extent that he honored a soldier’s refusal to kill family members.\textsuperscript{275}

In contemporary terms, Bertrand Russell identified such nonviolent premises as central to the context of truth, which is wider and more profound than mere knowledge. Thus Russell used words like \textit{relativity} and \textit{signification} instead of \textit{cause} and \textit{effect} to describe political truth reached by nonviolence or relative nonviolence. Deeper individual and state implications for long-term nonviolence of this nature can also be found in the writings of D. H. Lawrence, a 1940s friend of Bertrand Russell, exiled from his native England because of his opposition to conscription for war against Germany, whose works helped to encourage nonviolent approaches to international conflict resolution such as civilian defense.\textsuperscript{276}

Nonviolence in an era of omnicidal power has been complicated by the ruins of a bipolar Cold War, still transfixed by nuclear stockpiles. Soviet and United States security interests have been opposed especially in the Western Caribbean, over United States priorities, and in the Middle East, over Soviet and United States’ priorities. Nevertheless, dynamic street demonstrations in Costa Rica and Eastern Europe have illustrated the remarkable power of nonviolence, even for areas of intense conflict shadowed by threats of nuclear war since the 1960s.  

_Costa Rican Nonviolence for the Business of Peace_

In the mid-1960s, strong anti-war demonstrations were organized by the Costa Rican University Federation of Students, focused on evicting CONDECA, the United States-dominated military organization, from the isthmus. Unfortunately, these peaceful demonstrations were disrupted in September 1966 by nation-wide bombings and bomb threats. The disruptions have been traced to the anti-Cuban Free Costa Rica network (MCRL), initially funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Like other peace movements, the Costa Rican peace movement adapted under fire to initiate mutually beneficial change. In 1971 these adaptations produced a pioneer American hemispheric gathering, in the old university town of Alajuela, Costa Rica, of the organization “Service, Peace, and Justice.” By late 1977, such organizations had helped to reinforce

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279Richard Post, “The Second Conference on Nonviolent Liberation Movements in Latin America,” Friends Committee on National Legislation [FCNL] Mimeo, n.d. SERPAJ or _Servicio, Paz, y Justicia_ has developed a base in almost every Latin American state and is affiliated with similar organizations in North America.
consciousness-raising meetings with discussions on nonviolence by representative Latin American Catholic leaders in Medellin, Colombia.280 The meetings produced more than mere analytical work on the significance of leaders like Mohandas Gandhi. They also generated political pressure for United Nations peacekeeping, especially after Javier Pérez de Cuellar visited Costa Rica in late 1986. Pérez de Cuellar’s visit, on the heels of the controversial crash of Eugene Hasenfus, was the first of its kind by the United Nations to the isthmus.281

Parallel isthmian events inspired other nonviolent actions based on ecology, pacifism, and gender parity. Nicaraguan foreign minister Miguel D’Escoto, for example, lost thirty-two pounds in a twenty-six day hunger strike, and succeeded in temporarily reconciling Nicaraguan religious factions estranged by Contra war.282 At the same time, women hunger strikers were also partially successful in pushing the Costa Rican government to meet basic needs like housing, instead of switching its resources to remilitarization.283 The effects of these nonviolent actions spread across the United States, as farmers evicted from their farms by debt foreclosure moved their families onto borderland Nicaraguan farms.284 In the meantime, Brian Wilson would emerge as a pacifist leader of the Veterans Peace Action Teams after losing both his legs below the knees to a California munitions train headed for the isthmus.285

Such change was part of a larger context within four major global conflict zones to be described below. These zones have contained far more than their share of the world’s conflict, since the 1940s, in proportion to their percentage of the world’s population. The four zones will

280 Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Christ in a Poncho (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1983), 118-133. Pérez Esquivel received the Nobel Peace Prize while in prison for his nonviolent leadership. Such nonviolent events also encouraged a Lebanese peace movement during this time, including such groups as the Al-Muntalikun (in Arabic: People-Changers or Uprisers). This Lebanese group was visited by the author during travel and interviews in Israel and Lebanon, March-May 1976, after meeting some of its co-founders in Toronto, Canada (1974-1976).
serve as the geographical basis for introducing a more integrated theoretical perspective on international conflict resolution.

**Global Conflict Zones**

Nomadic ruins that endure to this day indicate that major civilizations began in the isthmian states, like Panama and Costa Rica, and the Levantine states of the Middle East. World order, anti-dependency, and nonviolent approaches to conflict resolution, rising from these ancient civilizations, continue to mold our views on international conflict resolution. According to Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky, the Western Caribbean and Middle Eastern civilizations²⁸⁶ have grouped and survived in various forms over many centuries to sustain two of our present civilization’s most significant interoceanic routes. These two routes, the Panama and Suez Canals, continue to be associated with geopolitically significant conflict zones.²⁸⁷

The section which follows is intended to offer an expanded orientation for international conflict resolution theory, extending this theory in a global sense, to focus on the Western Caribbean and the Middle East as global conflict zones. The four zones are the Western Caribbean, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa. Among these zones, the Middle East and Southern Africa have about the same land area, but the highest and lowest population densities, respectively. In contrast, the Western Caribbean and Southeast Asian zones each cover an area of land a third that of each of the other two zones.²⁸⁸ Central government

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²⁸⁶ C. C. Lamberg-Karlovsky and Jeremy A. Sabloff, *Middle East Ancient Civilizations, The Near East and Mesoamerica* (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin and Cummings Publishing Co., 1979), 327-28. According to these two authors, those civilizations in the Western Caribbean had twice the urban population of the Middle East at that time.


²⁸⁸ *Social Indicators of Development 1988* (Baltimore/London: WBK and Johns Hopkins Press, 1988) and *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1982* (Havana: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1982), 519-26. Namibia is not listed. The four global zones, home to a fifth of the world population, are (1) the Western Caribbean: Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela; (2) the Middle East: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, both Yemens, Kenya, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia; (3) Southeast Asia: Burma, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; and (4) Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Comparative data on arable land is not available. All four zones have a higher than
expenditures, from 1945 to 1985, for these four global conflict zones, indicate that militarization frequently profits the supplier of arms but promotes severe underdevelopment for the recipient.289

A world order approach toward small states like Costa Rica has inspired policies, like the Monroe Doctrine, used to justify conflict in such zones. From 1945 to 1985, ninety percent of United States foreign aid and arms went to states in these four zones, under varying command structures governed by the world order approach.290 Comparable Soviet policies were mainly directed at the Middle East, for reasons of strategic geopolitical proximity and because Muslims would constitute over a fourth of the Soviet population by early in the 21st Century.291

On the whole, according to Barrett, Kende, Petit, Rageau, and Chaliand, these four zones accounted for an aggregate three-fifths of recorded wars from 1945 to 1985. This aggregate count measures the wars significant both for their total number dead and their impact on international relations, including such conflict as that in Chile, Afghanistan, and Eastern Europe. Though significant as sources of world oil, coffee, cotton, and diamonds, these four zones appear to matter more to the super-powers for their geopolitical significance in arms and drugs than for their resource extraction value — as will become clearer in Chapters Five through Eight.292

average fertility rate, statistically compensating for war loss. Please see also Appendix C for intensity of wars and percentages of dead from war, by state, and Appendix D for a world map, shaded to illustrate the four zones.


290Other zones have been dominated by similar policies such as the Open Door, Manifest Destiny, and Constructive Engagement (all U.S.), or Marching Frontiers (Soviet). For the percent of aid and arms — derived by dividing the number of states receiving aid in these zones by the number of all states receiving such aid — see U.S. AID, “Implementation of Section 620 (S) of the Foreign Assistance Action of 1961, As Amended, A Report to the Congress for 1984,” (Received by House Committee of Foreign Affairs, 20 Nov. 1985), Mimeo, 25-26a. For the command structures, see Humberto García Muñoz, La Estrategia de Estados Unidos y la Militarización del Caribe (Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: University of Puerto Rico, 1988), 223-31.

291Dorothea E. Woods, “Islamic Countries and Conscientious Objection to War and Military Service” (Geneva: Quaker U.N. Office Mimeo, n.d.), 2-3. Southeast Asia may also have geopolitical significance for Soviet intervention in international relations, at least more so than the other zone, i.e., Southern Africa.

Similar findings on these four zones have emerged from trend research on war, genocide, terrorism, and even war-related prostitution, by Gurr, Harff, Azar, Berry, Eckhardt, and the Brookings Institute.

**Strategic Conflict Dominated by Violent Power**

From a Costa Rican viewpoint, conflict in these four zones raises challenging issues of sovereignty. On the one hand, Costa Rica claims to have abolished its military power. On the other hand, the United States, dominating military power relationships around Costa Rica, still adheres to nationalist theories like those of Mahan and Clark that preempt Costa Rican claims of neutrality. According to Björn Hettne (a professor in the Peace and Conflict Research Department at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden), the effect of this United States militarization is most threatening from a sovereign economic development standpoint in the destabilization that resulted from a Contra infrastructure intended for invading Nicaragua.

Perhaps the simplest way to interpret the United States program for world order in Costa Rica, through such destabilization (to be more fully explored in Chapter Eight), is to trace the

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87-647922, (1987), 17, 39-48, and 65-69. Again, please see Appendix C for quantification. Direct evidence of such violence can also be accessed in the annual reports of the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture, unique in the Americas, with a $250,000 per year budget, 62% of its clients coming from the global conflict zones. See its “Annual General Meeting, July 19th, 1990,” Mimeo, n.p.


United States Central Intelligence Agency’s Caribbean personnel management patterns. During the initiation of the Contra war (1979-1983), for example, according to Neuberger and Opperskalski, the states of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Jamaica each accounted for about fifteen percent of the Central Intelligence Agency’s total personnel stationed in the Caribbean. The remaining personnel were spread throughout the rest of the Caribbean, clustering in Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Trinidad & Tobago. There were twice as many agents per capita in Jamaica, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Trinidad & Tobago as elsewhere in the Caribbean. Finally, at least six agents seasoned in Latin American, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian war zones were stationed in Costa Rica during the early 1980s. Throughout the rest of the entire Caribbean, outside of Costa Rica, only one or two of these seasoned, veteran agents were stationed in each state.

From 1979-1983, such veteran agents directed United States Central Intelligence Agency management in Costa Rica. A central figure was Deane Hinton, “trouble-shooting” throughout the isthmus, by way of the United States State Department. Another centrally important agent, James Anderson, gained his experience while co-directing the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in the early 1970s, having served previously in the Dominican Republic and Mexico (1960s). Next in line, Jack Forcey, with experience in Costa Rica going back to the country’s revolutionary 1950s, had been posted to Cairo later in the 1950s, then to Brazil, Vietnam, and Kampuchea in the 1960s before returning to Costa Rica. David MacDonnell served in the Dominican Republic (1960s), and Richard Vago in Laos (1960s) and in Finland (1970s), before Costa Rica. From 1984-1987, Joseph Fernández directed the Central Intelligence Agency in

299 “Jack M. Forcey,” Biographic Register (1972), 356. See also Neuberger and Opperskalski, Mittelamerika, 180-83 and 188-200; Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, eds., Dirty Work, The CIA in Western Europe (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978), 689; and “Dennis Fay Smith,” Biographic Register (1973), 356. Smith was posted to Vietnam in the
Costa Rica, allegedly under “Project Veil” after the “La Penca” bombing. Fernández had seen duty in the Middle East before working in Brazil in the 1960s and in Vietnam in the 1970s. These veteran agents focused United States’ security decision-making for a world order approach to conflict resolution violently rooted in the Western Caribbean.

An Arab-Latin Focus — Hopes and Options

The reason for considering these zones is to facilitate an understanding of intense conflict in such as way as to introduce a more integrated understanding of violence and nonviolence in international conflict resolution. Since much of the literature deals with violent conflict in the Middle East, less violent conflict resolution strategies in Costa Rica may seem unrelated at first to conflict resolution in general. Thus, the two prime examples for clarifying violent and nonviolent approaches are the two states of Lebanon and Costa Rica, although the very brief comparison following is meant only to prepare the way for discussion of the method (in Part Two) and outcome (in Part Three) of international conflict resolution.

Outside intervention began in both states in the 1850s, with periodic, intense conflict in the 1950s and again after 1975, when both states were still considered as the leaders in literacy and culture of their respective Arab and Latin worlds. After the decisive Lebanese arms

1950s, and then to Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador by 1983. The author is grateful to Louis Wolf for computer-assistance in locating these cites.


302 See the first part of chapter 8 on Costa Rican literacy levels. For Lebanon, see Pat and John Caldwell, “Population Change and Development in the ECWA Region,” Cairo Demographic Centre, Research Monograph Series (Cairo: Cairo Demographic Centre, No. 9, 1984), 45.
shipments — tailored to fit Eden Pastora’s scruples against accepting weapons from any source connected to the pro-Somoza National Guard which had tortured and killed his father — and then the Iran-Contra scandals, (to be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven), not even Costa Rica continued to be such a leader. A few individuals in the Middle East still preferred the nonviolent approach also preferred by Costa Rica.

The brief look at Lebanon which follows — for insight to preface a short discussion of why conflict has concentrated in the Western Caribbean and the Eastern Mediterranean — comes from the co-founders of the Lebanese Peace movement al-Muntalikun, Souheil and Esma (Nadine) Khouwli. Started by women like Wadad Cortas (a pioneer educator of Arab university women), Al-Muntalikun — literally, the people-changers — had 200 core members and a working membership of 1,000. It mobilized community resources for practical first aid, bomb shelters, and education for liberation. Members dealt with breadlines, unemployment, lethal roadblocks, mercenary snipers, broken water lines, cut telephone lines, disrupted postal services, and the victimization of indiscriminate shelling. Their organization rested on both gender parity and intercultural roots, and was continued by Najdeh (a Lebanese and Palestinian womens’ aid society) after 1976.

During March 1976, a coalition of popular forces, including al-Muntalikun, struggled to establish a National Liberation Front and an anti-dependency-oriented republic in Lebanon. As the Kataeb militia armed by Israel destroyed the city’s main food and water supplies, and Syria undercut arms and munitions supplies, Beirut’s civilians faced a tightening cordon blocking

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303 As will be carefully noted in chapters 6-7, this scruple of Pastora skewed covert CIA arms logistics in northern Costa Rica — the crucible from which both Sandinista guerrillas (leading to the 1979 revolution) and Contra guerrillas (leading to the 1990 Chamorro election) had based violent conflict — toward Lebanon via Israel. Other Lebanon-Costa Rica parallels: severe debts, mountainous terrain, self-proclaimed neutrality, dependency on outside energy sources, the lack of state army conscription since the 1940s, and guerrilla military power (the FSLN formed in 1961 in San José and the PLO formed in 1964 in Beirut). Please note that the terms Levant and Levantine will refer to the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, as counterparts to the terms isthmus and isthmic.

304 A Middle East pacifist, Joseph Abileah, led appeals for a confederation based on cooperative use of all the Middle Eastern rivers, especially the Jordan, Litani, Yarmuk, and Euphrates River systems, on the basis of something like the Central American Common Market, (suspended from 1979 to 1990); see Joseph Abileah, “An Israeli’s Proposal for Peace,” Mennonite Brethren Herald 8 (30 May 1968): 8. The proposal landed him in jail off and on, after 1948, but the idea caught on informally.
incoming supplies of food and water.\textsuperscript{305} An Arab Defense Force from Syria, funded by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, tried to restrain the resulting chaotic violence,\textsuperscript{306} which filled even the Bay of Beirut with the rotting refuse of war.\textsuperscript{307} The polarization of this 1976 war deepened as Israel and Syria fought each other on Lebanese territory. In a scenario familiar to Costa Ricans, the Lebanese were eventually forced to import eighty percent of their food.\textsuperscript{308} Sealing the mouths of the Litani and Awwali Rivers, Israel finally succeeded in blockading Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut from the Mediterranean Sea. Israel was backed in this naval blockade by the Kataeb, operating inland as Israel’s proxy force.\textsuperscript{309}

About half the United Nations peacekeeping forces to die anywhere in the field would die in Lebanon, defending Lebanese neutrality.\textsuperscript{310} As in Costa Rica, the Lebanese conflict was complicated by drugs and debt.\textsuperscript{311} The international wars in both Lebanon and Costa Rica,

\textsuperscript{305}Widad Cortas, interviews with the author in Beirut, March-April 1976; and Souheil and Esma Khouwli, interviews and conversations in Toronto, Canada, and New York City with the author, 1974-1976. Souheil’s father, helping to coordinate security in the Jounieh Casino, disowned Souheil when he refused to fight in the war there. Esma’s parents directed the School of Education in the American University of Beirut. She joined Souheil in exile. (During the author’s visit to Beirut in March-April 1976, about 1 to 1.5 million people (refugees and residents) were at risk due to incoming fire and shortages of basic necessities like food and water because of this blockade. The concussive effects of bombing and shelling in Beirut, by Israel, Syria, and the various militias and guerrilla forces, did not feel very different in force from the 20-30 second earthquake tremors [from 4.5-5.0 on the Richter Scale] also experienced by the author in Mexico City during April 1989.) To compare this nonviolent viewpoint of the Khouwli’s with the world order approach of the U.S. Ambassador and CIA agents, seasoned in Southeast Asia through the arms and drug business and posted to Beirut during this time in 1976, see John Kelly, “The CIA in the Middle East,” Counterspy 3 (Dec. 1973): 3-11.

\textsuperscript{306}Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 162-64. The ADF operated as an internationally accepted-peacekeeping force, not like the Costa Rican Contras privately funded by Saudi Arabia.


\textsuperscript{309}“Israel Secretly Joins the War in Lebanon,” Time, 13 Sept. 1976, 30-31.

\textsuperscript{310}Timur Goksel, “UNIFIL: Honour in Lebanon,” [U.S.] Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 113 (Oct. 1983): 400 and 406. Goksel notes the use of attack dogs, patrol checkpoints, electronic terrain surveillance, and personnel surveillance radars, which could also be used in the isthmus. The location of its telecommunications headquarters in Nahariya, Israel, has been a problem for UNIFIL; see Marianne Neiberg and Johan Jörgen Holst, “Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Comparing UNIFIL and the MNF,” Survival 17 (1986): 402-403 and 416-417. Paralleling the efforts for neutrality in Costa Rica when faced by outside war, mobilization for peace also occurred inside Israel; see “West Bank Radicals Sweep Local Elections,” Jerusalem Post, 14 April 1976, 1. In the shadow of the 1976 war of Beirut, Bethlehem was the only city in Israel’s Palestinian areas that did not alter its political leadership.

\textsuperscript{311}For the Kataeb arms and drug business, based on 290,000 acres of opium poppies and transplanted Colombian coca plants, see Collin Knox, “The Lebanese Connection, Bekaa Valley Drugs Fuel Endless Conflict,” Soldier of
moreover, were also fought over the development of two critical fresh water rivers, the Litani (threatened by salinization as a result of desertification) and the San Juan (threatened by underground water salinization from the oceans compressing either side of the isthmus). Both were used for growing cash crops and for hydroelectric power. Costa Rica has used relatively nonviolent strategies to retain control over its part of the San Juan River ecosystem, although repeated Costa Rican border incidents allegedly spurred by the Contra infrastructure constructed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency have threatened the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua ecosystems. Lebanon, on the other hand, has almost lost the Litani River to Israel several times during violent struggle.

The 1980s United States Iran-Contra Congressional Hearings, although they came late and accomplished little, strengthened the Costa Rican stance against the Contras and for regional peace. But, at least according to London Observer journalists Farzad Bazoft and Simon de Bruxelles, the extent to which critical United States interests in Costa Rica were affected by the strategic 1984 to mid-1985 revelations of William Buckley in Iran and Lebanon remains unknown. Iran may have sold or traded these revelations in secret in exchange for arms.

Nevertheless, Costa Rican leaders like Oscar Arias tied their hopes for peace to the halt of the Contra war during the potential United States embarrassment over the arms and drug scandal. Arias sent Farid Ayales Esna as his ambassador to open peace negotiations with Nicaragua.

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immediately after the hearings opened. On the other hand, despite Costa Rican initiatives, Nicaragua retained a distrust of Israel, as a United States proxy selling arms to Iran and arming the Contras. Meanwhile, as if to counter Costa Rican peace initiatives, the United States reiterated its complaints of “terrorism” from Sandinista Nicaragua, exemplified in the “terrorist” take-overs of its embassies in various states, primarily in the Western Caribbean but also in the Middle East.

Quietly, in addition to backing their geopolitical priorities with nuclear threats, the United States and the Soviet Union also continued to experiment in these zones of conflict with cheaper, but equally controversial, bio-chemical and bio-molecular innovations in “just” warfare. Although Piller and Yamamoto, for example, note the impossibility of establishing cause or guilt for the use of these weapons, these authors have devised charts which, with some reconstruction, reveal a pattern in the use of such weapons in the four zones. This general pattern of use, from the 1950s onward, started and continued with the testing in the Western Caribbean of tear (CS) gas, bio-chemical and bio-molecular warfare, and TW (trichothecene mycotoxin) herbicides — in states like Cuba, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. By the 1960s, the use of such weapons, especially CS gas, had broadened to Southeast Asia — to states like Burma, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam (10,000 tons in South Vietnam), Indonesia, and Kampuchea. By the 1970s, this warfare had spread as well to the Middle East and Southern Africa — to states like Iraq, Iran, Zaire, Angola, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Namibia, Ethiopia, and South Africa.

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319 Charles Piller and Keith R. Yamamoto, Gene Wars, Military Control Over the New Genetic Technologies (New York: Beach Tree Books, 1988), 64-69. Piller and Yamamoto use SIPRI and the U.S. government as the sources for their findings. The authors also note that the 1975-1976 Church Committee in the U.S. Senate discovered further weapons controlled to a large degree by organizations like the CIA, such as “paralytic shellfish toxin.” CS gas is a generic term for tear gas.
After 1979, United States geopolitical plans were reorganized by a Rapid Deployment Force based in Florida with over 100,000 troops and a $14 billion annual budget. Targeting the other three zones from the Western Caribbean, these plans were operationalized by special forces using small tilt-rotor planes, land-to-air-snatch planes, propeller-driven parachutes, and even backpacks to deploy small nuclear bombs or to carry computers interfaced with satellites in space.

It appears, as a result of such affairs in theory and technology, that only the island of Diego Garcia and the state of Israel have become as central for intelligence matters as Costa Rica in the United States world order approach to conflict resolution. These affairs may also help to explain why Israel and Costa Rica have shared the highest per capita levels of indebtedness to United States aid — to be discussed more fully in Chapter Eight on the outcome of the international debt in Costa Rica.

Under this world order approach, equidistant from gulf oil in the Middle East, from Singapore in Southeast Asia, and from South Africa, Diego Garcia has channeled Middle East intelligence information through Australia back to the United States — to compensate for the security problems of an energy production void (for example, scarce oil or uranium fields) in the capitalist East Asian states and South Africa. By the same token, Israel gained (imported) nuclear weapons capability shortly after its formation in 1948, directly from the Manhattan

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Project, a capability soon augmented by missiles capable of reaching much of Europe, Africa, and Asia. But Israel’s potential for intervention remained stronger in Southern Africa and the Middle East, with Diego Garcia being active in Southeast Asian affairs as well.

The next chapter, chapter four, will introduce Part Two on methodology. In the chapters ahead, discussion will explore the methods and outcomes of conflict resolution — intended to address such problems as geopolitical security, an imposed canal, and ecologically sustainable development — in relation to Costa Rica’s problems of international debt and the international arms for drug trade. Employing differing levels of violence and nonviolence, these methods and outcomes flow from the three major approaches to conflict resolution just reviewed.

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326 In 1987, Nouhad Mahmoud (U.N. Lebanese Representative) denounced what he claimed were 600 Israeli 900-mile-range ICBM’s; see “Iran, Lebanon, Oman, Afghanistan, Costa Rica, and Somalia Present Views to Conference on Disarmament and Development Questions,” UN Press Release (DC/DEV/17, 1 Sept. 1987), 2.


328 For further analysis of the mirror images raised by contending sides in conflict, including the use of fear, terror, fanaticism, self-righteousness, name calling, ongoing dialogue, and the “truth” in each side of the conflict; see Mike Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), 96-103. Please consult the select bibliography for more on the three outlooks.
Part II  Method

Chapter 4

Disarmament and Development

This chapter, opening Part Two on the methods used in conflict resolution, introduces both Costa Rican and international attempts to resolve conflict (as represented by the United Nations). As will be shown, Costa Rica has attempted to use the rule of international law as its primary tool in resolving conflict. To the degree that international law has tried to abolish all war, Costa Rica has attempted to solve its problems without recourse to military power. For example, rather than enlarging its militia into a permanent military force (as has been common throughout the nation-state system), when it mobilized in the 1850s and the 1940s to meet outside threats, Costa Rica instead disbanded its military forces back into its local militias — following international law literally, rather than rhetorically.329

In Costa Rica, as a nation state, however, unarmed or armed approaches to conflict resolution may evolve toward combinations of peace, security, and development, or war, insecurity, and underdevelopment. Since the internationally-accepted criteria for evaluating the practice of conflict resolution, as previously noted, stem from the triangular debate of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, development, and security, this chapter will be couched in the terms of that debate.330 The three sides of this triangular debate can be seen in the affinity of the world order approach for methods that produce security, of the anti-dependency approach for methods that produce development, and of the nonviolent approach for methods that produce disarmament. A fitting symbol of the hypothesis central to this dissertation, this triangular debate also brings together the three theoretical approaches used as options to produce domestic and international conflict resolution.331

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329International laws since the 1940s wars, including the U.N. Charter, have literally declared war wrong or illegal for use in conflict resolution. However, this legal rhetoric outlawing war has not been observed literally by many states.
330This debate focused on the proposition that peace and security depend on a combination of development and disarmament, as previously introduced in Chapter 1.
331The qualities relating intranational (domestic) and international conflict resolution in this same triangular context for resolving problems are: (1) fairness and parity in disarmament, (2) efficiency and cost effectiveness in
Documents from this triangular debate, accepted by near-global consensus by a plenary vote of the General Assembly in the United Nations, state that peace and security come from the interplay of mutually-interdependent disarmament and development. The main proposition to result from this debate was a triangular one, that disarmament, development, and peace or security depend on each other.

This debate has been troubled by contending definitions of security. These contending definitions concern the secondary hypothesis of this dissertation — that when the attempt to gain or maintain security is skewed by militarization (violent conflict resolution), then war, insecurity, and underdevelopment dominate international relations. By the same token, the anti-dependency preference for development and the nonviolent preference for disarmament can also be distorted into short-sighted charity or foolish passivity. The triangular proposition from this United Nations debate will be refined in terms of the two hypotheses of this dissertation, outlined in the first three chapters, to explain numerous attempts to use the rule of law for resolving conflict peacefully in the San Juan River border ecosystem.

**Methodological Nonviolent Criteria and Their Characteristics**

Table 1, following below, will identify three criteria and characteristics of nonviolent conflict prevention and resolution. The examples in the table all concern Costa Rica. These criteria and characteristics will be explored throughout the remaining two parts of the dissertation on method and outcome. As shown in Table 1, the three intentional criteria that characterize such nonviolence include, on the one hand, (1) a nonviolent approach that defends peaceable, ecologically-sustainable values and a nonviolent (re-)definition of security. On the other hand, these criteria also affirm a society that (2) secures needs, rights, and self-reliance domestically, and (3) emphasizes the rule of law and unarmed, nonaligned neutrality to achieve its international objectives — instead of war, militarization, or military violence. Such criteria tend to produce a “fire-proof” society, rather than a society depending upon “fire to fight fire” for its prevention and resolution of conflicts.

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Table 1

Three Nonviolent Criteria and Their Characteristics in International Conflict Resolution

1 A nonviolent approach to a peaceable, unmilitarized society, (perennially rethinking national security), envisioned to prevent or resolve conflict and to inspire the values of equitable provision for needs and rights — an approach characterized by consensual, future-oriented, ecologically-sustainable criteria, instead of militarization or military intervention criteria — such as, for example:

A Creating and encouraging policies that articulate nonviolent or unarmed neutrality, based upon equitable, ecological needs and rights interests (since the state began in 1821); and

B Building the first Third World university for peaceful, ecologically-sustainable development, and conflict prevention or resolution — the U.N. University of Peace or UPAZ (established 1978-1982).

2 A nonviolent society to secure internal public safety and necessities, (via economically-fireproof, civilian-based national security) — a society characterized by active trends and strategies that emphasize self-reliance in labor, skills training, and technological feedback — such as, for example:

A Targeting funds on health, housing, employment, and education needs and rights, paired with equitable gender parity and land distribution standards — thus reducing military allocations and expenditures (since the 1880s), as well as controlling banking, farm or trade unions, and industrial production facilities, while avoiding an arms dependency relationship (1914-1984).


B Encouraging progressive views, as demonstrated in nonviolent strikes, opinion polls, voter support, and street demonstrations, even if the state is forced toward militarization — thus deterring outside economic or political pressure to remilitarize (since 1821) and abolishing military power and conscription policies (in the 1850s and since 1948);\textsuperscript{338} and

C Voting consistently for professionals such as doctors, farmers, lawyers, or teachers, rather than past military generals, for the top national leadership posts (since 1821) — complemented by a voluntary militia instead of a professional military (since its 1850s Pyrrhic victory over William Walker and the United States).\textsuperscript{339}

3 A nonviolent international outlook to prevent and resolve external, international conflict — an outlook characterized by active (formal and informal) diplomatic efforts that emphasize the rule of law and state support for national and international peace or anti-war movements\textsuperscript{340} — such as, for example:

A Affirming its self-declared, internationally-recognized status of\textit{unarmed neutrality} (in 1822, 1848, 1858, and 1983) — and so providing its territory and diplomatic “good offices” as a basis for exemplary diplomatic openings: such as for the United States and the Soviet Union (from 1945 to the 1980s) and for Cuba and the United States (since 1960);\textsuperscript{341}

B Founding and hosting the world’s first international court in its capital city, San José (1907-1916), and then supporting world rule of law through the World Court in the Hague (since 1921) — including its recourse to the international rule of law to protect generic isthmian interests centered on its border with Nicaragua (1916 and 1986);\textsuperscript{342} and


Guaranteeing international security through its self-reliant neutrality and nonalignment standards — by way of such international organizations as the United Nations, the Socialist International, the Nonaligned Movement, and the European Economic Community (since the 1940s).


To place these criteria and their characteristics in perspective, one more brief look at the Swiss and Austrian views of all three of these criteria above might be helpful. Briefly stated, a Swiss or Austrian person would quickly remind “an outsider” that they observe armed neutrality, not unarmed neutrality as claimed by Costa Rica. But, as part of a centuries-old tradition providing neutrality to resolve conflict between states at war, neutral states commonly do offer discreet good offices — offices which neutralize a less violent state as a reconciler for belligerent states.

Swiss and Austrian cities have traditionally offered themselves as discreet, neutral, less violent meeting grounds for states and superpowers in conflict. As a result of the international

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trust placed in their good offices, Swiss and Austrian embassies may, in turn, host “ambassadors” from conflictive pariah states (as in the cases of Chile, Israel, or South Africa), oversee elections (as in Namibia or Nicaragua), and even shepherd other ambassadorial “interest sections” (as in Havana or Washington, D.C.) — as well as conducting Irani and Soviet diplomacy in sensitive states such as Egypt, South Africa, and so forth.345 (Costa Rica, of course, most directly concerns “American” interests.)

Two prime historical events relate conflict resolution in Costa Rica to international conflict resolution. These two events — two cases in which the United States firmly rejected an international court during the 20th century — are interesting as examples of the use of international law instead of war to resolve conflict by states. The first event, in 1916, was the undercutting by Woodrow Wilson of what was then the world’s only international court. The second, in 1985-1986, was Ronald Reagan’s 1985 abandonment of a later world court, to preempt that court’s decision in 1986. Both of these events involved the San Juan River and issues related to it.346

Analysis of these events, historically framed by a background of conflict resolution beginning in the 1850s, will be keyed to the ongoing Costa Rican struggle for neutrality, complicated by a Third World push for nonalignment. After the 1940s, intense violence would dominate conflict resolution in the Western Caribbean, and after the 1960s, similarly intense levels of violence would resonate in the Eastern Mediterranean, Southern African, and Southeast Asian zones of global conflict.

Costa Rica and Its Primary Tool: The Rule of Law

Although Costa Rica preferred nonviolence, at least by historical accounts in isthmian literature, there were two major times when Costa Rica mobilized its police or militias to defend itself by armed force from armed intervention — as befitted a neutral state under international


346The author is grateful to Noam Chomsky for 1988-1990 correspondence, especially 23 Dec. 1988, over this little-publicized aspect of U.S. and international law.
law. Costa Rica and the United States confronted each other for the first time on such a field of battle in the 1850s Rivas-Walker war. This 1850s war framed isthmian-United States conflict that would end the claims of Spain, England, and Germany for geopolitical power in the isthmus. These wars for geopolitical power continued to influence Costa Rica’s future, whether they centered on common local and global needs such as a border canal, or on the specific purposes of the United States such as an oil pipeline in Costa Rica near Nicaragua.

The United States Undercuts a World Court to Stop Costa Rican Nonviolence

The two epic events in international conflict resolution mentioned above — in 1916 and 1986 — concern a river christened El Desaguadero (or The Drain) by the Spanish conquistadors. The river was soon renamed after a village called San Juan del Norte, located where the river enters the Atlantic Ocean. This village first gained importance as the port used for transshipping American loot from Peru over the isthmus to Spain. When English colonialism replaced Spanish colonialism, the village became a neutral Miskitian port between the unconquered interior of the isthmus and the areas in the Western Caribbean subjugated by England. England used this port as an isthmian gateway for its attempts to conquer the interior by violence.

In the early 1800s, English attempts to colonize the isthmian interior were challenged by isthmian forces mobilized from Chinandega in what is now northern Nicaragua. Characteristically for a neutral state that resisted being drawn into any side of a war, Costa Rica was attacked first by England, in unsuccessful forays from the Atlantic Ocean, and then by the isthmian forces resentful of its neutrality who invaded from the Pacific Ocean. The isthmian forces were led by Francisco Morazan, a Honduran general known as the isthmian Simón Bolívar who fought to free the region from the English by military violence. In 1844, England

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347 D. Manuel María de Peralta, El Canal Interoceánico de Nicaragua y Costa Rica en 1620 y en 1887 (Brussels, Belgium: Imprenta de Ad. Mertens, 1887), 5-6. These two events, in the 1850s and the 1940s, were noted as the times when Costa Rica deterred outside pressure to remilitarize, even though it did mobilize forces which were quickly demobilized after these events — see Table 1, 2 B above.

348 Manuel Araya Incera in his San José, Latin American Social Science Faculty (FLACSO) office, interview by the author, 30 March 1989. A pipeline would have provided the U.S. with a backup to the Trans-Panama Pipeline and also an excuse for invading southwestern Nicaragua from Costa Rica over alleged Sandinista sabotage.

349 Edwin Góngora Arroyo, Biografía del Río San Juan (Alajuela, Costa Rica: Museo Histórico Cultural Juan Santamaría, 1983), 9-11.
throttled military resistance in the isthmus by blockading San Juan del Norte, despite the interference of Napoleon Bonaparte, who also wanted to build an isthmian border canal. For a decade or so, the isthmus had to meet English terms for world trade.\footnote{Clotilde María Obregón Quesada, \textit{Costa Rica, Relaciones Exteriores de Una República en Formación, 1847-1849} (San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1984), 18, 116-120, 123, and 198.}

But isthmian military resistance to English colonialism regrouped along the Sarapiqui River in northern Costa Rica, which connected San José to the San Juan River, and around the village of Rivas in southwestern Nicaragua, near Brito on the Pacific coast. This resistance was temporarily overwhelmed in the 1850s by a United States pirate army led by William Walker. A Costa Rican counterattack, led by Juan Rafael Mora, decimated Walker’s army. Lasting about twenty hours, this counter-attack ending the bloody Rivas-Walker war was the last significant foreign military venture initiated by Costa Rica. It also marked the first of many low-intensity counterinsurgency wars initiated by the United States in the isthmus.\footnote{Edwin Arroyo, \textit{San Juan}, 12-13.}

Walker’s backers in the United States had as their aim to expand New York City transoceanic trade with California, by way of the isthmus and New Orleans. Detouring around the Rocky Mountains, the trip to and from California averaged two or three weeks, including several days of portage across the isthmus, even for the shorter, more desirable route along the Costa Rican border with Nicaragua.\footnote{Rafael Obregon Loria, \textit{Costa Rica, la Guerra del 56 (La Campaña del Transito) 1856-1857} (San José: Editorial Costa Rica, 1976), 30, 33, and 37. This border route was faster than and half the cost of a Panama portage.} To consolidate its rights to isthmian passage after the Rivas-Walker war, the United States had restricted English claims in the isthmus by an 1850 (Henry L.) Bulwer and (John M.) Clayton Treaty. This 1850 Bulwer-Clayton Treaty established legal precedents for the interoceanic Suez Canal Treaty, to be signed in 1863.\footnote{Hugh Gordon Miller, \textit{The Isthmian Highway, A Review of the Problems of the Caribbean} (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), 289-93.} Then, from 1854 to 1856, United States warships tried to establish control over the isthmus and the border
route by heavily shelling the French, English, German, and Sardinian trading vessels and
businesses in the harbor of San Juan del Norte.\textsuperscript{354}

In the wake of the Rivas-Walker war and the carnage in San Juan del Norte, a
Cañas-Jerez Treaty in 1858 delineated Costa Rican and Nicaraguan border rights, suspending
border disputes between the two countries and turning Guanacaste into a province of northwest
Costa Rica. This 1858 treaty, mediated by El Salvador, also established navigation rights over
the San Juan River between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, from three miles west of El Castillo
Viejo (\textit{The Old Castle}) — east to the coast of the Atlantic Ocean.\textsuperscript{355} However, since sand bars
physically shifted much of the San Juan River southeast by the 1860s as well, Costa Rica gained
sovereignty over the flow of the Colorado, the dominant mouth of the San Juan River where it
flows into the Atlantic Ocean from Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{356}

After the 1860s, an ex-Cuban engineer in the United States Navy, Aniceto Menocal,
initiated two surveys for a transoceanic border canal. His preliminary survey, finished in 1886,
roughly estimated working costs at between $48 and $65 million.\textsuperscript{357} Shortly afterward, his
second survey, for an official United States canal commission — strongly supported by, for
example, men of wealth such as the father of Franklin Delano Roosevelt,\textsuperscript{358} assessed the total
construction cost for a border canal at $120 million. This proposed border canal would stretch
between the villages of San Juan del Norte and Brito in southern Nicaragua, touching on Costa
Rican tributaries into the San Juan River for about a third of the way inland along the border with

\textsuperscript{354}Philippe-Auguste de Barruel-Beavert, \textit{Bombardement et Entière Destruction de Greytown} (Paris: Delegue de la
\textsuperscript{355}Edwin Arroyo, \textit{San Juan}, 20-21.
\textsuperscript{356}Felipe Rodríguez Serrano, \textit{Los Derechos de Costa Rica y Nicaragua en el Río San Juan} (San José: Lehmann,
1983), 11-12 and 51.
1886), 48.
\textsuperscript{358}Geoffrey Ward, \textit{Before the Trumpet; Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905} (New York: Harper & Row, 1985),
166 and 210.
Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{359} From an engineering viewpoint, Menocal’s surveys recommended a border canal as better, cheaper, and faster than a canal over Panama.\textsuperscript{360}

A United States company then began to dig a border canal, excavating 17 feet deep and 230 feet wide in the first of 170 projected miles. Excavating the first mile also included logistical matters such as preparing ship docks, warehouses, machine shops, military barracks, and a thousand-foot cement breakwater. In addition, engineers strung sixty miles of telegraph line, covering half the needed distance, as loggers cut down three-fourths of the trees scheduled to be eliminated for the whole project.\textsuperscript{361} However, events precipitated by unarmed Costa Rican diplomacy with England, combined with an economic recession in the United States, stopped the work.

Diplomats from England and Costa Rica fought this border canal project to a standstill by helping to negotiate the Hay-Pauncefote and Bunau-Varilla Treaties. These diplomats negotiated the two treaties in such a way as to include four international neutrality rights, based on the legal precedent of an 1888 Constantinople (Straits) Agreement for building the Suez Canal. The 1888 agreement, in turn, had been synthesized from the 1863 Suez and 1850 Bulwer-Clayton Treaties. The rights guaranteed to any state hosting an interoceanic canal zone by the 1888 agreement were navigation, maintenance, sovereignty, and arbitration. Included in the Hay-Pauncefote and Bunau-Varilla Treaties, these four rights defined the structure for the Panama-United States canal treaties and any other potential border canal treaty.\textsuperscript{362}

In effect, instead of a border canal, the 1903 Bunau-Varilla Treaty authorized United States claims for a Panama canal, conceived by Alfred Thayer Mahan and financed by John Pierpont Morgan. Costs to the United States for the Panama Canal rose to $387 million — over

\textsuperscript{359}Ricardo Jinesta, \textit{Confirmación de los Derechos de Costa Rica en el Canal de Nicaragua} (San José: Falco Brothers, 1937), 72.
\textsuperscript{360}Vicente Saénz, \textit{El Canal de Nicaragua, Conferencias y Discusiones de Mesa Redonda, Paraninfo de la Universidad Nacional de México}, 24 Julio de 1929 (Mexico City: Michoacan, 1929), 8-9.
\textsuperscript{361}Archibald Ross Coloquhoun, \textit{The Key of the Pacific, The Nicaragua Canal} (London: Archibold Constable & Co., 1895), 21-22 and 40-43. It was another 20 miles across Lake Nicaragua. The Canal was to have 6 locks.
\textsuperscript{362}Vicente Saénz, “Los Canales Internacionales,” \textit{Cuadernos Americanos [CAS]} 16/3 (May-June, 1957): 11-13, 15, and 17. Since these were four “neutral” rights, the use of the Panama Canal Zone for war became technically illegal as well, despite U.S. practice to the contrary. See also, e.g., Table 1, 3 A above.
three times the officially assessed cost for a border canal — a figure much closer to what Costa Rica would have considered fair payment for the rights to a border canal.\textsuperscript{363} These conflicts over control of the isthmus, which peaked in the 1850s, formed the background for the first of the two crucial events involving the United States and Costa Rica in an international court in the 1900s.

The first event was a judgement against the United States in the world’s first international court. This Inter-American Court, funded in Costa Rica by a $100,000 Andrew Carnegie grant, began with great promise as its five judges assumed five-year terms in 1907. Forced from Cartago to San José after a 1910 earthquake,\textsuperscript{364} the court faltered two years later when nearly 3,000 United States Marines stormed Nicaragua in order to cancel a border canal proposal from Japan.\textsuperscript{365} In 1914, under Woodrow Wilson, the United States designed the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty to deter any further competition over such a canal. Soon after, $3 million, allegedly paid to amortize Nicaraguan debt according to the terms of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, returned to United States banks.\textsuperscript{366} But Costa Rica challenged the legality of the treaty, and would defeat the United States in this pioneer international court.

Costa Rica challenged the sale by Nicaragua to the United States of Costa Rica’s right of sovereignty in the San Juan River. This challenge undermined United States hegemony in the isthmus. Recalling juridical precedents like the 1858 Cañas-Jerez Treaty over the Sarapiqui and San Carlos tributaries of the San Juan River, and the four neutrality rights, Costa Rica invalidated the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in 1916 in the international court. In reaction to the

\textsuperscript{363} Gregorio Selser, *Panamá, Erase Un País A Un Canal Pegado* (Mexico City: Universidad Obrera de México, 1989), 35-38. This cost included payments to the French who started construction. The Panamanians who fought for independence against Colombia received $67 million in payment over the next three-quarters of a century, up to the time of the 1977 Carter-Torrijos accord, while the U.S. netted $32 billion in profit, according to U.N. data quoted by Selser. The Costa Rican decision for less violent conflict resolution than that chosen by Panama kept Costa Rica from being overrun by a foreign-owned and managed canal.

\textsuperscript{364} Thomas L. Karnes, *The Failure of Union, Central America, 1824-1960* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 191-96. The international court in Costa Rica was called the Inter-American Court of Justice. The Hague world court in the Netherlands would be called the International Court of Justice. Andrew Carnegie initially funded both courts.

\textsuperscript{365} Raúl Sohr, *Centroamérica*, 131-32.

court’s judgement, the United States quit the court, an action which undercut and quickly killed the court. In refusing to recognize the right of Costa Rican sovereignty, the United States also encouraged proxy invasions by Nicaragua against Costa Rica in 1919.\textsuperscript{367}

Two years later, a more durable international court began in the Hague, the Netherlands, based upon the Costa Rican experience and guided by the League of Nations. To stabilize this international court as much as possible, the Hague Court tripled its number of judges to fifteen and almost doubled their bench time between elections to nine years.\textsuperscript{368} Toward the end of 1921, flagging attempts to rebuild the isthmian international court disintegrated under United States’ claims of its right to intervene militarily in Cuba.\textsuperscript{369} Nevertheless, over 120 international treaties, protocols, and conventions were filed in the Hague court by Costa Rica between 1921 and 1985, all attempts to reassert isthmian rights (especially on ecological sovereignty) through the international rule of law.\textsuperscript{370}

In the 1930s, Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua led isthmian conflict resolution attempts under an anti-dependency approach. Sandino’s primary international demands were isthmian sovereignty over the San Juan River system and cessation of internal counterinsurgency wars over the ownership of land.\textsuperscript{371} He joined forces with the International Workers of the World (“Wobblies”), exiled for opposing United States conscription and militarization. His

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\textsuperscript{367}Congress, Senate, Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting a Report of the Secretary of State in Response to Inquiries Contained in a Resolution of the Senate, August 2, 1919, in Regard to the Invasion of Costa Rica by Nicaraguan Armed Forces and the Reason why Costa Rica was not Permitted to Sign the Peace Treaty at Versailles, 66th Congress, 1st sess., Doc. No. 77 (21 August 1919), 3-5 passim. See also Mary Stewart, “The Recognition Policy of the United States in Central America since 1907” (Ph.D. diss., Clark University, 1931 [?]), 89-90.


\textsuperscript{371}James Dunkerley, Central America, 71 and 81 n44.
methods of struggle for independence were a varied assortment including yoga, anarchism, theosophy, freemasonry, American Indian socialism, and Seventh-Day Adventist ideas.\textsuperscript{372}

In the face of Costa Rica’s rule of law and Sandino’s guerrillas, the United States built about thirty major military bases in Panama and Nicaragua. These bases sponsored research, training, and deployment for warfare throughout Latin America, and elsewhere, despite the four previously-mentioned neutrality rights for any international canal zone.\textsuperscript{373} In response to this militarization and intense warfare to its north and south, Costa Rica tried to deter further violent conflict in 1948 by abolishing its own military and executive war-making powers. This abolition of its war powers was integrated into the Costa Rican Constitution, articles 12 and 121.\textsuperscript{374} Then Costa Rica renovated its “Pentagon” into a national museum, with exhibits ranging from archeological artifacts to memorials of peace parades.\textsuperscript{375}

Nevertheless, United States senators representing an autarchic world order view, such as John Tower and Strom Thurmond, still lobbied hard to undermine the sovereignty of the isthmian nations by trying to revive the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.\textsuperscript{376} Thereafter, by the 1960s, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, under such autarchic, outside


\textsuperscript{373}Gregorio Selser, \textit{Canal Pegado}, 58-59, 63-64, 136, 146, and 173-75.


\textsuperscript{375}The National Museum of Costa Rica, formerly its “Pentagon,” would later hold Oscar Arias Sánchez’ Nobel Peace Prize as well. See also, e.g., Table 1, 1 above.

military pressure, only Mexico and Costa Rica could claim to be civilian democracies in the Caribbean and in Latin America.  

The United States Abandons a World Court to Deter Costa Rica Nonviolence

The second United States rejection of an international court accompanied its rejection of the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution. At first, the United States reacted to this revolution by trying to persuade the Organization of American States to sponsor an invasion of Nicaragua. But, as noted already, this reaction was foiled by José Figueres and Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre from Costa Rica, among others, during a tense meeting of the Organization of American States. At the same time, while the Organization of American States and the United States Congress were working toward a consensus not to attack Nicaragua, the executive branch of the United States government began a series of covert attacks on Nicaraguan territory.

The Central Intelligence Agency coordinated these covert Contra attacks on Nicaragua from Florida, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Its attacks from Costa Rica were clustered around the San Juan River between Lake Nicaragua and the Atlantic Ocean. Alfonso Carro, Enrique Chacón, and Benjamin Piza aided in supervising these attacks from their administrative posts inside Costa Rica’s federal rural guard and ministry of security. One of the most intense military battles razed the village of San Juan del Norte during 13-17 April 1984. Shelling from the Atlantic Ocean by the battleship U.S.S. McKinley began this battle to breach a Contra beachhead inside Nicaragua. But the Contras were back in Costa Rica in less than 72 hours, belying their claim to have gained Nicaraguan land by violent struggle.

Meanwhile, since 1980, Japan had been insisting more loudly than ever that the Panama Canal’s 50,000 metric ton limit was obsolete. As proof, Japan pointed to a fifty-percent drop in the Canal’s ability to accommodate world-class, ocean-going ships between 1970 and 1978. Japan argued that the Canal’s limitations were placing needless restrictions on its own global economic potential and that of the United States. But, despite the support of other states, such as

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377 SIPRI, *Arms Trade*, 261. SIPRI also made this claim for Cuba.
Brazil, Japan’s $8.3-billion ten-year canal project proposal for Panama was buried after a few months by a quickly convened, joint Japan-United States study commission.\footnote{See “The Second Panama Canal Project,” *Japan Quarterly [JPQ]* 27 (July-Sept. 1980): 303-307. See also Armando Mayorga, “Gobierno Canetolso en Respaldo a Canal Nicarguia,” *NCN*, 16 March 1989, A 4.}  


From 10 May 1984 to 27 June 1986, the Hague World Court hammered out this near-global consensus, condemning the United States war and blockade in the isthmus, whether along the Atlantic Coast from the Coco River in Honduras to Puerto Limón in Costa Rica, or along the
Pacific Coast from Puerto Corinto in Nicaragua down to Murciélago, Costa Rica. In recommending that the United States stop its covert attacks concentrated on Nicaragua, the World Court also advised an interim payment to Nicaragua and negotiations for war damages to be paid to the other states damaged by the war. In response, during this consensus process, the United States rejected the World Court on 7 October 1985, to avoid responding to the court judgement expected in 1986.\(^{386}\) In abandoning the World Court as a current head of state, Ronald Reagan put himself in the company of Iran’s Khomeini, who also rejected the court’s consensus during the hostage crisis in the United States Embassy in Teheran.\(^{387}\) By supporting an anti-dependency approach toward regional peace and development, the World Court’s June 1986 judgement rejected the interventionist United States view of world order.

The next item on Costa Rica’s diplomatic agenda was to gain world recognition of the San Juan River system as an international river, a status historically recognized by the 1815 Treaty of Vienna. International legal precedents for this recognition would, of course, include related European river border treaties dealing with the Danube and the Rhine River. International diplomacy patterned upon the 1815 Treaty of Vienna thus backed the unarmed diplomacy agenda of Costa Rica, as did the international court judgements of 1916 and 1986.

Yet no precedent existed in the Americas for exercising such diplomacy over a border canal. After all, the St. Lawrence Seaway agreements affected only about a third of the Canadian-United States border. There were no cooperative border treaties governing the Coco River (Honduras-Nicaragua), the Río Grande River (Mexico-United States), or the Plate-Uruguay River (Brazil-Uruguay-Argentina).\(^{388}\)

\(^{386}\)Josef Goldblatt and Victor Millán, “The Central American Crisis and the Contadora Search for Regional Security,” in \textit{SIPRI} 1986, 523. See also the International Court of Justice, “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,” (Nicaragua v. the United States of America), Judgement of the Court,” \textit{ICJ Release} 86/8 (27 June 1986): 3-5, 9, and 20. The ICJ criticized the U.S. trade embargo on Nicaragua, the mines near El Bluff, Puerto Corinto, and Puerto Sandino, and the military attacks on Puerto Sandino (Sept. 1983-March 1984), Puerto Corinto (October 1983), San Juan del Sur (March 1984), and San Juan del Norte (April 1984). The ICJ also advised an initial $370.2 million war damage payment, as an interim award to Nicaragua, to be later negotiated as a fixed sum agreeable to all parties.


\(^{388}\)Manuel Freer Jiménez in his San José home, interview by the author, 29 March 1989. Freer Jiménez was one of the original architects of official Costa Rican neutrality in 1983 (see chapter one). The Rhine River flows along and through the Netherlands, West Germany, France, and Switzerland. The Danube flows along and through Romania, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and West Germany. The relevant treaties also proceeded from the above-mentioned four international neutrality rights from the 1850, 1858, 1888, and 1903 treaties. The author is grateful to Adolf Jonker, a retired Dutch diplomat, for insight into these examples. See also, e.g., Table 1, 1 A, 3 A, 3 B, and 3 C above.
In the hope of advancing isthmian peace, Costa Rica tried to interpret the Hague decision as both a bridge to support Nicaragua and a lever to expel Contra arms and drugs from Costa Rican territory. Costa Rica also used the Hague decision as a basis for its attempts to attract the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. At the same time, further bargaining between Japan and Nicaragua for a border canal early in the twenty-first century complicated the claims of Costa Rica to the San Juan River. As a door to the outside world, the San Juan River system was starting to attract vibrant foreign investment, industry, and trade, thus invigorating the least populated electoral zones of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and creating the potential for rapid economic growth.

*Costa Rican Ecology in Practice — Expanding Legal Means*

Costa Rica applied ecologically sensitive conflict resolution to conflicts over the San Juan River system. Its efforts heightened international awareness of the need for legal conventions on pollution control and resource replenishment. Ecological sensitivity on the level needed by Costa Rica, it might be added, was initially manifested by the United Nations during a previous war with ecocidal dimensions. That war, in Laos and Vietnam, may have permanently damaged soil, water, and biotic elements of the IndoChina environment. Costa Rica feared a similar fate.

However, in our interdependent world where under three percent of available water is fit for consumption, Costa Rica chose to exploit its fresh water surplus for profit, concentrating

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391 “Comandante Carlos ... The Revolution Advances,” *Agenda International* (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional or FSLN), Mimeo, Nov. 1986, 10. For information on the 8,000 peasants regionally displaced by the 1978-1979 war (leaving only 250 people near San Juan del Norte in 1979), and about the zone itself, with the highest pro-FSLN voter percentage of any Nicaraguan federal electoral zone, see also “Río San Juan: `Territory Free of Landless Peasants’,” *Envío* (5 Oct. 1986): 30-36.

on hydroelectric power and cash crops for export, and not on basic food crops for local
collection. Under United States political pressure, its agribusiness production of cash crops
grew to meet its debt payments. The ecological impact of agriculture on this scale was
complicated by crop fungicides, herbicides, nematocides, and insecticides (like DDT), plus forty-
six hundred tons of “agent orange.” Pesticide poisoning cases begin to rise among Costa Rican
children and animals, especially the fish and birds. In addition, adult lung and stomach cancer
rates rose each year, linked to toxic combinations of air pollution and chemically-abused tropical
soil, additionally acidified by deforestation.393

Deforestation and The Collective Good — Resource Limits

Deforestation in Costa Rica, coupled with a Contra-agribusiness infrastructure for
attacking Nicaragua, had consequences beyond the loss of lumber profits, or even the depletion
of ozone. This deforestation also disrupted what ecologists call hydrologic cycle regeneration.
Under normal conditions, water recycles steadily through soil, plants, and the atmosphere by the
interaction of precipitation, absorption, run-off, and evaporation. However, when rain strikes
barren dirt where spongy roots and foliage formerly kept tropical forest soil moist, loose, and
fertile, the earth is packed harder and harder each time. This packed dirt hinders rain from
replenishing underground water tables and results in flash floods that denude river banks. These
flash floods stunt plant growth. Decreased rain and cloud cover, as a result of the failure of the
hydrologic cycle to regenerate, lead to desertification, and over time to climatic warming effects
that may have catastrophic outcomes, as they have in Haiti, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and
Bangladesh.394

Costa Rica has suffered many setbacks in its nonviolent use of the rule of law to resolve
such conflictive issues as a growing deforestation problem — following on the heels of the
Contras imposed by the United States to overthrow a government unacceptable to the United
States in Nicaragua. As will be discussed, deforestation, concentrated since the 1850s in

393 Alexander Bonilla, Situación Ambiental de Costa Rica (San José: Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deporte,
394 Jodi Jacobson, Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch No. 86,
Nov. 1988), 19. For other militarization-deforestation links, see John Tinker, et al., “Environmental Degradation and
northwestern Costa Rica— to be intensified in the 1940s for United States bases, in the 1960s and the 1970s-1980s (throughout northern Costa Rica) for United States-funded anti-Cuba and anti-Sandinista wars, respectively — cleared away a previously-indomitable rainforest.

Originally justified by the requirements of war or conflict, such deforestation associated with land abuse and inequitable land distribution has killed about eighty percent of the Costa Rican tropical rainforests. This rapid deforestation is a serious threat to tropical rainforests like those in Costa Rica, which have sustained about half of the world’s germ plasm, the DNA building blocks of living cells. Given the present rate of desertification, especially in the Western Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa, scientists in international ecology and development predict that tropical rainforests may disappear midway into the twenty-first century.

Reversing the threat of deforestation would require changing how we view such violent ecocide. In the future, respect for rainforests as a collective good may someday outrank the human bias that favors military problem solving. But, achieving such a collective good will require a definite timetable in the near future, since a rain-forest depends upon water and dust nutrients from elevated or suspended epiphytes and fungoid growth (mycorrhizae), or an ecosystem of jungle and animal biomass. (There are 850 genera and 28,200 species of suspended epiphytes alone in the bio-mass of forests like those that still exist in Costa Rica.) A rainforest which depends on biomass suspended high above the jungle floor for its nutrients cannot grow back after clear-cutting as can a temperate forest ecosystem, sustained by ground soil nutrients. Unless the whole ecosystem is rebuilt at great expense, beginning in the next

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395 The northwestern area of Costa Rica, now the canton of Guanacaste, became part of Costa Rica after the near-disastrous Rivas-Walker war in the 1850s.
396 Costa Rica may have, however, delayed such deforestation much more than may have been the case in the war-related desertification of the Middle East or Southern Africa as noted in chapter 2. The U.N. debate on “disarmament and development,” when related to such deforestation, would seem to indicate that the potential development of Costa Rica will depend on demilitarization in order to redevelop its main natural resource, its rainforest. In other words, peace, security, and development in Costa Rica will depend on how nonviolently this militarization and deforestation trend is addressed. See also, e.g., Table 1, 1 A.
397 Catherine Caufield, *In the Rainforest* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 37-39 and 59. Caufield predicts the following percentage loss levels by the 1990s: Costa Rica — over 80%; Thailand — 60%; Honduras, Nicaragua, and Ecuador — 50%; Guatemala, Colombia, and Mexico — 35%; Madagascar — 30%; Philippines — 25%; Malaysia — 25%; and Indonesia — 10%. She also notes that Haiti, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have lost their rainforests, while Nigeria and the Ivory Coast may lose theirs in the 1990s. In the early 21st century, Latin America may be left with 57% of the remaining rainforests worldwide.
decades, little more than arid or semi-arid brush will be able to grow on the jungle soil left behind.399

In such a context, the United Nations triangular hypothesis implies that development and reforestation in a state such as Costa Rica may hinge on how quickly militarization can be reversed — before laterized soil prevents reasonable regrowth of the tropical forest ecosystem. The World Bank, for example, in trying to implement this hypothesis, has discovered that reforestation depends upon forward-looking planting of certain trees. These nitrogen-fixing trees improve regional soil porosity and bulk density, as well as prerequisite tree canopy closure, nutrients, (re)cycling, transfer, and conservation. Costa Rica has pioneered in such global social and scientific experimentation.400

The traditional remedies familiar to ecological advocates — a political mandate for environmental programs, governmental priorities that balance the needs of rural and urban citizens, and regular quality checks for chemical sedimentation in various habitats — although important, will be only part of reversing the environmental damage. Because critical changes in the delicate ecological balance of the isthmus also affect the balance of continental and international political systems, strengthening nonviolent means for international conflict resolution may also be necessary. For instance, when proposing a 33-meter-deep, 200-meter-wide, and 500,000 metric-ton sea-level canal over Panama in 1980, the Japanese learned through research model scenarios that a sea-level canal could introduce acanthaster starfish from


the Pacific to plunder the Caribbean coral reefs, along with Caribbean coral reef sharks to devour the Pacific anchovy fishing industry.401

Costa Rica narrowly escaped a similar “eco-tastrophe” in 1974, when ecological advocates stopped an oil pipeline across the country. Proposed by the United States Interocceanic Liquid Transport Company, this $400 million pipeline would have extended from Cahuita Reef to Golfo Dulce. The United States intended the pipeline to reinforce its other geopolitically strategic pipelines: the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline (Prudhoe Bay to Puerto Valdez), the Capline (New Orleans to St. Louis), the Colonial Line (Texas to New Jersey), and the Trans-Panama Pipeline. However, pushing a nonviolent strategy to the fore in national congress or legislative assemble, the Costa Rican Ecological or Green Party stopped this pipeline proposal by raising the possibility of oil spills and politically-motivated sabotage.402

Border planning by ecological advocates began as far back as an 1840s meeting on Cuba Island in Lake Nicaragua.403 In 1974 “green” politics404 over a border park were again supported by Nicaraguan and Costa Rican cooperatives along the San Juan River.405 In June 1985, Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, proposed demilitarized areas for peace and conservation between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.406 Aerial warfare, Contra foraging, tropical deforestation, and inflated land prices, however, from United States infrastructural projects to send Contras into Nicaragua, inhibited Costa Rica’s President, Luis Monge.407 Persevering until Oscar Arias
replaced Monge as president of Costa Rica, Ortega resumed this border planning with better results.408

Protected border areas for peace began to look more attractive by the late 1980s, as Nicaragua and Costa Rica started planning together against the Contras and deforestation. On 16 May 1987 a Managuan conference resumed the peace and reconstruction themes of the 1974 San José conference,409 addressing, among other threats, the potential international loss of genetically unique and species-diverse tropical ecosystems.

However, disagreement on how to establish these protected areas for peace arose within a Managuan Canal Commission formed inside the Nicaraguan Ministry of Finance in March 1989, under William Hüpper. Costa Rica voiced added uncertainty over Nicaraguan priorities410 after an aerial border reconnaissance flight in late March 1989 by private Japanese businessmen led by Yasunobu Somura. Reactions to this flight led the Japanese Ambassador in Managua, Yoshizo Konishi, publicly to deny the new proposal and any other Japanese border canal plans within a few days.411 But the initiative for joint border planning was lost once again.

On the other hand, Japanese pressure for a sea-level border canal continued to attract increasing international interest. Japan’s first attempt, stopped by the United States Marines in Nicaragua in 1912, fared no worse than its $8.3-billion, ten-year Panamanian proposal of 1979-1980, buried under Contra conflict and United States deliberations. Japan’s third border canal proposal, lasting under 48 hours during 18-19 March 1989, increased the stakes to $15 billion, spread over a twenty-year period of construction into the twenty-first century.


411“Japón Repite: No le Interesa el Canal, Niega Aseveración de Miembro de Misión Científica,” La Prensa, 20 March 1989, 1. Affirmed in less than 48 hours by an anonymous political affairs attaché in the Japanese Embassy in Managua, interview by the author, 20 March 1989. Such announcements from an embassy are unusual, since embassies are not often publicly involved with private enterprise.
Deforestation, “Green” Politics, and Ecological Violence

The dam siltation and deforestation for beef export which threaten to destroy the tropical rainforest ecosystem of northern Costa Rica, since the 1850s, may stem from deforestation of this area for military purposes or through devastating wars. It is clear that, as a result of the combined militarization and underdevelopment along their shared border discussed in Part One, from 1961 to 1978 Costa Rica and Nicaragua began to lead the rest of the isthmus in beef export, starting slowly and then accelerating six-fold in quantity by weight. After 1979 Costa Rica became the single largest beef exporter in the isthmus, though an average Costa Rican still ate less meat than an average United States house cat.412 Simultaneously, erosion and siltation began to clog Costa Rica’s Arenal Dam, a multi-billion-dollar Inter-American Development Bank project in the north. Related siltation in the San Carlos River complicated environmental damage in the upper Alajuela and Los Chiles provinces, where Contra militarization was also concentrated against Nicaragua.413

The challenge of green politics to Costa Rican remilitarization came first from organizations like the Guanacaste Monteverde Community and spread to the downtown San José Peace and Tropical Science Centers. The Monteverde (or Green Mountain) Community had begun with energetic isthmian and United States pacifist-socialist people in the 1940s. It started near Santa Elena in the Tilarán Mountains, twenty-five miles north of Puntareñas and a few miles west of the continental divide near Lake Arenal. Some of its founders later moved to Canada and Australia, but its original 1,000 acres grew to 6,000, prosperity based on its creamery cooperative producing 2,300 gallons of milk and a ton of cheese daily by the 1980s. Monteverde’s farming methods, which eschewed or strictly limited burning, clear-cutting, and agrochemicals, and emphasized pasture rotation, soon became a vital ecological example for other small cooperative farmers in the area.414

413IDB and Central America: Deforestation Threatens Big Hydro,” WRR, March-May 1988, 1 and 5. For the geostategic nature of this dam, see Rodrigo Camacho Elizondo, Atlas Geográfico Didáctico (Heredia: Editorial Rodrigo Camacho, 1980), 18, 23, 25, and 27-28.
A short-lived Costa Rican Green Party, reflecting the methods of Monteverde, also agitated for legislation to reverse deforestation and ecological pollution. But both major Costa Rican political parties accused the Green’s seven-member executive council of communist sympathies. The two parties combined to drive the Green party out of power in the late 1980s by condemning the Green’s 1974 parliamentary defeat of the oil pipeline proposal, mentioned above.

International conflict resolution continued to be linked ecologically to border peace proposals. Political consensus for a border park expanded with help from Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Nations Environmental Program, private United States organizations, and the Swiss International Union for Nature Conservation. Uniting behind the Si-A-Paz Park proposal, its proponents tried to reverse the ecological damage from remilitarization in the isthmus. During the 1987 Managua conference, for example, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands proposed funding for this ecological “heart” of the Arias or Esquipulas II peace plan. Conference participants estimated a $2 million start-up cost, toward which the Netherlands had advanced $0.5 million before obstacles suddenly appeared from Japan, in the form of its 1989 canal proposal, and from the United States.

The obstacles concerned vested economic and political interests. For example, United States pesticide corporations were exporting over forty percent of their total sales to the isthmus by the mid-1960s. An ecological agreement threatened such sales and complicated such interests in Nicaragua. For example, under United States-led development methods, by the 1970s, Nicaragua had come to lead the entire world in the per capita rate of internalized DDT. In 1980, forced to import 2.4 million pounds of DDT by carefully-crafted Contra attacks, Nicaragua again

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415 Alexander Bonilla, *Situación Ambiental*, 266-71. Partido Ecológico Costarricense was the first American Green Party to win a voting place in its national parliament.
417 Alexander Bonilla Durán in his San José Trianon Building office (shared with Costa Rica’s Ambassador to Nicaragua under Oscar Arias [Farid Ajales] and the dean of the country’s only university international relations program [Myron Ríos]), interview by the author, 27 March 1989. Platform statements on equitable wealth redistribution and gender parity in wages did not help to assuage the bias of the two dominant political parties against central ecological principles. On similar issues in the Bering Straits and the eastern Mediterranean, see Jan Knippers Black, “Greenpeace: The Ecological Warriors,” *USA Today* 115 (Nov. 1986): 28 ff.
420 Mattijis von Bonzel, political attaché in his office at the Netherlands Embassy in San José, interview by the author, 19 April 1989.
reported DDT breast-milk samples forty-five times the World Health Organization’s maximum tolerance level — then a world record.\textsuperscript{421} In addition, a United States manufacturer had dumped forty tons of mercury, a by-product of pesticide production, into Lake Managua at the origin of the San Juan River ecosystem. The poison seeped slowly into a lagoon near Managua’s water reservoir.\textsuperscript{422}

Geopolitical considerations also continued to impede ecological agreement. For example, the United States opposed not only non-American involvement in an ecologically-benign Nicaraguan geothermal power plant,\textsuperscript{423} but also non-American-based criticism of deforestation silting up the fresh water sources of the Panama Canal.\textsuperscript{424} The United States opted for more militarization instead, despite the ecological dangers to the rainforests and water supplies surrounding Costa Rica.

The subordination of ecological concerns to United States geopolitical priorities in Costa Rica recalls similar events in Laos and Vietnam. As far as can be ascertained, the United States Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development used ecocide in Laos and Vietnam for comparatively distant geopolitical goals. But over a quarter of South Vietnam, then a United States client state like Costa Rica — though much further away from the United States than Costa Rica geopolitically — was scarred by the killing or damaging of 45,000,000 trees, and the bomb cratering displacement of three trillion cubic meters of earth. Because of the chemical design characteristics of “agent orange,” herbicidal damage was concentrated in

\textsuperscript{421}Douglas Murray, “Social Problem-Solving in a Revolutionary Setting: Nicaragua’s Pesticide Policy Reforms,” \textit{Policy Studies Review} 4 (Nov. 1984): 220-22. Sandinista Nicaragua tried to use safer, organic pesticides, from the Netherlands in particular, but these pesticides were selectively destroyed at ports of entry by Contra attacks, leaving the Sandinistas little option other than more DDT — which further endangered the rest of the San Juan River ecosystem, including Costa Rica. For the lethal effects of such pesticides as DDT on internationally-migrating birds, many of which “summer” in the U.S., see the testimony of James Barborak, UPAZ professor, Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, \textit{U.S. Development Assistance and Environmentally-Sustainable Development}, 100th Cong., 2d sess., S. Hrg., 100-967, 1988, 350-57.


\textsuperscript{423}“Volcano Core of Bold Nicaraguan Renewables Plan,” \textit{WISE Bulletin} (Amsterdam, the Netherlands), April 1982, 1.

500,000 hectares of mangrove trees. Herbicides, cheaper and more efficient than aerial bombing, cut all Vietnamese industrial and agricultural production by forty percent. Half of the trees in the Vietnamese tropical rainforests were scarred or killed by herbicides. In the 1980s, coastal Vietnamese summer temperatures had climbed fifteen degrees — to an average 100 degrees Fahrenheit — and intensified underdevelopment in Vietnam through cyclical flooding, erosion, and desertification. At least forty percent of the mangrove estuaries along the Caribbean have also been singled out by “agent orange” in Costa Rica. The ecological impact of this geopolitical violence heightens the effects of war, insecurity, and underdevelopment, whether in Vietnam or Costa Rica.

Disarmament and Development— United Nations Options

Peace, security, and development in states such as Costa Rica may depend on the international consensus expressed by the United Nations disarmament and development debate. This consensus was made possible in the Third World by states such as Costa Rica and India, which have traditionally used their status of neutrality or nonalignment to establish relationships with both the Soviet Union and the United States. Neutral states in Europe such as Austria, Finland, and Sweden, along with formerly neutral states such as the Netherlands, formed another block of support. Concretized by a three-week General Assembly conference led by India in the fall of 1987, this international consensus also concerned itself with the $14 billion annually lost through industrial pollution. In brief, the conference engendered much debate over how to re-

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educate relatively militarized and industrialized states toward ecologically-sustainable conflict resolution and development.

The United Nations debate grew from an observation that peace and security depend on both disarmament and development in areas like the isthmus. Discussion of disarmament, however, even in the United Nations, is skewed by military security priorities. In the United States, on the other hand, international conflict resolution derived historically from militarized interpretations of the Renaissance nation states and the Iroquois Confederacy. In the Soviet Union, both pro- and anti-czard writers, like Ivan Bliokh and Yakov Novikov, have also interpreted conflict resolution from the viewpoint of violent traditions. The prevalence and the ease of recourse to “assembly-line” militarization has thus compromised the potential of a United Nations consensus for less violent conflict resolution around the world.

It is ironic, then, given this consensus over security, insecurity, and militarization, that the International Labor Organization chose to convene the disarmament and development debate originally by discussing war-torn areas like the isthmus. In May 1927, for example, shortly after the Versailles Treaty, a world conference was held to discuss economic development and international conflict resolution. That conference was attacked and boycotted by the United States, although it might have prevented the Axis blitzkrieg (lightning war) in the 1940s. Subsequent meetings and proposals sponsored by India eventually led to a United Nations disarmament and development resolution for international conflict resolution.

In 1950, two years after Costa Rica abolished its military power, India drafted a preliminary disarmament and development resolution. Honoring Mohandas Gandhi, the 1950


430 Donald A. Grinde, Jr., The Iroquois and the Founding of the American Nation (San Francisco: Indian Historian Press, 1977), 130-33.


Indian resolution suggested a “United Nations Peace Fund,” maintained by disarmament savings and devoted to development.\(^{434}\) During the late 1950s, the nonaligned movement, along with Dag Hammarskjold and Ralph Bunche, managed the adoption by the United Nations of more practical methods for implementing the Indian resolution also mentioned in chapter one.\(^{435}\) In 1959, a Latin American draft proposal for international conflict resolution appeared spontaneously during an Organization of American States meeting in Chile. Then, in 1971, Costa Rica sponsored an Organization of American States resolution to encourage both sustainable development and international conflict resolution.\(^{436}\)

These three Third World initiatives, in 1950, 1959, and 1971, led to the United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) agreement in 1974, articulating economic principles for Third World nonalignment. This 1974 agreement was strengthened in 1978 by a proposal for a new international economic order, which reaffirmed disarmament and development as the foundation for international conflict resolution.\(^{437}\) In 1980 the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research opened in Geneva as a clearinghouse for such initiatives, supported by France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Romania, Argentina, and Switzerland.\(^{438}\)

In the early 1980s, with the help of institutions related to the Geneva-based Disarmament Research Institute, Costa Rica engendered the first United Nations-related university for Third World peace research.\(^{439}\) France and Brazil mobilized a steering committee for the 1987 General

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Assembly conference on disarmament and development.\textsuperscript{440} But the Geneva Disarmament Research Institute could not locate more than twelve global computer databases capable of tracking and verifying world disarmament and development trends. Six of these twelve databases were located in Washington, D.C., and one each in Ann Arbor (Michigan), Seattle (Washington), Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania), New York City, Paris, and Moscow. The scarcity of such large databases limited the potential of critical trend data studies for the most part to the French, English, and Russian languages.\textsuperscript{441}

Despite such limitations, ongoing Geneva Disarmament Research Institute planning for upgrading international conflict resolution, in cooperation with the United Nations University, has produced: (1) a World Institute for Development Economics (WIDER, Helsinki, 1985), (2) an Ivory Coast and Ghanaian international development organization (1989), and, for the future: (3) a user-friendly, computerized technological assistance organization (in the Netherlands), an outer space organization (in Austria), and a computer software laboratory (in Macau).\textsuperscript{442} Further criteria have evolved in the study of disarmament, development, oceanography, outer space, and regional technologies.\textsuperscript{443} Clear representative statements originated especially from Cuba, Sweden, Burkina Faso, and the Netherlands during the 1987 fall conference on disarmament and development in New York City.\textsuperscript{444}  


\textsuperscript{442}“UNU Goes to Congress,” and “Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (INRA),” \textit{American Council of the United Nations University Newsletter}, Spring-Summer, 1989, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{443}UNIDIR, \textit{Data Base}, 3.

In Costa Rica, planning for United Nations international conflict resolution led to offers from Spain and Canada to provide unarmed or lightly armed peacekeeping troops and from West Germany to send supplies for this peacekeeping. These peace-keeping offers were made in response to Oscar Arias’ plea for United Nations intervention. Peacekeeping was planned for southern Honduras, northern Costa Rica, and the southeastern and northwestern borders of Nicaragua, although it was not likely then to be managed from Nicaragua. The preliminary agenda meeting for these international ventures was convened by the five concerned isthmian foreign ministers in San José in late March 1989.

This foreign ministers’ isthmian meeting, held in the same “Yellow House” that hosted the early 1900s international court endowed by Andrew Carnegie, readily approved security verification mechanisms for United Nations isthmian peacekeeping forces. Later, at a meeting in Tela, Honduras, the five isthmian presidents expanded on the preliminary foreign ministers’ meeting by requesting that the Contras disarm and return to Nicaragua. “Humanitarian” United States Contra aid and Panamanian intervention would interrupt the momentum for the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces in the isthmus, but international efforts to deescalate isthmian war and violence would also continue.

Costa Rica has attempted to use the international rule of law nonviolently for peaceful negotiation, based on ecological sustainability. Such a combination well reflects the intent of the United Nations debate on “disarmament and development.” Although relatively unrecognized at the time, Costa Rican attempts in an international court, both directly in 1915-1916 and indirectly in 1985-1986, would help to steer even the United States toward less violent conflict resolution in this isthmus. But such nonviolent methods are hard to measure directly. As will be discussed in the next chapter, violence leaves a measurable trail of dead bodies.

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But nonviolence, even though it may move millions to act quickly, once some sort of yet undefined critical mass in international consensus is achieved, leaves what may be best described as an invisible trail — not measurable by current social scientific indicators (unless one includes the indicators which measure relative accumulation of wealth). Costa Rican nonviolence may, however, be measured indirectly, as will be introduced in the next chapter, even if this nonviolence concerns economic or military intervention by states as powerful as Japan or the United States.

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447 As occurred in India in the 1920s-1930s or in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990.
Chapter 5

Power, Needs, and Rights Criteria

In order to test the viability of Costa Rican nonviolence in conflict resolution, as recently introduced in Chapter Four, this chapter introduces a quantifiable means of measuring violence in conflict. This quantifiable means should also help to prove or disprove the hypothesis of the dissertation on the relative effects of violent and nonviolent conflict resolution in promoting or undermining peace, security, and development relevant to Costa Rica. The indicator to be introduced here resembles the infant and child (ages 1-5) mortality rate indicator, commonly used to measure relative structural violence. But the serial violence indicator to be introduced in this chapter should measure not only the war deaths of children, or the relative accumulation of wealth supporting a child or an infant, but the deaths of all people in war — in other words, a death toll indicator helpful for measuring both conflict intensity and the potential for less or more violent conflict resolution.448

Few international indicators exist that can significantly measure levels of conflict intensity or predict the potential of success in conflict resolution. Such an indicator is basic to proving that nonviolent conflict resolution promoted peace, security, and development in Costa Rica from 1914 to 1984, and that violent conflict resolution promoted war, insecurity, and underdevelopment after its remilitarization in the 1980s. By slow trial and error, United Nations peacekeeping has only begun to address the lack of such an indicator of vulnerability, a fundamental deficiency in our understanding of conflict, insecurity, and militarization. Instead of quantifying wartime suffering and death, most researchers have measured this toll indirectly through indicators of structural violence — or the denial of access to human necessities in underdevelopment — resulting in one way or another from war.

However, militarization and underdevelopment are intimately related to each other in an historical cycle that will be examined in the context of Costa Rica, surrounded and at times

448 As will be explained here in chapter 5, and also in Appendix C with the appropriate, if lengthy, presentation of data, this indicator has been developed through a careful measurement of death tolls from ongoing wars since 1945 in what is commonly called the Third World. The steps used in developing the indicator began with current literature, biased toward what might be called First or Second World conflict, in the field of conflict and conflict
overrun, as will be discussed, by much of the most intense warfare known on our planet. In this
cycle, militarization, or remilitarization in the case of Costa Rica, has been used to repress
dissent, which leads in turn to violent revolution, and which in turn calls up more repression, and
so forth.

Serial Violence — A Tool to Measure Conflict Intensity and Its Resolution

The term serial violence indicator will denote the quantitative international indicator
introduced here to measure the intensity of condensed, continuous, or periodic conflict, and the
potential success of conflict resolution. A serial violence number represents a percentage
derived from total numbers of people killed in war divided by national population totals,
measured over twenty-year time periods. The four global war zones mentioned in chapter three,
where much of the most lethal, hard-core colonial warfare is historically rooted, exhibit
unusually high serial violence. In these zones, the accuracy of the data on serial violence may be
compromised by personal hazards for the researcher, including social ostracism, physical danger,
and even death. A researcher analyzing serial violence in Costa Rica, for example, as will be
discussed, needs to probe the reasons for covert bombings and border incidents, as well as the
relationship of cocaine and diplomatic protection to the spread of AIDS.

The percentages of serial violence may help to explain aggregate density levels of
structural violence as well. In a globally-widening poverty gap which condenses the unremitting
conditions of serial violence, people are often denied access to basic human necessities, such as
food, housing, health care, education, and employment. But the loss of 20 to 25 million people

resolution research. This indicator is especially relevant to the global war zones previously discussed at the end of
chapter 3.

449 The word serial was suggested to the author by William T. R. Fox (professor emeritus), the founder with his wife
Annette Baker Fox (professor emerita) of the Columbia University Center for the Study of War and Peace, as well
as the World Politics journal at Yale University — in personal and telephone interviews with the author in New
York City, Aug.-Sept. 1987. In this chapter, the adjective serial describes condensed warfare that is continuous or
periodic. Colleagues of the Foxes, studying Arab-Israeli conflict at the Hebrew University in Israel, believe that
effectively resolving conflict will be easier once we have achieved some scientific, statistical understanding of
warfare and conflict resolution potential. The word serial was originally lifted from journalistic usage in the U.S.,
as in serial rape or serial murder. The analogy the Foxes used to explain such scientific understanding was the
research of one of their ancestors, who discovered the cause of cholera in relatively impure water during a cholera
epidemic in London. The general availability of data may narrow such research on international levels to after 1945,
but this is a matter of what data has been collected — not the use of the indicator here identified as serial.
since 1945, at the core of intense Third World conflict, is harder to evaluate than the loss of another 20 to 25 million people from war-related famine, the latter dying slowly under less-abrupt, terminal violence.450

Serial and structural violence together are an integral part of the hard-core business of arms, drugs, and geopolitical ideology.451 Lightweight, easy-to-carry cocaine and heroin shipments, for example, fund vested interests that encourage violent conflict resolution in order to stimulate more arms and drug sales, all morally buttressed by conservative geopolitical ideology. By way of illustration, according to observers like Zbigniew Brezezinski, the clashing of geopolitical ideologies in the Ukraine has promoted the highest concentration of serial violence anywhere in the Soviet Union.452 The combination of serial and structural violence there extends over to the Middle East, to states like Afghanistan, where heroin has been an important source for arms funding. The Middle East arms and drug business may have promoted corresponding conflict in the Ukraine, in a familiar cycle.

To understand the context of serial violence in the nation-state system as it impacts one state like Costa Rica, it may be helpful to stand back momentarily and analyze the accelerating violence of war. The approximate figures which follow are intended to provide a background for

450 Nationale Advies Raad voor Ontwikkelingen — Samenwerking,” Advies Ontwikkeling en Ontwapening 76 (May 1982): 28-29 and 82. See also Alex Poteliahkhoff, “The Arms Race and the Health Needs of the Developing Countries,” Medicine & War 3 (April-June 1987): 102. This number does not include the deaths of infants and children due to war or resultant violence, estimated at 15 million deaths per year.

451 Conflict research problems are compounded by the military intervention of industrialized states in nations like Colombia and deaths in those same states from Latin American cocaine. Further problems arise from uncertainties over international arms and drug routes, since, e.g., Brazil, Chile, Japan, Peru, Lebanon, Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia, and so forth, all grow coca plants commercially, but Peru and Colombia — or Cuba or Costa Rica, where allegedly no cocaine is grown — attract much of the geopolitical attention related to cocaine.

comparing wars before and after 1945. After 1945, more accurate but still approximate measurements of the death tolls from war emerged — for war often limited to the Third World, which will be evaluated by the introduction of serial violence data as an experimental indicator.

All the world’s recorded conflicts before the 1980s killed about 3.64 billion people. European wars alone killed 37.5 million people in 1913-1919 and 55 million more in the 1940s. Ninety percent of all the European war dead recorded since 1700 were killed in twentieth-century wars. Another three billion-plus people would be killed in a nuclear exchange, according to nuclear winter projections. Biological and chemical arms also threaten both nuclear and non-nuclear states.

High body counts in pre-1945 wars were historically focused in the four global conflict zones, especially in the American isthmus. Early Spanish estimates of war dead in the Americas indicated that three-quarters of the native people living in the Americas died during the 1500-1800s, with the highest per capita death totals in the isthmus — surrounding what became known as Costa Rica. Recent American estimates for that time, which more than likely include war-

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454 Richard Rhodes, “Man-Made Death: A Neglected Mortality,” Journal of the American Medical Association 260 (5 August 1988): 686-87. Rhodes notes also the danger of nationalism in modern conflict, which increasingly affects mostly civilians in the death toll — climbing from 50% of the death toll (1940s) to 85% (1980s). In the 1920s, Lewis Richardson, a founder of peace and conflict resolution research (and statistical meteorology), furnished a basis for such numbers of the dead in war, when he initiated the classification of European (“Great Powers”) war dead in 300 wars from 1820-1949 — using logarithms of wars with one to ten million dead per war; see “Editor’s Introduction,” Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood Press, 1960), vi-xii. See als Appendix B.

related famine dead, exceed ninety-five percent of the population or ninety-five million dead.\textsuperscript{456} This was at a time when fifty million Europeans lived west of the Urals.\textsuperscript{457}

African and Asian war dead counts are slightly less staggering. For example, W. E. B. du Bois estimated deaths from the African slave trade and related wars at sixty million, or twenty-five percent of the African people, during the period from the 1500s to the mid-1800s.\textsuperscript{458} Over sixteen million died from European wars in India from the 1600s to the mid-1900s, a toll that does not include structural violence on Asian plantations copied from models in Latin America.\textsuperscript{459} Death tolls from Asian wars averaged under five percent, including aberrations such as the 1850-1864 Taiping Rebellion and the 1821-1856 Greek-Turkish war.\textsuperscript{460} At the turn of the twentieth century, in a crude Southern African prelude to the 1940s Holocaust, twenty thousand Dutch or Huguenot Boers and eighty thousand Herrero (Namibian) people died in intense African-European wars.\textsuperscript{461}


\textsuperscript{460}Ruth Leger Sivard, \textit{World Military and Social Expenditures}, 11th ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1986), 26. Measured regularly by census, China’s population grew from 100 million (1600s), and 275 million (1700s), to 430 million (1850s); see Gwendda Milston, \textit{A Short History of China} (Stanmore, New South Wales: Cassell Australia Ltd., 1978), 219 and 238.

This carnage marked an 1885-1905 shift from private colonial enterprise to public neo-colonial enterprise, ending with reforms in European colonialism after the death of about thirty percent (seven to eight million), of the twenty-eight million people living in the Belgian Congo.\textsuperscript{462} Ecological after-shocks of plague following war, as recorded by E. Franklin Frazier, were not as intensive over the long run in areas physically unsuitable for “white” Europeans. Those unsuitable areas were: China, Japan, India, Africa (between the Sahara and South Africa), Southeast Asia (including Indonesia), and much of the Pacific Islands (where originally decimated populations competed well in the 1900s).\textsuperscript{463}

In general, throughout the two or three centuries of European colonialism, organized opposition to the fiercest of the world’s wars that mutilated the American landscape came from European feminists and pacifists. At the core of this opposition, beginning in the 1500s, throughout the Hanseatic League’s neutral cities, pacifist Brethren, Quakers, and Mennonites opposed the European state system of war itself. Later, these Hanseatic League cities were the first European entities to sign international nonaggression treaties with Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{464} But few

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item William Roger Louis and Jean Stenger, eds., \textit{E. D. Morel’s History of the Congo Reform Movement} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), x and 252-60. Edmund Dene Morel and his wife Mary Florence Richardson led this reform, funded by William Cadbury. But these intense wars in Angola and the Congo River Basin were resolved largely by what became the world’s largest nonviolent or “peace” church. This was the Kimbanguist Church, with an estimated 3-5 million members, led by Lucien Luntadila; see Lanza del Vasto, “Simon Kimbangu et la Nonviolence Africaine,” \textit{Jeune Afrique} 385 (20-26 May 1968): 62-65. The author has not been able to ascertain present membership levels because of adverse political conditions. In the 1990s, the so-called European “peace churches,” the Brethren, Quakers, and Mennonites, numbered altogether about 1 million people, not counting unknown totals in the USSR. For Kimbanguist history, e.g., the April-Sept. 1921 anti-war campaign of Simon Kimbangu launched from N’Kamba (near Kinshasa), the 1921-1959 killing of all but 2,000 members of 37,000 Kimbanguist families in prison, and the leadership of men and women in community-building and war relief stretching to Angola after 1959, see Marion Keeney Preheim, “Send Us Young Men Without Guns,” \textit{Canadian Mennonite}, 22 Aug. 1969, 6.
\item E. Franklin Frazier, \textit{Race and Culture in the Modern World} (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957), 18-30 and 81-90. Pacific plague percentages as a whole apparently reached 33%, but over 80% of the native “blacks” or “Indians” died, e.g., in Australia or New Zealand, respectively — and 77% of the Hawaiians.
\item Cecil John Cadoux, \textit{Philip of Spain and the Netherlands, An Essay on Moral Judgements in History} (Oxford: Archon, 1969), 70 and 220 ff. See also Cornelius Krahn, \textit{Dutch Anabaptism, Origin, Spread, Life and Thought (1450-1600)} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1968), 33, 38, 42, 69, 79-80, 91, 191-94, 207, 220, and 260; as well as chapter one on the Hanseatic League. Since then, few states other than the Netherlands have taken the time to try to combine human rights and inter-national decision making; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, \textit{Human Rights and Foreign Policy} (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982), 23 and 84-85. Women leaders who opposed European colonialism were punished by mass European movements that some claim to have exterminated nine million women as witches during the colonial period. See Starhawk, \textit{Dreaming the Dark, Magic, Sex and Politics} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1982), 187 and 200.
\end{thebibliography}
Europeans did much to stop the American killing or suffering. Of the hundreds of treaties co-signed by European and American Indian diplomats, only Dutch and American Indian treaties in Surinam, during the late 1500s and early 1600s, may actually have been honored. Violent Europeans invaded like massive earth-moving machines, plowing Indian people apart, over, and under, voiding areas of population to be refilled by Europeans in nations like Costa Rica and the United States.

By contrast, international conflict in areas surrounding the San Juan River resulted in high European rather than Indian war dead counts. Over half of the Hispanic-European Costa Rican militia fighting in the 1850s Rivas-Walker war died in that war — including a young boy whose name graces the national airport, Juan Santa María. Clotilde Maria Obregon Quesada claims that ten thousand, or ten percent of the total Costa Rican population, died either from war-related cholera or directly from that war. Igor Nemira claims that another 200,000 people, mostly Hispanic Nicaraguans, died in this area during violent foreign interventions in 1909, 1912, and 1927. Yet another costly battle would be fought in the same area in 1978-1979, to determine the outcome of the Sandinista Revolution.

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465 Educational statistics here reveal much structural violence. For example, 90% of the incoming students in U.S. Indian schools are denied the kind of bilingual education that would allow them to navigate the gap between English and their own language. This culture and language gap continues in college, where, for example, less than 3% of Indian or U.S. Native American students who enter college graduate from college, and still fewer earn Ph.D.s; see William E. Coffer, Sleeping Giants (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), 33-35. In Latin America, Cuba, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru claim to accommodate Indian cultures in the classroom; see Kjell J. Lings, Un Elemento de Reflexión Terriblemente Dinámico, Antología Temática Sobre la Nueva Educación Indígena en América Latina (Stockholm: Institute of Latin American Studies “Occasional Papers” Series, 1987), 42-72.


470 This critical battle will be discussed in the next chapter, chapter six. See the various articles written in June-July 1979 by Alex Drehsler for the San Diego (CA) Union. Drehsler covered that event as a U.S. reporter, and described what he saw as trench-style warfare reminiscent of World War I. Conversations with the author, The American University (December 1989).
Such hard-core serial violence among European emigrants converged after the 1860s in the Western Caribbean and the Middle East. The rewards of such costly victories, however, remained dubious. Sixty years of sporadic warfare beginning in the 1860s in Cuba, for example, cost the lives of 250,000 people. Such violence was less frequent among European emigrants to the Middle East, an exception being the 1920s blockade of Lebanon by Europe. That blockade to defeat the Ottoman Empire cost Lebanon 100,000 of its 420,000 people.

The levels of intolerance in war surged in the 1940s, followed by what will be described as serial violence after 1945. In Costa Rica, accustomed to resolving conflict by democratic means, this intolerance was limited to the imprisonment of German-speaking Costa Ricans in military camps like those housing citizens of Japanese ancestry in the United States. Elsewhere, intolerance sank to new depths in events like the drowning of one million Chinese people in the Yellow River by the Kuomintang (1938), or the bombings of Hiroshima (78,000 deaths), Tokyo (83,000), and Dresden (135,000).

At the same time, intolerance degenerated into genocide in Poland, Russia, and Yugoslavia. Bradford Lyttle notes that the genocide of (what amounted to) the hostages in the Nazi death camps peaked in response to saturation bombing raids on Germany, as initiated by an English general. Paradoxically — but quite in keeping with both of the counterintuitive hypotheses of this dissertation — although six million Jews were killed, Jews had the highest survival rates in those states that used nonviolent struggle against the Nazis: that is, in Italy,

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471 James E. Bristol, “Nonviolence Not First For Export,” AFSC Pamphlet, 1972, 4. Such victories were mutually destructive, similar to the U.S. 1860s war. From 1830-1890, e.g., the U.S. taxpayers paid the equivalent of $1 million to kill each Indian, according to John Collier, America’s Colonial Record (Research Series No. 119, Fabian Publications, Ltd., n.d.), 31.


Denmark, Finland, Norway, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and the Russian republic of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{478}

A comparatively lower body count from nonviolent conflict resolution, as practiced by Costa Rica, can also be found in other statistics. In northwest India during anti-colonial conflict in the late 1920s and 1930s, for example, one of the bloodiest events took place in the central Sikh Temple courtyard in Amritsar. The colonial police and English advisers there killed 379 people because a few had forgotten to use nonviolence. A group assaulted the police and the advisors, who then fired into the crowds.\textsuperscript{479} However, only two nonviolent protesters died in the crucial conflict of the Gandhian campaigns. That battle in April 1930 involved 2,500 nonviolent fighters, or satyagrahis — led by Sarojini Naidu, a Cambridge-educated woman from Madras — trying to enter the Dharasana Saltworks, 150 miles north of Bombay. Under a sweltering temperature of 116 degrees in the shade, Naidu marshalled her forces on blood-stained ground against the incessant blows of steel-studded British lathis or police sticks. The gory event helped to crystallize world opinion against the bitter violence of English colonialism.\textsuperscript{480} By the end of the 1930s, only 8,000 Indians and a handful of English soldiers had died in this prototypical nonviolent struggle to free India from European colonialism and the opium trade.\textsuperscript{481}

Third World Serial Violence in the World’s Wars

The domino theory of world order theorists can justify but not explain the increased intensity of war, insecurity, and underdevelopment in Costa Rica after remilitarization in the

\textsuperscript{478}For 1940s Jewish survival rates, see Lucy Davidowicz, \textit{The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945}, 10th ed. (New York: Seth/Free Press, 1986), 388-90 and 403. Israeli researchers note that Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union each lost about 10% of their people in the 1940s — a percentage similar to that in Costa Rica in its 1850s Rivas-Walker war — whereas, in 1913-1919, France and Germany each lost about 5%. In contrast, from 1945 to 1985, the Israeli serial violence level was under 0.3%; see Baruch Kimmerling, “Making Conflict a Routine: Cumulative Effects of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Upon Israeli Society,” in Moshe Lissak, ed., \textit{Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment, The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict} (Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1984), 17. As will be explained further on, Lebanon lost 5-10% in the 1970s and 1980s. See Appendix B for more on Israel.

\textsuperscript{479}James E. Bristol, “Nonviolence, Not First for Export,” AFSC Pamphlet, Oct. 1972, 6. Bristol adds that 125 people were killed under similar circumstances in Sharpeville, South Africa, in 1960.


1980s. Neither can the anti-dependency outlook — which defines warfare as a struggle to control the surplus extraction of natural resources — explain why the isthmus and Mexico should be a battleground, when the two regions together represent under one percent of the United States income from foreign trade. In the early 1980s, this conflict in the isthmus did, however, motivate Mexico toward working with Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica for a Contadora peace process. Mexico emphasized its need for regional dialogue with states like Nicaragua and Costa Rica to stimulate isthmian peace plans. Mexico also arranged special oil credit agreements with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, to minimize the Lebanonization or Balkanization of the isthmus.

But state-by-state serial violence percentages do contrast intensity and conflict resolution levels — the higher the percentage of conflict intensity, the lower the potential for peaceful resolution — regardless of the synchronicity of such intense conflict (indicated by parentheses). Despite the high rate of violence to its north in Nicaragua and numerous interventions in Panama since the 1850s, Costa Rica itself ranked respectably low in such serial violence. From 1945 to 1990, ranked on an overall spectrum of nations, Costa Rica (with ongoing conflict between 1948 and 1990) lies on the low side of the continuum with Cuba (1952-1990), Chile (1973-1989), and Israel (1948-1990), all under one percent (D on the graph below).


\[483\] At 10-15 years in length, the wars in both Chile and Afghanistan lack the 20 years in duration necessary to qualify as serial. They are included for reference purposes, since these events — and other highly publicized “wars” like the Israeli conflict and the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia — measure much lower on this spectrum than might be expected (e.g., Israel) or too low to be measured (e.g., Hungary and Czechoslovakia). The numbers which are relevant are the percentages, not the geopolitical or serendipitous synchronicity of wars between 1945 to 1990.
Kampuchea (1965-1990), and North Korea (1950-1970), have each experienced serial violence levels of five percent and above, reaching the high side of this continuum (A on the graph below).

From the graph below, it can be seen that the states at the vortex of global conflict zones with five percent or higher serial violence (A) have a low potential for conflict resolution. These states are Lebanon (the highest levels) as well as Laos, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, and North Korea. Uganda and Nicaragua have somewhat less intractable conflict. Costa Rica appears as an anomalous state, which, if militarized, should have a higher level of serial violence than it does. Israel’s position can be partly explained by the fact that it has very different serial violence levels among its European (counted) and Palestinian (often uncounted) populations. States under (C) and (D) would appear to have less serial violence and more potential for successful conflict resolution by nonviolent intervention.

In other words, those states emphasizing a less violent approach to conflict resolution should be expected to have a more successful record in the peaceful resolution of conflict. A nonviolent or less violent approach, as followed by Costa Rica, should tend to lead to less killing in warfare, as measured by the serial violence indicator. Because of this lower serial violence level, or a lower dialectic of killing and vengeance, a higher potential for peaceful security and development should also be expected in states relying on nonviolent or less violent conflict resolution.
The high serial violence levels resemble the ten percent 1940s levels in Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Ukraine. All in all, a minimum of 60 percent of the wars and the deaths in wars in the Third World between 1945 and 1990 — or an estimated 60 to 70 of the estimated 99 to 101 wars since 1945, as well as from 12 to 16.8 million deaths of the total 20 to 25 million war deaths since 1945 — occurred in one of the four global conflict zones. In other words, since 1945, in a world with over six billion people by the year 2000, the four global war zones held 2 of every 10 people, and over 6 of every 10 (or three times more) wars and war deaths.\(^4^8^4\)

After 1945, intense warfare was focused in the four global war zones, with body counts which equaled or surpassed the ten percent dead in Poland in the 1940s. Post-1945 potential for global violence climbed in the early 1960s, when six of fourteen United States National Security Council members voted to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear bombs in a dispute over Cuban sovereignty.485

Hard-core violence in the Third World often remains obscure. Little exists in print, for example, about how the Sandinistas were initially supported by Mexico, Venezuela, and Costa Rica, but not by Cuba, the Soviet Union, or the United States. No Camp David Accords were applied to the isthmus. At the time of the July 1979 Revolution, the Nicaraguan totals of war dead rose to 50,000, including Costa Ricans killed in border fighting and in the Sandinista struggle in Nicaragua, with another 160,000 wounded or orphaned.486 From the 1979 Revolution in Nicaragua to 1990, another 50,000 Nicaraguans, Hondurans, and Costa Ricans may have died in Contra war.487 Fighting during this decade focused in southern Nicaragua and northern Costa Rica, as well as northwestern Nicaragua, where, for instance, estimates for the number dead ranged up to 600 from a single mid-1980s San Juan del Norte fire-fight.488

487 Numbers vary on this time frame: (1) for 1978 to November 1979 (after the July Revolution), according to the Nicaraguan government, there were 35,000 Nicaraguan dead; see Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de FSLN, “Balance Preliminar: A Noventa Dias de la Revolución Sandinista,” in Gregorio Selser, ed., Nicaragua: Elementos Históricos, Estratégicos, y Tácticos de la Revolución FSLN (Mexico City: SEPLA, 1979); (2) for 1980-1987, according to the Nicaraguan government, there were 18,000 dead; see Agenda Internacional, “Fact Sheet: The Costs of the War,” (April 1987), Mimeo from the Nicaraguan representation to the U.N., n.p.; and (3) for 1980-1987, see also the Witness for Peace estimate of 22,500 dead in “Casualties of the War, from 1980 to June 1987,” Witness for Peace, Feb.-March 1988, 12.
488 Frida Modak, “Ni la CIA Pudo Mantener a Pastora en San Juan del Norte,” El Día Internacional, 17 April 1984, 16. The Sandinistas lost 72. Before 1979, structural violence in Nicaragua was highest in the Nicaraguan zone across the San Juan River from northeast Costa Rica, with, e.g., the highest infant mortality rates per capita. That same zone had one physician, no paved roads, and only a handful of teachers for the primary grades; see Willie Ney,
Rican war dead totals moved closer to those from the 1980s Grenadian or Malvinas wars, although the actual numbers remained hazy, since few Costa Rican newspapers would willingly report such numbers.489

Meanwhile, what the Kerry Commission called ticket-punching, or diplomatic protection, began to characterize the arms and drug business in the isthmus. Such ticket-punching — referring to the punching of one’s ticket at a public event or while riding a public conveyance, such as a train — described diplomatic protection given to drug traffickers. This protection granted immunity from prosecution to the drug traffickers who claimed to be anti-communists, as they armed the Contras who fought against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and used the protection thus afforded to traffic undisturbed in cocaine — with minimum danger of drug enforcement prosecution.490

This diplomatic protection shielded the profiteers of the arms and drug business, who were responsible for drug-related death and violence even in the United States.491 The arrangement put Costa Rica directly in the anti-communist, or “anti”- anti-dependency, diplomatic (and economic-brokerage) center of the cocaine wave heading overland at the United States. As a diplomatic shield, it produced a narcotics prosecutor’s nightmare, protecting mercenaries and drug traffickers who blended politically with the Contras to avoid


489Miguel Sobrado, “Contrarrevolución en Costa Rica: Historia de Una Guerra Oculta,” in Gabriel Coronado, Miguel Sobrado, and Leda Trejos, eds., ¿Quién Quiere La Guerra en Costa Rica? (San José: Instituto Costarricense de Estudios Sociales [ICES] and Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales [CRIES], 1988), 16-17, 20, and 24. According to Sobrado, the war dead numbers were the highest in areas dominated by pro-Batista ex-Cubans or “cubiches,” i.e., CIA-trained mercenaries from the “Bay of Pigs” fiasco — timing their attacks with Costa Rican elections to persuade Costa Ricans to support the Contra network and to produce electronic technology to aid the Contras. Costa Rican government census estimates place the involved Costa Rican population at between 5,000 and 10,000; see Censo de Población, 1984, Vol. 1 (San José: Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía, Imprenta Nacional, 1986); and also, Población, Total, Urbana y Rural, Por Provincias, Cantones y Distritos, Vol. 2 (San José: Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos, 1974), 17-18. Even after 1979, only 1,000 Costa Rican men patrolled the 200-mile Nicaragua-Costa Rica border, according to Dennis Volman, “US Anti-Sandinista Efforts Begin to Strain CR,” Christian Science Monitor [CSM], 3 July 1984, 14. See chapter 6 also.


491In the 1980s, according to random public opinion polls, U.S. citizens considered cocaine the single most dangerous threat to U.S. security; see James Van West, “The US State Department’s Narcotics Control Policy in the Americas,” JISWA 30 (Summer-Fall 1988): 2-3.
prosecution. As the Contra war went from bad to worse, cocaine deaths increased inside the United States by eighty percent, with the metropolitan areas of Miami and Washington, D.C., topping the charts. Even more significantly, between 1982 and 1988, social and clinical trend research on intravenous cocaine use in urban centers, from San Francisco to New York City, indicated that binge users of cocaine were the single largest growing factor in the national transmission of AIDS.

Meanwhile, during the Contra war against Nicaragua, overall casualties and body counts were lower to the north of Nicaragua. From 1978 to 1985, for example, about 200,000 people died altogether during neighboring wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. But Guatemala and El Salvador, with larger populations than Nicaragua, also registered serial violence levels around a third of Nicaragua’s, or closer to that of Costa Rica. Overall, from 1945 to 1990, an estimated 110,000 to 250,000 people died in war throughout the isthmus, in addition to the 50,000 war dead associated with the events leading to the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution.

Reverberations in the Global Conflict Zones

Militarization or violent conflict resolution has promoted hard-core serial violence and underdevelopment in the Western Caribbean. But this violent conflict resolution has also infected the three other global conflict zones, that is, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa. It should be noted here as a strong caveat that the numbers of people killed in

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492 Kerry Commission, *Foreign Policy*, 2, 7-9, and 124. For deaths caused by cocaine in the U.S., see “Do We Know the Lethal Dose of Cocaine?” *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 32 (March 1987): 303-312. Please see chapters 7-8 for the political and economic damage of the arms for drug trade.


war after 1945, although generally more accurate than pre-1945 numbers, are still subject to much debate. The body count of serial violence is not that much more accurate than the estimated data for levels of access to human necessities, also used to measure development and underdevelopment.

For example, from 1956 to 1976, the Lebanese serial violence level may have climbed higher than the serial violence level for all four previous Arab-Israeli wars (estimated at 37,500 dead). Lebanese estimates for 1956 to 1976 ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 Lebanese dead. A high percentage of the Lebanese deaths was attributed to rightist troops like the Kataeb militia of the conservative Christian Phalange, tied historically to French, Italian, and Spanish fascism. In 1958 this militia was trained by United States advisors experienced in isthmian military intervention.

By the mid-1980s, some Lebanese estimates surpassed 150,000 dead, in contrast with the 100,000 dead in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. From a population the size of Costa Rica, up to 900,000 people had also fled Lebanon since the 1975-1976 war. From 1976 to 1986, the Lebanese GNP fell by sixty percent, and the cost of reconstruction was estimated at over $12

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498 AFSC, *A Compassionate Peace, A Future For the Middle East* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), 93-94; or Thomas Wersto, “Protecting Noncombatants in New Kinds of War,” *CSM*, 8 January 1982, 23 — for the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars. However, other respected commentators estimated the 1975-1976 Lebanese war dead at 10,000 (Itamar Rabinovitch), upwards (Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde* correspondent) to 25,000 (Geoffrey Jansen, *Economist*) — while Israeli intelligence estimates listed 100,000 dead, according to Noam Chomsky, correspondence with the author (9 April 1990). The AFSC and Wersto numbers of 100,000 were lower than those claimed in Lebanese journals then, especially for the fighting in the mountains above the coastal cities, viewed by the author in Beirut, March-April 1976. But those editions of *Beirut’s Monday Morning* and the *Star* do not appear to be available for verification inside the U.S., despite numerous personal and telephone interviews with the concerned ex-Beirut editorial staff of those same Arab journals in Washington, D.C., in the spring of 1989.

billion. As much as ten percent of the Lebanese population may have been killed. The birth rate failed to keep pace with the losses. Such intense conflict in Lebanon may also have prompted Soviet discord and apprehension over involvement in Afghanistan.

Southeast Asia has also experienced intense warfare. From 1945 to the early 1960s, French colonialism in Vietnam killed as many as 2,000,000 people and mutilated another 680,000 people by torture. After the United States began to intervene there in the mid-1950s, Saigon attracted growing waves of refugees, many addicted to heroin or afflicted with such diseases as leprosy and the bubonic plague, while aid for militarization promoted corruption instead of development. When the United States withdrew in 1975, at least 3,000,000 IndoChinese people had died from the thirty-five years of random bombing and war-related disease and famine, in addition to those killed by the French. On the same pattern as United States experience in the isthmus, through what may have been renegade death squads initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency, consequent death squads there also pinpointed Lao and Vietnamese leadership for extinction. Even after the war’s official end in 1975, some 890,000 unexploded bombs and mines would kill hundreds more.

Finally, from 1960 to 1990 in Southern Africa, serial violence along the western coast, south from the Congo River mouth, was lower than Nicaragua’s but higher than Costa Rica’s. In

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500 Charles Percy, “The Costs of Conflict in the Middle East, Geopolitics Ignores Human Suffering.” CSM, 22 December 1986, 11. Other estimates geared toward southern Lebanon mention another 100,000 dead; see Khatmeh Osseiran, “Testimony on Humanitarian Conditions in Lebanon,” Testimony for House Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle-East (25 July 1989), Mimeo, 3 and 5. By 1985, about a third of all Lebanese infants were born physically or mentally handicapped in one way or another, while 45% of the teenagers had turned to hard drugs, according to a survey by the American University of Beirut psychologist, Adnan Sabbagh; in Lebanon Information Processing Service [LIPS] (British Refugee Council), 14 August 1985, 1. About 15 to 20 million internationally migrating birds also died over Lebanon annually, promoting erosion when pest-infested trees died; see Rick Boling, “Battered Birds of Lebanon,” Audubon 88 (Jan. 1986): 36-39. The teeming sea bottom off the Lebanese coast was thus turned into a toxic void; see “War Makes Lebanon an Ecological Disaster Zone,” NYT, 31 May 1984, A 8.

501 Zbigniew Brezezinski, Grand Failure, 92. Brezezinski notes that Soviet academic opposition to this intervention dates from the war’s beginning, led by, e.g., Oleg Bogomolov (a Western Caribbean specialist) and Yevgeniy Primakov (a Middle Eastern specialist) within the Moscow University Academy of Sciences.


the early 1960s, for example, 55,000 people died and 500,000 were displaced because of ex-
Cuban and United States air raids in Angola.\textsuperscript{507} In the 1970s and 1980s, bubonic plague struck the southern Angolan border with Namibia.\textsuperscript{508} Another 70,000 died from 1976 to the early 1980s from war in Angola and Namibia, after the formation of an anti-apartheid organization — the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, or SADCC.\textsuperscript{509} The United Nations war and famine body count in Angola for the early 1960s to the mid-1980s climbed to over 320,000, taken from a population three times that of Nicaragua or Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{510} So what kind of war is Costa Rica resolving with its unarmed diplomacy, in the light of all these statistics? Like the proverbial eye of the hurricane, Costa Rica has survived at the geo-strategic center of fierce pre- and post-1945 per capita levels of war dead. Costa Rica’s recent body count may never be fully known, given the reluctance of its media to cover even the 1980s Contra wars, let alone the more violent 1978-1979 conflict. But its serial violence rate was lower than expected.

Comparing all of the post-1945 Caribbean, Middle Eastern, and Southern African wars with the now-familiar disease of AIDS, it can be deduced that the 1975-1976 war in Lebanon may have caused as many deaths as AIDS did in the United States from its first appearance to mid-1989. Likewise, the Angolan, Lebanese, and Soviet Ukrainian war dead counts, taken singly, each surpassed the global total of infectious AIDS cases reported to the United Nations World Health Organization by mid-1989.\textsuperscript{511} At the same time, the serial violence levels for


\textsuperscript{510}Another 215,000 died in Mozambique; see Dan O’Meara, “Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987,” \textit{Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security} (Background Paper Number 20), (June 1988): 6 and 80-86. One million people died and another 11 million people were displaced in Southern Africa, in a 30-year, $60 billion Southern African war; see Victoria Brittain, “Over a Million Dead in South African Wars,” \textit{Guardian}, 16 April 1989, 8. Cuban war dead in Angola (2,016) or Ethiopia (160) yielded a low serial violence percentage well under .1% — since the population of the first two states numbered over 9 million and the latter over 40 million. Millions of crocodiles also died in related ecological havoc;

\textsuperscript{511}Update: AIDS Cases Reported to Surveillance, Forecasting, and Impact Assessment Unit (SFI), Global Programme on AIDS [149 states reporting],” WHO Mimeo, 1 July 1989, 1-7. This WHO report found that AIDS cases in the four global conflict zones were especially concentrated in Southern Africa. In further comparison: auto accidents may kill 500,000 people per year worldwide; see Hylke Tromp, “Peace and Disarmament at the End of the
Nicaragua were higher than those for Angola, but at most, half the serial violence in Lebanon or the Soviet Ukraine. On the whole, despite its location at the center of hard-core conflict in the past and the present, Costa Rica’s unarmed diplomacy claims and its inclination toward nonviolent resolution may account for its low levels of serial violence. No other verifiable explanation seems to exist yet in the literature.

*Power, Human Needs, and Human Rights*

Needs and rights criteria are, of course, more expressive of the range of potential violence than the stark corpses of war. Please note that *needs* as used here refers to social and economic necessities (emphasized by the anti-dependency approach), for example, access to adequate health, housing, and education services — as observed by the United Nations social and economic conventions on human rights and the rights or duties of states. In addition, *rights* as used here refers to cultural and political necessities (emphasized by the world order approach), for example, civil rights like freedom of speech and assembly — as observed by the United Nations cultural and political conventions on human rights and the rights or duties of states.512

However, within the world order perspective, cultural and political necessities may be considered more important than social and economic necessities for promoting free economic enterprise. Thus questions as to the right to housing or employment may be difficult to categorize as other than “freedom” needs, as opposed to the needs of work and health or education — characterized then as identity and welfare (charity) needs, respectively.513 As a result, needs may be interpreted for the most part as needs for security that are (1) genetically determined by biological behavior and (2) ontologically dominated by legal roles and rules.514

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514Joseph Scimecca, “Self-Reflexivity and Freedom: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Conflict Resolution,” in John Burton, ed., *Human Theory*, 36 ff. Words such as war, wealth, conflict, or violence are more-or-less absent from such a world order-oriented definition of needs.
At the same time, all three approaches, the above two approaches and that of nonviolence, are still quite difficult to quantify regarding needs and rights, beyond the attempts of such as writers as Amartya Sen, Paul Streeten, and Mahbub ul Haq — who, while still unable to index some unverifiable issues, have attempted to define more than only security needs. These three writers, among others in the United Nations Development Program, have thus proposed a tentative “Human Development Index,” based upon evaluation of an individual’s literacy, life expectancy, and buying power. This index also highlights the promising performance of states that have consciously targeted their budgets toward meeting the priorities of human needs and rights: such as Ghana, Botswana, Mexico, Mauritius, Tunisia, and Costa Rica, regardless of their original economic starting point.\textsuperscript{515}

A state like Costa Rica fears the intense isthmian geopolitical power struggles leading to war and poverty. The costs of these violent struggles can be represented by the fact that, in the 1940s, outside of demilitarized Costa Rica, over ninety percent of the isthmian population was denied proper housing or nourishment and died without a nurse or doctor present. Outside of Costa Rica, over half of all isthmian children died before age nine.\textsuperscript{516} However, in a Costa Rica with a military force, war and poverty combined over the next few decades could have produced the same level of structural violence found in the neighboring states. Instead, until the 1980s, Costa Rica was serving as the isthmian academic source for anti-dependency notions like liberation theology — notions which spread to Nicaragua from Costa Rica after 1979 — while also trying to meet hardening United States demands that it behave like the newly-industrializing countries of Chile, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea.\textsuperscript{517}


\textsuperscript{517}Oscar Arias Sánchez, \textit{Nuevos Rumbas Para El Desarrollo Costarricense} (San José: EDUCA, 1979), 72-74. Travellers entering Costa Rica in the late 1980s, except for foreign soldiers, were subjected to conditions reflecting fear over drugs and AIDS. For example, stays beyond 30 days had to be approved by the federal government after expensive AIDS testing. Then, before leaving, after a stay longer than 30 days, male visitors were required by federal law to leave verifiable evidence with the federal court of not having fathered a child in Costa Rica. Petty thievery and prostitution were in evidence in large Costa Rican bus stops and major city markets. These conditions were reminiscent of pre-1959 Cuba or Haiti before 1990, at least according to the author’s impressions during 1989-1990 in Cuba and Costa Rica.
To reconcile conflicting external and internal demands, Costa Rica organized itself to meet the human needs of its own people and refugees from wars in neighboring countries. For example, during the first four decades after its 1940s revolution, Costa Rica increased the number of jobs in the public sector eight times and tripled private sector jobs. At the same time, Costa Rica gave half its people access to adequate water and sanitation, despite the difficulty of reaching its barely accessible rural and mountain areas. Hydroelectric plants were built to furnish ninety-eight percent of the nation’s energy needs. In essence, Costa Rica tried to distribute its wealth equally, despite the pressure of militarization both from the United States and from surrounding isthmian nations.

War overwhelmed the economies of the other isthmian states, like Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, as evidenced by their individual annual incomes expected to remain under $1,000 past the year 2000. But Costa Rica continued to reconcile these powerful threats by shifting its central government expenditures toward needs like education and away from military allocations. This policy continued into the early 1980s. Costa Rican social indicators continued to reflect a standard of living higher than isthmian averages until the United States began to remilitarize Costa Rica in order to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Costa Rican social conditions depreciated further still when the United States repressed both Costa Rica’s and Nicaragua’s favorable oil agreements with Mexico.

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Remilitarization pressure in Costa Rica materialized also in the reversals of human rights standards. For example, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, an Argentinean Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, was detained and interrogated in the national airport and then deported from Costa Rica by federal police on 16 January 1985. No charges were filed. Pérez Esquivel was carrying a conflict resolution proposal from Tomás Borge in Managua to strengthen Contadora peace talks with Nicaragua.\(^{524}\) In the mid-1980s, Costa Rican police increased such illegal receptions at the national airport and other border entry points, while initiating mass urban roundups without warrants of alleged prostitutes and homosexuals, justified by allegations of AIDS. In June 1987, prison statistics indicated an unprecedented forty-three percent of the Costa Rican prison population illegally in prison without trial.\(^{525}\) Such detentions contravened the Costa Rican federal constitution, which demands verifiable evidence and a judicial writ for legal detention and prolonged interrogation.\(^{526}\)

Other unprecedented events compelled Costa Rican economic destabilization. In 1984, the national Costa Rican health budget was shaved by eighteen percent and the social welfare budget by eleven percent. Within three years, national education funding fell fifteen percent. Seven percent of all Costa Rican students were thus unable to attend school at all and eighteen percent of the students attended schools with no chairs or desks for them.\(^{527}\)

Even the leader of the Honduran legislature found cause to fret about the destabilization or Lebanonization of Costa Rica.\(^{528}\) Between 1977 and 1982, half of Costa Rica’s population not previously under the poverty line fell below that line.\(^{529}\) Small “free enterprise” businesses and

\(^{527}\)CODEHU, Derechos Humanos, 82 and 83. Similar percentages and school closings applied inside Nicaragua as a result of the Contra war.
\(^{528}\)Raúl Sohr, Centroamérica, 179.
cooperatives caught the brunt of this hardening destabilization,\textsuperscript{530} traceable to the United States-inspired parallel state identified by Oscar Arias’ economic advisor, John Biehl. As a result, unemployment rates reached twenty percent by 1984, as seventy percent of all Costa Ricans were forced under the poverty line.\textsuperscript{531} In rural areas, seventy percent of Costa Rican farm workers became landless, while the prime arable land owned by the wealthy was polluted even more by the residue of fertilizers used on agribusiness coffee and banana crops.\textsuperscript{532}

Costa Rica faced intensified landlessness and homelessness from this destabilization, a war-related, enervating condition strange to its culture and history. Between 1985 and 1987, about 600 families and 4,000 individuals led large rural nonviolent struggles and demonstrations against violent eviction by the state police.\textsuperscript{533} Their struggle was joined by a housing coalition that, for instance, organized a demonstration of 20,000 people in March 1984, to mobilize massive hunger strikes against police violence.\textsuperscript{534} These struggles of the landless (\textit{precaristas}) agitated eastern and northern Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{535}

Official Costa Rican police response to these nonviolent struggles invoked truncheon and death by torture. These struggles reached the national legislature, where a legislative commission uncovered an underground torture room in the basement of the Costa Rican federal police building in late March of 1989.\textsuperscript{536} Nine by eighteen feet and nine feet high, this damp room contained empty syringes and other evidence of torture.\textsuperscript{537} The torture was intended to

\textsuperscript{532}Roy May, \textit{Los Pobres de la Tierra} (San José: Departamento Ecuménico de Investigación, 1986), 7-8 and 38. In an interview in his home by the author (9 April 1989), May indicated that the increasing governmental pressure to grow cash crops eventually forced the eviction of increasing numbers of small farmers.
\textsuperscript{533}CODEHU, \textit{Derechos Humanos}, 77-80.
\textsuperscript{534}Concepción Político-Ideológico y Practica de los Frentes de [la] Lucha por Vivienda en Costa Rica (San José: Centro de Estudios para la Acción Social, 1985), 1.
\textsuperscript{536}Peter Brennan, “Congressmen Denounce Police 'Torture Chamber','” \textit{TTS}, 31 March 1989, 5. The main federal police funding source then was the U.S. government.
counter or chill nonviolent attacks on landlessness, homelessness, remilitarization, and destabilization.\(^{538}\)

In desperation, Costa Rican leaders like Oscar Arias — pushed by popular mandate — struggled to meet Nicaragua halfway by negotiating a peace plan despite United States violence. Arias repeatedly emphasized the international benefits of negotiating sustainable peace through development. In response, Daniel Ortega tried to call attention to how Nicaragua and Costa Rica had both complied more than the other isthmian states with the international peace commission, approved by the leaders of the isthmus to carry out the Esquipulas Agreement in August of 1987.\(^{539}\)

Regional Human Needs and Rights in the Context of War

What were the effects of the Arias or Esquipulas II peace plan? There are valid grounds for asserting that, in 1988, the Contras would have received an immediate $270 million more in United States Congressional aid, if not for the peace plan initiated by Oscar Arias and Daniel Ortega. Inside Nicaragua, the peace plan ended emergency security laws and the special “Somoza” tribunals that had denied the right of habeas corpus, while setting fixed time limits for prison detention and release.\(^{540}\) However, these improvements did not resolve the conflict raised by the arms and drug business in the Andean countries. Between a quarter and a half of the Andean Indian population would continue to die from famine and chronic malnutrition.\(^{541}\)

While Costa Rica welcomed much United States aid before the 1986 peace plans, Nicaragua was devastated by a Contra war. Estimates for Costa Rica’s three highest years of aid during the height of the 1982 to 1985 Contra war and destabilization — aid concentrated on violent conflict resolution, not on development — reached about $640 million dollars, much of


this from the United States Agency for International Development. In contrast, the three highest years of aid to Nicaragua during 1979 to 1983, from the European Community and the Soviet-backed Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, reached $700 million dollars, essentially aimed at sustainable development to recover from Somoza rule.542

United Nations statistics indicate that Costa Rican consumer price inflation between 1980 and 1986 stayed under twenty percent, although its earning power declined over forty percent in 1982. At the same time, despite Soviet and European development aid in Nicaragua, inflation in Nicaragua rose from 20 to 780 percent.543 In 1988, Nicaragua’s inflation rate almost topped 8,000 percent.544 This inflation rate was aggravated by the fact that few Sandinista leaders had been able to complete university educations to prepare them to cope with such lethal pressure.545

Nicaragua’s practical problems, as opposed to Costa Rica’s, surfaced in mining, construction, and agricultural production. Despite initial growth from 1979 to 1984 in housing starts (over sixty percent), pillage by the Contras damaged the economy of Nicaragua above all in agricultural production (down sixty-one percent), and construction (down fourteen percent). Intervention by the Contra proxies shifted construction priorities in Nicaragua toward building bulk storehouses to house imported aid, and also repressed building starts. In addition, the families of miners and soldiers suffered about half the total deaths caused by war, as Nicaraguans tried to meet hard currency demands both by digging for precious minerals and deterring Contras.546 Still, by 1982, production of rice, corn, and beans (up fifteen percent) indicated that land ownership returned to peasant farmers was reflected in higher production of food staples

542 Jorge Mario Salazar, Crisis Centroamérica y Política de las Super-Potencias (San José: Editorial Alma Mater, 1987), 61 and 93.
543 “Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy,” Notas Sobre la Economía y el Desarrollo (CEPAL or the U.N. Economic Commission on Latin America), 438/439 (Dec. 1986), 15. For Costa Rican inflation, see Jorge Mario Salazar, Crisis Centroamérica, 82.
545 Carlos Melendez Chaverri in his home, (Professor of History at The National University), Heredia, Costa Rica, interview by the author, 4 April 1989. According to Melendez Chaverri, Tomás Borge was one of the rare exceptions.
546 “Comandante Carlos ... The Revolution Advances,” Agenda Internacional (FSLN), Mimeo, Nov. 1986, 3, 7, 11-13, and 16.
consumed inside Nicaragua. In short, Nicaragua was reversing the trend to landlessness and feeding its own people. But in Costa Rica, this trend reversed in 1984, with the denationalization of its banks.

Conditions in the isthmus again recall Vietnam, including intense war-related population pressures in both places. Neither Vietnam nor Nicaragua could claim the near-comprehensive literacy levels of Costa Rica after its relatively nonviolent 1940s revolution. Over ninety percent of the Nicaraguan and Vietnamese people were illiterate before beginning their independence struggles. Educational aid to the two latter countries from socialist countries, as well as from France and the Netherlands, helped raise overall literacy levels after their liberation struggles. At the same time, neither Nicaragua nor Costa Rica would experience the large-scale societal transformation accompanying Vietnamese farmland redistribution, when twenty-five percent of Vietnam’s arable farm land was transferred back to its small farmers.

In the chapters ahead, conflict resolution will be discussed in relation to remilitarization, to evaluate Costa Rican approaches and methods for unarmed diplomacy. A nonviolent or less violent approach, as followed by Costa Rica, should tend to lead to less killing in warfare, as measured by the serial violence indicator. But Costa Rica also exists in the center of an eye of a hurricane of conflict, extending over many centuries. Geopolitical counterinsurgency, as influenced from the outside by way of the phenomenon called ticket-punching by the Kerry Commission, produced problems of violence difficult for Costa Rica to resolve nonviolently. Building on the discussion so far, Chapters Six and Seven will analyze the prevailing methods and the related outcomes, respectively, of militarization or remilitarization in the Western Caribbean, accompanied by the outcome or side effects of an arms and drug business.

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Chapter 6

Violence And Nonviolence

This last chapter on method will open with a brief reiteration of the nonviolent methods used in Costa Rica, before proceeding to a discussion of violent, short-term world order methods applied from outside. Discussion on violent remilitarization, as part of the public mass media record, covers the covert war attempted by the United States in northern Costa Rica, and relates such a record to the serial violence indicator. The three basic methods, representing the three approaches, are represented here: from the Costa Rican nonviolent approach, to the Sandinista’s anti-dependency approach, and the imposed world order approach represented by the United States supplied-Contras. This chapter ends with a summary discussion of the approaches and methods used to resolve conflict in the context of Costa Rica.

As will be shown, the Contra military failures and the failures of neighboring, revolutionary, anti-dependency approaches for resolving conflict do give some credence to the hypothesis that Costa Rica may have chosen a more advantageous, long-term method to resolve conflict than its anti-dependency-minded neighbors. If Costa Rica manages to resolve the violence imposed from the outside by a world order approach — mainly via Europe and the United States — then the Costa Rican approach may once again prove to be the best short- and long-term approach. The chapter begins by exploring Costa Rican approaches to conflict generated by the Contras’ little-publicized “Southern Front” for covert war against Nicaragua. Discussion then broadens to explore the relative involvement of trade or arms dealing by European and Middle Eastern players in the war waged (often involuntarily) from Costa Rica, such as the gains from such trade, via European Community trade, and the trade-offs from such arms dealing, via Irani, Israeli, and Saudi arms dealing.

Evaluation of a short-term covert war applied from outside should illustrate how the violence of the Contra war may have promoted severe, traumatic damage that will endanger peace, security, and development in Costa Rica for a long time.\textsuperscript{550} Damage from the Contra war

\textsuperscript{550} The discussion will concentrate on the 1980s, although a case might also be made for similar negative effects through violent, short-term counterinsurgency or contra-type warfare in the 1960s and 1970s. Already in the early
was apparently concentrated in two outcomes: in the immediate, violent effects of an arms for drug business, a result of geopolitically-imposed counterinsurgency (already discussed as ticket-punching in Chapter Five and to be discussed further in Chapter Seven), and in the long-term tension culminating in the structural violence of international debt (to be discussed in Chapter Eight).

Conflict resolution in Costa Rica has evolved through a combination of violence and nonviolence in demilitarization, intervention, destabilization, remilitarization, and equitable or inequitable international trade. Proxy Contra war, destabilization, and remilitarization set the pace for violent conflict resolution, as discussed in this chapter, while undermining Costa Rican attempts at peaceful conflict resolution. Violent proxy intervention promoted the outcomes of war and insecurity rather than peace and security (to be evaluated in chapter seven), and underdevelopment rather than development (to be discussed in chapter eight).

Tico, Contra, or Sandinista Peace and Covert War

In late 1978, Somoza again tried to invade Costa Rica, by bombing and shelling neutral Ticos (an isthmian nickname for Costa Ricans). In response, although not choosing to remilitarize itself, Costa Rica admitted advisors in security matters from Chile and Romania. Conservative Costa Ricans argued that these advisors might resolve a growing polarization between rich and poor, heightened by the remilitarization and destabilization associated with a growing Contra war.

Nonviolent isthmian conflict resolution contrasted sharply with this remilitarization. Early in 1978, for example, five Nicaraguans and a Costa Rican carried out a long, successful

1960s, from San José, the Sandinistas had declared their intent to overthrow the ruling Somoza family, through a Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional — as previously noted in chapter 3. But the focus of this dissertation is not the Sandinista Revolution.


hunger strike for the rights of small farmers in front of the United Nations offices in San José.\textsuperscript{555} Then, in mid-1984, a random national opinion survey established that eighty-three percent of Costa Rican adults opposed any national military force. This poll was reinforced at the same time by the 30,000 people in San José who demonstrated against the remilitarization promoted by Curtin Winsor, then United States Ambassador to Costa Rica. Luis Monge, president of Costa Rica, even tried several times to expel Eden Pastora, the main Contra leader funded by the United States in Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{556} But this growing advocacy of nonviolence was met by redoubled United States efforts at remilitarization.

Nonviolence was also applied in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas Tomás Borge and Marcio Jaénz gained power through hunger strikes in Anastasio Somoza’s prisons.\textsuperscript{557} Their hunger strikes stimulated international pressure and inspired 10,000 students to close over eighty percent of Nicaragua’s top colleges and universities for nearly a month by a general strike. Supported from Costa Rica, this nonviolent, general, academic-led strike broke the ability of Somoza to continue as the leader of Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{558} Students coordinated this national strike, buttressed by sit-down strikes of various trade unions throughout the major cities of Nicaragua, which finally overthrew Somoza and his National Guard, funded and trained by the United States.\textsuperscript{559}

Costa Rican and Nicaraguan nonviolence also worked on international levels. On 6 August 1985, such cooperation led to United States Congressional pressure for the release of fifty-six members of an international observer team, kidnapped and held by Eden Pastora’s Contras for forty hours along the San Juan River southeast of Lake Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{560} Likewise, in

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\textsuperscript{555}“Toma la Sede de la ONU, Nicaraguënses en Huelga de Hambre,” \textit{La Prensa Libre}, 1 Feb. 1978, 10. Four of the strikers were Nicaraguan (Daniel Albea, Leonardo Alemán, Mario Palma Flores, and Efraín Medina Torres). One of the strikers, Felipe Cháves Alvarado, was Costa Rican.

\textsuperscript{556}Mercedes Lynn de Uriarte, “Costa Ricans Want the Contras Out,” \textit{Nation}, 3 Nov. 1984, 444-45. For a definition of re/militarization see chapter 1.


\textsuperscript{558}“Somoza Cedió Ante Présion Estudiantil,” \textit{RPA}, 30 April 1978, 6. For parallel strikes at the Managua OAS offices, see “Estudiantes Ocuparan Ayer Sede de OEA en Nicaragua,” \textit{NCN}, 4 April 1979, A 21. The international pressure refers to outside public pressure in the form of parliamentary and world organizations condemning the human rights abuses of the Somoza regime and supporting the nonviolent strikes — as cited in the two citations above and in much of the literature of the time.

\textsuperscript{559}“Ocupan Edificio de la OMS en Managua,” \textit{RPA}, 21 April 1979, 4. The author is grateful to Myron Rios, Dean of Costa Rica’s International Relations Program, and its library, for access to clipping files regarding citations for footnotes 5-9; see also Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, \textit{Christ in a Poncho} (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1983), 30-31.

\textsuperscript{560}Kidnapped by the Contras, \textit{The Peace Flotilla on the Rio San Juan, Nicaragua [and Costa Rica] August, 1985} (Washington, D.C.: Witness for Peace Documentation Project, 1985), 3-5, 9, and 12. The team was kidnapped on
1987, Costa Rican trade unions sent 120 of their trade union members as representatives in forty canoes toward Nicaragua, down the Sarapiqui River, as a nonviolent protest against the Contra war. Then in 1988, Nicaragua and Costa Rica began working with United States and various nongovernmental international organizations to develop nonviolent civilian-based defense plans, and to prepare for United Nations peacekeeping concerning their border conflict. All of these efforts, as well as many others cited previously, were initiated in Costa Rica.

Costa Rica’s “Southern Front” for Covert War

But, dominating violent conflict resolution in the isthmus, the United States government managed much proxy intervention instead with its “Southern Front” in northern Costa Rica. This proxy intervention was led by Eden Pastora, who had repudiated a tercerista (or third) Sandinista coalition formed in 1976 to overthrow Somoza. Besides Pastora, other leaders of this coalition had been Violeta Chamorro, Sergio Ramírez, and the Ortega brothers (Daniel and Humberto). From late 1978, Pastora followed a checkered career that began when he engineered a hostage exchange between Somoza and Oscar Torrijos in Panama. A year later, Pastora led the coalition’s armed struggle in the July 1979 Revolution, but soon after, he began to lead United States proxy intervention, working through John Hull.

Pastora directed anti-Somoza Contra attacks into Nicaragua, through swampy, forested, and mountainous terrain, from Quesada in Costa Rica. His pro-Somoza counterparts feigned attacks from more comfortable camps in Honduras and northwest Costa Rica, under tighter Central Intelligence Agency reins. But the pro-Somoza Contras, more comfortably deployed, attracted less popular support inside Nicaragua than the anti-Somoza Contras led by Pastora.

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563 Raúl Sohr, Centroamérica, 138-39 and 203. This third coalition formed as a compromise between two factions: a pro-Cuban faction led by Jaime Wheelock and a pro-PLO faction led by Tomás Borge. Violeta Chamorro left this third coalition to assume a widow role similar to that of Corazon Aquino, supported by the U.S.
564 Roberto Bardin, Eden Pastora, Un Cero en la Historia (Mexico City: Mex-Sur, 1984?), 35-36 and 107. Pastora was married to a Costa Rican woman.
The Costa Rican pro- and anti-Somoza Contra groups both received World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Central Intelligence Agency, and Agency for International Development aid. Pastora’s group operated from bases around Hull’s ranches, depending on covert aid sent to Quesada, connected by railroad with San José about sixty miles further south.

Transiting northern Costa Rica to avoid antiaircraft fire, regular night supply flights for the Contras from Honduras, Panama, and El Salvador glided into Nicaragua from the San Juan River jungle valley. Participating Costa Rican officials streamlined these Contra logistical operations through John Hull’s strategically-located, multimillion-dollar string of ranches. His central ranch north of Quesada coordinated arms and supplies between the San Carlos and Sarapiqui rivers, which both fed north into the San Juan River, and thence to Nicaragua. Arms supplied ranged from the M-16 to the Red Eye missile, as well as mines, mortars, cannons, AK-47s (or Kalashnikovs), RPKs, RP G-2s, and Katyushas — often captured in Lebanon and shipped by Israel. A Free Costa Rica network facilitated the night supply flights for these Contra logistics. This paramilitary network had been started by Manuel Artime, the ex-Cuban leader of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion against Cuba, who afterwards moved much of his covert war network to Costa Rica.

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Sponsored by Central Intelligence Agency organizations in northern Costa Rica since the early 1960s, this network had illegally influenced Costa Rican politics for some time. Among the groups in this area first used by Manuel Artime and later by John Hull were ad-hoc military groups such as the Reserve, the Tridents, the Blue Berets, and the Patriotic Union, and other assorted conservative groups. These groups exhibited the same irreverence for domestic law as similarly named groups in Lebanon also armed by Israel and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Beginning in the 1960s, the Central Intelligence Agency coordinated such groups via thousands of agents from the southern campus of the University of Miami, through a firm called Zenith Technological Services and nicknamed JM/WAVE. Led by Theodore Shackley and John Dyer, and fronted by sixty fictitious companies, JM/WAVE coordinated what became the third largest Navy in North America. The Central Intelligence Agency used this hemispheric network to suppress dissidence in the isthmus and to attack Cuba from all sides. In Costa Rica, from 1982 to 1985, the network emerged as a federal organization (OPEN) contrived by the ex-Cuban Felipe Vidal, John Hull’s main bodyguard, and by Bernal Urbino Pinto from the World Anti-Communist League, then headed by John Singlaub. One of Felipe Vidal’s tasks was to counter attempts at nonviolent conflict resolution, such as those initiated by John Paul Lederach from the Moravian Church and Mennonite Central Committee. Lederach began by mediating between the Nicaraguan government in Managua and the Miskito people, organizationally based in San José, but living along the Atlantic Coast near the mouth of the San Juan River. But Lederach, his wife, and his daughter received dangerous threats from Felipe Vidal, intended to force Lederach away from the negotiations. According to three reporters, Vidal was backed in

Miami, see Kenna Simmons, “Neighborly Partner: Community Projects Like the Manuel Artime Center Receive Miami’s Support,” Horizon (New York City), April 1988, 24.
571 Al Burt, “Secrecy Hid Smuggling in Costa Rica,” MHD, 13 Dec. 1964, A 2. The author is grateful to the MHD (Miami) library staff for making article files available here and in footnotes 22 and 24 following.
576 Andy Stone, “Our Man in Managua,” Sunday Camera Magazine (Boulder, Colo-rado), 29 May 1988, 10. Stone, although living in the Boulder area, reported on these events as he travelled over an extended period of time in this area. Under the context of the peace talks in Esquipulas, Lederach mediated directly between Brooklyn Rivera (based in San José) and Tomás Borges (in Managua) to effect a working arrangement for reconciliation between the
his threats not only by John Hull, his employer, but also by the United States Embassies in both Costa Rica and Honduras. The United States thus used violent proxy intervention to curb nonviolent, Costa Rican-based negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and the Miskito Indian people.

OPEN, the federal organization spurred by the Free Costa Rica network, concocted additional, multifarious methods to subvert Costa Rican neutrality. To accomplish this, OPEN advanced conservative United States business interests inside Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and reinforced remilitarization schemes by the United States, through a Costa Rican Organization of Judicial Investigation, a Security Intelligence Directorate, and a National Security Council. These Costa Rican organizations corresponded to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council, and were accompanied by other Costa Rican agencies dealing with drugs, immigration, the police, and anti-terrorism.

Somoza’s former ranch in northwest Costa Rica, El Murciélago, served as the base for Costa Rican remilitarization. Toward this end, a Central Intelligence Agency corporate front renovated Murciélago and its Potrero Grande air base, fifteen miles from the Pacific Ocean.

Indian group (YATAMA) and the FSLN. According to Lederach, the U.S. attempts to disrupt the negotiations included the meddling of a State Department official (including what appeared to be bribes), as well as reports by the Miskitos to Lederach that Felipe Vidal intended to harass his wife and kidnap his daughter. Afraid for their lives, Lederach, his wife, his daughter, and his mother-in-law fled into hiding from their San José home, and thence out of the isthmus. Brooklyn Rivera was then also not allowed to enter Honduras, in order to talk with his people there. Finally, an ambush killing one person followed soon after in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, near the Costa Rican border. The kidnap and harassment threats were reported to the Arias administration. John Paul Lederach, “Nicaraguan East Coast Mediation,” Mennonite Central Committee [MCC], U.S., Memo., 30 Nov. 1987, 1-2. The author is grateful to Delton Franz, director of the MCC offices in Washington, D.C., for access to this memo.


The author is grateful to John Paul Lederach for input here and concerning the previous two footnotes. Please see also John Paul Lederach, “Of Nets, Nails, and Problemas” (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1988), 263-358. These pages describe the basic terms employed by Lederach for micro-level negotiations: e.g., trust (confianzas), misinformation (chisme), impartiality (neutralidad), and plausible denial (indirectas).


Oliver North, Richard Secord, and Albert Hakim (from Iran) managed the base at Murciélago through the Udall Research Corporation and the Stanford Technology Corporation. Secord qualified for this post because of his Middle East arms deals for Ronald Reagan during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hakim’s and Secord’s experience in arms dealing with Iran and Israel, respectively, provided the means for coordinating the flow of incoming captured weapons — from Lebanon by way of Israel (and Irani money) to remilitarize Costa Rica.\footnote{Roberto Bardini, \textit{Monjes, Mercenarios} (Mexico: Mex-Sur, 1988), 41-42 and 153. For related training of Costa Rican civil guards by the U.S. Green Berets Special Forces, see Gregorio Selser, “Costa Rica: Más Militarizacion del País que No Tienen Ejercito,” reproduced from \textit{El Día} (Mexico), 4 May 1985, in “Costa Rica: Entre Las Tenazas del FMI, la AID, y el Pentagono,” \textit{La Parcial} (Hamburg, West German “Greens”) 7 (June 1986): 40.}

Lewis Tambs, the United States Ambassador to Costa Rica, pressured Luis Monge to support this remilitarization. Murciélago and Potrero Grande launched bombing raids on both Managua (8 September and 2-14 October 1983) and Puerto Corinto (9 September and 2-14 October 1983). Operatives from Murciélago also coordinated major land offensives like Operation Blazing Tooth, deploying over a thousand Contras to attack San Juan del Norte soon after Monge’s neutrality declaration.\footnote{Richard Alan White, \textit{The Morass, United States Intervention in Central America} (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 68-73.} Contras were trained and outfitted at Murciélago by United States vigilante groups, led by Thomas Posey (Civilian Military Assistance) and Robert Brown (Omega Force), as well as an aging Harry Aderholt and Edward Lansdale (who died in 1981).\footnote{Tom Barry, et al., \textit{The New Right Humanitarians} (Albuquerque, NM: Resource Center, 1986), 18-28.}

While handling this crisis, Costa Rica dodged participation in the Contadora process championed by Mexico. However, Costa Rica’s foreign ministry stubbornly continued to defend its claim to neutrality in order not to undermine the Contadora talks. Then, in 1986, the combined effect of Oscar Arias Sánchez’ election and the Iran-Contra scandal in the United States cleared a way for change. Arias’ political edge was slim, since his party controlled only twenty-nine of fifty-seven seats in the national legislature. To gain precious momentum, Arias immediately travelled to Europe for a month of consciousness-raising, hoping to attract international support for his plans to solve the arms, debt, drug, and Contra crisis overwhelming his country. By initiating an international peace plan for the isthmus, Arias managed to pre-empt Ronald Reagan’s idiosyncratic world order vision.

Arias also undercut remilitarization inside Costa Rica. After dismantling Pastora’s logistical network, he shut down Contra military hospitals and other related organizations. His objectives were a ceasefire, political amnesty, decreased military aid, and an international monitoring committee supported by an isthmic parliament. By September 1986, he also oversaw the evictions of specific mercenaries from Murciélago, each of whom was sentenced to five years in prison. In response to these efforts at demilitarization, aid and loans to Costa Rica were reduced by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States


588 Lowell Gudmundson, “Costa Rica’s Arias at Midterm,” CHY 86 (Dec. 1987): 417-419. For originally strong doubts about Arias as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” before the Iran-Contra scandal, shielding U.S. attacks on Contadora supported by Mexico, see “La Propuesta de Paz de Oscar Arias: Lobo Vestido de Oveja?” Opinión Política, April 1987, CIDE (Centro de Docencia Económica) National University of Mexico), Mimeo, n.p.


591 For these objectives, see “Central America Is Ready for Arias’ Peace Proposal, U.S. Policy Will Determine Success,” FPCN, May-June 1987, 2.

592 Richard J. Walton, “Costa Rica: Back From the Brink?” Nation, 20 Dec. 1986, 698. These specific mercenaries were later identified as employees of John Hull by a Costa Rican congressional drug commission, to be discussed in chapter 7.
Agency for International Development. Nevertheless, given his electoral mandate, Arias had no political choice but to continue his unarmed diplomacy for peace.

Then, gliding in from Costa Rica on 6 October 1986, Eugene Hasenfus was shot down by José Fernando Canales about twenty-five miles north of the San Juan River. United States plans crashed with Hasenfus, the first United States prisoner of war captured in Nicaragua since the early 1900s. Carrying United States’ State Department authorization papers as a highly-paid freight kicker, Hasenfus jumped from a plane owned by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Southern Air Transport Company. His personal papers linked him to John Hull, Daniel Quayle, the future United States Vice-president under George Bush, and Robert Owen — Quayle’s former staff aide from Hull’s home state of Indiana.

The Central Intelligence Agency would continue to direct pro-Somoza Contras from both Costa Rica and Honduras. On the major northern land route from Honduras, for example, Ocotal would be taken in transit for a few hours when Contras tried to conquer Estelí, a major city a few miles north of Managua. But these Honduran attempts were even less significant than the seventy-two-hour Costa Rican-based occupation of the village of San Juan del Norte. Richard Melton, the United States Ambassador to Nicaragua, still worked to pit Honduras against the cooperative Nicaraguan and Costa Rican implementation of the isthmian peace plans — in order to undermine the first major regional agreement since the 1960s Alliance for Progress. As a result, the Hondurans would sign only if all the peace plan stipulations advanced by Costa Rica were met by Nicaragua. In contrast with the Contadora Agreement, proposed primarily by Mexico, this Arias or Esquipulas II peace plan emphasized a nonaligned isthmian peace agreement for the needs and concerns of the isthmus arranged by the isthmian nations themselves.

594 Robert Parry and Brian Barger, “Reagan’s Shadow CIA,” NRC 195 (24 Nov. 1986): 23 ff. Parry and Barger, a major media team covering the crash, charged that George Bush played a role in managing the mid-level ex-Cuban operatives who over-saw the Contras’ arms and drug business.
596 Raúl Sohr, Centroamérica, 145 and 205.
Europe and Israel were secondary players in the international resolution of conflict in the isthmus. Israeli presence dated from the early 1950s, when Costa Rican communists challenged the United Fruit Company.599 European contacts, established by colonialism, were interrupted by two world wars and did not resume until 1968, when an isthmian mission lobbied the European Economic Community in Brussels. In the 1980s, Europe began to show a resolve to support the Contadora process and plans for an isthmian parliament.600 This European support was symbolized by the Nobel Peace Prize given to Oscar Arias Sánchez for his attempts at international conflict resolution. European support also reflected the political fact that European peace movements were threatening to put pressure on both NATO and the conservative ruling European political parties by mass civil disobedience, if something tangible was not done to resolve isthmian conflict.601 Analogous Israeli peace movements lacked the power to push for similar nonviolent conflict resolution on the international level.

European Community Trade — Profitable Gains

In the 1970s, emphasizing equitable trade in commodities instead of arms, the European Economic Community patterned its reemerging isthmian interests upon an Andean-European arrangement, linked by other arrangements to trade with Japan.602 Preliminary agreements evolved through a May 1976 Socialist International conference in Caracas, Venezuela, sponsored by Rómulo Betancourt (Venezuela), Willy Brandt (West Germany), Luis Alberto Monge (Costa Rica) and Edelberto Torres-Rivas, “Documento Base de la Reunión: Nuevo Formas de Cooperacion Europa-Centroamérica,” Cuadernos Semestrales del Centro de la Investigación y la Docencia Económica (CIDE) 18 (1985): 34-39.

Rica), Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), and Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre (Peru and Costa Rica). The aims of this conference were strengthened by a San José, Costa Rica, meeting in July 1978, and a 1979 meeting in Lisbon, Portugal.\textsuperscript{603}

Further meetings of the Socialist International gave Rodrigo Carazo, president of Costa Rica before Luis Monge, the courage to bargain directly for help with the European Economic Community. Thus, in June 1980, Carazo went first to Paris, then to Brussels for meetings with Roy Jenkins (president of the European Economic Community), and finally to London. Carazo pleaded for aid to both Nicaragua and Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{604} Aid followed. In 1984 the European Economic Community even tried to persuade George Shultz not to block loans to Nicaragua from the Inter-American Development Bank, partially funded by the European Community.\textsuperscript{605} Leadership from Spain and West Germany coordinated the European support for Nicaragua and Costa Rica, primarily through a West German development aid model used before in Laos and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{606}

After 1979, the European Economic Community coordinated isthmian aid and trade through the Central American Integration Bank.\textsuperscript{607} In five years, European isthmian aid reached over $360 million, of which eighteen percent went to Costa Rica and forty-six percent to Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{608} Over ninety percent of the total supported Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

\textsuperscript{603}Gregorio Selser, “Presencia de la Internacional Socialista en América Latina y el Caribe,” in Centroamérica, 3d ed., 270, 283, 285-86, 301, and 305-306. Bettino Craxi (Italy), Anker Jörgensen (Denmark), Bruno Kreisky (Austria), Guillermo Manuel Ungo (El Salvador), Mario Soares (Portugal), and Ulpio Tapiola (Finland) also attended this conference.


During this same period, trade between the isthmus and the European Community rose to over $4 billion annually, half of which accounted for a sixth of all Central American exports. Aid to the isthmus from the European Community — which had averaged $60 million per year before 1984 — would exceed $215 million per year after 1984, of which a third went to Nicaragua and a tenth to Costa Rica.

A 1984 San José conference and a 1985 meeting in Luxembourg launched plans to install a five-year isthmian development package, under a generalized preference system already open to Belize. These meetings also indirectly improved the relations of the isthmian nations with other countries in the region such as Cuba. Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, as protagonists for peace through the agreements signed on Contadora Island, were included in the five-year package. As part of these developments, Sweden and other neutral states also lobbied for stronger Canadian and European economic relations with the isthmus. By mid-1988, the European Community included full Cuban trade and diplomatic relations among its overall political objectives.

These improved European-Western Caribbean relations undermined United States hegemony in the Western Caribbean, since the economic power of the European Economic Community was second only to Japan’s in the capitalist world. Sergio Ramírez, Nicaragua’s vice-president, optimistically noted that improving European relations could make it possible to

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613*Aid That Counts, The Western Contribution to Development and Survival in Nicaragua* (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Transnational Institute, and Managua: CRIES, 1988), 9, 18, and 98 ff. From 1979-1986, over a fifth of Nicaraguan trade was with the EEC and Canada.
draft and implement a health and medical plan for the entire isthmus.\footnote{Nicaragua Propone Elaborar Plan de Cooperación en Central América, "RPA, 20 August 1986, 13.}

In 1988, hopes for an isthmian parliament also improved,\footnote{Mattijs von Bonzel, political attaché in the Netherlands Embassy to Costa Rica, in his office, interview by the author (19 April 1989).} as European trade rose to over a quarter of all exports from the isthmus. Increasing European economic involvement also led to greater political support for Latin and European proposals on United Nations peacekeeping.\footnote{J. D. Gannon, “You Scratch My Back And ...,” CSM, 3 March 1989, 4. Isthmian governments remained concerned over what would happen to European tariffs and terms of trade, when Europe would transform as planned into a single European economic system, including East Germany.}

\begin{quote}
Iran, Israeli, and Saudi Arms — Shaky Trade-Offs
\end{quote}

Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia took another approach to conflict resolution in the isthmus. Instead of involvement through trade, these nations stressed military solutions through proxy intervention. As will be shown in the following section and the section after it regarding the United States, Saudi (and Brunei) money funded proxies such as Israel for violent United States conflict resolution in the isthmus. These proxy funds were supplemented by cocaine profits negotiated in Costa Rica, by way of Panama and Colombia, through exchanges engineered by, for example, Manuel Antonio Noriega, Sarkis Soghanalian (Lebanese) and Michael Harari (Israeli). Much of the isthmian diplomatic complicity in this arms and drug business was based in San José, espoused there by Israeli interests left over from the Somoza era.\footnote{Marshall Yurow, “Legacy of the Pledge: Israel’s Involvement in Nicaragua” (MA non-thesis option, The American University, 1986), n.p., Chapter 3. For Soghanalian’s business with Israel, along with his yearly $2 billion arms sales average — including Iraq, Eastern Europe, France, and Argentina (e.g., the Exocets sinking British warships in the Malvinas War), see Knut Royce and Miguel Acoca, “Big-Time Arms Man Indicted,” \textit{Sunday Times Mirror} (Albany, New York), 28 Sept. 1986, A 7. For Harari’s other interests, ranging from nuclear technology to Palestinian death squads, see Juan Tamayo, “Noriega Supported by Ex-Spy,” \textit{MHD}, 19 Jan. 1988, A 4. The author is grateful to journalist Knut Royce (\textit{Newsday} Washington, D.C., Bureau) for access to these articles, during an interview by the author in Royce’s office, 29 Sept. 1989. Some arms also came from Taiwan; see Reuter Cable L 124 (22 Oct. 1986). See also chapter 7 for the resultant role of drugs.}

Israel, externally dependent on imports for over ninety percent of its energy resources, and upon Latin America — especially the isthmus — for its Third World arms exports, unified plans to arm the Contras by selling Iran weapons. From the 1950s to the Khomeini Revolution in 1979, Israeli intelligence had done more than train the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, for such clandestine deals. Ongoing Israeli deals ensured that Khomeini\footnote{Marianne Van Leeuwen, “Israël en Iran—Strange Bedfellows?” \textit{Transaktie} 16 (1987): 197 and 199.} and pro-Somoza groups continued to rely on Israeli arms.\footnote{Jane Hunter, \textit{Israeli Foreign Policy, South Africa and Central America} (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 141-43.} In the late 1970s, Israel also planned an electronic Costa
Nicaragua border fence patterned after its Namibia-Angola and Israel-Palestine border fences, while prolonging Somoza’s last bloody year in power (mid-1978 to mid-1979).

Understandably, some people disliked these Israeli arms deals. In Managua, massive nonviolent trade union demonstrations at the Israeli Embassy compelled Daniel Ortega to break diplomatic relations with Israel. In so doing, Ortega also disclaimed arms-related debts to Israel and Argentina. Controversy persisted over whether or not Israel had coordinated arms sold to Iran in 1979, preceding a similar 1984 William Buckley deal for delaying the release of United States hostages. The 1979 arrangement may have been responsible for making Ronald Reagan president, instead of Jimmy Carter, who was favored as the incumbent.

By 1980, over forty percent of Israeli export revenue came from arms deals with Latin American countries like Costa Rica. A Turk from Lebanon — Sarkis Soghanalian — brokered a large share of these arms deals, using his arms and drug business experience from wars staged in IndoChina, Iraq-Iran, and Israel-Lebanon, by way of his offices in Iraq, Laos, Florida, Nicaragua, and Switzerland. During the 1970s, through United States diplomatic channels, Soghanalian had supplied Somoza, the Lebanese Kataeb, and Moamar Khadafi in Libya. Such international dealings disgusted law enforcement agents like Richard Gregorie,

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628 Michael Gillard, “CIA Is Accused in Arms Fraud Case,” *Observer*, 8 June 1982, 12. For IndoChina origins, via Air America and Laos air operations management in 1966-1974 under the U.S. State Department, see “James Cunningham, Director” resumé — for Soghanalian’s “right-hand” man and company roots — in “Pan Aviation File,” Civil Aeronautics Board, U.S. Department of Transportation, mimeo. The author is grateful to Knut Royce
who may have resigned his United States Attorney post in the Southern (Miami) District of Florida because traffickers like Soghanalian made his work irrelevant. Gregorie discovered others like Soghanalian working from the top of federal agencies such as those in Costa Rica, Peru, Israel, Lebanon, Bolivia, Colombia, and South Africa. To the south of Costa Rica, another such major international arms and drug business figure — Michael Harari — worked through similarly official, overlapping diplomatic and intelligence channels, whether in Israel, South Africa, or the United States, with similar high-level diplomatic protection.

Identified as a founder and arms supplier of the Contra proxy intervention network, Michael Harari was also part of the logistical network for the Lebanese Kataeb so familiar to Soghanalian. Harari’s network had supplemented Soghanalian’s deals by inducting a Panamanian, Manuel Antonio Noriega, into the arms and drug business, and by forging Noriega’s personal bodyguard. Harari’s network fed arms to Costa Rican Contras through fellow ex-Mossad agents like William Northrup, who also dealt arms to Iran after 1982. Guarded by Noriega’s own personal aide, José de Jesús (“Chu Chu”) Martínez, Harari helped Noriega to shelter the Shah of Iran before his death on Contadora Island. After the 1989 United States intervention in Panama, Harari quietly returned to Israel.

A 1981 memorandum of understanding, arranged between Israel and the United States by Ya’acov Meridor, authorized Israel to serve as a military proxy for the United States for such


629Richard Gregorie in his Key Biscayne, Florida home, telephone interview by the author, 30 Oct. 1989. Please note: the alleged role of Soghanalian, confirmed by the first telephone interview with Gregorie from his home — soon after the Kerry Commission hearings, was later denied by Gregorie from his Miami office during a second telephone interview by the author (30 Jan. 1990). See also, Kerry Commission, Foreign Policy, 123. For Israeli and English mercenaries in Colombia, see Eugene Robinson, “Bogota Security Alleges Mercenary Aid to Cartels, WPT, 29 August 1989, A1 and 18. According to a long Radio Moscow short-wave program (28 August 1989), South Africans also worked with the CIA, along with British and Israeli mercenaries, to train Colombian drug security squads.


conflict, despite paper obstacles like the Boland Amendment.\footnote{Jane Hunter, No Simple Proxy, Israel in Central America (Washington, D.C.: Washington Middle East Associates, 1987), iii and 79.} Israel worked well as a proxy in Costa Rica because anti-Somoza Contras like Eden Pastora refused to deal with former Somoza National Guard members.\footnote{Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection, Who Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 90 and 92.} Unable to forget that the Somoza National Guard had killed his father, Pastora preferred Israeli-supplied arms from Lebanon, regardless of the cost to Lebanon.\footnote{Bryan Smith, “Israel and Central American Arms,” Canadian Dimension 17 (July 1983): 16. For Pastora’s initial stance against Israel, due to arms shipped by Israel to keep Somoza in power during the last year before the 1979 Revolution, see also “Por Ayuda a Somoza Ataca a Israel,” La Prensa Libre, 6 July 1979, 15.}

In arms-debt-Contra exchanges involving Eden Pastora and Luis Monge, Quesada served logistically as the railroad depot for Israeli arms, supplies, and training materials coordinated by managers such as John Hull. Each Contra was paid an initial $200 and another $100 per month,\footnote{Blanche Petrich, “Financian Washington y Tel Aviv a los Contra-revolucionarios de Eden Pastora,” Uno Mas Uno, June 1983 — CODELIDE Reprint. For training of the Costa Rican rural guard by Israel, see Aaron S. Kleiman, Israel’s Global Reach, Arms Sales as Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Brassey’s, 1985), 135.} while Israeli Contra advisors received up to $10,000 monthly. The Israelis employed Israel Defense Force training manuals and catalogues to teach the Contras how to use the incoming shiploads of arms, including surface-to-air missiles for destroying Soviet-made helicopters. These shipments were sent by Israel through San Antonio, Texas, from Lebanon.\footnote{Jonathan Marshall, et al., Iran-Contra, 14 and 98-100.} In exchange for basing the Contras in and around Quesada, and also for agreeing to switch the Costa Rican Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Luis Monge dispassionately renegotiated Costa Rica’s international debt with 170 United States commercial banks after a short meeting in Washington, D.C.\footnote{Jane Hunter, “Israel in Central America, Arms Merchant and U.S. Proxy,” Nicaraguan Perspectives 7 (Winter 1983): 36.}

In August 1982, Karen Olson, the first wife of José Figueres and a United States citizen, negotiated an arms, debt, and Contra deal as the Ambassador of Costa Rica to Israel. She completed the deal as Israel occupied Lebanon.\footnote{Gregorio Selser, “Costa Rica: El Traslado de Embajada a Jerusalén,” El Día (Mexico), 18 Sept. 1987, 4.} Back in Costa Rica, legislative queries over the legality of this deal were brushed aside, since Israel had similarly armed Japan, Taiwan, Argentina, and South Korea.\footnote{In August 1982, Karen Olson, the first wife of José Figueres and a United States citizen, negotiated an arms, debt, and Contra deal as the Ambassador of Costa Rica to Israel. She completed the deal as Israel occupied Lebanon. Back in Costa Rica, legislative queries over the legality of this deal were brushed aside, since Israel had similarly armed Japan, Taiwan, Argentina, and South Korea.} Annual Israeli-Latin American trade accordingly mushroomed from $250 million, in 1981, to over $1 billion after 1982. Meanwhile, the Palestine Liberation
Organization reciprocated by co-coordinating military training in a fourth of the Sandinista military bases.\footnote{Miguel Concha, “Gendarmes Nacionales y Regionales,” Uno Mas Uno, 28 Nov. 1982, 14; in CSPPCPR, 94.} On 12 January 1983, the 1981 (Meridor) Israeli-United States memorandum of understanding was formally modified to include Costa Rica. The 1981 memorandum may have had a clause that Israel would attack Cuba or Nicaragua with the United States if necessary. But the 1983 memorandum included pledges covering Irani, Iraqi, Afghani, Lebanese, and South African conflict too.\footnote{Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Israel’s Role, 17 and 21.} The foreign minister of Costa Rica, Angel Edmundo Solano, travelled to Israel and met with Ariel Sharon (General-in-Chief), Shimon Peres (Labor Party leader), Yitzhak Shamir (Chancellor), and Menachem Begin (President),\footnote{Volio: Nicaragua Desea Ensuciar la Imagen Clara de Costa Rica,” El Día, 12 Jan. 1983, 15; in CPSPPCR, 57.} in order to co-sign this memorandum of understanding.\footnote{Acuerdo de ‘Colaboración’ Entre Israel y Costa Rica,” Uno Mas Uno, 13 Jan. 1983, 12, in CSPPCR, 96.} Needless to say, Israel did not reciprocate by recognizing Costa Rica’s claims to neutrality and unarmed diplomacy.

Later in 1983, two other Israeli projects also emerged, beginning with a TADIRAN contract to build the first isthmian arms and munitions factory in Guatemala. This factory standardized small arms production in the isthmian states politically aligned with the United States, such as Costa Rica, whether for pistols, rifles, and machine guns, or for computer-assisted counterinsurgency technology.\footnote{“Israeli Arms Factory Opens for Business,” Guardian in DCF (16 Nov. 1983).} Secondly, Israel and the United States Agency for International Development proposed a joint project for northern Costa Rica. This second project constructed military barracks and other related buildings north of Quesada.\footnote{El Libro Blanco de Uno Agresión contra la Democracia, Costa Rica Entre la Neutralidad y la Guerra (Madrid: IEPALA/Costa Rican Socialist Party, June 1984), 16 and 18.}

In 1984 these long-range Israeli-Costa Rican plans were derailed by the William Buckley kidnapping in Beirut, Lebanon, and the Boland Amendment. In response, under White House National Security Council Directive 111, top Israeli cabinet officials maneuvered to retrieve Buckley by offering Iran more weapons.\footnote{Jack Colhoun, “Israeli Handwriting All Over Iran-Contra Scandal, Guardian (New York), 4 Nov. 1987, in DCF (1987), 17.} Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continued proxy intervention by funding both arms shipments to Iran and (Israeli) Contra military training. In the next two years, Brunei, Saudi Arabia, and private citizens in the United States publicly sent over
$250 million to the Contras, despite the Boland Amendment’s ban on United States federal funding for such warfare, from October 1984 to October 1986.\textsuperscript{649}

\textit{Superpower Stalemate or Nuclear War — An Unstable Peace}

Underneath the proxy roles of Israel, Costa Rica, and Saudi Arabia was, of course, the United States geopolitical program for hegemony over the isthmus. This program originated from a world order view of geopolitical security.\textsuperscript{650} Since the 1940s, the United States had advanced low-intensity counterinsurgency tactics for geopolitical security, with its nuclear threat quietly in the background.\textsuperscript{651} This program explains why José Figueres, the Costa Rican president who abolished its army in 1948, still had to consider United States military threats to invade by air, by sea, and by land from Panama.\textsuperscript{652}

Covert and Overt Costa Rican Remilitarization

From the early 1960s, United States geopolitical priorities in Costa Rica were patterned by organizations like the Free Costa Rica network, funded by smuggling, and used to suppress pro-Cuba and anti-dependency organizations.\textsuperscript{653} After 1966, this network was joined by the World Anti-Communist League, commonly called the League. This League stemmed from an anti-communist coalition of Far East Asian, Croatian, and Romanian ex-Nazi-sympathizers, previously led by John Singlaub during the Lao war.\textsuperscript{654} The League’s Asian experience distinguished it from the Middle East-oriented, ex-Cuban Free Costa Rica network.

Surprisingly, at first, a fear of the Soviet Union itself was not a recognizable part of either


\textsuperscript{651} Jan Black, “United States Security Policy and Penetration: The Case of Brazil in the Sixties” (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1975), 35-36.


network’s concerns. However, by the 1970s — at a time when Soviet Third World experts begin to abandon their violent revolutionary rhetoric because such tactics had failed — United States training manuals used by such groups were beginning to adopt low-intensity counterinsurgency tactics against all who were alleged to be communists, nonviolent or otherwise.

After 1976, what had been considered to be a backwater United States military mission in Costa Rica was upgraded in status. Stinging embarassments in Lebanon — where a pro-Cuban government almost took power in 1976 — and the equally pungent IndoChinese defeat in 1975 may have motivated this militarization of Costa Rica. At the time, the arms and drug business in IndoChina had ended, though surplus funds from that business and its Phoenix Project had been transferred to the Nughan Hand Bank in Australia and Miami, Florida. In any case, Jimmy Carter’s ambassador to Costa Rica, Frank McNeill, and two Central Intelligence Agency (isthmian) Covert Operations Task Force directors, Dewey Claridge and Alan Fiers, began to muster Lebanonization tactics for the rest of the isthmus from this military mission.

In the wake of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution, many events motivated covert interference. Pro- and anti-revolutionary organizations sprung up rapidly in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Inspired by the Nicaraguan Revolution, small farmer or peasant guerrilla organizations sprouted from hidden base communities in Panama, Honduras, and El Salvador. Many of these

654Scott and Jon Lee Anderson, League, xvii, 7, 12-29, and 35 ff.
small farmer uprisings were suppressed by rapidly deployed, United States-funded isthmian military power. Also, after 1979, Caribbean independence movements flexed their muscles in the Dominican and Grenadian revolutions and the counter-revolutions that echoed in Haiti and Guyana. For the first time in the Caribbean since 1959, Cuba began to establish adroit trade relations with Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam, and Nicaragua.

William Casey, the main United States “spook” overseeing proxy intervention in states like Costa Rica, proceeded under Project Veil. He had a strong personal and professional example to follow in his mentor and surrogate father, the afore-mentioned William Donovan. Casey, for example, oversaw Bruneian and Saudi Arabian money transfers. Operating as money-laundries, his offices also handled State Department funds channeled directly to Costa Rican Contras through the State Department’s International Business Communications enterprise. This proxy intervention was aimed at both Costa Rica and Nicaragua, as managed by the parallel state crippling Costa Rican economic development. John Biehl later reviled its disastrous effect on the Costa Rican people.

But Casey’s Costa Rican proxy intervention was also diverted by the Buckley kidnapping, and then derailed by the bombing deaths of top Central Intelligence Agency agents intending to visit Beirut. At first, Casey tried to lead the search for Buckley himself, since Buckley had headed all the Central Intelligence Agency covert operations. That is to say,

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661 Gabriel Aguilera and Edelberto Torras Rivas, *Para Entender Centroamérica, Los Hechos que Formaron la Crisis* (San José: CRIES/ICADIS, 1986), 11, 62, 83-86, and 107-108. For the U.S. arms for such covert interference, sent from Texas (Beaumont, Houston, or Corpus Christi), Florida (McDill) and California (Concord, Oak-land, or Fort Worth), see “Up In Arms, U.S. Military Shipments to Central America, A Guide for Activists,” AFSC Mimeo, n.d., 4-5.


besides his work against operatives suspected of collaboration in Beirut with states like Cuba or Sandinista Nicaragua, Buckley and Theodore Shackley had also trained the leaders of Manuel Artine’s network, ending, after the 1959-1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, in the Costa Rican network already-mentioned — as well as in the Phoenix network in Laos and Vietnam.669 Revelations about these omnivorous networks could be embarrassing, personally and diplomatically.

The Arms and Drug Business

Emergency plans were made to restrain the repercussions expected in the isthmus. Some of these plans were privately successful in jump-starting the Contras with drug money, through Colombian cocaine traffickers linked to United States drug dealers; (see Chapter Seven). Still other political plans, such as George Bush’s internment plan, met strong public opposition inside the United States. (Bush tried to authorize a national plan for imprisoning 400,000 people inside United States internment camps, if and when the United States decided to invade Nicaragua, but the plan was shelved quietly when public opposition surfaced.)670

After Casey’s death, the task of resolving the emergency fell to Clair George, also a former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Lebanon.671 George appointed Alan Fiers as his liaison to the isthmus, especially for Joseph Fernández, in charge of the Central Intelligence Agency station in San José since Buckley’s kidnapping. Fernández redesigned the United States strategy away from the economic destabilization plans used under James Anderson, last


671Daniel Rosenbaum, “Chief of CIA Covert Operations, Criticized in Iran Affair, Resigns,” NYT, 26 Nov. 1987, A 2. Rosenbaum describes Clair George as the top CIA agent in Beirut until 1975, before going to Athens as the top CIA agent there, in order to fund the Christian Phalange back in Lebanon. For the 170 CIA agents in Athens actively funding the Christian Phalange, who thus helped indirectly to arm the Costa Rican Contras, see David Tonge, “CIA ’Kindled Beirut War’,” Guardian (Manchester), 19 April 1976, 2.
mentioned in chapter three. Obviously, such economic destabilization had not kept Costa Rica away from the negotiation table with Nicaragua. Something else was needed to fund the Contras and deter Costa Rica — possibly economic destabilization by an arms and drug business, like the one that flourished openly in Cuba before 1959?

Aided by the Lebanese expertise of Clair George, Joseph Fernández began to coordinate the Contras despite the 1984 Boland Amendment. Fernández helped to coordinate attacks on Nicaragua and to put pressure on Mexico to stop selling oil to Nicaragua and Costa Rica. This pressure forced Ortega to Moscow for oil, and intimidated the United States Congress into doubling its aid to the Contras just before it passed the Boland Amendment, while Costa Rican human needs fell between the cracks. However, the extent to which an arms and drug business replaced a Chilean destabilization strategy in Costa Rica would remain hazy in most publicly available historical accounts.

Fernández coordinated United States attacks on Nicaragua from San José. He used National Security Agency KL-43 communications scrambler machines to keep in touch with alleged arms and drug Contra leaders like Oliver North, Robert Dutton, Richard Secord, and Rafael Quintero. In addition, Fernández met for undisclosed reasons with such Contra leaders as John Hull and Robert Owen, on the night of the La Penca bombing, and continued to advise Hull on how to avoid prosecution by Oscar Arias for illicitly funding the Contras.

In the United States, his use of National Security Agency KL-43 devices left records that were internally audited by the Central Intelligence Agency, because of the Boland Amendment (PL 98-473, 12 October 1984). During a probing investigation, which in all likelihood stumbled over his arms and drug business, Fernández lied to the internal investigators of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Tower Commission. In 1987, thrown into a “near panic” over

673Peter Calvert, “U.S. Decision-Making and Central America: The Reagan Administration,” in Shearman and Williams, eds., Superpowers, 7 and 9-14. Calvert points out that the Reagan administration was the first U.S. administration to computerize electoral and foreign intervention scenarios, thus making fast, far-reaching decisions for violent conflict resolution through computer imaging processes.
674Government’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Exclude KL-43 Messages (By Responding to Defendant’s Pretrial Motion No. 29), United States of America v. Joseph F. Fernández, Defendant, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division (10 July 1989), Criminal No. 89-150-A, 1-3.
revelations from the unravelling arms and drug business in Costa Rica that threatened its own clandestine legitimacy. In mid-1989 he was indicted for these arms and drug dealings by the six-month Drug Commission of the Costa Rican National Legislature. Like his colleagues North and Secord, he was barred by this Drug Commission from returning to Costa Rica.

In northern Costa Rica, coordinating the Contras on the ground, John Hull had continued to manage his multi-million dollar string of ranches. But on 30 May 1984 in La Penca — about the time of Buckley’s kidnapping — things unravelled for Hull as well, when Pastora avoided assassination. Pastora immediately accused Hull and Owen of planning the bombing assassination attempt. Owen was a Contra fundraiser and leader of the pro-Somoza Contras, who met Hull while working for Daniel Quayle. Consequently, the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Embassy in Costa Rica obstructed investigations by the United States Customs and United States Congressional aides into Hull’s activities — despite federal orders in the United States to investigate his alleged use of drugs to finance Contra arms while mercenaries working for him readily discussed his business.


678 Asamblea Legislativa, Comisión Especial Nombrada Para Investigar los Hechos Denunciados Sobre Narcotráfico, Expediente 10.684, Informe Final, San José (20 July 1989), 57-67. See chapter 7 for discussion of this commission. The U.S. Congress appears not to have made any reply to the Costa Rican Legislature over this Drug Commission report, which alleged the very things that the U.S. Congress pre-sided over by Daniel Inouye (Senator, HI) refused to allow into public hearings.


681 Kerry Commission, *Foreign Policy*, 55-56. In addition to denied access for Senate investigators working for John Kerry, Joseph Robert Kelso, an undercover U.S. customs agent trying to meet Hull, claimed to have narrowly
Finally, in November 1986, a Beirut newspaper, *Al-Shira*, broke the so-called Iran-Contra story. Consequent United States Congressional investigations managed to isolate only one man who claimed to be honest to himself, Robert MacFarlane, almost a man without a country after his attempted suicide over the Iran-Contra hearings. But, another man without a country, John Biehl, was not asked to testify before the Congress. The United States Congress may have been as unable to relate to the nonviolent Costa Rican courage represented by Biehl — a Chilean who found refuge in Costa Rica after 1973 — as were the Reagan and Bush administrations. Enigmatically, the Soviet Kremlin leadership belittled the Iran-Contra event as a diversion to discredit its Rejkyavik negotiations and *perestroika* (reconstruction) strategy. At the same time, United States Special Forces were again deployed to intervene once more, this time in Panama from southwest Costa Rica, ten months before the publicized invasion in December 1989. Meanwhile, the arms and drug business continued unabated, diplomatically protected by anti-communist rhetoric, in a zone of conflict that the United States considered part of its legitimate sphere of influence.

escaped death at the hands of unfriendly Hull employees and local police; see Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein, “Report Links National Security Council with Costa Rica Drug Mystery,” *Guardian*, 2 Dec. 1987, 5. The author is grateful to David MacMichael and to the Christic Institute for computer-assisted help on this issue of legal jurisdiction.


688 For example, according to various sources, Arturo Cruz was involved in the arms and drug business to supply his Contra forces. But he was protected diplomatically both as an international relations professor in the University of Miami and as a lover of Fawn Hall, secretary to Oliver North. See Prensa Latina (Cuba) Cable PL-015, over Frida Modak, “Las de la ‘Contra’: Familias Muy Caras de Mantener” (5 March 1987). Such shielding often boomeranged as, e.g., when Louis Tortorella, in charge of security planning and operations for Fort McNair, home of the U.S. National and Latin American military colleges in Washington, D.C., was charged for dealing cocaine throughout the U.S. armed forces. See Juan Marrero, “Las Drogas, Un Negocio Criminal con las Puertas Abiertas en Estados Unidos,” *Cuba Socialista* 32 (March-April 1988): 99. The author is grateful to the ISRI librarians for computer-assisted help on this topic.
A Chronology of Examples Regarding Approaches and Means from Chapters One to Six

Primary trends and issues, such as the above focus on the arms and drugs business (in the 1970s and 1980s), complicated by long-term debt, will carry over from the foregoing discussion (Parts One and Two) into the concluding discussion over outcome (Part Three) which follows next. A primary, remaining question may be whether or not Costa Rica may still be what some authors have called the prime international candidate for transarmament, that is a change-over toward civilian- as opposed to military-based defense. Answers to such a question will depend on the post-Contra war performance of Costa Rica, as mitigated by the short-term problems of the arms and drug business and the long-term problems of international debt.

A brief table and chronology or date line to recapitulate the short-term and long-term trends or issues in Chapters One to Six should be helpful before proceeding to the last Part of the dissertation on outcomes. This dateline highlights the approaches and methods of nonviolent conflict resolution practiced by Costa Rica, as raised by its recourse to the rule of law and ecologically-sustainable development. Please note that Table 2 below is intended to illustrate nonviolent conflict resolution within the nation-state system — from the viewpoint of a state such as Costa Rica. To this end, nonviolent conflict resolution has been defined as the study and use of power toward mutual change for mutual benefit. John Ruskin, one of the few outstanding economists to analyze such nonviolence, has likewise characterized such nonviolent approaches and methods as those befitting ecologically-sustainable production, distribution, consumption, and preservation of useful and pleasurable life-styles and commodities. According to Ruskin, violent conflict resolution, on the other hand, in choosing power as the deployment of violence

689Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins describe Costa Rica as the most likely model for state transarmament of all the states in the nation-state system. Civilian-based defense concerns nonmilitary, nonviolent protection and preservation (defense) that can deter, prevent, and restrain foreign hostile or aggressive feints and attacks. A transarmament tendency is also emerging inside such states as Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, and possibly, Iceland. See Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins, Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 38-79 passim, 128-32, and 140; Gene Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrence and Defense (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985), 57-124 passim; and, for definitions, Gene Sharp, National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense (Omaha, NB: Association for Transarmament Studies, 1985), 47-52. In Civilian-Based Defense, Sharp and Jenkins also mention the nonviolent struggles in 1765-75 of the U.S. against the English, the 1898-1905 Finnish struggle against the Soviets, a 1919-1922 Korean struggle against Japan, and a 1978 struggle of Bolivians against U.S.-funded opposition among similar struggles to resist foreign wars, espionage, and counterinsurgency. A typical article about such events might be: Esther Fein, “Unshackled Czech Workers Declare Their Independence,” NYT, 28 Nov. 1989, A1 and A12 — over a 2-hour nationwide strike, capping 10 days of protest, which left only essential hospitals, food stores, and nursing homes open and ended 40 years of Communist rule — from a strike covered by the Czech and United States mass media alike.
toward conquest for control, results in the usurpation of the wealth of the poor. To accomplish such violence, youths (soldiers) must kill other people. Killing people, however, maximizes inefficiency — in itself being the most unproductive labor possible.\footnote{For further definitions of a violent and nonviolent political economy, see E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, eds., Vol. XVII, \textit{Unto This Last} [London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1862], in \textit{The Works of John Ruskin} (London: George Allen, 1905, 44, 46, 75, and 97-104. Please see also the definitions of violence and nonviolence in \textit{Sarvodaya, Its Principles and Programme} (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1951), 3 and 9-10. Mohandas Gandhi commonly attributed his theory about a beloved community, or a community in which each individual’s good or value is part of the common good, whether for a nurse, doctor, housewife, lawyer, farmer, or common laborer — the most humble of which may benefit society the most — to the above citations from John Ruskin.}

Such a maximization or optimization of inefficiency, within a context of militarization, of course, may result from one of two approaches: the optimistic world order approach for a militarily-efficient “free” market or the enthusiastic anti-dependency approach for revolutionary equality and efficiency. Both approaches may fail to produce or restore equity or efficiency, though, if killing or brutalizing people is still considered a skillful art or science — and if peacemaking is still belittled as an impractical negation of war. In other words, killing or brutalizing people produces not only economic waste and inefficiency, but also costly economic shadow and opportunity losses in an historical process — as summarized in the table below.
### Table 2

*Concise Dateline In The Western Caribbean: A Foundation For Transarmament?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Costa Rican gains Independence from Spain. Costa Rican trading and neutrality treaties — 1822 (Spain and the isthmus), 1848 (Hanseatic League), 1850s (England and the United States) and 1983 (international). The Monroe Doctrine becomes the United States’ American policy (1823), as opposed to the “unarmed neutrality” of Costa Rica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840s</td>
<td>Bilateral meetings convene on Cuba Island, Lake Nicaragua, over ecologically-sustainable use of the resources of the San Juan River border rainforest between Nicaragua and Costa Rica — despite colonial wars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-1916</td>
<td>The world’s first International Court convenes in San José, Costa Rica — called the Inter-American Court of Justice. Ends in a 1916 International Court decision favoring Costa Rica and United States withdrawal from the Court. An International Court of Justice forms in the Hague, the Netherlands, based on the Costa Rican model (1921).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-1984</td>
<td>Costa Rican nationalizes its banking system. The United States will try to do the much the same in 1933 with its Glass-Steagall Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-1948</td>
<td>Costa Rica pioneers in creating openings for Soviet-American diplomacy and abolishes its own military power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Turrialba, Costa Rica, hosts the first international teaching center for applied ecology regarding sustainable development (and disarmament). (Later in 1987, it will host pioneer experiments for regenerating tropical rainforests — regarding pioneer matrix trees that restore and improve appropriate soil and forest canopy conditions.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td><em>Brazos Caídos</em> or general strike in Costa Rica stops United States and Nicaraguan invasion, halfway between Nicaragua and San José.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Nicaragua leads the world in DDT contamination of mother’s breast milk — from within Lake Nicaragua (San Juan River ecosystem), the source of the Costa Rican water ecosystem. Sporadic strikes throughout Nicaragua and Costa Rica — led by students, trade unions, and small-farmer unions — lead toward the 1979 Sandinista Revolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1974  First American “Green Party” (Costa Rican Partido Ecologico) organizes to stop a United States-funded cross-country oil pipeline.

1980s  United Nations University of Peace (UPAZ) forms in Costa Rica as the first such Third World, conflict-oriented, degree-granting, academic peace and conflict resolution research program (established 1978-1982). No United Nations funding. Little funding by developed states.

1981  August — Costa Rica becomes the first American state to default on its debt. Eden Pastora (former military leader of the Sandinistas in Costa Rica) begins to reach for Lebanese arms — supplied, via Israel, by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The United States begins a training center in its Smithsonian Institute for applied, ecologically-sustainable development, as begun earlier in Costa Rica (in 1942).

1983  First Gandhian-style peace army deploys in the Americas — from Toronto, Canada, and Costa Rica.


1986  A World Court decision favors Nicaragua and Costa Rica and ends in United States withdrawal from that Court — in defiance of that Court — again concerning the San Juan River border area. U.S. Congressional Iran-Contra Hearings.


1989  ONUCA form as the first United Nations’ American Peacekeeping operation. December — the United States invades Panama

A Brief Summation of Nonviolence As Attempted in Costa Rica

This dateline above can also be illustrated briefly by referring to Chapters One to Six. To begin with, between 1914 and 1984, as determined in Chapter One, Costa Rica has avoided the dominant institutionalizing trends toward a permanent war economy.691 In the 1860s and the 1980s Costa Rica also tried to mobilize international opinions in its favor for mediating isthmian

691Overall, from the early 1940s to 1985, Costa Rica also devoted more of its per capita gross national product (GNP) to education and other human needs than did its neighboring isthmian states. It was demonstrated in Chapter Three that Costa Rica spent under a twelfth of the annual military allocations spent by its neighboring states.
conflict. Such mediation would eventually invite unprecedented United Nations peacekeeping in the Americas.692

It was further argued, in Chapter Two, that the Monroe Doctrine could not be significantly challenged until the 1980s Arias peace plan.693 In true democratic fashion, Costa Ricans continued during this time to vote farmers, lawyers, writers, and teachers (unskilled in military conflict resolution) — over generals — into their leadership posts. These leaders promoted methods for financially self-reliant development and established the first United Nations-associated University for Peace.

Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Three, since the 1920s, in struggles for self-reliance and against militarization, Costa Rican trade unions led Latin American attempts to control national railroad, telephone, and electric power companies.694 Ongoing Cold War tension was allayed by a nonviolent “brazos caídos,” or general nation-wide strike in the mid-1950s, as well as by student peace demonstrations in the mid-1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, such methods for isthmian nonviolence grew to include ecology, pacifism, and gender parity priorities.695 In Chapter Four, it was ascertained that Costa Rica has relied on ecological sustainability and the rule of law aimed at peaceful negotiation. Costa Rica twice opposed the United States successfully in an international court of law (in 1916 and 1986).696 Meanwhile, ongoing

692This neutrality was guided to fruition by José Néstor Mourello Aguilar. Please refer to chapter 1 for the small circle of academic and political figures who brought this neutrality into focus for a short time. Guatemala (in 1984 and 1986) and Nicaragua (in the late 1980s) would also lean toward armed neutrality.
693Along the way, in the 1940s, Costa Rica backed a nonviolent coup in El Salvador, hosted one of the first socialist-led coalitions to govern an American state, granted female suffrage significantly before its neighbors, and hosted OAS negotiations to recognize Cuba after 1960. Later, in the 1970s, Mexico and Costa Rica donated more humanitarian aid to the Sandinistas than the Cubans and the Soviets.
694Parallel liberation or anti-dependency struggles erupted through the Americas, between 1933 and 1936. In 1944, while maintaining its friendly relationships with the U.S. (then entering a long Cold War), Costa Rica consequently became the first isthmian nation to open diplomatic links with the Soviets.
695These events generated political pressure for U.N. peacekeeping. Finally, Javier Pérez de Cuellar visited Costa Rica in late 1986. His visit would initiate the first instance of U.N. peacekeeping in the Americas.
initiatives in 1950, 1959, 1974, 1978, and 1980 reinforced related United Nations debate over disarmament and development. When turning to serial, long-term, quantitative proof of the advantages of non-violence (introduced and tested in Chapter 5), it was established that Costa Rica has survived at the geostrategic center of fierce pre- and post-1945 serial violence. Despite high serial violence, since the 1850s, to its north in Nicaragua and its south in Panama, Costa Rica would rank respectably low in such serial violence. Costa Rica’s social indicators also continued to reflect a less-violent standard of living, until the United States began to remilitarize it.697

Then, in Chapter Six, it was noted that Costa Rican nonviolence was exemplified in such actions as nonviolent hunger strikes for the rights of small farmers in front of the United Nations offices in San José. By mid-1984, a random national opinion survey established that eighty-three percent of Costa Rican adults still opposed any national military force. This poll was reinforced at the same time by 30,000 people in San José, who demonstrated against the remilitarization promoted by Curtin Winsor and Oliver Tambs. Such nonviolence would also persuade the United States Congress to demand the release of fifty-six members of a nonviolent international observer team, kidnapped not far from John Hull’s ranches.698

But, as also noted in Chapters One to Six, Costa Rican living standards began to drop significantly when Curtin Winsor and Oliver Tambs, the United States Ambassadors to Costa Rica, pushed to privatize its economy (as part of an effort to build a Contra infrastructure).699

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698 Initial meetings of the Socialist International would also give Rodrigo Carazo (Costa Rica) the momentum to start bargaining directly with the European Economic Community. By the early 1980s, Europe would resolve to support both the Contadora process and plans for an isthmian parliament. A 1984 San José conference then launched plans to install a 5-year isthmian development package.

699 As noted in chapter 1. In late 1984, to avoid a military confrontation — by the Contras or U.S. invasionary troops aimed at Nicaragua — and to soften economic devastation from the debts related to such a confrontation, Costa Rica modified its banks for “free enterprise” which favored U.S. businesses vis-à-vis Costa Rica’s own banks and those of other countries. At the same time, John Biehl, economic adviser to Oscar Arias and the foremost architect of the Arias peace plan, was forced into exile by death threats when he voiced opposition to such covert U.S. coercion.
the 1980s, the United States State Department and National Security Council threatened to cut all economic aid to Costa Rica if it would not support the Contra war against Nicaragua. Under such violent pressure, the Costa Rican government veered toward a anti-dependency viewpoint and condemned the United States intervention in Grenada. 700

Meanwhile, Costa Rica’s path was complicated by clashing policy priorities. Costa Rica was pressured to exploit its fresh water surplus, in order to meet United States conditions for foreign aid (and remilitarization). Hydroelectric power and cash agribusiness export crops replaced basic food crops for local consumption as a priority. Agribusiness-related pesticide poisoning cases begin to rise, as deforestation multiplied. Costa Rica became a potent global symbol of the disappearing rainforest, a disappearance that threatens about half of the world’s germ plasm, that is, the DNA building blocks of all living cells. 701

International conflict in the San Juan River region has produced some of the highest serial violence data in world history. 702 In the 1980s Costa Rican serial violence inched closer to that in the Grenadian or Malvinas wars. Meanwhile, what the Kerry Commission called ticket-punching, or diplomatic protection, a long-term condition exacerbated by wars in Southeast Asia (the Golden Triangle) and the Middle East (the Golden Crescent), began to characterize the isthmian business of war. As a diplomatic shield to avoid prosecution, at the highest federal levels, ticket-punching produced a narcotics prosecutor’s nightmare in Miami, Houston and Los Angeles. 703

700 As noted in chapter 3.
701 As noted in chapter 4.
703 As noted in chapter 5. Landless (precarista) struggles consequently agitated eastern and northern Costa Rica — its geopolitical face toward the outside world — and stormed the national legislature, where a legislative commission uncovered and closed down an underground torture room in the basement of the Costa Rican federal police building, then largely funded by the U.S. In this sense, it might be noted that the nonviolent opposition of Costa Rica — with international opinion on its side — was more difficult to suppress than outright violence (represented by an anti-dependency approach). This would seem to be a major reason why covert organizations were fostered by the U.S. and privately funded by a covert arms and drug business.
Costa Rica thus struggled against a covert war organization, much of which was supplemented by cocaine profits negotiated through Costa Rica, via Panama and Colombia. As a result, coordinating the Contras on the ground from northern Costa Rica, John Hull tried to dodge official allegations of an international Contra-cocaine network. Finally, as noted in chapter 6, the ultimate cost to the United States was its infamous constitutional Iran-Contra crisis — a crisis rooted to a large degree in the United States’ covert and overt militarization of both Israel and the isthmus.
Part III  Outcome

Chapter 7

Barriers to Security: Drugs and Militarization

This chapter initiating the final part of the dissertation — on the outcome of the means and approaches already mentioned for resolving conflict — begins with a brief evaluation of the cost and outcome of militarization. The remilitarization of Costa Rica in the 1980s grew from military intervention imposed from the outside. Nonviolent Costa Rican approaches and methods to counter such violent outside intervention have sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed under such outside pressure.

The nonviolent methods historically favored by Costa Rica for promoting peace may still prove to be its greatest strength in the future. As presupposed by some researchers into the future potential for economic conversion, from a customary war economy to a peaceful economy, peace may well be more profitable than war. For example, it will be shown that Costa Rica has profited from its attractiveness to gifted young refugees fleeing the other isthmian states at war. However, such a peaceful future is still anomalous in the nation-state system, where states still opt for a world order view of reality — and their youth who are unwilling to kill for a nation state at war must usually face exile or prison in time of war.

Various consequences of debt, drugs, and land misuse will be used to evaluate the outcome of violent intervention in Costa Rica. The cocaine trade has been a major problem, with more immediate consequences of armed violence and the threat of armed violence than that from debt or land use issues related to malnutrition or deforestation. As an arms-for-drug business, briefly introduced in Chapter Six, the cocaine trade gained international attention with the Contra war in Nicaragua. In order to place this arms-for-drug trade in its proper context, the discussion of this trade will widen to cover the practices of international (frequently ex-Cuban) arms for drug business entrepreneurs. This discussion should prepare the way for an economic evaluation in Chapter 8 of the long-term outcomes from the violent conflict resolution externally imposed
on Costa Rica — to be described as the tensions of unmet human needs and the misuse of land, within the context of an unpayable international debt.

The outcomes of international conflict resolution in Costa Rica present an unusual opportunity for evaluating the anomaly of a state that claims to have abolished its military power. In Chapter Seven, therefore, it should become clear to what degree changing outcomes of development — resulting from cooperative conflict resolution enhanced by neutrality — contrast with underdevelopment resulting from violent conflict resolution. As will be shown, cooperative conflict resolution, in the contexts of neutral and nonaligned states such as Costa Rica, may have thus advanced peace, security, and development. As a consequence, this concluding part of the dissertation will investigate short-range outcomes from an arms and drug business and long-term outcomes from an international debt, in Chapters Seven and Eight, respectively.

Given such outcomes, at least as early as 1986, Oscar Arias and Daniel Ortega began trying to negotiate conflict in a more cooperative manner than the military intervention advanced by the United States. Accordingly, Arias and Ortega privately approached each of the isthmian leaders before public negotiations began. These private preparations presented the United States with a peace agreement it privately opposed.704 To have its hand in what it considered its sphere of influence, the United States then did all it could to oppose the Contadora and Esquipulas peace plans, either overtly or covertly.705 The extent to which cooperative isthmian conflict resolution to promote sustainable peace and development — without depending on military power — would be overcome by United States-funded covert or overt war and militarization will be summarized briefly in what follows.

It may be helpful at this point to keep in mind that few states other than Costa Rica have been able to reject a national military complex within an area where wars are historically commonplace.706 Before the late 1800s, Costa Rica itself dedicated at least a third of its budget

704 Mikhail Baklanov, Central America: From Plantations to Nations (Moscow: Novost, 1989), 46-47, 50, and 56-57. An unnamed brother of Arias piloted a small plane (2- or 4-seater) carrying John Biehl to each of the isthmian presidents for these private negotiations. On the other hand, the development of cocaine profits to finance armed violence, as a short-term outcome or epiphenomenon of socially, politically, and economically-violent international conflict resolution, has long plagued peace in the Western Caribbean, according to Oscar García Cubas and Carlos Alzugaray Treto, Rector and Vice-Rector (of research), respectively, in the Cuban Graduate Institute of International Relations (ISRI), Havana, conversations with the author (2 and 5 Feb. 1990). See also Haynes Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History, America in the Reagan Years (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 245-477 passim.

705 Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 89 and 223-32. Gerardo Trejos Salas, vice foreign affairs minister of Costa Rica, observed that covert opposition was mounted especially through Honduras and El Salvador.

706 Council of Europe, Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Europe (Brussels: Quaker Council for European Affairs, 1981), 37, 66, and 82. One possible exception, Iceland, does countenance what NATO claims are nuclear-free forces and an early-warning (DEW) system, although Iceland has also managed to preserve the oldest continuous electoral democracy among the European states. Other states, like Barbados or Vanuatu in the Pacific Ocean, where conflict is historically infrequent, have simply denied any need for a military or for military conscription, despite tremendous losses from disease following European colonialism.
to its militia. After that time, it began reducing its bureaucracies for conscription and industrial war production. Because of this historical trend toward abolishing its military power, Costa Rica still fails to display otherwise common nation-state behavior, such as economic or political military “service,” pervasive suppression of dissent against such “service,” and interaction on the level of defensive or offensive treaties with the militaries of other states to justify a balance of power based on violence.

The Cost and Outcome of Militarization

Costa Rica lies within a global conflict zone where conflict resolution has steadily grown more militarized in the last three decades. From 1963 to 1982, all military spending within the Western Caribbean rose 5300 percent, over four times more rapidly than military spending within the Middle East during the same period, which increased 1200 percent. Costa Rican remilitarization had been initiated during the 1940s, when the United States constructed military roads from the central interior plateau to the city of Quesada, halfway toward the Nicaraguan border from San José.

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712 Judit Balázs, “Die Volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkung des Wetrüstes auf die Länder Schwarz-Afrikas,” *Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (1986): 107. The author is grateful to Balázs for this article from her Budapest world economy doctorate program in peace and conflict resolution. These zones of conflict have also been called *spheres of influence*. 

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But following Costa Rica’s abolition of its military power in 1948, militarization proceeded slowly until the 1980s, when the United States Agency for International Development alone spent $350 million to arm Costa Rica’s northern border area. By 1986, the proportion of military aid in United States development aid as a whole averaged ten percent higher for Costa Rica than for the other states of the isthmus. Although a well-equipped United States base was established in Murciélago, the center of this remilitarization, with five military training schools, the process occurred reluctantly in Costa Rica.

Militarization Allied with Intervention

Costa Rica has generally avoided the wars that have plagued its neighbors in the isthmus, an area haunted by geopolitical war and militarization. For example, for Panama and Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega calculated an average of one war every five years since the 1850s, frequently in the form of a United States military intervention. According to writers such as Fox, Szentes, and Duboff, as professors at the universities of Columbia, Budapest, and Bryn Mawr, respectively, such serial violence has characteristically promoted underdevelopment in those states prone to conflict. Until the 1960s Missile Crisis, linked to such underdevelopment, Latin American states bought from the United States seventy percent of the arms they used to resolve their internal disturbances militarily. Whereupon, as Cuba survived repeated intervention attempts over the next two decades, both direct and proxy, Latin American states independently shifted about half of their arms import business to other states, particularly Israel.


and the Soviet Union. Europeans arms dealers, as such, were still excluded to some degree by the long-reaching Monroe Doctrine.\footnote{Pyotr Yakovlev, et al., *Latin America: Arms Build-up and Disarmament* (Moscow: Scientific Research Council on Peace and Disarmament and Nauka, 1983), 11-16. The U.S. share of arms sales in Latin America dropped from 70\% (1962) to 15\% (1980s) when Latin America began to absorb up to 60\% of Israeli arms exports.}

Meanwhile, Costa Rica tried to avoid isthmian wars, while still appearing to follow the security mandates of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1963, these mandates took the form of a United States security organization transplanted into Costa Rica and copied elsewhere in the isthmus as a model intended to counter alleged Cuban subversion.\footnote{Iliana Cruz Alfaro and Ronald Saborio Soto, "La Seguridad Externa de Costa Rica, Frente a la Crisis Centroamericana" (LL.D. thesis, University of Costa Rica, San Jose, 1986), 130-32. In 1985, this security agency was renamed the Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad, or DIS. See also *La Policía de Costa Rica, Informe Preparado para El Estudio Sectorial Sobre Justicia en Costa Rica* (Miami: International University of Florida, Justice Administration Center, 1986), 89.} In the early 1970s, this United States security organization succeeded in arming Costa Rican police and paramilitary forces with M-16 rifles and 81-millimeter machine guns.\footnote{Rodrigo Jauberth Rojas, “Militarización y Modificación Sustantiva del Estado Costarricense,” *La Jornada*, 27 February 1987, 21-22.} However, this well-armed organization did nothing to calm the apprehension of Costa Rican citizens over regional militarization, heightened after the 1979 Nicaragua Revolution. It was clear to these citizens that drug-related violence had multiplied, increasing the impact of the arms and drug business in Brazil, Chile, and the Andean states.\footnote{Lilia Bermúdez and Antonio Cavalla, *Estrategia de Reagan, Hacia la Revolución Centroamericana* (Mexico: Ed. Nuestro Tiempo, 1982), 56. For Brazil, see “Brazil Vendió Armas á Somoza,” *RPA*, 5-7 July 1979, 6; and Isaac Caro, *Relaciones Militares Interlatino-Américas-Caribeñas y Vínculos con Africa Subsahariana* (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, No. 308, 1986), 83-84. For Andean arms, see Julio Suñol, *Insurrección Nicaragua, La Historia No Contada* (San José: Ed. Costa Rica, 1981), 164.}

**Nonviolent Response to Militarization**

As noted above, the United States has used violent intervention to further its geopolitical goals in the isthmus since the 1850s. As also noted, several of the Central Intelligence Agency veterans assigned to Costa Rica had wide-ranging experience in the kind of violence associated with the arms and drug business. During the 1950s, that experience had been focused in Cuba, Vietnam, and Lebanon; during the 1960s and 1970s, in Cuba, Laos, Brazil, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Kampuchea; and later, in the 1980s, in the Western Caribbean and the Eastern Mediterranean by Project Veil. These seasoned veterans used their international expertise to
counter resistance to the world order geopolitics of the United States, especially in Cuba, Iran, Laos, Vietnam, Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

Within the United States, awareness of the intensity of this violence arrived with the floods of isthmian exiles and refugees fleeing serial violence and seeking sanctuary in the United States. Once introduced, this awareness mobilized groups inside the United States against the actions of their government in the isthmus. Legal attacks against such anti-war groups by the United States government eventually fragmented in the so-called Iran-Contra scandal, as participation in the arms for drugs business was uncovered at the highest levels of United States leadership and diplomacy. The ensuing collision of private and public consciousness sensitized anti-war organizations to the violent roots of isthmian intervention.

Both the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees and the United States refugee organizations observed that many of the isthmian refugees of the 1980s were men fleeing formal or informal conscription and women or children fleeing the trauma of war. From 1980 to 1985, for example, 20,000 people fled Nicaragua to avoid military impressment and conscription. This loss of population, roughly equal to the number of the Sandinistas’ military war dead number in the same period, hurt Nicaragua at least as much as the Contras’ weapons. Costa Rica claimed that 3,000 of these Nicaraguans sought residency, not merely refuge, in Costa Rica. Similar statistics have not been made available for the other isthmian states, but demographic projections from this Costa Rican claim would indicate that around 300,000 political exiles also fled Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Studies on El Salvador which do exist support this simple projection, indicating that between five and ten percent, or 100,000, of about the one million Salvadoreans in exile, for example, had left to avoid military conscription engendered by United States aid. Fleeing their country rather than dying or killing

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721 Legal cases were coordinated by sanctuary organizations, by minority refugee law centers like CARECEN, by organizations like the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York City, and by the Christic Institute — with various branches throughout the U.S. — concentrating especially on events in Costa Rica.
for it, these exiles represented a tremendous human loss to the isthmus and its future development potential.

In Costa Rica, as in Canada during the United States-IndoChina war, these political exiles included their home states’s most educated people. For example, two-thirds of the Salvadorean exiles were business or white-collar people, a representation far larger than in their society back home. Few citizens fled from Costa Rica, since it did not levy military conscription. Instead, Costa Rica gained from the skills, ideas, and willingness to work of the new immigrants. Their presence also opened varied possibilities for economic and political growth in Costa Rica. In retrospect, given the findings of experts on economic conversion in the United Nations debate on disarmament and development — experts like Inga Thorsson — this flow of refugees into Costa Rica may have been the primary economic counter-force to its remilitarization by the United States.

Canada during the U.S.-IndoChina war would indicate that less than a third of such exiled professionals return to their country of origin.

Segundo Montes Mozo and Juan José García Vasquez, “Salvadorean Migration to the United States: An Exploratory Study,” (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Hemispheric Migration Project, 1989), 13 and 34. Unfortunately this survey failed to distinguish between anti-dependency and nonviolent approaches to international conflict resolution. See also U.N., World Population Prospects, Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984 (New York: U.N., 1986) for derivation of population projections. No studies are known to have been done on the international effects of the hundreds of thousands of such business or white-collar (middle and upper-class) refugee youth (men and women) lost by the U.S. to Europe, Canada, and elsewhere during the U.S.-Southeast Asian War — who may have even shifted the national political directions of their adopted and their rejected home countries.

Thorsson, described from chapter 1 onward as one of the originators of the U.N. debate on disarmament and development, in an articulate and well-documented study of economic conversion potential, has noted that the largest and most immediate financial gains to be expected from the abolition of military power relate to the former (abolished) military labor base. That is to say, the abolition of military power in state governance will produce the greatest economic benefits by cutting the economic actuarial and shadow or opportunity costs lost through a nation’s military “service,” especially its conscriptive process — whether economically-driven or legally-mandated. See Inga Thorsson, In Pursuit of Disarmament, Conversion from Military to Civil Production in Sweden, Vol. 1 A, Background, Facts, Analysis (Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget, 1984), 185-210 passim.

Ibid. Thorsson based her findings on the study of what it would take to realize economic conversion, not on the traditional comparisons of “guns and butter” (as found in such authors as Seymour Melman). In other words, Thorsson noted that the primary cost of militarization, and thus the primary strength of Costa Rica, concerned military conscription. She argued that conscription, whether economic or political, offered the “clearest distinction between budgetary outlays and social cost in the entire defense sector.” Ibid., 180. Thus conscription was the most costly barrier to nonviolent conflict resolution, or disarmament and development, because of shadow and opportunity costs. Its “value added per employee” costs in Sweden alone, as evaluated for the Fiscal Year of 1984-1985, shortened both the average working lifespan and the lifetime income, per worker, and cost the Swedish economy about $770,000 that same fiscal year. In addition, this military labor base generated justification for shadow and opportunity costs in lost rent and land revenues, along with the hoarding or stockpiling of strategic oil and petroleum products in particular, as well as the hard-to-measure long-term social, cultural, and psychological costs of training people to kill. Ibid. 181-85 and 200-201. See also , in Linus Pauling, Ervin Laszlo, and Jong Youl You, eds., World Encyclopedia of Peace, Vol. 2 (Oxford/New York: Pergamon Press, 1986), s.v. “Inga Thorsson [461-62]” by Abdul Aziz Said and Paul Hubers. In other words, Costa Rica not only avoided such hidden costs of conscription, but benefited from the labor of many war refugees who fled to it.
Flight to avoid conscription is one nonviolent approach toward conflict resolution. The individual physically withdraws as much support as possible from an offending state. However, penalties for such self-exile are generally harsh. International as well as national security and intelligence agencies mobilize against such an exile. Even states claiming to be neutral, such as Costa Rica, are reluctant to challenge the traditional notions about such exiles for fear of international repercussions. The European neutral states have yet to reach consensus on this issue. Austria has established unique constitutional guarantees to care for such political exiles in flight as refugees, who may legally receive aid and shelter from its state government. But, in the 1980s, thirty imprisoned Swiss resisters were forced into an eighteen-month political (relay) fast to defend even their right to refuse to kill for the nation state. Some neutral states still remain hostile to those approaches to conflict resolution that reject the power of the state to levy military conscription.

Various prison penalties criminalize this kind of nonviolence, even in neutral states like Costa Rica. Conscientious objectors might receive four-month prison terms in Sweden, repeatable six-month terms in Austria, or a year in Finland. A Swiss war resister might be subjected to a cat-and-mouse game of release and imprisonment until the age of retirement, or age sixty-five. Similar formal or informal penalties also hold for the nonaligned states, like Cuba, Libya, Honduras, Mexico, Syria, Guatemala, and El Salvador, where the superpowers’ precedents obtain in international criminal law. Beginning in the 1960s, as an outcome of their progressive positions on international conflict resolution, however, Austria, Costa Rica, and the Netherlands had led an international campaign before the United Nations Human Rights Commission to decriminalize refusal to kill for the nation state. On 10 March 1987 their lobbying resulted in a pioneer resolution to this

\[728\]Peter Johan van Krieken, Deserteurs, Dienstweigeraars, en Asielrecht (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum and Assen, 1976), 293-95.
729Dorothea Woods, COWM, May-June 1988, 12. This article notes that Sweden is lax in applying its prison penalties.
effect approved in the United Nations by general consensus. On 8 March 1989, Costa Rica and a few other states, including Hungary, re-introduced this resolution to encourage others to decriminalize war resistance within their individual legal systems. In this way, Costa Rica has applied the lessons it has learned from war in the isthmus for the benefit of all the states in the nation-state system.

_Human Cost Beyond Serial Violence_

Structural violence exists in Costa Rica, despite its low level of serial violence. It has tried to measure and reduce the economic disparity by which, for example, less than ten percent of the isthmian population owns half of the isthmian wealth. In 1987 Costa Rican researchers issued a critical study of isthmian income disparity from 1960 to 1978, which noted that the annual wages for the bottom seventy percent of all isthmian wage earners increased seven dollars (to $82), while the annual income of the top three percent doubled (to $15,000). According to a United States Congressional Study Commission, this war-related poverty struck three in every four rural Costa Ricans by 1982, up from one in two in 1980. These economic changes presaged political remilitarization in 1984.


735 Jorge Arturo Reina, _Análisis de los Conflictos en América Central_ (Heredia: Centro de Estudios Democráticos en América Latina, 1987), 10 and 35. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua redistributed 1,500,000 hectares or 3,706,500 acres of land, seven times more acres than in the U.S.-assisted Honduran land reforms (218,000 hectares or 538,678 acres). This research came from the PLN party of Monge and Arias.

736 Congress, House, “Report of A Congressional Study Mission to Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador” (27 August-8 Sept. 1983), Committee on Foreign Affairs, _Central America: The Deepening Conflict_, 98th Congress, 2d sess., 1984. One place where such violence has taken place in so-called developed states has been on the former East-West frontline in Western Germany, where one of every eight children has been handicapped by pollution from drugs or radiation. See Petra Kelly, _Fighting for Hope_, trans. by Marianne Howarth (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), 6, 98, and 106. For more on international militarization and cancer, see the introduction by Dietrich Niethammer to Petra Kelly, ed., _Viel Liebe Gegen Schmerzen, Krebs bei Kindern_ (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1986), 9-10.
Regional Trends Affecting Costa Rica: Malnutrition and Deforestation

Isthmian states like Costa Rica may face high death tolls and underdevelopment caused by violence. In 1984, for example, one in every fifty isthmian people were displaced by war, while child malnutrition ranged from eighty percent in Honduras to thirty-nine percent in Costa Rica.\footnote{Priority Health Needs in Central America and Panama,” Executive Summary (PAHO), (CD 30/19 Annex), (June 1984), 3-4.} During this remilitarization, in addition to widening internal economic disparity, Costa Rica also faced ecological damage, concentrated in its mangrove swamps facing the Caribbean, and structural adjustment regulations harsher than those imposed on the other isthmian states.\footnote{Colin Danby, “Aiding Central America, An Alternative for Equitable and Sustainable Development,” Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America, Pamphlet, Washington, D.C. 1989, 3-6. Such economic problems were lessened before 1979 by a Central American Common Market, dating from a U.N. 1950 initiative, which began in 1960 and was joined by Costa Rica in 1963. It fell apart under U.S. pressure in the 1979 Revolution after reaching a $6 billion GNP. In the 1970s the isthmus had a combined GNP about the size of New Hampshire’s. GNP numbers from 1979 to 1990 were not proportionately reliable. See Francis Gannon, “Nicaragua’s Agony, The Central American Context,” Americas, Sept. 1977, 4. Gannon wrote this article as an AIFLD consultant.}

This was not the first time that Costa Rica faced biased conditions when it tried to resolve conflict with less violent conflict resolution. For example, in 1954, it sparked higher demands throughout the whole isthmus for better terms on the banana crop. These demands were met a year later by an invasion of Somoza’s forces.\footnote{Elena de la Souchère, “Costa Rica: Citadel of Democracy,” MRW 7 (May 1955): 58 and 62-64.} At the same time, despite a Costa Rican preference for small-scale horticulture, which before 1979 could employ 100 small farmers to every one beef farmer per square mile of Nicaraguan or Costa Rican farmland, deforestation for beef farming had turned these two states into the two largest isthmian beef exporters to the United States.\footnote{Catherine Caufield, In the Rainforest (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), 78-79 and 110-111. Caufield notes that there are still many unknowns in how fast tropical trees normally grow and how long they live, since they do not form annual growth rings. Even the identification of the species-diverse plants and animals is difficult in tropical rain forest research. Estimates also vary for how large each rain forest must be to stay healthy, ranging from 125,000 to 500,000 acres.}

After 1979, Costa Rica overtook Nicaragua in beef exports, in order to meet its demands for hard currency. Overall, from 1961 to 1986, these two states together furnished one-half to two-thirds of all isthmian export beef.\footnote{H. Jeffrey Leonard, Natural Resources and Economic Development in Central America (New Brunswick, NJ: International Institute for Environment and Development, 1987), 216-217.} But the chemicals used for beef farming began to pollute the San Juan River ecosystem of both these states.\footnote{This pollution first troubled both states after intensive insecticide application to plants grown for cotton and beef fodder; see David Pimentel, “Environmental Aspects of World Pest Control,” in David Pimentel, ed., World Food, Pest Loss and the Environment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press and American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1987).} Along with remilitarization and
declining terms of trade, this environmental crisis contributed to a polarization of Costa Rican society over land use.

Costa Rica and Other States At War — Impact and Resistance

Remilitarization pressure increased precisely where the two pivotal international law cases concerning Costa Rica and the United States under Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan have occurred, as discussed in chapter four. In the 1980s, northern Costa Rican remilitarization by the United States multiplied Costa Rica’s own arms and security spending levels by a factor of 100. The conditions for receiving United States aid promoted more structural violence by curbing or denying social services. Militarization also promoted the abuse of human rights, an arms-drug business, and the ecological problems that followed on the heels of war.

Costa Ricans resisted in different ways. In September 1987, for example, about 4,000 small farmers participated in a hunger strike against the denial of farm credit, ecological damage to their land, and the Contras’ arms and drug business. The struggle of these farmers became a symbol of resistance for another 118,000 Costa Rican families in need of housing, and sparked massive protests throughout Costa Rica against ecological damage in the north. By the end of the 1980s, at the top of the San Juan River ecosystem, similar protests arose over ecological damage in Nicaragua, as even the polluted city water in Managua was cut off for two days a week. Costa Rica did not undergo desertification on the heels of war like the damage done to

Science, 1978), 166-68. The pollution spread up the food chain through the river systems, including Guatemala’s; see Francisco Aguirre Batres and J. Fernando Mazariegos, “In Place of Pesticides,” Mazingira 3-4 (1977): 93-96. For war-related effects on biomass, biotic and abiotic ecosystems, and concomitant geocide promoting laterite desertification, see Julian Perry Robinson, The Effects of Weapons on Ecosystems (London and New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 28-29, 37, and 46. For further international implications, e.g., nonalignment and alternative energy, see Partido Verde, Propostas de Ecologia Politica (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Anima, 1986), 52-53.
746Eduardo Galeano, “Defensa de Nicaragua,” Política, Teoría, y Acción (Santo Domingo) 8 (March 1987): 17-18. The effects of serial war and nonviolence on these profound levels are still unknown to most social researchers. To explore these phenomena in areas of intense conflict like that of Vietnam and Nicaragua would require at least two changes: 1) The end of U.S. blockades like those against Cuba and Vietnam; and 2) Renewal of the exchange of
sixty percent of the potential farmland in the Middle East\textsuperscript{747} and sixty-seven percent of the potential farmland in South Africa,\textsuperscript{748} but the nation was damaged environmentally by remilitarization, intensified by an arms and drug business along its border with Nicaragua. Because this war remained largely covert, this ecological destruction did not have the same kind of political impact inside the United States as did that which occurred during the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{749}

\textit{Drugs: Paying for War the Hard Way}

The exchange of drugs for arms in order to pay for isthmian war has produced violent outcomes that, like deforestation, have obstructed diplomatic conflict resolution and economic activity for the common good. But, as explained below, the isthmian arms and drug business became geopolitically linked to isthmian war, just as oil was linked to Levantine war in the Middle East. That is to say, the isthmian states without indigenous cocaine and the Levantine states without indigenous oil both served as brokers for world businesses that involved very high stakes, with their success frequently determined by violence. As will be shown, brokered profits from this arms and drug business created economic interests that obstructed cooperative conflict resolution. These economic interests became vital to a business projected northward from the Andean states and mixed with the violence of geopolitics.


\textsuperscript{749}For more on North and South Vietnam, the common borders of which were pockmarked by 400 pounds of metal bomb fragments per square yard, see Ngo Vinh Long, \textit{“Vietnam: Conventional War and the Use of Nuclear Threats,” in The Deadly Connection: Nuclear War and United States Intervention} (Cambridge, MA: AFSC, 1982), 54. Instead of the so-called low-intensity Contra warfare, this border bombing concentrated a tonnage estimated at 5-7 times the total weight of bombs dropped during the 1940s; see \textit{The Vietnamese People’s Struggle in the}
The geopolitical outcomes of this arms and drug business in Costa Rica can be brought to light by examining cocaine’s path to the north. Historically, the major northbound cocaine routes have transited the isthmus or the Caribbean Islands from the Andes toward Europe and the United States. These isthmian and island routes, over the Caribbean, laid the colonial foundations for even the Asian heroin trade routes in other tropical states. In time, the profits involved grew so large that violence seemed essential to safeguard them; the regions could no longer afford peace.\textsuperscript{750}

The cocaine that transited these routes became the cash crop most desired by the so-called developed world from the so-called underdeveloped world. By the late 20th century, cocaine paid nineteen times more profit than ordinary agricultural crops, with an economic mark-up of three hundred times (30,000 percent) from the grower to the consumer.\textsuperscript{751} In the United States, from 1981 to 1989 — demonstrably in sync with isthmian Contra war — a form of cocaine refined for smoking and intravenous use known as \textit{crack} cocaine became the most profitable of all drugs. The purity of the crack sold on the street increased three times, to become almost 100 percent pure in those years.\textsuperscript{752} Worldwide, more money was spent annually for illicit drugs (above all cocaine) than for food, clothes, housing, education, and medical care. The growing economic value of the addictive drug trade came to equal one-half of the value of the global arms trade.\textsuperscript{753}


\textsuperscript{750}Colonial governments, as well as a Mediterranean organization called the Mafia, dominated the cocaine and heroin trade. The word \textit{Mafia} is a contraction of a colloquial Arabic phrase expressing economic exigency, \textit{ma feesh fluss}. It means something like “ain’t no other alternative” or “I’m broke,” according to the author’s Arabic travel experience in the Middle East and Northern Africa (late 1970s).


\textsuperscript{753}James Mills, \textit{The Underground Empire, Where Crime and Governments Embrace} (New York: Doubleday, 1986), 3. Mills noted that the sheer physical bulk of the $0.5 trillion spent each year on illicit drugs weighs more than all the people living in Washington, D.C. This amount is also triple the amount of U.S. currency in circulation. But the amount earned by drug dealers not politically well connected was lower than the so-called minimum wage; see Gina Kolata, “Despite Its Promise of Riches, The Crack Trade Seldom Pays,” \textit{NYT}, 26 Nov. 1989, A 1 and 42.
The first international legal structures erected to combat this arms and drug business were based at the Inter-American Court in Costa Rica. Early in the 1900s, following the precedent of this international court, the Hague World Court drafted the first internationally accepted conventions against drugs like opium and cocaine. These conventions were aimed at impeding the critical drug routes through Cuba and the isthmus, already seen as the foundations for a global arms and drug business, that carried Asian and Western Caribbean traffic under active United States government intervention. After the Cuban Revolution and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in the Western Caribbean, this violent business veered toward Miami, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, as described below.

Colonial Cocaine: Cuba and Israel

The physical basis of the arms and drug problem is the coca tree, a shrub under eight feet high harvested three or four times a year in mountainous regions such as the Andes.

Exploiting ninety percent of the remaining Latin American Indians who had survived the onslaught of the European invasions by retreating to the Andean states, the cocaine trade

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757 Françoise Morin, “Indianidad y Estado,” in *Indianidad, Etnocidio, Indigenismo en América Latina* (Mexico City: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1988), 346. Costa Rica is only 1% Indian, in comparison to Nicaragua (5%) or Guatemala (42%), with majority Indian percentages in the Andean states; see Massimo Amadio, “Políticas Educativo-Cultivales y Principales Acciones Entre los Grupos Indígenas de Centro América y Panamá,” in Madeleine Zuñiga, et al., *Educación en Poblaciones Indígenas, Políticas y Estrategias en América Latina* (Santiago,
managed by the conquistadors in league with corrupt officials working in the Roman Catholic Church grew from the conditions of local war and slavery to encompass states and corporations as well as organized crime.\footnote{Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins, 59-60. See also Fernando Ortíz, ed. by Diana Iznaga, Los Negros Curros (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1986), 192-208. The author is grateful to a student of Fernando Ortíz, Julio Le Riverend Brusone, the post-1959 founder of the National Archives and Library of Cuba, for help and insight here — through an interview with the author by him in his home, Feb. 1990.} This “fair, honorable, and legitimate” trade, as it was called by Warren Delano II — grandfather of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and a senior United States trader in Chinese opium by clipper ship — would eventually amass tremendous momentum.\footnote{Geoffrey Ward, Before the Trumpet, Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905 (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 63-97 and 352. As noted earlier, cocaine was synthesized (in the U.S.) at least 40 years before heroin (in Germany), with global coca and cocaine routes preceding opium and heroin trade routes.} United States war and intervention punctuated the early growth of the arms and drug business in the Western Caribbean, through the leadership of people like Franklin Roosevelt, and later, William Donovan. Roosevelt began his public career in the United States Navy, overseeing Caribbean operations under the Woodrow Wilson administration.\footnote{Roberto Álvarez Quiñones, “Mito y Realidad de la Política Exterior de Franklin D. Roosevelt,” Granma Resumen Semanal, 4 July 1976, 2. Alvarez was the president of the international relations section of the Union of Cuban Journalists for some time; see Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Washington, D.C.: C.I.A. Directorate of Intelligence, 1984), 16 and 218. The author is indebted to the staff of the National José Martí Library of Cuba and Julio Le Riverend Brusone for advice here and for locating relevant information citations.} According to Cuban nationalists like Ricardo Villares, however, during the 27 June 1932 Democratic Party Convention in Chicago, Roosevelt was helped to win the United States presidency by two men who soon took central roles in syndicating the arms and drug business, especially the cocaine trade: Meyer Lansky and Salvatore (Charles or “Lucky”) Luciano. Lansky incorporated his conservative syndicated enterprise in mid-1933, soon after Roosevelt became president.\footnote{Ricardo Villares, “El Gansterismo, Brazo Armado del Imperialismo,” Bohemio, 21 May 1976, 5 ff. Frank Costello also attended the Convention with Lansky and Luciano, but he did not share their interest in drugs. Costello dominated organized crime in Manhattan (Roosevelt’s power base) from 1936-1946. F.D.R.’s prime years in power, according to Eleonora Schoenebaum and Michael Levine, eds., “Costello, Frank,” Political Profiles, The Eisenhower Years (New York: Facts on File, 1977), 124. Roosevelt guided the U.S. repeal of its prohibition of alcoholic beverages.} At the same time, according to the Cuban nationalists Roberto Álvarez Quiñones and Raúl Roa Kouri, Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles as his Ambassador to Cuba to advance the interests of Lansky, Luciano, and other politically conservative businessmen.\footnote{Roberto Álvarez Quiñones, “Mito y Realidad de la Política Exterior de Franklin D. Roosevelt,” Granma Resumen Semanal, 4 July 1976, 2. Welles struggled to suppress 1930s student-led anti-war demonstrations in solidarity with anti-war struggles elsewhere, such as the U.S. and Costa Rica. See Raúl Roa Kouri, La Revolución Del 30 Se Fue A Bolína (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1976), 150. Welles was credited in the U.S. with}
the U.S. presidency, the Republican Party pursued similar interests through Luciano, “Legs” Diamond, and Thomas Dewey.⁷⁶³

In developing this arms and drug business, nurtured by diplomatic protection in the 1930s and 1940s, Lansky and Luciano proceeded much like the architects of any security-minded transnational corporation. Their syndicate was founded upon a combination of Mafia and rogue intelligence operatives from the United States.⁷⁶⁴ Meanwhile, William Donovan sought the help of people like Lansky and Luciano to advance the covert objectives of federal intelligence initiated during the 1940s. Following the 1940s war, Donovan wanted leaders able to implement covert action and to continue the arms and drug business as part of the Cold War.⁷⁶⁵

Until 1959, as an outcome of such isthmian intervention by armed violence, syndicate cocaine compromised the integrity of Cuban leadership. Cocaine became the habitual drug of leisure, especially for the young “pseudo-aristocracy” of Cuba.⁷⁶⁶ But gravitating around the Mafia and rogue intelligence operation in Havana, established in 1937 by people like Meyer Lansky in the National Hotel of Cuba, this cocaine syndicate was ultimately aimed at United States consumers. Lansky split the syndicate profits with Cuban leaders like Fulgencio Batista and with his international contacts, while hoisting syndicate profits with luxurious, high-rise casino hotels, based on a revolving enterprise of arms, cocaine, gambling, and prostitution.⁷⁶⁷

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⁷⁶³ “La Mafia en la Política de los Estados Unidos,” Moncada, Nov. 1973, 36. Those interests grew from Legs Diamond and Lucky Luciano, through Thomas Dewey, the head of a national crime commission that was supposed to investigate and imprison Luciano. Dewey worked then with Charles Mitchell, an ex-president of the National City Bank of New York, with hegemonic banking investments in Cuba.

⁷⁶⁴ Bernard Fensterwald (defense attorney for James Earl Ray), Coincidence or Conspiracy (New York: Zebra, 1977), 176. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Mafia and U.S. government intelligence agencies had worked together to “clean” the U.S. waterfront of Nazi intervention. See also Dan Moldea, The Hoffa Wars, Teamsters, Rebels, and Politicians (New York and London: Paddington Press, 1978), 41 and 86. Costello was almost killed and temporarily replaced by Vito Genovese (a pro-drug gang lord). For the U.S. Senate’s Estes Kefauver Commission findings on Costello, see “Frank Costello Dies of a Coronary at 82,” NYT, 19 Feb. 1973, A-21. The author is grateful to Louis Wolf for computer-assisted help in this area.

⁷⁶⁵ Robert Anson, They’ve Killed the President (New York: Bantam, 1975), 291-92 and 306-313.

⁷⁶⁶ Enrique de la Osa, “Cuando la Mafia se Hospedaba en la Habana,” Gramma Resumen Semanal, 21 June 1987, 2. Among illicit drugs, cocaine cornered the market at 20 pesos per gram, versus 1 to 5 pesos per gram for heroin or morphine, while marijuana cigarettes became the ordinary choice of less wealthy people.

⁷⁶⁷ Norberto Fuentes, “La Mafia en Cuba,” Cuba Internacional 10 (Aug. 1979): 60-64. A few of these steel-reinforced, concrete, high-rise hotels, once numbering in the hundreds, still stand twenty stories and higher, e.g.: Sans Souci, Hotel Capri, Hotel Deauville, Hotel Plaza, Hotel Comodoro, Hotel Riviera, Hotel Saint John, Hotel Varadero International, and the Havana Hilton Hotel (now Havana “Libre”) — built parallel to the Hotel Tropicana in Las Vegas or the Hotel Copacabana in New York City (named for a Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, beach). Lansky’s lieutenants, Santo Trafficante, Sr., and Jr., from Tampa, FL, worked repeatedly with Robert Kennedy in assassination attempts on Fidel and Raúl Castro after 1959 to regain this business.
Diagonally facing the *U.S.S. Maine Monument* dedicated to Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders — over a prime plaza centered in the business section of Havana — the National Hotel offered fast-paced, high-stakes gaming and gambling, crowned by cocaine. Soon, in its rhythmic alliances with military intervention in the isthmus, this business syndicate would also begin to boost financing for fascism and Mussolini. To coordinate all this illegal capital worldwide, syndicate plans emerged for a central underground bunker overlooking the waterfront in downtown Havana. The bunker plans were interrupted in 1959, however, and the foundations for the bunker instead became the foundations for Cuba’s most medically advanced hospital.

As a management model for the incipient isthmian and Caribbean arms and drug business, this syndicate based in Cuba depended on the military power of Fulgencio Batista, especially in Havana and Varadero Beach, a few miles east of Havana. Meyer Lansky managed its profits, concentrated in the Havana Flamingo, National, and Riviera Hotels. As Lucky Luciano’s treasurer, Lansky managed Luciano’s arms, drugs, gambling, and prostitution profits, as well as the Bahamian casinos delegated to him by Luciano. Not surprisingly, related Varadero financial interests were controlled at that time by a United States arms magnate, Ireen du Pont. After 1959, Lansky laundered his ex-Cuban and Bahamian syndicate profits through his shifting properties in Miami and Tel Aviv, by way of a Swiss bank account managed by Tibor Rosenbaum in Geneva.

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768 *The National Hotel of Cuba* (New York: National Hotel of Cuba, n.d.), 2-11. The Hotel also offered access to games of golf, hazzard, baccarat, jai-alai, horse-racing, and chemin-de-fer. Such games and pleasures also came to roost in San José in the 1980s.


770 The author toured this hospital in early February 1990. Similar plans for concentrating illegal or semi-illegal funds resulted in the building of similar bunker-like vaults to finance similarly conservative politics in Monte Carlo, near Italy, and in Jounieh, the Lebanese Kataeb fortress north of Beirut. The vault in Jounieh was broken up in 1976, according to Souheil Khouwli, co-founder of the Lebanese Peace Movement (*al-Muntalikun*) — later an employee of the Qatar representation to the U.N. in New York City — whose father helped to coordinate security for the Jounieh Casino. Conversations with the author in Toronto, Canada, 1974-1976.


772 Jane McManus, *Getting to Know Cuba, A Travel Guide* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 98. The du Pont Varadero estate was called Xanadu, named after the mythical palace in “Kubla(i) Khan,” the opium-laden poem fragment by Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

Costa Rica began to get involved in the business then. The syndicate had to relocate its cocaine and heroin routes to previously peripheral states such as Laos, Vietnam, and Costa Rica following the 1950s wars and revolutions in Cuba, Lebanon, and the isthmus. The syndicate’s retrenchment, expedited by French and United States intelligence operations, was patronized by the above-mentioned Costa Rican network, organized Corsican and Sicilian crime families in Paris and Marseilles, and Anglo-European company interests in Beirut and Vientienne (Laos). In Beirut, according to R. T. Naylor, professor of economics at the University of Montreal, Yousef Beidas tended the Asian roots of the business. Beidas invested his profits in the control of IntraBank, the Beirut Port Authority, the Middle East Airlines, and one of the world’s largest casinos in Jounieh, a small port city north of Beirut.

Jounieh became the urban heart of the Lebanese Christian Phalange (Fascist) Party and its militia, the Kataeb, while Sami El Khoury, an associate of Beidas, extended the syndicate business to Southeast Asia. By the 1960s, this business enveloped Southeast Asia in war, under the United States-supported Nguyen Cao Ky, the head of South Vietnam’s Air Force and the most extreme opponent of the Buddhist and Roman Catholic Vietnamese peace movement. At the same time, through agents like Ahmed Yousef Wehbe, El Khoury would continue to

For Lansky’s post-1959 Bahamas operations, see Jim Hougan, Spooks (New York: Bantam, 1979), 378-80; or “Israel Bars 3 Identified by Interpol as Criminals,” NYT, 7 June 1971, A 8.

Richard West, Victory in Vietnam (London: Private Eye, 1974), 34-37. The French connection was made possible by ousting socialists from political power.

For this alleged CIA “apple-pie diplomacy” in Beirut after 1958, see Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand, America’s Failure in the Middle-East (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), 121-52, 163-80, 234; and 249-306. According to David MacMichael, who visited Eveland during the last days of a terminal illness (telephone interview with the author, Dec. 1989), Eveland’s private papers regarding the isthmus have been tied up by the CIA.


coordinate this syndicate business, financing deals through the Nugan Hand Bank in Australia — trading Afghani heroin for arms sent to Afghani Contras.\textsuperscript{779}

In Costa Rica, as briefly mentioned in the last chapter, the isthmian arms and drug profits were managed by ex-Cubans like Manuel Artine, and later by Sarkis Soghanalian and Michael Harari.\textsuperscript{780} Manuel Artine began to finance such criminal smuggling deals, working with Anastasio Somoza through the Free Costa Rica network. In building this business, Artine worked primarily with Howard Hunt, then Miami Central Intelligence Agency station chief. Under Hunt’s direction, Artine also selectively assassinated top competing drug dealers not diplomatically aligned with the United States approach to conflict resolution. He thus consolidated the economic and political foundations for an isthmian arms and drug business, helping the syndicate cover its losses from the 1959 Cuban Revolution.\textsuperscript{781} In Cuba, the profits of this business had exceeded $100 million per year for the gambling side alone. The net profits from its drug syndicate remain undisclosed.\textsuperscript{782}

Artine established the business financially. For this, he mobilized funds from Colombian arms and drug cartels, and possibly also from Israel, through what was later called “the Harari network.” Michael Harari, an ex-Mossad executive, did business with men like Artine and Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama. After Artine’s death in 1977, Harari managed the business, drawing on information from the Central Intelligence Agency as well as on his past experience in facilitating the 1981 Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor.\textsuperscript{783} Money launderers trained by Artine, such as Ramon Milian-Rodriguez, used their skills to advance the Contra arms and drug business.\textsuperscript{784} While employing friends of Artine like Felix Rodriguez for

\textsuperscript{779}Henrik Kruger, “Strange Tales of Nugan Hand Drug Clients, CAIB, Sept. 1987, 9-10. The Nugan Hand Bank in Australia was, as mentioned in the footnote above, a central bank for the CIA in its Southeast Asia endeavors. The author is grateful to Louis Wolf for computer-assisted help on this point. Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been also accused of drug-trafficking in recent times.

\textsuperscript{780}Jeff Mackler, “Behind the Cover-Up: Contragate’s Hidden History,” \textit{Socialist Action}, July 1987, in \textit{DCF} (1987), 18-21. Diplomats like Karen Olson, also mentioned above, were helpful here in providing diplomatic protection or ticket-punching for isthmian-Levantine links.

\textsuperscript{781}”DEA, Crime and the Press Today,” \textit{Lobster Magazine} (Hull, England), 1986, 8. According to this article, Artine worked especially with ex-Cubans like Orlando Bosch and Felix Rodriguez.


\textsuperscript{783}“Nicaragua: The Harari Network & MOSSAD’s Ben-Or,” \textit{Intelligence/ Parapolitics} (Paris, France), August 1988, 7. The CIA provided Harari with the satellite photographs he needed to locate the Iraqi reactor, thus starting an exchange relationship that continued in the isthmus.

the arms and communications networks centered in Costa Rica, the business transshipped Andean cocaine northward in exchange for contra arms. Meanwhile, Israelis from the Hod Hahanit (Hebrew for Spearhead) company devised business security and training systems in Colombia, in the United States, and beyond.

The “Private Benefactors” of the Arms and Drug Business

As an outcome of the privatized arms and drugs market that financed the Contras, cocaine streamed through Costa Rica. In the early 1980s, its police estimated the amount of cocaine transiting it overland at fifteen tons each year. This conservative police estimate may have equaled as much as forty percent, or $50 billion worth, of the cocaine sold annually on United States streets. Numerous French and Mexican “private benefactors” moved to San

Of course, the arms and drug trade also involved Afghanistan, as Norwegian detectives discovered in 1988; see “Bush, Drugs, and Pakistan,” Nation, 14 Nov. 1988, 492. But those events near the Middle East were more critical to U.S. policy for the tricontinental region of Asia, Africa, and Europe, militarily based in the island of Diego Garcia; see V.D. Chopra, Pentagon Shadow, 88, 143-58, and 209 ff.

Rodríguez worked with Artime in events like the Bay of Pigs fiasco and directed Artime’s arms and communications network centered in Costa Rica for anti-Cuban hostilities; see Felix Rodríguez and John Weisman, Shadow Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 116.

Jane Hunter, “The Israeli Connection,” Middle East International 14 May 1988, 16-17. For the training of Noriega’s bodyguards and his security system, linked to both Felix Rodríguez and the security advisor of then U.S. Vice-President George Bush, see also David Teacher, “Israel’s Edwin Wilson,” Lobster Magazine, 1988, 21.

“Colombia: Israelis Train Drug Lords,” Intelligence Newsletter (Paris, France), 30 August 1989, 1. This article notes that Hod Hahanit, gaining counterninsurgency experience in Lebanon, was directed by Yair Klein, with a board of directors including Harari, Moshe Spector (an armored corps commander), Avraham Tzedaka (a retired paratrooper group head), and Yaakov Biran (a helicopter pilot). Hod Hahanit was one of 800 international Israeli arms and security training organizations. South Africans were also part of this arms and drug security training program. See also Jane Hunter, “The Israeli Connection: Israeli Involvement in Paramilitary Training in Colombia” (Washington, D.C.: Arab-American Institute, 1989). José Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and other Colombians — heading drug cartel security forces — employed Klein. See Ed Magnuson, “The Israeli Connection,” Time, 11 Sept. 1989, 26. Ariel Afek, one of Klein’s men in Colombia, received U.S. asylum and a U.S. passport in exchange for information on his work in Colombia shortly before George Bush prepared to travel there in 1989. However, in late Jan. 1990, shortly after his preliminary interrogation by U.S. Secret Service agents, Afek was found decomposing in a car trunk at the Miami International Airport. See “A Coverup of Israeli Drug Connections?” Palestine Perspectives, March-April 1990, 11. Klein returned to Israel.

Guillermo Fernández R., “Cocaína Hunde su Garra en el Pais,” NCN, 23 Nov. 1986, 8. Compare with 15 million U.S. cocaine users; see Ronald Siegel, “Cocaine — A Clinical View,” San Francisco, June 1982, 52. The actual tonnage is probably higher. For instance, a single police action seized a ton of cocaine in late 1989 at the Puerto Limón Airport; see “Coke Nabbed,” TTS, 3 Nov. 1989, 1. Ronald Reagan and George Bush used the phrase “private benefactors” for entrepreneurs supporting the Contras, while accusing Cuba and Nicaragua of trafficking drugs for arms. However, academic publications have yet to confirm such accusations or insinuations.

S. Cohen, “Recent Developments in the Abuse of Cocaine,” Bulletin On Narcotics (U.N.) 36 (April-June 1984): 6. Cohen estimated the annual world cocaine trade at between 80 and 130 tons. Since the USA uses an estimated 50-70% of the world’s illicit drugs, fifteen tons of cocaine transiting Costa Rica would equal 15-40% of the U.S. cocaine market or up to $50 billion in street value every year. Other estimates of cocaine trade trends place the cost
José to help flood the market. Ricardo Alem León, the top fund-raiser for Oscar Arias’ political party, also joined the business. But those trying to fund the anti-Sandinista Contras, the major private benefactors behind this arms and drug business, operated from the United States Embassy in Costa Rica through people like John Hull, as described below.

While serial violence raged in Nicaragua, waves of cocaine transiting Costa Rica and the Caribbean began to overwhelm European and United States cities. According to Penny Lernoux’s 1984 research, Citibank, the Bank of Miami, the Continental National Bank in Miami, and various glutted fly-by-night money changing stalls processed the profits by weight, rather than by face value, in order to stay ahead of the flooding bonanza of cash. In 1985, in the midst of the bonanza, random forensic United States paper money studies came to the conclusion that anyone using paper money anywhere in the United States for any reason could not avoid touching cocaine ingrained onto the paper currency from this business.

Between 1978 and 1985, as the Contra war waxed and waned in Costa Rica, cocaine replaced heroin as the most profitable illicit drug in the United States. Ex-Cubans personally

lower but the tonnage higher, and these estimates also contain anti-prohibition pleas by conservative British Tories (Margaret Thatcher’s party) for the legalization of cocaine itself; see “Drugs, It Doesn’t Have To Be Like This,” Economist, 2 Sept. 1989, 21.


“Cocaine Traces Found on Circulating Cash,” Oakland Tribune, 14 Dec. 1987, 5; “Cash-and-Carry’ Cocaine: Drug Traces Found by Chemists on Most U.S. Bills,” The Sun, 7 April 1986, 3; and “Drug Money,” Economist, 15 April 1989, 32. Lee Hearns and Terry Hall, Miami toxicologists, made these studies — confirmed by U.S. Customs and Drug Enforcement Administration forensic scientists. For such a forensic study in Washington, D.C., see Roger Aaron and Peyton Lewis, “Technical Article: Cocaine Residues On Money,” Crime Laboratory Digest (FBI), Jan. 1987, 18. The author is grateful to DEA forensic specialists here for insight (Winter 1989). The DEA/FBI articles were sent anonymously by individuals to the author after telephone searches in Washington, D.C., 1988-1990. No direct contact was possible with these offices, whether DEA, FBI, or even the U.S. branch of “Interpol” — in spite of repeated attempts. All such libraries were “off-limits.”

taught by Artime — like Rafael “Chi-Chi” Quintero, who had armed Somoza — continued to arm the Contras privately in Honduras and Costa Rica. The business also continued to expand with arms from Sarkis Soghanalian and his friends, such as Ed Wilson, and various renegade United States Special Forces operatives.

The cocaine crossing the isthmus and the Caribbean was purified along the way for smoking or intravenous use. This seventy-five to ninety percent pure “crack” cocaine first appeared on Houston, San Diego, and Los Angeles streets in 1981-1982 during the initiation of the Contra arms and drug business. The use of crack cocaine multiplied cocaine-related deaths from suffocation and heart attacks. INTERPOL in Europe found that only Panama then rivalled Costa Rica in transshipments of cocaine, which then rippled outward from Miami, Houston, and Los Angeles. Costa Rica became an international crossroads for drug deals to finance the Contras, bringing the syndicate’s business back to its pre-1959 strength.

According to many sources, John Hull was the focal United States Central Intelligence Agency field agent for the business in northern Costa Rica. He established himself in Costa Rica with a Ford Foundation grant, under an assignment to oversee the building of roads and airstrips along Costa Rica’s northern border. He used these roads and six airstrips to manage his business, linking with the critical Sarapiqui River and San Carlos River tributaries nearby, which fed northward into the San Juan River. He connected the Andean drug cartels with the United States drug dealers in exchange for military supply flights to the Contras in Costa Rica and

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797 Roberto Bardini, Monjes, Mercenarios, 39.
Eden Pastora, Marco Aguado, and José “Chepo” Rebelo, top Contra leaders, were implicated in this arms and drug trade through Hull by means of crashed or intercepted Contra air force flights transporting Andean cocaine northward.

Meanwhile, in the United States federal courts, the cover of national security was used to thwart attempts by the public to understand and combat this arms and drug business. Legislative and intelligence officials tried to hush linkages between federal employees such as George Bush, Alan Fiers, Clair George, William Buckley, and William Casey. Political fallout from association with this syndicate business could be a very different political matter than the more difficult to prove economic destabilization of Nicaraguan and Costa Rican national sovereignty. The United States Central Intelligence Agency and Drug Enforcement Agency declined even the private invitations by Charles Rangel — chairing the appropriate House of Representatives committee on crime and drugs — to attend closed hearings under tight security. Joseph Fernández, a central figure after 1984 in the destabilization accomplished by means of the arms and drug business, escaped trial in the United States altogether by allegations from his lawyer that national security was at risk.

However, in order to protect Costa Rica’s own national security, the Drug Commission of Costa Rica’s National Legislature (its congressional body) rejected legislative attempts to hide this covert business. Meeting for six months early in 1989, the Costa Rican Drug Commission decided to penalize John Hull and to deport him permanently, but Hull secretly fled the country, still refusing to defend himself before this federal commission. Hull and Manuel Antonio Noriega received special censure, while the other Iran-Contra arms and drug business leaders were judged and sentenced in absentia by this national legislative commission.

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The Costa Rican Drug Commission found Oliver North, Lewis Tambs, Richard Secord, Joseph Fernández, and John Poindexter — all working under George Bush during the time in question — to be guilty of managing an arms and drug business in Costa Rica. The Commission permanently barred all of the Iran-Contra defendants — except George Bush and Ronald Reagan — from returning to Costa Rica. In addition, the Drug Commission penalized the Costa Rican officials found guilty of participating in this arms and drug business, such as Benjamin Piza and Ricardo Alem León, as well as various managers of the Costa Rican federal bank, civil aviation authority, and attorney general’s office staff. These state employees were fired and excluded from future public employment. Through new regulations on the Costa Rican banks, the Commission also reserved the authority to probe the isthmian arms and drug business again. This oversight power, held in reserve, could warn the country if the business again threatened Costa Rican neutrality or security.805

The immense entangled profits of this business in Costa Rica may have been at least partly responsible for the mercurial shifts of Costa Rican opinions for and against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. However, the end product damaged the societal fabric of the United States in a deeper sense. Between 1980 and 1985, each cocaine user spent an average of $19,000 per year, compared with $16,000 per year for an average heroin user, on his or her personal addiction. Simply multiplying the $19,000 cost per cocaine user by the alleged 15 to 30 million cocaine users would indicate a social cost between $285 and $570 billion per year in the United States alone — not counting another estimated $8 billion annually from heroin.806

805 Asamblea Legislativa, Comisión Especial Nombrada Para Investigar los Hechos Denunciados Sobre Narcotráfico, Expediente 10.684, Informe Final, San José, Costa Rica (1989). A rough draft of a partial English translation (by the author) of the commission’s hearing concerning Hull, Noriega, and the Iran-Contra figures may be available from The Christic Institute. Public Costa Rican action differed from the inconsequential U.S. court trials, as well as from the firing squad reaction of Cuban courts to the arms and drug entrepreneurs. For an English summary of this hearing, see Peter Brennan, “Probe Rips U.S., Local Officials,” TTS, 21 July 1989, 1 and 5. For a Spanish summary, see “Recomendaciones del Informe Sobre el Narcotráfico,” RPA, 21 July 1989, A 8. The author is grateful to Moira Kenny and Rob Ritchie of the Christic Institute for insight into problems that may also influence events in the 1990s. Despite Costa Rica’s tough stance, other isthmian states, such as Honduras and Guatemala, in particular, have begun to experience problems with cocaine heading north. Nicaragua may also face such problems in the 1990s.

comparison, the societal damage experienced from abuse of the legal drug of alcohol, often used with tobacco, reached $117 billion annually in the United States.807

Cocaine use climbed rapidly. By early in 1982, a third of all United States youth aged eighteen to twenty-five, and seventeen percent of United States adolescents, had tried cocaine at least once, according to the U.S. News & World Report. Not surprisingly, from 1977-1982 — before the full-scale outbreak of crack cocaine, drug clinic admissions multiplied by 300 percent in the United States. Annual cocaine profits climbed over $32 billion, more than twice the combined profits of the largest transnational United States oil corporations.808 This syndicate business thus overshadowed commercial transactions on many levels.

Another factor that spurred the cocaine traffic into the United States was cocaine’s strong appeal for career women and other urban dwellers. The recently engineered preparations of cocaine, unlike other addictive drugs, addicted men and women in equal numbers.809 Moreover, cultural and skin color variables did not affect the chances of cocaine addiction.810 In effect, during the isthmian Contra war, cocaine flooded all the major United States metropolitan centers.

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808“Cocaine Spreads Its Deadly Net,” USNWR, 22 March 1982, 27. Likewise, a national NIDA household survey found that 9% or 1 in 11 of all employed U.S. males aged 18-34 use cocaine at least once per month; see “Facts About Drugs In the Workplace,” NIDA Capsules (Nov. 1988), 1. Cocaine or heroin played decisive roles in 55% of all teenage emergency room deaths by the late 1980s, according to Charles Schuster, “Consequences of Teenage Drug Use,” Challenge (U.S. Department of Education), March-April 1989, 5.
809Maureen Orth, “Women and Cocaine,” Vogue, Nov. 1984, 240 and 244. This article noted national estimates that 70-80% of cocaine addicts are also alcoholics. A typical woman cocaine addict was married and earned $25,000 per year.
in a grip with more immediate potential for violence than that of any business enterprise except the Pentagon or the U.S. Department of Defense itself.811

In short, it can be asserted with significant assurance that violent conflict resolution imposed from outside on Costa Rica has hurt its potential for peace, security, and development in an immediate sense. Instead of victory over communism, the arms and drug business emerged as a global symbol of violent outside intervention. The long-range outcome of such violence will be explored next.

811NIDA, Annual Data 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Health and Human Services, Series 1 (7), 1988): iii-vi. In Washington, D.C., during the 1980s, cocaine was encountered in about 70% of adult and 20% of adolescent criminal arrests. If a person under arrest tested positive for a drug, that drug was cocaine 94% of the time. Furthermore, while AIDS was estimated to cost $1 billion per year in the U.S. as a whole, Los Angeles police alone seized over $1.6 billion in cocaine in 1986, the first year of the Iran-Contra Hearings. See Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Federal Law Enforcement Role in Narcotics Control in Southern California, 100th Congress, 2d sess., Report SCNAC-100-2-8, (1989), 158 and 170. For further reading into the history of the arms and drug business, an outgrowth of organized “white-collar” crime, traditionally rooted in the militarization of U.S. society — and singularly investigated once by the U.S. Congress during the 20th Century in its 1930s Nye Munitions Hearings — see Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime, The Uncut Version (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1983), 175 and 227-29; as well as Ruth & Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager, Corporate Crime (New York: Free Press, 1980), 155-86. For the pivotal, intermediate role of Miami for the “underground” economy of this “white-collar” crime, see Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee of Governmental Affairs, Staff Study of Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, 98th Congress, 1st sess., Feb. 1983, S. Prt. 98-21, 16 ff., 35, 95-126, and 207. The author is grateful to David Saari, Professor of Justice, [Law, and Society], The American University, for collegial discussions introducing the last three citations (Fall 1990).
Chapter 8

Debt and Credit

In order to focus a long-range view of debt as an outcome of violent conflict resolution in Costa Rica, this chapter begins with a summation of that nation’s assumed potential for peace — counterbalanced with a summation of its assumed potential for war. In other words, its equitable, nonviolent distribution of wealth and cooperative use of power will be contrasted with its national strain and tension over land use, including deforestation, small farmer evictions, and a future border canal. This contrast of the peace and war potential in Costa Rica is used to illustrate the seriousness of its international debt, a debt which indicates the hard price Costa Rica may have had to pay for its pioneer attempts at the peace table. As will be shown, every possible attempt appears to have been made to force Costa Rica to pay disproportionately for what it has borrowed or has been forced to borrow from the outside — much of which went to the Contras instead of the Costa Ricans themselves.

By this costly commitment to nonviolence, the Costa Ricans have also avoided the high serial violence and structural violence inflicted upon the other states in the Western Caribbean. Discussion in this chapter of such long-term matters will finish with a comparison of Costa Rica and Cuba, another logical target for crippling and clandestine violent conflict resolution. This comparison culminates in a contrast of the analogous conflict resolution outcomes and living conditions of both states.

Negotiating for peace in various ways, Costa Rica has tried to turn its border with Nicaragua into a peace park, while encouraging pioneer peacekeeping intervention by the United Nations in the Americas. The qualified neutrality of Costa Rica has facilitated such negotiations, producing less violent outcomes than the series of broken ceasefires, truces, and armistices in states like Lebanon and Nicaragua. Because of these outcomes, leading through negotiation instead of war toward peace, security, and development, the central hypothesis of this dissertation does reflect the reality of Costa Rica’s claim that it has exercised unarmed diplomacy.
Without military power, Costa Rica was able to act on its high regard for literacy, communication skills, electoral democracy, and the rule of law, all of which contribute to the maintenance of peace. It remains difficult to decide if Costa Rica’s experiment in unarmed diplomacy has survived the debt and Contra crisis that culminated politically in 1984. Although it recently evicted many agents of the arms and drug business, Costa Rica still faces serious economic destabilization from the debt and ecological problems which will be evaluated in this chapter.

As noted in chapter four, the first chapter on method, the 1914-1916 events in the international court based in Costa Rica have had exemplary significance. These pioneering peace negotiations initiated seventy years of peace and prosperity in Costa Rica, especially notable when compared with the histories of its neighboring states. The historical growth of consensus and cooperation in international law was impelled by events like the court decision of 1916, in which an international court chose the approach of Costa Rica over that of Woodrow Wilson for resolving conflict. At the same time, internationalists like the Republican Edgar Borah began to echo Costa Rica’s approach toward peace in the United States Congress. Evoking a semblance of multilateral coherence in the isthmus, these events based in Costa Rica gave the world the hope that it needed to found the Hague World Court in 1921.

Throughout the 20th century, the resulting isthmian coherence and reliance on international law continued to help Costa Rica resolve its conflicts, despite outside intervention from militarily powerful states. Such choices based on the rule of law rather than on waging war to meet human needs and to resolve conflict will be explored next. Equitable education, as one of these needs, would appear to be a strong indication of the outcomes of such peaceful conflict resolution.

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812 Despite a modest GNP per capita, Costa Rica thus had scored as high (in the 1970s, before its 1980s remilitarization) as states with a high GNP such as the U.S. or Saudi Arabia on the U.N. human development index (mentioned previously in chapter 2), a composite indicator of sustainable development deriving from equitable distribution of wealth, little or no military spending, and a conscious targeting of the provision of specific necessities (health, housing, education, and employment). See U.N. Development Program, Human Development Report 1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 9-14, 19-20, 30, 45-46, 50-53, 76-78, 128-29 [HDI ranking], and 185. The U.S. scored at the bottom of the major Western industrialized states on this same index; see also James Rupert, “GNP Disputed as Development Index,” WPT, 25 May 1990, A 16.


Costa Rican Potential for Peace

As noted in Table 1, 2 A and 2 C, Costa Rica has targeted funds on education and elected officials such as teachers to make an outcome of high literacy possible. This emphasis on comprehensive literacy\textsuperscript{815} has meant that over ninety percent of Costa Ricans are literate and half of its university graduates are female. This achievement makes possible competitive political elections\textsuperscript{816} for civilian, rather than military leadership.\textsuperscript{817} Even commonly overlooked things such as the labels for urban streets in Costa Rica — odd numbers for east-west streets and even numbers for north-south streets, instead of the names of military heroes — underscore this nation’s preference for reasoning cooperatively.

Internal Strengths for Peace in Meeting Needs

Costa Rica’s relatively nonviolent conflict resolution has proven just as powerful as the general strike in Havana that hurled Fidel Castro into office. Like the Cuban Revolution over two decades later, the Costa Rican Revolution that began in 1934 was followed by general strikes throughout Latin America. From the 1940s to the present, as previously illustrated in Chapters Four, Six, and Seven, Nicaraguans exiled to Costa Rica — whether Contra or Sandinista — learned there for how Nicaraguan conflicts could be resolved through nonviolent methods. These methods included fasting, general strikes, and competitive elections. By 1989, even states far removed from the isthmus, such as those in Eastern Europe, would use nonviolent methods to create change for mutual benefit and responsible democracy.

\textsuperscript{815}Comparative world literacy rates (75\% of a population, on average), were lower for underdeveloped nations other than Costa Rica (50\%), and much lower for African women (25\%); see UNESCO, Literacy & Illiteracy, 1982 (Paris: Educational Studies & Documents, No. 42, 1982), 7. In 1980, the world’s spending on education was only $33 per capita; see UNESCO, International Cooperation in Education in the 31 Least Developed Countries: A Statistical Analysis, Meeting on the Least Developing Countries’ Needs and Priorities in Regard to Education (Paris, 20-24 Sept. 1982), (ED-82/WS/73) (July 1982), 1. The author is grateful for insight on this point from Darrell Randall and Nicholas Onuf.

\textsuperscript{816}Despite foreign intervention, competitive elections much like those in Canada, Australia, the United States, and Western Europe have distinguished Costa Rica from the other isthmian states since the 1850s. After 1979, Nicaragua began to adopt democratic measures. See Mitchell Seligson and Miguel Gómez B., “Ordinary Elections in Extraordinary Times, The Political Economy of Voting in Costa Rica,” in John Booth and Mitchell Seligson, eds., Elections and Democracy in Central America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 158-78.

In 1974, during a conference in San José, Costa Rica called for new respect, cooperation, and sensitivity in its ecological plans to turn its Nicaraguan border into a pioneer international peace park. At the same time, Costa Rica established legislative precedents in the Americas for conservation and respect for Indian rights. This call came over a decade before the renowned 1987 “Brundtland” report on world ecology, based on the United Nations triad of disarmament, development, and peace. The report of a 1987 conference in Managua, parallel to the “Brundtland” report, repeated these objectives. As a result, promoted by nongovernmental organizations, these international calls resounded through many levels of government.

Ecological respect and sensitivity for the unparalleled diversity and efficiency of the tropical rainforest ecosystem gained additional impetus from the work of privately-funded research scientists. Daniel Janzen, for example, funded by a United States’ MacArthur Foundation grant for research using Costa Rica as a model, tried to arouse scientific interest in how people might rebuild tropical rainforests through careful planning over the next three centuries. Appropriating much of the Murciélago military base where Oliver North had personally threatened Oscar Arias over Contra air power, Janzen also set concrete goals for reversing the global warming effect. Other researchers from nongovernmental organizations discovered that tropical rainforests, as typified by those in Costa Rica, hold fifteen percent of the world’s potential anti-carcinogenic drugs. Such calls for ecological sensitivity slowly began to change the world’s understanding of nonmilitary threats to security.


823 Catherine Caufield, The Rainforest, 221 and 228. Caufield adds a finding from the U.S. State Department: that the world is more dependent upon chemical germ plasm (focused in rain forests) than it is upon oil. For example, the rainforests in China, India, Mexico, and Costa Rica furnish diosgenin, the basic chemical in “the pill” for human fertility control; see Norman Applezweig, “Dioscorea — The Pill Crop,” in David Seigler, ed., Crop Resources (New York: Loudon, 1977), 155-59. Other researchers have deduced that existing rainforests generate half their own rainfall; see Thomas Lovejoy and Eneas Salati, “Precipitating Change in Amazonia,” in Emilio Moran, ed., The Dilemma of Amazonian Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 214. For its northern border rainfall,
Overall Strengths for Peace in Cooperative Power

In recent years, peace initiatives have begun to restore the stability that the world needs to respect human rights and meet human needs. Esquipulas II, for instance, called for by Oscar Arias and Daniel Ortega, concentrated on the priorities of free speech, competitive elections, and open international dialogue. Needless to say, these same human rights were interpreted differently by the United States, which saw Esquipulas II as blocking the United States military containment of Nicaragua and hampering the planned future of Contra aid. Continuing to mold its unarmed diplomacy toward the priorities of mutual change for mutual benefit, however, Costa Rica did what it could to become a bridge-builder between adversaries instead of merely a bridge for the traffic of cocaine. Such calls for international negotiation supported progress at the peace table and served as a gateway for a better international understanding of the tropical rainforest.

In addition, Costa Rica used unarmed diplomacy to advance bilateral cooperation between Panama and Nicaragua. The credibility of this diplomacy rested on the fact that, since 1934, Costa Rica had been moving towards its height (achieved in the early 1980s) of spending twelve times more for societal well-being — such as health, housing, education, and employment — than for the military. Although the isthmus continued to have the highest birth and death rates in Latin America as a whole, Nicaragua and Costa Rica both managed to provide some

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825 J. Bryan Hehir, “The Arias Plan, ‘Framing Our Choices,’” *Commonweal* 114 (25 September 1987): 522. These events forced Costa Rica to act more like other neutrals, such as Finland or Lebanon, which have sparked SALT and other bridge-building initiatives as part of their attempt to provide conflict resolution services unavailable from other states; see Efraim Karsh, “Geographical Determinism: Finnish Neutrality Revisited,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 21 (1986): 43-54; or Raimo Väyrynen, “Prospects for Arms Limitation Talks: Negotiations, Asymmetries, and Neutral Countries,” *Co-Existence* 9 (March 1972): 1-2 and 10-15.


economic security for their people.\footnote{828} Such shared social service goals were also evident in Costa Rica’s guarantee of the civil rights of communists, even though communists had historically supported invasions led by the Somoza family into Costa Rica.\footnote{829}

During 1978-1979, Sandinista supply operations in Panama routed through Costa Rica by Eduardo Contreras, the original Commander Zero before Eden Pastora, did strain the creditability of Costa Rican neutrality. Contreras worked with Rodrigo Carazo, then President of Costa Rica, to furnish arms and so-called humanitarian aid.\footnote{830} In other words, reverting mainly to an anti-dependency approach, forces led by Carazo and Contreras within the three isthmian nations cooperatively stalled an invasion of Nicaragua by the United States.\footnote{831}

But, using its ecological strengths, Costa Rica officially continued to generate neutral cooperation, such as that with Nicaragua through the Tortuguero Rookery, at the mouth of the San Juan River. This beach rookery supports large green sea turtles native to Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Busy from July to September each year, Tortuguero is the last of the many large sea turtle rookeries once common throughout the Caribbean. Rookeries in the Bermudas, Trinidad, Alta Vela, the Dry Tortugas, and the Cayman Islands disappeared in the 1800s. The green sea turtles born on Costa Rican beaches live in the sea off the coast of Nicaragua.\footnote{832}

\footnote{828}Richard Garfield, “Health and Development in Central America,” in \textit{Health Care in the Caribbean, Studies in Third World Societies} 30 [Williamsburg, VA, College of William and Mary] (Dec. 1984): 109, 116, and 120. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, preferring to follow the U.S. world order approach — instead of the approaches for resolving conflict from either Nicaragua or Costa Rica — have suffered more rapidly deteriorating conditions of poverty, according to this report.


\footnote{830}Gregorio Selser, \textit{Canal Pegado}, 107, 192-97, 200, 218, and 247. Panama continued to work with Eden Pastora, who replaced Contreras when he died in the conflict over the control of Managua. After 1979, despite the mysterious death of its president, Oscar Torrijos, Panama also gave Miguel D’Escoto a place from which to represent Nicaragua in the OAS.

\footnote{831}John Swomley, “True and False About Nicaragua,” \textit{The Churchman}, October 1987, in \textit{DCF} (1987), 97-98. In fact, the U.S. was breaking its own Neutrality Act, OAS treaties, and the U.N. charter in its attacks against a country of four million Nicaraguan people — half of whom were under age fifteen. Nicaragua offered repeatedly to end its incoming foreign military aid if the U.S. would end Contra aid.

\footnote{832}Bernard Nietschmann, \textit{Caribbean Edge, The Coming of Modern Times to Isolated People and Wildlife} (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979), 196-97. The U.S. marine ecology record was quite different, accounting, e.g., through its naval forces, from 1945-1988, for almost two-thirds of the nearly 1,300 major international accidents at sea, and 7 of the 8 most dangerous accidents, dumping nuclear reactors and weapons on the ocean floor. These accidents included many instances of collisions (at least 10), fiery explosions (at least another 10), and a sunken submarine: around Cuba, near the Panama Canal, and off the coast of Vietnam — involving ships that the U.S. Navy would “neither confirm nor deny” were nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered; see William Arkin and Joshua Handler, \textit{Naval Accidents, 1945-1988} (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace and the Institute for Policy Studies, Neptune Paper No. 3, 1989), 1-2, 16, 18, 21, 27, 32-37, 43, 49, 67, and 80.
Other examples of nonviolent problem solving have been linked to the isthmus and influenced by the example of Costa Rica. In solidarity with Costa Rican and Nicaraguan demonstrations and hunger strikes, as previously noted briefly in both Chapters Six and Seven, peace movements across the United States pledged similar actions to de-escalate the United States’ threat to invade Nicaragua. Unarmed patrols were also sent from the United States into El Salvador to guard Salvadorean political leaders targeted for death squad execution. These interrelated actions multiplied outcomes from cooperative conflict resolution beyond the Americas, in Laos and Vietnam, Indonesia and Australia, Israel and Palestine.

Costa Rican Potential for War

Despite such beneficial outcomes, the potential for violent conflict resolution in Costa Rica — such as the previously-mentioned incoming arms shipments slated for either the Contras or Sandinistas — is never far away. Diplomatic protection for the United States remilitarization of Costa Rica, focused in the arms and drug business in Murciélago, quickly destabilized Costa Rican neutrality. In trying to fit Costa Rica back into the status quo of the nation-state system, the United States imposed its approach for conflict resolution by military violence. Beyond the immediate threat of the arms and drug business, this remilitarization pushed Costa Rica toward destabilization in four major areas: (1) plans for an interoceanic border canal, which exacerbated conflict, (2) tropical rainforest deforestation, which impoverished the soil, (3) the eviction of

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836In Queensland, Australia, Waterside Workers or “Wharfies” laid the trade union foundation for the Australian peace movement by boycotting Dutch ships headed for Indonesia; see Victor Williams, The Years of Big Jim (Victoria Park, West Australia: Lone Hand Press, 1975), 62; or Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada, Australia, and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Marrickville, NSW, Australia: Hale and Iremonger, 1982).
837Outcomes from the Intifada have included demonstrations, tax resistance, general commercial strikes, and work or produce boycotts, despite Israeli shootings, imprisonment, and demolition; see Khalil Mahshi (Principal, Boys School, Ramallah), “Dilemma in the Middle East, The Palestinian Uprising and the Friends School in Ramallah,” Quaker Life 30 (June 1989): 20-21. For Israeli support of the intifada by Kibbutz Kerem Shalom, see “UNRWA Receives Donations of Cash and Foodstuffs from Local Groups,” U.N. Press Release, 26 Jan. 1988, 1.
small farmers to make way for the expansion of agribusiness, and (4) an international debt acquired to pay for the remilitarization.

Each of these four major areas of conflict and destabilization — tied to a border canal, ecological damage, land struggles, and international debt — threatens Costa Rican neutrality. These threats are difficult to comprehend and to resolve through the world order approach, with its belief that there can be only one victor after a conflict. But from the Costa Rican point of view, already noticeable early in the 20th Century — as noted previously in Chapters Two and Four — the 1916 court case which it won against Woodrow Wilson was not a one-dimensional victory. Costa Ricans viewed this event as analogous to the nonviolent struggle against the Russian Czar during 1905, which had already changed through nonviolence what the violent 1917 Soviet Revolution only pretended to change. 838 From a Costa Rican viewpoint, both the 1916 and 1986 International Court verdicts prepared a way for mutually beneficial change not dependent on violence, despite later counter-revolutions that used violence to reinstate structurally violent conditions.

From about 1920 to the mid-1940s, four periodicals in Costa Rica began to elaborate upon such outcomes of cooperative change — under nascent discussions of Pan-Americanism and the proper treatment of issues such as an isthmian canal. The cooperative approach prevailed for the longest time in Reportorio Américano, edited by Joaquín García Monge. Until his forced exile to Mexico after 1948, Vicente Saénz’ Liberación complemented the work of García Monge with articles on the anti-dependency approach. Two other periodicals, El Hatikva and El Libano, discussed mutual isthmian and Levantine concerns for cooperation in cultural growth and conflict resolution. Emerging as a focal point for the theoretical, methodical, and practical foundations of Pan-Americanism, the neutrality of Costa Rica synthesized by the contributors to these four periodicals would link that nation to other self-proclaimed neutral states in the Third World, like Lebanon. Contributors to these periodicals included Diego Rivera (Mexico), William Saroyan (United States), Leila Neffà (Uruguay), and Benedicto Chuaqui (Chile). 839

839 Ibid. Because of their fragile condition, copies of El Hatikva and El Libano were unavailable for research in Costa Rica. But Joaquín García Monge discussed the content of these periodicals in his Obras Escogidas (San José: Ed. Universitaria, EDUCA, 1974), 8-13, 170-78, and 259-63. See also Roberto Brenes Mesén, “Autores y Libros — Poética Voz del Libano: Kahlil Gibran,” RAO 40 (1943): 131.
During this period of emerging neutrality and Pan-Americanism, the most difficult conflict to resolve cooperatively was disagreement over a sea level border canal. Local remilitarization was only a superficial danger in this conflict. A sea level canal would be the cheapest interoceanic waterway to build. But, as has been discovered by intensive research, the Pacific Ocean — nine inches higher than the Atlantic’s Caribbean Sea, where tides vary by less than a foot — has tides that vary twenty feet. With a net transfer of colder Pacific Ocean water to the Caribbean Sea, in such a sea level canal, tidal currents swishing back and forth every six hours could reach 4.5 (nautical) knots. Following the construction of such a canal, rain cycles in the United States wheat belt and Mexican urban areas could be disrupted by the cooling of the Caribbean, ten or fifteen years after the construction of a sea level canal. Ensuing international struggle would challenge the hemispheric status quo, and demand cooperative conflict resolution on a scale beyond our present historical experience.

While conflict simmers over the future of a border canal — as resolved peacefully by the rule of law in 1916 and 1986, the other three areas of conflict mentioned above still trouble Costa Rica directly. For example, at least two-thirds of Costa Rica’s primary forest has been cut down since the early 1940s. Landlessness in eastern Costa Rica (along the Atlantic coast), in tandem with potential racial conflict, has also become even more pressing than in the 1920s. At that time, Omar Dengo and Joaquín García Monge had carefully managed to resolve such conflict nonviolently — personally intervening to defuse and redress troubled situations before


841 “Son of Sea Level Canal,” Audubon 82 (May 1980): 137. This article describes a private Smithsonian study predicting a 1 or 2 degree Caribbean Sea temperature drop that would lower U.S. rainfall volume, especially in the wheat belt. Climatic changes would also cool Mexico City, the world’s largest city, already high above sea level. Studies have not yet been made public on whether this sea level canal would salinize tributaries of the San Juan River in Costa Rica — causing ground-water salinization that would threaten its water supplies and that of Nicaragua.

842 The present scale of peaceful conflict resolution on the high seas has been particularly obstructed by the U.S., England, and the Soviet Union which have refused to participate directly in the relevant U.N. dialogue. See U.N., Curbing the Naval Arms Race: Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments and Extension of Confidence-Building Measures to Seas and Oceans (A/39/419, Secretary General Report from the U.N. 40th Sess. A/RES/40/94 [I, pp. 147-49]), (1984), 1-19.
such situations could become full-fledged race or land riots. These conflicts will be addressed throughout the rest of this chapter, ending with a discussion of Costa Rica’s international debt.

National Strain and Tension Over Land Use

Located by geopolitical fate in an area that fascinated theorists like Alfred Thayer Mahan, Costa Rica has experienced more than its share of world conflict. In attempting to practice diplomacy without military power, Costa Rica has also suffered the feedback from war in other global conflict zones. Although Costa Ricans prided themselves on their historic, cooperative approaches to conflict resolution — as demonstrated in Chapters Four to Six by their reliance on the rule of law and ecological sensitivity to resolve conflict — their own remilitarization still polarized opinions on violence and nonviolence.

This polarization was vividly demonstrated in mid-December, 1985. A group of international peace marchers attempted to walk from Panama to Mexico in support of peace negotiations. The peace marchers were denied entry into Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, but had little trouble walking in Panama, Mexico, and Nicaragua. When the marchers stayed overnight in the Toruma Youth Hostel of San José, however, the local police and the Free Costa Rica network attacked the marchers with rocks, glass bottles, and tear gas. Despite strong protests from José Figueres and national congressional leaders in Costa Rica, Denmark, Norway, Australia, and the United States, all 250 of the international marchers — nine of whom were seriously injured — were first quarantined and then shipped under stringent police custody to the Nicaraguan border.

Such conflict and polarization had its roots in the earlier remilitarization along the border with Nicaragua during the Contra war supported by the United States. From the early 1980s to 1988, for example, the area proposed by both Nicaragua and Costa Rica as a “Si-a-[la]-Paz” Park was rife with Costa Rica-based Contras. Even with an armed escort, Nicaraguan scientists

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843 Val Barzetti, “Despair and Hope in Manzanillo,” *Not Man Apart*, Jan.-Feb. 1986, 12. Barzetti notes that conservation combined with horticulture or butterfly “farming” would be up to 50 times more profitable than the present clearcutting of forests for beef export farming.
wanting to research conditions of riverine ecology could not travel down the San Juan River to San Juan del Norte until May 1989. By then, what was left of the village of San Juan del Norte had almost disappeared underneath swarming jungle foliage.\textsuperscript{847}

As illustrated already in the history of the long-standing border problems connected to the possibility of invasions from Nicaragua and a border canal across the isthmus, the different roots of border conflict have long aggravated deforestation as well in this area. As alluded to previously in Chapter Four, over a third of the rain-forest disappeared because of deforestation by war and clear-cutting along this border, between 1950 and the mid-1970s, despite the fact that ninety percent of the rainforest trees remaining in these two states have yet to be botanically identified.\textsuperscript{848} From 1979 to 1984, according to the United States Agency for International Development, Costa Rica’s most dense remaining rainforests decreased by another forty percent.\textsuperscript{849} These areas of former rainforest — cut clear of growth and reseeded in African grasses for export beef — are exhausted in five years.\textsuperscript{850} By the late 1980s, eighty-five percent of Costa Rica’s arable land had become pasture for export beef. The resulting soil erosion, chiefly by border militarization and beef grazing — chiefly on its Pacific coast — has forced Costa Rica to import wood to meet domestic needs.\textsuperscript{851}

Behind Costa Rica’s call for ecological conservation dating from the mid-1970s is the brutal reality of a nation that is losing its forests and promoting soil erosion more rapidly than

\textsuperscript{847}David Dudenhoeffer, “Lasting Peace Needed for River Park Project,” \textit{Times}, 18 August 1989, 15. This official group contained scientists aware of Japanese plans to propose a canal again that month.


any other Latin American state. Soil erosion has reached critical levels on forty percent of its arable land.852 Subsequent sedimentation and deforestation losses in the areas of the Cashi and Arenal Lake hydroelectric dams have produced damages estimated at over $300 million.853 Hydroelectric plans for the remaining major waterfalls and waterways continue to complicate these deforestation and erosion problems.854 Contributing to both deforestation and health problems, pesticide abuse also threatens Costa Rican agricultural workers.855

Problems generated elsewhere in the San Juan River ecosystem also affect Costa Rica. Some of these problems originated in Posoltega, Nicaragua, used before 1979 as a West German and United States pesticide laboratory.856 Other problems multiplied during the Contra war, as the war undermined mosquito control programs and unleashed malaria in Nicaragua. In 1985, dengue fever, transmitted by mosquitoes, as is malaria, infected 600,000 Nicaraguans, or a fifth of the population.857 Finally, mercury pollution, a byproduct of chloralkali pesticides produced by the United States Pennwalt Company for farmers growing cotton and cattle fodder, has continued to pollute Lake Nicaragua at the top of the San Juan River ecosystem.858

Conflict, deforestation, and misuse of the land have combined in Costa Rica to promote hunger and poverty instead of peace and development.859 After 1979, the disparity between

859 Frances Moore Lappé, et al., *Aid as Obstacle, Twenty Questions About Our Foreign Aid and the Hungry* (San Francisco for Food & Development Policy, 1980), 10. The author is grateful for insight here and in the following
wealth and poverty exacerbated open conflict between evicted small farmers and large landowners, especially in food riots and land strikes around Puerto Limón, mainly populated by Black and Indian people.\textsuperscript{860} This conflict over land distribution, hunger, and poverty led to angry warnings from Costa Rican legislators like Eric Ardon to Ronald Reagan — when Reagan visited Costa Rica — that peace cannot be negotiable.\textsuperscript{861} In brief, during the 1980s, remilitarization of Costa Rica exacerbated problems of deforestation and small farmer land evictions, during a heated battle over the border with Nicaragua. The economic losses from these conflictive problems led Costa Rica into the largest debt in its history, and severely threatened its century-and-a-half-old tradition of democracy and neutrality.\textsuperscript{862}

The International Debt — A High Cost for Peace

Undergirded by remilitarization and the arms and drug business, an unpayable international debt overshadowed the destabilization of Costa Rica as a whole through hunger, poverty, deforestation, and land conflict. By limiting national sovereignty and self-determination, this international debt fueled potential for more conflict and abuse of power by violence, violence which rebounded in the near breakdown of the national economy. Brisk depreciation of Costa Rica’s monetary unit, the colon, was an early warning sign of this breakdown. Between 1980 and 1983, before the political denationalization of the Costa Rican
banks in 1984, the colon crashed from six colones per United States dollar to sixty colones per dollar, while the national debt rose from $800 million to $3 billion.863

Costa Rican debt problems reflected the violence of this international debt straining the entire isthmus. Between 1973 and 1983, the isthmian debt attained significance as the most onerous and economically-biased part of the Latin American debt, which constituted the largest single part of the Third World debt.864 Costa Rica began borrowing heavily in the early 1980s to meet rising oil costs and plunging coffee prices. But as aid became increasingly tied to building a Contra infrastructure, the problems associated with the debt worsened.

From 1981-1983, during the beginning of the Contra war, Costa Rica paid the highest debt service rates — plus the highest debt-to-GNP ratios — of any nation in the isthmus, and suffered a GNP rate loss double that of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador in the same period.865 In 1983, the per capita debt of the isthmian nations alone reached a point twice as high as that of the Latin American nations overall, when viewed in proportion to the aggregate gross national products of both groups.866 Luis Monge, as noted in Chapter Six, while the President of Costa Rica, tried to reschedule Costa Rica’s debt in exchange for United States “aid.”867 The destabilizing “aid” tied to the Contra infrastructure reached its heights between 1982 and 1987. According to Lezak Shallat, Medea Benjamin, Phillip Berryman, and Kevin Danaher, between 75-80 percent of this incoming aid, largely from the United States Agency for International


865Costa Rica’s negative GNP rate was 8.3% — versus Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, each at about 4%. The Tico debt-to-GNP ratio was 142%, versus the next highest — Nicaragua at 96%. See R. L. Chawla, “Central America, Pangs of Revolution,” World Focus (New Delhi) 6 (April 1985): 4-5. The debt servicing percentages were: Costa Rica, 91%, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, between 36-47%, and Nicaragua, 5% — according to “Centroamérica: Crisis y Políticas de Ajuste, 1979-1986,” (CEPAL/UN, LC/Mex/L.81), (15 July 1988), 62 and 66.

866Debt Crisis Network, From Debt, 7.

Development, was security assistance. This will be shown in the tables that follow shortly after a brief description of the tables’ contents.\footnote{Lezak Shallat, “US Aid to C.R. — The Story Behind the Uproar,” \textit{TTS}, 15 July 1988, 1. Shallat reports that the interest charged was 21%, most of which went into a “special account,” that bypassed the Costa Rican Central Bank, and was used to fund the so-called parallel state criticized by John Biehl. See also Kevin Danaher, Phillip Berryman, and Medea Benjamin, \textit{Help or Hindrance? United States Economic Aid in Central America} (San Francisco: Food First Development Report No. 1, Sept. 1987), 2-3, 8-10, 49, and 84. Characterized as security assistance, military assistance, and economic support funds (ESF) by U.S. AID, this kind of aid for militarization rose from 13% in 1980 to 68% in 1986 for the entire isthmus — compared with the 75-80% level in Costa Rica itself (Table 3) — propping-up only those governments willing to militarize in agreement with the U.S. military aims in the isthmus. To compare with the rest of the isthmus, see also “Invasion, A Guide to U.S. Military Presence in Central America” (Philadelphia: NARMIC/AFSC, 1985), 4.}

The left-hand columns in the following tables on security (and military) aid, disbursed by the Agency for International Development, come directly from that Agency’s data for the disbursement of such military aid and related economic support funds. It may be helpful to note as well that United States arms sales were not as common in Costa Rica as in the other isthmian states. In addition, scattered articles appearing in the literature indicate abruptly falling rates of aid after 1988.

Between 1982 and 1988, the total of funds from the Agency for International Development reached about $1.2 billion.\footnote{Cameron Duncan, “Costa Rica: Conditionality and the Adjustment Policies of USAID in the Eighties,” Paper for Latin American Studies Association, Miami, FL (Dec. 1989), 12-25. Duncan used the same kinds of federal sources as used in the table of aid. According to Duncan, some of these AID funds used in the Contra infrastructure were reported during the Oliver North trial.} The disbursement of this security aid can be seen in the tables which follow — on aid to Costa Rica (1946-1988) — with their three columns, comparing: 1) Security military aid measured as a percent of all United States Agency for International Development aid; 2) All such aid measured in millions; and 3) All other aid measured in millions as recorded by the 1989 \textit{World Development Report} of the World Bank. Such “all other aid” does not measure the covert military or security (Contra) content of “all other aid,” nor does it include illicit funds from the arms and drug business.

The three tables on aid to Costa Rica which follow will illustrate military, security, and the combination of military and security support funds — defined as economic support funds by the United States Agency for International Development and the Pentagon or Department of
Defense. Table 3 lists the official figures for military loans and grants, Table 4 the official figures for economic support funds (loans or grants), and Table 5 the total of military and economic support loans or grants. As such, the three tables also offer a graphic view of the three approaches.

Table 3 on military and development aid represents the official United States data on military and development aid to Costa Rica. The military numbers alone are relatively low, and give the impression of such aid being rather inexpensive and cost-effective. These numbers also represent the violent means used for violent ends to ensure hegemonic power in what is considered a zone of conflict or sphere of influence — the United States being the hegemonic state in this context. It might be helpful to keep in mind that the proposed United States aid to Costa Rica for 1990, after electoral changes in Nicaragua, would plunge to $57 million.

The military aid numbers represent the economic value articulated by a world order approach to conflict resolution in terms of the cost of military aid and technology. These

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870 The best overall source for such official U.S. government data is that of the “Green Book,” an annual report from U.S. AID prepared in the Pentagon and in the State Department: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (state-by-state, from 1945 to the current fiscal year, updated each fiscal year — as cited under each of the 3 tables). The Pentagon prepares its own version of this annual report, reversing the priorities of military and economic assistance data in its state-by-state tables. Apparently the basics for the annual report are customarily worked out first in the Pentagon with teams from the State Department, although which version is based on the other is not available in print in the public domain. For the Pentagon’s version see Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year . . . [Especially for 1988-1991]. Jointly Prepared by The Department of State and the Defense Security Assistance Agency. This Pentagon version has acknowledged a Costa Rican prohibition of a “professional army” while claiming a need to repel hostile action from Panama and Nicaragua. In addition, AID must also file a full report of its justification for such allocations — world rankings, state-by-state rankings, and regional rankings for Africa; for Europe, Asia, and [the] Near East; and for Latin America and the Caribbean — in an annual report by the director of AID (at the State Department) to both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations committee chairpersons. This report, called the Implementation of Section 620 (s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, has focused upon such data as the percentage of the gross national product spent on militarization, the percentage of the central governmental expenditures spent on militarization, and the percentage of militarily-related imports to total imports. It is not known if the Pentagon has a similar checklist for covert and overt expenditures. Such reports seldom report allocations to any state such as Chile or Nicaragua while actively led by what might be called an anti-dependency approach. The author is grateful to anonymous people in the State Department and the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C., for providing access to the above documents.

871 For further official discussions on such data, see House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Task Force on Foreign Assistance, 101st Cong. 1st sess., Doc. 101-32 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989); and for an official bibliography on such data, see House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Materials on Foreign Assistance, 101st Cong., 1st sess, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989).

872 “Bush’s Trip to Costa Rica Drawing Fire From Left to Right as Poor Diplomacy,” WSJ, 27 Oct. 1989, B 6B.
military allocations are targeted against armed opposition to hegemonic influence, whether this
opposition is armed by another hegemonic state, such as the Soviet Union, or by other states
capable of such aid. The representatives of the world order approach regard the anti-dependency
approach as representing a threat from another hegemonic state, and the nonviolent approach as
an irrational approach to solving armed threats from another hegemonic state. Please note that
the numbers in the left-hand column of Table 3 and Table 4 may not add up to total those in the
left-hand column in Table 5. These numbers should add up, but do not necessarily do so because
of the inconsistent way that the numbers, from which the percentages are taken, are reported as a
percentage of total economic and military loans and grants.

Table 3

Military and Development Aid to Costa Rica (1946-1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Assistance Aid (in percent)</th>
<th>All AID Aid (in millions)</th>
<th>All Other Aid (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1961</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1981</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>231</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Not Yet Reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: For the left-hand and middle columns (1946-1985), see U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. AID, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Office of Planning and Budgeting.

The main opposition on Capitol Hill to such militarily-dominated allocations and expenditures, by lobbyists from churches, trade unions, and various community-based organizations, has been coordinated by such organizations as the Interreligious Task-force on U.S. Food Policy. This task force criticized the concentration of militarization in the isthmus and the Middle East, by way of military assistance and economic support funds — aimed during the 1970s and 1980s at Egypt, Laos, Turkey, (South) Vietnam, and Israel for about 70% of such funds. See “Security Assistance and the Poor: The Recasting of the US Foreign Aid Program,” Hunger (United Methodist IMPACT Program, No. 32), March 1983; or “U.S. Foreign Aid: Rival Visions of `Security’,” Prepare (Impact), Dec. 1988.

Table 4 on military and development aid represents the official United States aid intended to support military assistance without technically functioning as military equipment. This aid may be used tactically in a military capacity or strategy. Such economic support funds are considerably more expensive than the official military support, but still less costly than the total funds allocated. These numbers frequently represent violent means used for violent ends to ensure hegemonic power in what is considered a conflict zone or sphere of influence — the United States being the hegemonic state in this context.874

Anti-dependency critics frequently criticize economic support funds because of the way in which such funds may function repressively. Official military and development organizations may also use such funds to hide the full extent of military intervention from public scrutiny. These militarily-oriented allocations are frequently targeted against armed opposition to hegemonic influence, whether this opposition is armed by another hegemonic state or by other states capable of such aid. Critics of such support funds may not oppose the relatively small allocations represented by mere military aid (Table 3), and often fail as well to criticize other arms suppliers, whether hegemonic or not. Representatives of the anti-dependency approach often regard the world order approach as unnecessarily harsh, legalistic, or repressive — and the nonviolent approach as too slow or naive. An interesting example of such an agenda was

874For one of the most extensive analyses of such hegemony and dependency in an isthmian context, see Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, The Soft War, The Uses and Abuses of U.S. Economic Aid in Central America (New York: Grove Press, 1988), 4-43 and 84-103. The authors highlight the complementarity of AID and Pentagon funding (p. 23) and the convergence of these two funding sources in what the Pentagon and State Department called “low intensity conflict” — imitating “counter-insurgency” strategies used previously in Southeast Asia — particularly in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador (pp. 85-90) under Oliver North and John Singlaub. For an example of what such an anti-dependency approach might call destabilization, concerning increased arms logistics, capital flight, paramilitary disruption, hoarding of goods, and disinformation to discourage incoming tourists, see Michael Kaufman, Jamaica Under Manley, Dilemmas of Socialism and Democracy (London: Zed and Lawrence Hill, 1985), 118-122, 187-93, and 200-201.
provided in Congressional Hearings by Stephen Hellinger.\textsuperscript{875} For such an anti-dependency-influenced view of aid to Costa Rica, see Table 4 below:

## Table 4

**Security and Development Aid to Costa Rica (1946-1988)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Economic Support Funds Aid (in percent)</th>
<th>Security Aid (in millions)</th>
<th>All AID Aid (in millions)</th>
<th>All Other Aid (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1961</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
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<td>1962-1981</td>
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<td>237</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Not Yet Reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The third table, Table 5, on military and development aid, represents the total official United States aid to Costa Rica. These numbers give the totals for violent and possibly not so violent aid delivered to Costa Rica. These numbers also represent the violent means used for

violent ends to ensure hegemonic power in what is considered a conflict zone or sphere of influence — the United States being the hegemonic state in this context.

Nonviolent critics of military intervention may tend to clump the first two categories of military and security aid together because neither can clearly be distinguished from the other — both the means and the ends for these categories being violent rather than nonviolent as a whole. Such nonviolence opposes the use of violent means to achieve what are alleged to be peaceful ends — as violence wielded by a hegemonic state, a parallel national security apparatus, or an “underground” guerrilla cadre network. The representatives of the nonviolent approach regard the world order approach as mere violence rather than change, and the anti-dependency approach as still leading economically to an arms dependency relationship.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security and Military Aid (in percent)</th>
<th>All AID Aid (in millions)</th>
<th>All Other Aid (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1961</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1981</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>123</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>219</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
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<td>179</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>231</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>165</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>183</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Other than AID aid in percent of total aid: 1982 (33%), 1983 (13%), 1984 (19%), 1985 (18%), 1987 (16%), and 1988 (20%).

From 1980 to 1988, due to the deteriorating economic conditions in Costa Rica — as associated with its (re-)militarization according to such organizations as the United Nations — wage and production levels in Costa Rica dropped severely. For instance, from 1980 to 1982, as inflation pushed by the deteriorating economic conditions in Costa Rica associated with its (re-)militarization rose eighty percent, Costa Rican industrial and agricultural production fell ten percent and average wage levels dropped thirty-six percent (in “real” value, 1980 = constant). In the next five years, from 1983 to mid-1988, “real” wages would fall another forty-two percent (in “real” value, 1983 = constant), as Costa Rica, a state formerly self-sufficient in food crops, had to import food and felt compelled to hide the exact level of its international debt as a state secret. By 1985, its debt had risen to seventy-five percent of the income from its national exports, representing a total estimated from $4.5 to $6 billion.

With 140,000 people unemployed and a total fiscal deficit of $16 billion, conditions in Costa Rica began to resemble the debt dependency relationship of one other major United States client state: Israel. Nicaragua tried to advise Costa Rica to fight for political independence from the United States. Instead, in exchange for a promise to reduce its debt, Costa Rica

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877 The terms of U.S. aid to Costa Rica made Costa Rica dependent on the U.S. for economic survival, but U.S. objectives, as noted in chapters 5-6, were remilitarization of Costa Rica and building a Contra infrastructure — not Costa Rican peace, security, and development. See Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, 268-69 and 398 n12.
881 “Costa Rica: Between Dignity and Submission,” Envío (Managua) 7 (April 1988): 59. See also: CODELIDE Apoya las Luchas Campesinas Costarricenses,” Uno Mas Uno (6 June 1984), 15. About two-thirds of Costa Rica’s import and export dealings were with the U.S., with about a quarter of Costa Rica’s GNP and labor force occupied
chose to surrender part of its territorial sovereignty to United States conservation organizations under a debt-for-nature swap.882

Of all the states in the isthmus, Costa Rica and Nicaragua have had the most trouble paying their international debt — due at least in great part, according to United Nations reports, to the isthmian war concentrated in these two countries. To resolve this problem, the United Nations advanced several recommendations, all dependent in one degree or another upon the cessation of hostilities, for example, renegotiable debt financing, higher tariffs through something like another Central American Common Market, and cessation by the United States of its embargo on Nicaragua.883 However, these recommendations did not address the biased debt-servicing ratio endured by Costa Rica, which was about double that of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.884 Given the ongoing chronology of events, regarding the role of the Contra war and the United States’ change in its debt negotiation policy after the peace overtures of Oscar Arias (mentioned especially in Chapter Six), Costa Rica’s pro-peace position appeared to have been a very costly position at the international debt negotiation table.

Parallel debt servicing recommendations from nongovernmental organizations and the nonaligned movement stressed the need to reverse the unfair terms of debt servicing and the need for special drawing rights, and recommended the formation of a debtor’s cartel to boycott the debt.885 The United Nations University, sensitive to the economic vulnerability of the isthmus, advanced recommendations to re-schedule or cancel the international debt because of the Third

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884“Centroamérica: Crisis y Políticas de Ajuste, 1979-1986” (CEPAL/UN, LC/Mex/L.81), (15 July 1988), 62 and 66. The debt servicing percentages were: Costa Rica, 91%, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, between 36-47%, and Nicaragua, 5%. See also footnote 53.

885Debt Crisis Network, From Debt, 35-55. See also Fidel Castro, How Latin America’s and the Third World’s Unpayable Debt Can and Should Be Canceled and the Pressing Need for the NIEO (Havana: Editora Política, 1985), 3-4.
World’s inability to pay. Nevertheless, according to a business professor of the University of California at Berkeley, the United States’ criteria for debt negotiations (for such states as Costa Rica) continued to mandate profit management, technical assistance through privatization, and increased militarization to co-opt electoral or extra-parliamentary opposition to privatization by both neutrality and nationalism. The bottom line appears to be simply that Costa Rica may be caught in a debt squeeze that it can not escape.

*Analogous Costa Rican and Cuban Outcomes*

After the dramatic, relatively nonviolent changes of world communism in 1989-1990, in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Americas, it may be highly relevant to compare the nonviolence of Costa Rica’s approach with Cuba’s anti-dependency approach. Because of these changes and the dissolution of what used to be the Soviet economy that undergirded it, Cuba may well be the primary target in the Americas for violent covert action by the United States in the future. But violent covert action may or may not work in Costa Rica. It did not work well in Costa Rica, which, up until the 1980s, at least, has served as an American neutral ground for mediating conflict between Cuba and the United States.

Since 1959 and 1948, respectively, Cuba and Costa Rica have tried to follow what can be called an anti-dependency and a nonviolent approach, respectively. Although Costa Rica has tried to hold on to its neutrality, it received about as much aid per capita at the height of the Contra war from the United States as Cuba had received per capita from the Soviet Union — neither nation lagging far behind the per capita aid given Israel by the United States. Both Cuba and Costa Rica have been able to use such aid in some constructive ways; for example,

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researchers have noted that Cuba and Costa Rica share the lead in the Americas for the highest percentage of women in politically significant employment.\textsuperscript{889}

As will be discussed below, Cuba and Costa Rica have tried to minimize the number of poor people in their societies. It might be profitable to compare the results of their attempts to prevent and to resolve conflict by improving access to the human necessities of housing, health care, education, and employment.\textsuperscript{890} Both states have tried to employ relatively less violent conflict resolution than that favored by the United States. At the same time, as measured by a serial violence indicator (Chapter Five), both states have experienced about the same levels of war deaths — under one percent, despite war in Angola. Both states also have dangerous foreign debts.

Historically, Cuba and Costa Rica have similar ethnic roots, both bound to anarchist and socialist Cataluña, a province in northeast Spain. As far back as the 1800s, leaders of Cuba and Costa Rica have descended from Catalan immigrants. Up to the present, Cuba and Costa Rica have also depended to a great degree on cooperative organizations like the enterprising cooperatives and trade unions still functioning in the Spanish provinces of Aragon, Cataluña, and Valencia, as well as among the Basque people.\textsuperscript{891} Both countries also have sizeable Afro-Latin populations, throughout Cuba and on the east coast of Costa Rica. Both Cuba and Costa Rica have tried to meet human needs — despite externally-introduced wars or frequent violent

\textsuperscript{889}JoAnn Fagot Aviel, “Political Participation of Women in Latin America, “Western Political Quarterly 34 (March 1981): 158, 167-68, and 171-72. In the early 1980s, Costa Rican women constituted one-fourth of the presidential cabinet leadership and helped to lead the national legislature. Cuba’s women in leadership included Celia Sánchez Manduley, state council secretary from 1959 until her death in Jan. 1980. The author is grateful to Aviel for correspondence on this point (Feb. 1990).

\textsuperscript{890}Karl Wagenheim (ed. of Caribbean Update), “Letter to the Editor,” NYT, 10 Feb. 1990, A 34. Wagenheim points out that Cuba can not be easily compared with the Eastern European nations surrounded by the relative affluence of Western Europe. The economic conditions in Cuba are more like those of Israel or New Zealand — at least as measured by one frequently used economic development indicator, the infant mortality rate. In these three countries, it stands at about 11 per 1,000 live births. Compare with Cuba’s neighboring states of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic (60-70/1,000), and Haiti (118/1,000). The author is also grateful to William LeoGrande, professor of government, The American University, for correspondence in comparing Cuba and Costa Rica (7 March 1990).

\textsuperscript{891}Sheldon Liss, Roots of Revolution, Radical Thought in Cuba (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska, 1987), 6-23. For intellectual Basque, Galician, Catalan, and Valencian roots of Costa Rica refer to chapter one. This less violent preference was demonstrated frequently in the 1930s, when Cuba and Costa Rica both struggled for change; see Patricia Parkman, “Insurrection Without,” 5, 8-11, 13-14, 18-20, 30-31, 36-38, 153, and 195. In Cuba, this cultural tradition is referred to as Gallego — a term for northern Spaniards (from, e.g., Galicia) — as symbolized by a major artisan and cultural center in the old part of Havana known as the Gallego Theater. This theater housed the formation of artisan trade unions. For further discussion of such Catalan priorities in meeting human needs, see also George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), 4-7 and 47-57.
intervention — through organizing for social goals, such as primary health care, instead of amassing nuclear weapons for “defense.”

Analogous Conflict Resolution Outcomes

Late twentieth-century patterns for resolving conflict in the Western Caribbean, characterized by the Organization of American States’ aversion to disagreement with the United States, were frequently initiated by meetings convened in Costa Rica. All this time, as noted already in Chapter One, the United States based nuclear-armed forces in Cuba and Puerto Rico, while sending such forces through the Panama Canal. Throughout August 1960, for example, in order to resolve a Cuba-United States crisis that would develop into the 1962 world missile crisis, Latin American foreign ministers met numerous times in San José to discuss the implications of their common sovereignty without direct mention of Cuba. In October 1960, despite these peace negotiations in Costa Rica, the United States resolved the conflict by violently blockading Cuba. In January 1961, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, and then diplomatically muzzled opposition to military attacks against Cuba.

892 Whatever missiles Cuba may have had up until the 1962 Cuban-Soviet-U.S. Missile Crisis were taken out of Cuba in exchange for a tacit U.S. agreement not to invade Cuba. What kind of (or if) nuclear-armed missiles were actually stationed in Cuba may still be under fierce debate, as more information about that event becomes public. For this fierce debate, e.g., between Raymond Garthoff, Robert McNamara, and Sergo Mikoyan, on the literal absence or presence of warheads, see James Blight and David Welch [International Affairs professors at Harvard University], eds., On the Brink, Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989), 45, 90-91, 113, 126-29, and 274-76. At the time, the Soviets possessed only either 4 or 6 land-based, nuclear-armed ICBMs — not the kind of scarce weapon likely to be stationed that far away in Cuba. See Seymour Melman, The Demilitarized Society, Disarmament and Conversion (Montreal: Harvest House, 1988/1990), 102-103 and 118-120. For comparisons of health in Cuba and Costa Rica, see Priscilla Rivas, “Primary Health Care and Planning in Cuba and Costa Rica” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1988). Notwithstanding, of course, Cuba has also fought long and costly wars in Angola and Ethiopia.


894 Daniel Wood, Armed Forces in Central and South America (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, No. 34, 1967), 7. Guantánamo Bay in Cuba has operated as the U.S. “Gibraltar” — with a bay of 14 square miles, little troublesome rainy weather or ship congestion, and a precipitous drop to 900 ft. directly outside the harbor — according to Martin Scheina (MA, International Affairs, The American University), “The U.S. Presence in Guantánamo,” Strategic Review 4 (Spring 1976): 85-86. Called “Gitmo” by its 6,000 personnel, the sprawling base with its two airfields is located on 19,625 acres of land (735 acres of which are mined), and has functioned as a training base for the entire Atlantic fleet. Annual rent: about $4,100 per year. See Theodore Mason, Across the Cactus Curtain, The Story of Guantánamo Bay (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1984), 11-12, 36-37, and 49). Meanwhile, using U.N. Res. 2105 (20 Dec. 1965) and U.N. Res. 2344 (19 Dec. 1967), the U.N. General Assembly has continued to challenge the U.S. legal right to occupy this base, according to Gilberto Toste Ballart, Guantánamo: U.S.A. al Desnudo (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1983), 89.

to the pre-1959 Cuban arms and drug business. These military attacks against Cuba, before it became communist, were launched from Nicaragua, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{896}

Despite a preference for a nonviolent approach, Costa Rican reactions toward such conflict in the Western Caribbean have consequently reflected both the influence of the Cuban anti-dependency approach and the imposition of the United States world order approach. In 1981, for example, temporarily adopting a world order approach, Costa Rica broke formal consular relations with Cuba under pressure from the United States, following a 1976 convention of ex-Cuban conservatives in Costa Rica to honor Manuel Artime.\textsuperscript{897} On the other hand, in 1982 and 1983, despite possible backlash from the United States, Costa Rica employed its traditions of unarmed diplomacy to forward two Cuban peace proposals for normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States to Washington, D.C. Both of the Cuban proposals were relayed by Costa Rica during severe Contra hostilities, and both proposals were then summarily refused by the United States.\textsuperscript{898}

The remilitarization of Costa Rica in the 1980s, as previously noted in Chapter Two (regarding economic issues) or Chapter Six (regarding military issues), promoted violence and underdevelopment like that which existed in pre-1959 Cuba. This kind of militarization of Cuba (before 1959), and Costa Rica (in the 1980s) was spearheaded by the Air America Corporation of the Central Intelligence Agency. According to Peter Dale Scott, Air America entered the arms and drug business during the 1930s in Asia under the corporate leadership of William Pawley — chief executive of the Pan Am transnational corporation — by promoting Chinese, Laotian, and


\textsuperscript{897}Grinevich and Gvozdarirov, \textit{Washington Contra}, 47, 229-30 and 250. The Free Costa Rica network was formed at the same time in the early 1960s.

Vietnamese arms and drug business leaders such as Chiang Kai-Chek. But Pawley failed to keep leaders like Fulgencio Batista in line, thus forcing Batista and Meyer Lansky to flee a pre-1959 Cuba where one and a half percent of the landowners owned forty-six percent of the best arable land.

After 1959, living conditions in Cuba changed to resemble the more humane living conditions in Costa Rica before remilitarization. At the same time, urban rents dropped from thirty to fifty percent in the worst of the slums or cuarterías in downtown Havana. To put it differently, militarization (as defined in Chapter One) in Costa Rica after 1984 begin to reproduce conditions of hunger and poverty similar to those which drove Cuba into a revolution to evict its arms and drug traffickers.

**Living Conditions and Possibilities**

In response to such changes after 1959, urging counterinsurgency, Dwight Eisenhower put an embargo on cash crop imports from Cuba. Ronald Reagan and George Bush would do the same over two decades later to both Nicaragua and Costa Rica, curbing or halting imports over a difference of opinion about how to resolve conflict. Still the death toll in revolutionary Cuba rose no higher than the toll of the 1948 Costa Rican Revolution.

For obvious reasons, the people of both Cuba and Costa Rica preferred having their needs met to being “protected from Communism” by the United States. For example, the malnutrition that had affected a third of the urban and two-thirds of the rural Cuban population

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Further research into similarities in the outcomes of the two experiments, both countered by violence from the United States, may further clarify options for nonviolent conflict resolution. For instance, the dollar value of the Cuban debt is still much higher than that of the Costa Rican debt. In 1986, after the end of the Costa Rican Contra war, analysts put the Cuban debt at almost $15 billion: $4.7 billion owed to the West and $10 billion owed to the CMEA. However, Cuba’s per capita debt stood at $1,400, under the per capita debts of Venezuela at $2,000 or Costa Rica at $1,800.\footnote{Andrew Zimbalist, “Cuba’s External Economy: Reflections on Export Dependence, Soviet Aid and Foreign Debt,” \textit{Comparative Economic Studies} 30 (Summer 1988): 40-43. In 1982, the U.S. tried to halt travel to Cuba when Cuba asked for debt-rescheduling. The raw sugar price dropped from $0.29 (1980) to $0.04 (1985).} At the same time, as analyzed and evaluated by a 1984 Rand Study, United States restrictions on travel to Cuba between 1960 and 1981 cost Cuba $9 billion. According to that Rand study, these travel restrictions damaged Cuba’s economy severely: much the same, it would appear, as the arms and drug business had damaged Costa Rica’s severely. Without these
restrictions, Cuba’s debt might not have mounted so high. In response to this embargo, Cuba also began building a nuclear power plant (with the potential for making atomic weapons).

Since 1959, because of its violent resolution of its pre-1959 problems, Cuba has suffered the loss of ten percent of its people to Venezuela and the United States — a loss somewhat analogous to Costa Rica’s in the 1850s, Poland’s in the 1940s, and Laos’ and Vietnam’s in the 1960s and 1970s, as illustrated in chapter five — on top of an ongoing conflict with the United States. Fleeing especially to Miami and Caracas, refugees from Cuba who continue to imitate the example of Manuel Artime only prolong the pseudo-aristocratic nostalgia for the profits of the arms and drug business before 1959. But these profits will not return because of a claim to diplomatic protection based on geopolitical anti-communism. Anti-communism, however

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910 Donald Henry, et al., *An Analysis of Cuban Debt* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand R-3120-USDP, May 1984), v and 1. The U.S. has constrained exchange with Cuba through use of sections of its “Trading with the Enemy Act.” With ten million people, Cuba has a population roughly three times larger than Costa Rica’s. Since 1960, the U.S. embargo also cost the U.S. between $0.6 to $1.2 billion each year in lost sales. See Kirby Jones and Donna Rich, *Opportunities for U.S.-Cuban Trade, A Study by the Cuban Studies Program of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies,* Mimeo, June 1988, 1-2, 8, and 14.


913 John Spicer Nichols, “The Power of the Anti-Fidel Lobby,” *Nation,* 24 Oct. 1988, 389-90. This article identifies, for example, an anti-communist Cuban American National Foundation based on Israeli “PACs” (1981), led by Jorge Mas Canosa with the help of Dante Fascell (then House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson), as well as George Bush, Jesse Helms, Dan Quayle, Lloyd Bensen, Paula Hawkins, Ernest Hollings, Claude Pepper, and Ronald Reagan. But like Artime in the 1960s and 1970s, Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez (formerly a Cuban military general in Angola) also severely threatened Cuba in the 1980s — because of the arms and drug business. In other words, military intervention in Angola by Cuba at Angola’s request, similar to U.S. intervention in Russia and Europe in the 1940s, resulted in further use of Varadero Beach by traffickers like Ochoa, reminiscent of the Lansky and Luciano syndicate cocaine routes. Instead of shunning traffickers like North, Ochoa, Tambs, Secord, Singlaub, Fernandez, and Poindexter, as did Costa Rica — also suffering from unwanted U.S. covert action — the Cuban government executed Ochoa and his fellow Cuban traffickers by firing squad. See *Causa 1/89, Fin de la Conexión Cubana* (Havana: Editorial José Martí, 1989), 14-15 and 322. See also Francisco López Segrera, *De Eisenhower a Reagan* (Mexico City: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1985). López Segrera is a professor at ISRI in Havana.
carried on, is still threatening states such as Costa Rica, destabilizing its debt-ridden economy, and undermining its peace and democracy.\textsuperscript{914}

If violent militarization — including the old arms and drug business — is again applied to Cuba from the outside, as it was to Costa Rica, a victory over communism is not the most likely scenario. Much more likely, if Canada, Europe, and the United States do not interfere directly or through United Nations-related peacekeeping, is a descent into a conflict that will polarize Cuba with the kind of bitter violence now paralyzing Lebanon. Unless, of course, atomic weapons aimed at the United States become part of the Cuban arsenal in the future. The Soviet reaction may be, at best, uncertain, if not also violent, toward such a conflict. A safer course close to the unarmed diplomacy of Costa Rica would seem the better choice for peace, security, and development in the Western Caribbean. The most nonviolent approach possible would also appear, therefore, the least likely to exacerbate the already high levels of fear, anger, apprehension, and militarization — representative of the anti-dependency approach of Cuba and of the world order approach of the United States.

\textsuperscript{914}For ongoing Cuban research into modifications of national security, arms and drug issues, and international relations, concerning, e.g., ex-Cuban people concentrated in Florida and Venezuela, see Mercedes Arce Rodríguez, “El Centro de Estudios de Alternativas Políticas (CEAP) y Sus Lineas Investigativas,” Mimeo, University of Havana, 1990. Since 22 June 1989 CEAP has published various things, including a periodical issued three times a year from the University of Havana and through the University of the Yucatan, México.
Chapter 9

Resolving Future Conflict

Conclusion — Suppositions, Notable Trends, and Future Options

This final chapter reconsiders the central reasons for the less violent resolution of conflict and the salience of such less violent attempts for resolving conflict in the Costa Rican experience. The focus for these reasons appears to be the need for effective international conflict resolution that will deal with both the immediate violence of the arms for drugs business and the long-term damage from international debt. Some progress has been made in the unprecedented peacekeeping attempts by the ONUCA\textsuperscript{915} force of the United Nations, as well as by nongovernmental organizations. Less progress seems likely from such attempts as the George Bush plan for dealing with drug and debt damage. The outcomes of intense conflict will become even deadlier in the future if the current methods of fighting fire (violence) with more fire (violence) are not changed for less violent methods.

The dissertation concludes with a discussion of what might best be called surprises to expect in the future. Hopefully, future writers may be able to progress beyond the serial violence indicator — a sledge-hammer-like indicator of death tolls — toward more precise, surgical instruments. The anomalous states of Iceland, Barbados, Vanuatu, and Costa Rica — with their attempts to deal with outside violence in nonviolent ways — as well as such states as Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Angola, Lebanon, and Nicaragua (with their conflict-ridden histories), will have much to teach us about conflict resolution. In sum, further research into the links among militarization, serial violence, and structural violence, as well as into the links among peace, security, development, and nonviolence, may well prove critical for creating, encouraging, and maintaining what we hope will be an ecologically-sustainable future.

\textsuperscript{915}In Spanish, ONUCA stands for “La Organización de las Naciones Unidas de Centroamérica” — the U.N. [Peacekeeping] Organization in Central America.
Contrasting violence with nonviolence, this dissertation has tried to break new ground in the slowly emerging field of international conflict resolution, and to introduce relevant American experience and literature. The discussion of war, peace, and justice in the context of Costa Rica has revolved around the international use of power, whether for violence (war) or nonviolence (peace). The use of power in the theory and practice of conflict resolution within international relations remains entangled in such ancient ethical issues as the definition of just war. In looking at the future, however, scholars must be bold and impartial enough to consider the outcomes of both violent and nonviolent conflict resolution.

Outcomes of the Struggle Over Debt and Drugs

The following discussion will briefly reiterate the summary of approaches and methods at the end of Chapter Six, and then summarize the main points of Chapters Seven and Eight. This summary will conclude the analytic task of the dissertation and allow room for speculation on the future of research into peace and conflict resolution. Background information will also strengthen these final observations.

Between 1914 and 1984 Costa Rica did avoid the dominant international institutionalizing trends toward a permanent war economy. Through peaceful dialogue for peace, it would also lead isthmic attempts to invite unprecedented United Nations peacekeeping participation in the Americas. By the 1980s, its emphasis on unarmed neutrality would include the priorities of ecology, nonviolence, and gender parity. It relied on the methods of ecological sustainability and the rule of law aimed at peaceful negotiation, twice opposing the United States successfully in an international court of law (in 1916 and 1986). Surviving at the geo-strategic

916 The claim of power in war still echoes from Greco-Roman beliefs. But Irene or Eirene — daughter of Zeus/Jupiter (god of war, god of gods) and Themis (goddess of justice and the oracles) — was worshipped as the goddess of peace, enforcer of law, and guardian of the gates of Olympus (Heaven). See Thomas Carr, A Manual of Classical Mythology (London: Simpkin Marshall, 1846), 19-26, 117, and 140.

917 Bertrand Russell, Justice in War Time (Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916), 2. This potential concerns notions of truth; see James Ring, “The Notion of Truth in the Philosophy of Bertrand Russell: 1905-1918” (Ph.D. diss., St. Mary’s University, Halifax, N.S., Canada, 1968), 6-29 and 47-63. Before the 1970s, when militarization was considered “good for [U.S.] business,” academic limits contravened anti-war evidence of the type raised by this current dissertation. Doctoral dissertations on international conflict resolution still concentrate on the violent resolution of conflict, for example, in Israel and Lebanon, rather than on the nonviolent
center of fierce pre- and post-1945 serial violence, its social indicators also continued to reflect a
less-violent standard of living, until the United States began to remilitarize it.

Costa Rican nonviolence was exemplified in such events as nonviolent hunger strikes,
random national opinion surveys, and mass peace demonstrations in the streets of San José. But
its path was complicated by clashing policy priorities, conditioned by foreign aid and
remilitarization. Meanwhile, what the Kerry Senate Commission called *ticket-punching*, or
diplomatic protection, a long-term condition more frequently identified with the ongoing wars in
Southeast Asia (the Golden Triangle) and the Middle East (the Golden Crescent), began to
characterize the isthmian business of war, arms, and drugs. The ultimate cost to the United
States was its infamous Iran-Contra constitutional crisis — a crisis rooted to a large degree in the
United States’ covert and overt militarization of both Israel and the isthmus.

What were the significant outcomes for Costa Rica? Ultimately, the most significant
long-term outcome of war in the isthmus for Costa Rica was that isthmian war refugees fled
toward rather than away from Costa Rica during the isthmian war in the 1980s. Given the
findings of experts on economic conversion for the United Nations debate on disarmament and
development — such as Inga Thorsson — this flow of anti-war refugees into Costa Rica (a state
without military conscription) may have been the major economic counterforce to its
remilitarization by the United States. On 10 March 1987, Dutch, Austrian, and Costa Rican
lobbying also resulted in a pioneer United Nations resolution to decriminalize the right to refuse
to kill.

In September 1987 about 4,000 Costa Rican small farmers likewise participated in a
hunger strike against the denial of farm credit, ecological damage to their land, and the Contras’
arms and drug business. The struggle of these farmers also symbolized anti-war resistance for
many Costa Rican families struggling for housing. Together, such protest sparked national
protests against war and ecological damage.

Such peaceful attempts were counterbalanced by the exchange of drugs for arms in order
to pay for isthmian war, which, like deforestation, obstructed peaceful conflict resolution and
economic activity for the common good. The isthmian states, without indigenous cocaine, and
the Levantine states, without indigenous oil, both served as brokers for risky world businesses,
with success frequently determined by violence. Isthmian routes and island routes, over the Caribbean, laid the colonial foundations for the later Asian heroin trade routes. Worldwide, more money would be spent annually for illicit drugs (especially cocaine) than for food, clothes, housing, education, and medical care. The growing economic value of the addictive drug trade came to equal one-half of the value of the global arms trade.

The first international legal structures erected to combat this arms and drug business were based at the Inter-American Court of Justice in Costa Rica, and later at the Hague. These conventions were aimed at impeding the critical drug routes over Cuba and through the isthmus, identified as the foundations for a global arms and drug business. After the Cuban Revolution and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the world routes for this violent business veered toward Miami, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

In Costa Rica the isthmian arms and drug profits were managed by ex-Cubans such as Manuel Artime (primarily with Howard Hunt and Anastasio Somoza), and later by way of others, such as Sarkis Soghanalian and Michael Harari. Post-1959 efforts began with Artime in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, through Colombian arms and drug cartels as well as “the Harari network.” Money launderers trained by Artime, such as Ramon Milian-Rodriguez (under Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama), further advanced a Contra arms and drug business. By the early 1980s, Costa Rican police estimated the amount of cocaine transiting Costa Rica overland at fifteen tons per year. This conservative police estimate may have equaled as much as forty percent, or $50 billion worth, of the cocaine reaching United States streets.

Between 1978 and 1985, as the Contra war waxed and waned in Costa Rica, cocaine replaced heroin as the most costly and profitable illicit drug in the United States. According to many sources, John Hull was the focal United States Central Intelligence Agency field agent for the business in northern Costa Rica. He allegedly connected the Andean drug cartels with the United States in exchange for military supply flights to the Contras in Costa Rica and Honduras. Eden Pastora and other top Contra leaders allegedly worked with Hull, as indicated by means of wrecked or intercepted Contra air force flights transporting Andean cocaine northward. The alleged top leaders of this business, including major defendants in the U.S. Iran-Contra Hearings (and John Hull), were found guilty and banned from returning to Costa Rica by its Congressional Drug Commission in mid-1989.
As a result of a series of intense wars focused around Lake Nicaragua in the isthmus between the 1850s and the 1980s, ten percent of the isthmian people would own half of the isthmian wealth. In 1987 Costa Rican researchers noted that, for 1960 to 1978, the annual wages for the bottom seventy percent of all isthmian wage earners increased seven dollars (to $82), while the annual income of the top three percent doubled (to $15,000). This war-related poverty struck three in every four rural Costa Ricans by 1982, up from one in two in 1980. By 1984 one in every fifty isthmian people were displaced by war, while child malnutrition ranged from eighty percent in Honduras to thirty-nine percent in Costa Rica.

Deforestation, begun under militarization in the 1850s in northwestern Costa Rica — intensified in the 1940s for military bases, in the 1960s for anti-Cuban wars, in the 1970s for anti-Sandinista wars, and then, in the 1980s, throughout northern Costa Rica for a Contra infrastructure — cleared away the previously-common rain-forest. From 1961 to 1986, beef farming for export in the cleared areas would make Nicaragua and Costa Rica into the two largest isthmian beef exporters to the United States. But the chemicals used for beef farming began to pollute the San Juan River ecosystem of both these states. Long-term Costa Rican ecological damage was concentrated in the loss of forty percent of its mangrove swamps facing the Caribbean.

Costa Rica did not undergo desertification on the heels of war, such as the after-effects of war damage found in sixty percent of the potential farmland in the Middle East and sixty-seven percent of the potential farmland in South Africa, but the nation was damaged environmentally by a Contra war along its border with Nicaragua. Because this war remained largely covert, this ecological destruction did not have the same kind of political and ecological impact inside the United States as did that which occurred during the United States-Southeast Asian War.

Since 1934 Costa Rica had moved towards its height (achieved in the early 1980s) of spending twelve times more for societal well-being — such as good health, housing, education, and employment — than for the military. Although the isthmus continued to have Latin America’s highest birth and death rates, Nicaragua and Costa Rica both managed to provide some economic security for their people. As a result of Costa Rica’s emphasis on comprehensive literacy, over ninety percent of Costa Ricans were literate, and half of its university graduates were female. Such achievements sustained competitive political elections for civilian, rather than military leadership. Even commonly overlooked things such as the labels
for urban streets in Costa Rica — usually labeled with odd numbers for east-west streets and even numbers for north-south streets, rather than the names of military heroes — underscored this nation’s preference for reasoning cooperatively.

Costa Rica also generated neutral cooperation, such as that with Nicaragua through the Tortuguero Rookery, at the mouth of the San Juan River. In 1974, during a conference in San José, Costa Rica called for new respect, cooperation, and sensitivity in its plans to turn its Nicaraguan border into a pioneer international peace park. This call came over a decade before the renowned 1987 “Brundtland” report on world ecology, based on the United Nations triad of disarmament, development, and peace, or a parallel 1987 conference in Managua.

At the same time, privately-funded research scientists, such as Daniel Janzen, aroused scientific interest in how people might rebuild tropical rainforests through careful planning over the next three centuries. Appropriating much of the Murciélago military base where Oliver North had personally threatened Oscar Arias over Contra air power, Janzen tried to set concrete goals for reversing the global warming effect. Other researchers estimated that tropical rainforests, as typified by those in Costa Rica, hold fifteen percent of the world’s potential anti-carcinogenic drugs. Such calls for ecological sensitivity slowly began to change the world’s understanding of non-military threats to security.

Without military power, Costa Rica was able to act on its high regard for literacy, communication skills, electoral democracy, and the rule of law, aimed at negotiation for and maintenance of peace. It remains difficult to decide if Costa Rica’s experiment in unarmed diplomacy will survive the debt and Contra crisis that culminated politically in 1984. The 1914-1916 and 1985-1986 events in two international courts did have beneficial international effects, including the reinforcement of international solidarity against war in the isthmus. This solidarity was articulated by demonstrations, hunger strikes, and food caravans. International peace movements also pledged related actions to derail any direct United States’ threat to invade Nicaragua, while unarmed patrols were sent into El Salvador to guard Salvadoran political leaders targeted for death squad execution.

Esquipulas II, initiated by Oscar Arias and Daniel Ortega, concentrated on the human rights standards of free speech, competitive elections, and open international dialogue for peace. Continuing to mold its unarmed diplomacy toward the priorities of mutual change for mutual benefit, Costa Rica thus did what it could to become a bridge-builder between warring
adversaries — instead of merely being an unwilling bridge for the traffic of arms and cocaine. Such calls as Esquipulas II for international negotiation supported progress at the peace table and served as a gateway for a better international understanding of the tropical rainforest.

Costa Rica’s political “unarmed neutrality” contrasted with its economic strain and tension over land use, including deforestation, small farmer evictions, and a future border canal. Every possible attempt appears to have been made to force Costa Rica to pay disproportionately for what it borrowed from the outside — much of which went to arm the Contras rather to help the Costa Ricans themselves. This Contra remilitarization pushed Costa Rica toward conflict in four major areas: (1) plans for an interoceanic border canal, which exacerbated conflict, (2) tropical rain-forest deforestation, which damaged the ecosystem, (3) the eviction of small farmers, despite struggle over land, to make way for the expansion of agribusiness, and (4) an international debt acquired to pay for the remilitarization. Meanwhile, from the early 1980s to 1988, the area proposed by both Nicaragua and Costa Rica as a “Yes-to-Peace” (Si-a-[la]-Paz”) Park was rife with Costa Rica-based Contras.

Behind Costa Rica’s call for ecological conservation dating from the mid-1970s was the brutal reality of a nation that was losing its forests and promoting soil erosion more rapidly than any other Latin American state. This brutal reality was complicated by problems of malaria, dengue fever, and mercury pollution, (a by-product of chloralkali pesticides in Lake Nicaragua, at the top of the San Juan River ecosystem) — and undergirded by debt incurred because of remilitarization and the arms and drug business. By limiting national sovereignty and self-determination, this international debt fueled potential for more conflict and the abuse of power by violence. Between 1973 and 1983, the isthmian debt attained significance as the most economically-biased part of the Latin American debt, which in turn constituted the largest single part of the Third World debt. With 140,000 people unemployed and a total fiscal deficit of $16 billion, conditions in Costa Rica began to resemble the debt dependency relationship of one other major United States client state: Israel.

United States intervention, which multiplied in the 1980s, did not appear to benefit Costa Rica. Analogous Soviet intervention in Cuba since 1960 also produced a United States economic blockade or embargo of Cuba — damaging both Cuba and the United States. Because of the dramatic, relatively nonviolent changes in world communism in 1989-1990 (in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), and the changes in or the dissolution of what used to be the Soviet
economy that undergirded it, Cuba may well be the primary target in the Americas for violent covert action by the United States in the future — as was Costa Rica in the 1980s.

But violent covert action may or may not work in Cuba. It did not work well in Costa Rica, which, up until the 1980s, at least, served as a neutral American state for mediating conflict between Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States. A safer course close to the unarmed diplomacy of Costa Rica would seem the better choice for peace, security, and development in the Western Caribbean. The most nonviolent approach possible — as intended by Costa Rica — would also appear, therefore, the least likely to exacerbate the already high levels of fear, anger, apprehension, and militarization (reflected in both the anti-dependency approach preferred by Cuba and the world order approach preferred by the United States).

Trends and Options for War and Peace

Over the last few decades, Costa Rica has excelled in preventing conflict through sustainable development and education, planning programs of peace and teaching conflict resolution skills for the future despite surrounding isthmian conflict. These pedagogical programs have resulted from the Costa Rican emphasis on allocating its meager resources to meet the needs of health, housing, education, and employment, rather than to meet the demands of uncontrolled militarization (at least until the 1980s). Begun in San José under the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), these powerful programs for peace and conflict resolution have permeated “North-South” debate on disarmament, development, and conflict resolution. From Costa Rica, the ideas of FLACSO have spread to similar centers in Mexico City, Lima (Peru), Quito (Ecuador), Santiago (Chile), and the United States.918 These

918Felipe E. MacGregor, “Military Spending in Latin America,” UNIDIR Newsletter (Geneva, U.N.), June 1989, 8. FLACSO — Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales — spinoffs have surfaced as Latin American Institutes for Transnational Studies. FLACSO’s work can be compared to that of the U.N-associated University of Peace in Costa Rica, CRIES in Managua, and related international relations departments of the Hebrew University (Jerusalem), Hanoi University, the University of Havana, and the University of Zimbabwe (Harare). Other such programs: the Palestine Center for the Study of Nonviolence (Jerusalem), the Gandhi Peace Foundation (Delhi, India), the Peace Studies Center in the Mindanao (Philippines) State University, and Proyecto Caribeño Paz y Justicia (Puerto Rico). For analogous movements in citizen diplomacy, such as sanctuary for isthmian refugees and divestment in South Africa, practiced by over 65 major U.S. cities, see Louis Freedberg, “Sanctuary and Divestment — A New People’s Diplomacy Takes Off in U.S. Cities,” PNS (9 July 1986) in DCF (1986), 99; or Michael Shuman, “Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies,” FPY 65 (Winter 1986): 154-174. Or consult the Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy, started by a mayor of Irvine, CA, Larry Agran, and linked to the U.S. Conference of Mayors. For analogous attempts at military-civilian (1980s) dialogue in the Americas, see Louis W. Goodman, “Civil-Military Relations,” International Review (May-June 1986): 13.
educational centers and programs have prospered despite the intense serial and structural violence clustered in the isthmus since the 1850s.

These American centers have had to deal with increasing demographic pressure complicated by poverty, which enhances the potential for conflict in this hemisphere. From a 1970s population similar in numbers to that of rapidly aging North America, Latin America will have grown proportionately — especially in the geopolitically critical isthmus — to a population twice that of North America by the early twenty-first century. At the same time, in the eastern hemisphere, the Levant — an area as geopolitically critical to the Soviet Union as the isthmus is to the United States — is projected to see Muslim demographic growth on a similar scale. In the 1950s, awareness of these trends and the need for preventive conflict resolution motivated the first (world order-oriented) Soviet arms deals with Egypt, Syria, and later Lebanon. Neither Soviet nor United States world order approaches have given much consideration yet, however, to the potential of nonviolent conflict resolution in encouraging change for mutual benefit under volatile demographic conditions.

Many observers believe that popular movements for democracy in China, Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union may soon reduce the world’s dependency on violent power. This optimistic prediction is based on the precarious notion that the ebbing level of violence between the nuclear-armed superpowers should trickle down into general disarmament and eventually wash away conventional (serial) violence. Given the world’s widening poverty

919 S. Paul Ehrlich, Jr., and Jorge Litvak, “El Envejecimiento y los Paises en Desarrollo de la Region de las Américas,” Boletín de la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana 91 (1981): 513. This bulletin is a publication of PAHO, a branch of the U.N. WHO organization. Latin America here includes México, the isthmus and the Caribbean.
922 See the representative call for complete (unilateral?) disarmament by the dean or rector of the central international relations program (Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, Potsdam, a suburb of Eastern
gap, though, it is likely that advocates of violent power will try to retrench geopolitically at a
time when international relations are burdened by fewer “Berlin Walls” and fewer long-range
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Such intentions may explain the actions of states like Iraq.
What form this geopolitical retrenchment will take has begun to attract speculation in
international relations literature, even in Israel and the United States.

One trend that should lessen global violence, however, is the increasing political power
of women used to humanize international conflict resolution. This trend can be seen in
Lebanon, Costa Rica, and other strategic areas of conflict. Modified by more female
political participation than in the past, nonviolent power applied to conflict resolution should
promote and reinforce healthier trends toward trade and cooperation.

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Berlin) in what was East Germany until 1990 — Max Schmidt, “Vollständiges Verbot von Kernwaffen Notwendig,
Vortrag Symposium d. DDR-Kom” — in Wege in den Frieden, Panorama DDR 6 VI 2/3.2 (1986): 2-17, listed as
no. 916 (p. 86) in Wissenschaftlicher Rat für Friedensforschung, Zentrum für Friedensforschung [Scientific Council
for Peace Research], Zentrum für Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Information, ed., Friedensforschung in der DDR,
Ergebnisse der 80er Jahre (Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, 1988), 1875 citations, 195 pp. U.S.
views on this can be found in renewed attention to regional conflict, such as legislation by U.S. Rep. Dave Nagle
(DIA) or conferences in the U.S. Institute of Peace; see “Regional Conflicts: A Role for U.S.-Soviet Cooperation?”
In Brief 17 (May 1990): 1-3. The author is grateful to Mary Liepold for noting this trend, a trend also anticipated in
shortwave broadcasts from states like Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

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Saul Cohen, The Geopolitics of Israel’s Border Question (Boulder, CO: Westview and Jerusalem
Post, 1986), 30. The 1958 and 1976 wars in Lebanon have yet to be discussed at length in Israeli international
relations literature; see also George Rishmani and Michael Opperskalski, Palästina, Unterdrückung und Widerstand
(Cologne, West Germany: Mediapro, 1982), 34.

Women have often become known as better defense leaders than men in the nonviolent approach to international
conflict resolution; see Mohandas Gandhi, Women and Social Injustice (Ahmedabad, India: Navijan, 1954), 18-19
and 99 ff.

Yolla Polity Sharara, “Women and Politics in Lebanon,” Khamsin 6 (1978): 6-14. Lebanese women have led the
Lebanese struggle to meet human needs.

Nancy Hartsock, “The Barracks Community in Western Political Thought: Prolegomena to a Feminist Critique of
that one can conquer fortune (feminine) by war. Nonviolent power for peace has long been a concern for anti-war
figures like Margaret Sanger, who have tried to prove that war stems from, e.g., poor family planning or the denial
of access to basic necessities; see Margaret Sanger, Woman and the New Race (New York: Truth, 1922), 1-158
passim.

international power would ruin the state, a belief also found in the prototypical U.S. political science program begun
by the just war pioneer Francis Lieber, at Columbia University. But 80% of military jobs are logistical and
noncombative jobs that men and women can both do. See Kathleen Jones, “Dividing the Ranks, Women and the
The power for beneficial change inherent in economic trade should also be considered in the prevention of serial and structural violence. From 1945-1977, for example, United States and European Economic Community capital influenced between one-half and three-quarters of the foreign industrial investments in Latin America. These nations influenced only ten to twenty percent of the corresponding foreign industrial investments in the Middle East. In other words, while the United States and the European Economic Community influenced outside trade with the isthmus, as a means for providing access to human necessities and preventing conflict, the Levant depended much more on Asian, African, and Australian trade. The net results in world trade undermined United States interests during the international debt and drug crisis, much of which has been unfavorably attributed to the United States (the world’s largest debtor and its largest consumer of illicit drugs).

Without the use of equitable international trade to prevent conflict, violent intervention can have unexpected outcomes, especially when confronted by the cooperative conflict resolution of states such as Costa Rica. Central Intelligence Agency arms and drug operations in Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Costa Rica, for example, have hurt long-term United States corporate interests. Only six of the six hundred United States firms registered with the United States Embassy in Lebanon managed to survive the 1976 war. United States corporations had to leave the Western Caribbean too when the United States arms and drug business undercut isthmian corporate interests. At the same time, to deter the arms and drug business in Costa


Rica, the Drug Commission of its National Legislature responded by publicly banning all the major United States political officials involved except George Bush.

By pursuing violent conflict resolution in the isthmus, the United States created and nurtured a transnational arms and drug business. This violence alienated the major country remaining in Latin America with strongly democratic, pro-United States sentiments: Costa Rica.\(^{931}\) It follows that, given enough time, such violence will also alienate the United States’ main ally in the Middle East, Israel.\(^{932}\) Israelis are strongly cognizant of the fact that their nation will have less military relevance than the island of Diego Garcia to the United States once the oil runs out. As discussed in the two previous chapters, the security threats of debt, drugs, and remilitarization reinforced Costa Rica’s determination to overcome the violent power of this transnational arms, debt, and drug business by unarmed diplomacy.\(^{933}\)

**Effective International Conflict Resolution**

While the Nicaraguan Contra war destabilized Costa Rica, cocaine trade profits surging through Panama and Colombia promoted Costa Rican violence and underdevelopment. This underdevelopment resulted from the intervention of diplomats and traffickers in arms or drugs such as Karen Olson, Michael Harari, and Sarkis Soghanalian, as Israel prepared to invade Lebanon and to supply the Contras with Lebanese arms. Given these dismal outcomes of the use of violent power, one must surmise that cooperative approaches flexible enough to fit the needs


\(^{932}\)A less violent solution might include regional relief, reconstruction, and reconciliation which deals with both Israeli-Palestinian (Arab) and the Gulf (Iran, Iraq) wars, as described by observers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Three Rs for the Middle East,” *NYT*, 21 April 1991, E 17. The author is grateful to Darrell Randall for access to this article.

\(^{933}\)Interviews by the author in the Middle East in 1976 and in the Western Caribbean in 1989-1990 indicated that the 1976 war merely shifted drug routes to Haifa and Tel Aviv in Israel, bypassing Beirut, while the 1959 Cuban Revolution and ex-Cuban counterrevolution shifted drug routes to the isthmus and the Bahamas. These same interviews also revealed an undertone of anti-Soviet and anti-U.S. resentment for using people as guinea pigs, in the testing and marketing of the latest inventions of war and espionage in Cuba, Israeli, Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
of those concerned would be more effective than violent approaches for peacefully resolving severe, long-term conflict.  

In the isthmian context, effective conflict resolution attempts emerged in the Esquipulas II Agreement that facilitated United Nations peacekeeping. This second agreement obtained in Esquipulas, sometimes called the Arias Plan, strengthened the confidence building measures necessary for de-escalating isthmian conflict. By resolving conflict with less violence than that proposed by outside intervention, ongoing dialogue in Esquipulas also increased the potential for convening a future isthmian parliament. To some degree, the United States 1989 military intervention in Panama weakened United Nations peacekeeping and parliamentary planning. From Costa Rica’s point of view, this action sidetracked the Esquipulas II Agreement and reinforced the Contras on its northern border. The Contras there were the last holdouts against the demilitarization of Nicaragua.

United Nations Peacekeeping — American or International

Esquipulas dialogue was rooted in the isthmian struggle for the human right to peace and nonviolence, or the jus contra bellum. Despite United States opposition, pledges of support

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935Esquipulas II was hosted by a monastery behind the Church of the Black Christ in Esquipulas, Guatemala. Formal results of the isthmian nations’ decisions were announced afterward in front of this Church. The Black Christ and Black Madonna survive as a syncretistic matrix of pre-European and Roman Catholic beliefs in Spain, some Slavic states, such as Poland, southern India, Africa, and Latin America. The village of Esquipulas lies astride the major land route from Guatemala over Honduras into Nicaragua, in a rugged and isolated mountain area visited by the author with Robert Ganter in early March 1989.


937Patricio Falconí Almeida, La Encrucijada Centro Americana, Viviencias del Parlamento Latinoamericano (Quito: Comisión Política del Parlamento Latinoaméricano, n.d.). No precursors yet exist for a Levantine parliament, other than the Arab League, which operates much like the OAS and OAU in conflict resolution.

938Jean Pictet, Le Droit Humanitaire et la Protection des Victimes de la Guerre (Leiden, the Netherlands: A. W. Sijthof, 1973). See also works by Milan Bartos of Yugoslavia. The author is grateful to José Néstor Mourelou Aguilar for pointing out the possibilities beyond just war laws, which, as ethical or religious criteria, lack objective legal precedent in international law; see also Josef Kunz, “Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale,” American Journal of International Law 45 (1951): 530-31.
arrived quickly from both the United Nations Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuellar, and the 
Organization of American States Secretary General, Joao Clemente Baena Soares. To deflect isthmian momentum for United Nations peacekeeping, the United States temporarily overwhelmed Honduras with Contra aid. Inside the United States, 
however, defying criminal lawsuits instigated by the executive and judicial branches of the United States government, lobbying and sanctuary groups applied political pressure for isthmian peace. As the first Amnesty International political prisoner of conscience in the United States since 1979, one of the sanctuary movement leaders — Stacey Merkt — became an international symbol for the human right to peace.

Further gains from peace plans like that of Esquipulas for resolving isthmian conflict will depend on combined United Nations and nongovernmental organization action. For example, Andrew Young and Walter Fauntroy helped to initiate parallel or citizen diplomacy in a nonviolent, nongovernmental visit to Beirut, criticizing proxy intervention by Israel. This visit soothed the tension arising from conflict that included Israeli suppression of the July 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution. In 1983, the Lebanese conflict itself reached an impasse with a brief 

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940 “ONU Envia Observadores,” Barricada, 8 July 1989, 1 and 5. 


942 “Response to Repression,” Bethesda Co-op Newsletter, Sept. 1985, 2. The sanctuary movement was modeled on the 1860s Underground Railroad developed to carry escaping slaves and pacifists to Canada. 

943 Vicki Kamper, “Stacey Merkt Released from Prison,” Sojourners, June 1987, in DCF (1987), 95. The Christic Institute’s defense of Merkt pulled it into a struggle against the arms and drug business. The judge sentenced her to federal prison for transporting isthmian war refugees, an action permitted by U.S. federal law but contested by the Reagan administration. She was pregnant at the time. For U.S.-IndoChina war veterans’ roles in the sanctuary movement, see Jack Elder, “The Sanctuary Challenge,” The Texas Observer, 27 June 1986, in DCF (1986), 57. Organizations like the Christic Institute would also oppose Thomas Polgar, the chief Senate investigator for the Congressional Iran-Contra hearings. Polgar and Theodore Shackley were both ex-Saigon CIA station chiefs; see David MacMichael, “Report From Washington [D.C.],” Unclassified, August 1989, 2.

944 “Misión de la SCLC en Líbano, Es Posible una Solución No-violenta en El Cercano Oriente,” Estudios Arabes (Buenos Aires) 12 (April-June 1982): 164-69. They visited top leaders in Beirut, including Yassar Arafat, but were not permitted into Israel. The visit was marred by the alienation of U.S. Zionist leadership from the U.S. civil rights
attempt to institutionalize military conscription. That impasse dissolved as the Arias plan scaled back the Contra war and Israeli anti-war organizations mobilized the largest peace demonstrations ever experienced in Israel.\textsuperscript{945} These Israeli demonstrations pressed for intervention by the United Nations, instead of proxy intervention in Lebanon, which then repealed its military conscription legislation.\textsuperscript{946}

Effective international peace and conflict resolution initiatives, focusing on human needs and expectations, will continue to rely upon nonviolent cultural synthesis and dialogue. Such initiatives have included the dialogue of Contadora and Esquipulas, the sanctions of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, and the dialogue and sanctions synthesized by the Islamic Conference. However, official factions, tied to the arms and drug business in states like Israel and Costa Rica, have opposed such peaceful initiatives.\textsuperscript{947}

This factional opposition has obstructed multi-state, confederated peace proposals to end the conflicts embroiling Lebanon and Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{948} Attacks have continued despite pro-peace movement for the first time since the 1960s, despite the rapidly growing popularity of other forms of citizen diplomacy, e.g., U.S.-Soviet citizen diplomacy.


\textsuperscript{946}Dorothea Woods, “Kidnapping, Round-Ups and Other Forms of Extra-Legal Conscription,” \textit{QUNO Newsletter}, Jan. 1988, 6. For a brief description of the many post-1982 Israeli peace groups, including Enough (\textit{Da’i}), Artists against the War, Alternative to Silence (\textit{Horim Nged Schtika}), the Democratic Front for Peace and Freedom (\textit{CHADASCH}), No More Border War with Lebanon (\textit{Yesh Ghvul}), and the Committee Against the War in Lebanon and for Israeli-Palestinian Peace; led by, e.g., Yehoshua Leibowitz, ed. of the \textit{Hebrew Encyclopedia} — see Peter Bathke and Karin Kulow, \textit{Israel, Kriegspolitik, Antikriegsbewegung} (Berlin: Dietz, 1985), 50-72.

\textsuperscript{947}Issam Sartawi was thus allegedly killed in April 1983 by the CIA and the Israeli Mossad for proposing peace. See Maxim Ghilan, “Almost a Homecoming,” \textit{Israel & Palestine}, April-May 1983, 6-10. Such violence may continue to plague Israeli history, if, as has been claimed by the political scientist Guieievski, the profits of Meyer Lansky and Fulgencio Batista from the syndicate in Cuba originally funded the Israeli Stern, MOSSAD, and Irgun Zvaia Leumi networks. See I. A. Guieievski, \textit{La Mafia, La CIA, Watergate, Ensayo Sobre La Delincuencia Organizada y Las Practicas en EE.UU.} (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Lihuel, 1982), 41-48 and 104-106.

initiatives such as support from the leaders of the European “Green” Party, proposing
cooperative neutrality along the lines of Costa Rica’s, and advocating the human right to
peace. The Soviet Union also supported neutral, multi-state peace proposals for international
conflict resolution, while the United States persisted in proposing the proxy Contras as helpful
for ending conflict in the isthmus, duplicating the proxy Israeli military for ending conflict in the
Levant.

Accustomed to a world order maintained by violence, states like the United States may
continue to oppose less violent alternatives. The basic George Bush plan to stop the arms and
drug business, for example, recommended imprisonment of street offenders and discretionary
United States foreign military intervention. His plan did not recommend better cash crops to
replace coca and opium poppies or better ways to alleviate the international debt. By simply
ignoring the violent counter-insurgency roots of arms and drug-related violence, his plan tacitly
authorized more of such violence. The Bush plan consequently rode roughshod over
international legal decisions — like the Hague Court’s decision against the war in Nicaragua and
the Costa Rican National Legislature’s Drug Commission’s decision against the arms and drug
business in Costa Rica.

Echoing the recommendation of the Israeli peace movement for a multi-state solution, the Greens also endorsed
Austrian and Finnish neutrality as a model for West Germany. Three of the nine Green Party work groups were
headed by group chairs — Waltraud Schoppe, Ellen Olms, and Otto Schily — with a direct interest in conflict
resolution concerning women, international law, and international relations. See also “Green Work Group

“Appeal of Scientists of Socialist Countries” [Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea,
Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Roumania, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union], 1984 Conference of the Scientific Council on
Peace and Disarmament, Moscow, Mimeo (1984), 1-3. For a background on Soviet interests in the Middle East, see
Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, Soviet Oil Politics in the Middle East and Soviet-American Relations (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv
University, No. 6, Dec. 1976), 4-5. For the related need to transplant much of the Soviet heavy “Glav[kli]metal”
industrial plants, during the 1940s, to Kharkov, Moscow, and Leningrad, and even Siberia, in order to prevent war in
the Middle East from destroying the Soviet industrial base, see Maurice Dobb, Soviet Economical Development

Clarence Lusane and Dennis Desmond,” Drug War Games, An Overview and Analysis of the Drug Crisis,”
Mimeo from the Office of then U.S. Representative Walter Fauntroy, Washington, D.C. (Fall 1989), 2-4. No
explanations were given for the plan’s 20,000 domestic prisons, scheduled for the year 2005. Prisons have not held
top domestic money earners in the past. The plan also ignored precursor chemicals required to produce cocaine,
the majority of which originate from California. See also Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and
Control, The Flow of Precursor Chemicals and Assault Weapons from the United States into the Andean Nations,

With debts to U.S., Israeli, Brazilian, and European banks, Colombia may also have been subjected to a covert
U.S. Operation Extermination, based on a model of Israeli-managed covert action in Guatemala, to eradicate anti-
dependency-oriented conflict resolution. See Rafael Cribari, Colombia, Operación Exterminio (Montevideo,
The United Nations peacekeeping mechanisms recommended by the Esquipulas II Agreement, in contrast, were based soundly on Angolan and Lebanese international conflict resolution experience. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission leader, Píricles Ferreira Gomes (from Brazil), led the initial mapping efforts and deployment exercises for United Nations isthmian peacekeeping forces. This United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)\(^{953}\) concentrated on removing obstacles to disarmament and development for regional peace and sovereignty.

The prime obstacle to reconciliation was the Contra logistical network. ONUCA was thus coordinated by the five isthmian capitals as liaison centers, linked to the ONUCA headquarters in Tegucigalpas, Honduras.\(^{954}\) As the first United Nations peacekeeping force in the western hemisphere, ONUCA formed from Spanish, Canadian, and other unarmed or lightly armed Blue Helmet forces. A larger force was intended before Violeta Chamorro’s 1990 electoral win in Nicaragua, if organizing initiatives in Honduras could proceed far enough to allow the Contras to return unarmed to Nicaragua.\(^{955}\) ONUCA’s proposal was similar to that which the United Nations continued to advance for justice in Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, requesting that refugees in exile (such as the Contras or Palestinians) be allowed to return to their home country under an international governance agreement.

Nonetheless, the United States has persisted in its world order approach to conflict resolution.\(^{956}\) At the same time, operating economically like a Third World state, with a world order-oriented military, the Soviets were guided by anti-dependency expectations for a better future\(^{957}\) and some cooperative input.\(^{958}\) But, to ensure peaceful international conflict resolution


\(^{957}\)Oleg Bogomolov, “The Socialist Countries at a Critical Stage in World Economic Development,” *Problems of Economics* 30 (Dec. 1987): 39-40. This belief was based on production trends of oil, gas, steel, cement, electric
on individual and governmental levels, both the United States and the Soviet Union will need to coordinate all three approaches in the least violent way possible. Neither of the two superpowers, both handicapped by their own powerful perceptions of violent world leadership, has so far managed to conceive such an approach, although Mikhail Gorbachev’s “international” reconstruction dream may appear to be kinder and gentler than a world dominated by crowded prisons envisaged by George Bush.

A final piece to the still incomplete puzzle of international conflict resolution concerns the pressing aspect of racial, linguistic, and demographic conflict, especially in the Spanish and Arabic cultures of the isthmus and the Levant. English, the main language of the world’s major cities from 1800-1990, will recede to fifth place by the year 2000, while Russian (fourth in 1900) dropped under twentieth place in 1990. Thus, Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, Los Angeles, and New York City will be surpassed in size after the year 2000 by Seoul, Beijing, Bombay, Cairo, Lima, Madras, Shanghai, Calcutta, Jakarta, Karachi, New Delhi, Buenos Aires, São Paulo, Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro.

In other words, in the twenty-first century, Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Spanish, and Portuguese will be spoken in the world’s largest cities, not French, English, German, and Russian. In particular, Bombay, Cairo, Madras, Calcutta, New Delhi, and Mexico City will remain the significant cities near the four conflict zones of the Western Caribbean, the Eastern Mediterranean, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia. Future research in Spanish and Arabic,
if current violent trends continue, will become central in developing international conflict resolution. This research will concern how to resolve progressively more congested urbanization, disparities between wealth and poverty, tension from population density in states prone to conflict, and burdensome economic (debt-drug) conflict and destabilization.

**Surprises to Expect in the Future**

We may expect surprises in the future of international conflict resolution. Judging from the difficulties of writing this work, it is clear that the concepts of serial and structural violence need further research attention. Indicators of serial violence should be linked more precisely with the degree of success in meeting the human needs of housing, education, employment, and health care, and with the human rights of free speech, free elections, and free assembly. Making some of these connections in trend research on serial and structural violence uncovered powerful social minefields or cultural taboos, and contrasted conceptual polarities not originally expected. It was not originally clear, for example, that Central Intelligence Agency intervention was intended to undermine the international demonstration effect of Costa Rica’s unarmed diplomacy.

Attempts to improve on the knowledge of these trends, linkages, and indicators of violence and nonviolence may invite better, more incisive research tools to probe intense international violence and to discover ways to cure it. Hopefully, this kind of scientific research will go beyond the prurient fascination with war and violent power that characterizes current politically-colored mass media images. Trend research for peace and justice should improve and integrate caring approaches that strengthen the power of nonviolent conflict resolution on legal, social, economic, and political levels, not only on the level of interpersonal interaction.

The death toll is a blunt sledgehammer-like instrument for the scientific analysis of power, conflict intensity, and the potential for success in conflict resolution. But, as yet, no commonly accepted tool less like a bludgeon can quantify the conditions of international conflict

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It may be such future conditions that will bring full meaning to phrases like *world apartheid*, vividly applicable in white states like Costa Rica surrounded by black and latin populations.
resolution. Hopefully, future researchers may be able to proceed less clumsily because they will have better tools and less violence to account for. Preventive rather than interventive scientific tools, based on local and global knowledge drawn from all three approaches, may advance this future research work — for example, to enable the construction of a quantifiable “ecology” or ecological quality of life indicator. There may be no exit from the globally lethal arms race other than such painstaking research and careful creativity.962

The largest obstacle to this research and creativity is the partisan bias of the international relations literature about war and war resolution in states such as Cuba, Iceland, Laos, Vietnam, Angola, Barbados, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, and Costa Rica. An initial understanding of these states from their own point of view, trying to use nonviolence and trying to resolve serial violence imposed on them by outside intervention, came only through many personal interviews during years of travel — often on foot. But understanding of this potentially fertile field of knowledge about peace must also be cultivated to gain the awesome wealth here, otherwise the pragmatic power of nonviolence will continue to be marginalized in international relations and development contexts.

Relevant literature has emerged only in slow, patient, and revolutionary struggle.963 In the meantime, serial violence will last as long as the emotionally-entrenched judgments of reality that relativize the critical value of nonviolence for the needs and rights of people. In the Twenty-First Century, if nonviolent means do not gain credence, widening economic disparities could continue to brutalize ninety percent of the world’s poorest (Third World) people — literally impoverished, wounded, and killed in their daily, face-to-face encounters with the other ten percent of the world’s militarized people — with even more serial violence.

962 This choice became starkly evident to the author during conversations with a long-time friend and correspondent of Simone de Beauvoir — Helen Wenck — a Quaker who overcame the personal trauma of a Nazi death camp experience (Kalamazoo, MI, 1979-1982).

963 As impressed upon the author during conversations with Bonnie Day, a (U.S.) Quaker poet exiled for acting as a courier — relaying tens of thousands of dollars at a time — from U.S. peace movements to Canada. The money then went to hospitals in Hanoi and Haiphong, Vietnam, during the U.S. saturation bombing, by way of Mennonites in Canada and the Soviet Union (Toronto, 1974-1979).
The author was seriously hampered by this partisan bias in international relations literature which: (1) obscures what we need to know to discover the violent role of militarization achieved by conscription and taxes for war in the nation-state and the nonviolent resistance to this militarization, and (2) blurs what we need to know to disclose the practical links between this militarization, serial violence, and the structural violence of underdevelopment. This partisan bias has preserved violent power from healthy criticism, left it hidden by the equivocation of power and violence embedded in thought and language that conceals the personal dependency of many state leaders on violent approaches in conflict resolution. But power euphemistically shielded from scrutiny as “just war” can only entangle us in more war, insecurity, and underdevelopment. An “equal rights amendment” to substitute persistent nonviolence and cooperation for this deeply-embedded linguistic and intercultural enslavement to violence is long overdue in our dream for a better future.

Limited progress toward nonviolent international conflict resolution has been made through the United Nations formula on disarmament, development, and security. As a result, the United Nations has proposed better arms monitoring, especially for conventional arms, which constitute eighty percent of the weapons the world plans, produces, and stockpiles. These proposals center on debate over beginning a fund that would resolve underdevelopment by diverting money away from arms. The bulk of the opposition to this fund came from South Africa and the United States.

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964 Such “knowledge” is also noted by Judit Balázs, “Peace Research in Hungary,” Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Mimeo, (11 Jan. 1985), 1-2 and 6-9. See also its Development and Peace magazine, which opened capitalist-communist dialogue through an International Peace Institute in Vienna, Austria, encouraging input by U.S. scholars such as Paul Peachey.

965 The upshot of the U.N. security through disarmament and development hypothesis has thus been argued to the effect that the ideological motor or power source of the arms race — the shield concept of violence as power, mutually reinforced by a globally widening disparity of wealth and poverty and by ecological disintegration — is driving us as a species to omnicide. See U.N., “Disarmament and Development,” A/36/356, 132. Arguments such as this may need to address prosaic questions as well, e.g., (1) Why may the right to refuse to kill and to pay taxes for war undermine the legitimacy of the nation-state system (possibly even undercutting the violence of drugs and the debt)? and (2) Why are omnicidal systems part of the next stage of world history (or lack thereof) in which the nation-state system has become as useless as the medieval castle in confronting the arms of a bygone age? Such systems are the problem, according to the founder of IPRA: Bert Röling, “De Universiteit en het Probleem van Oorlog en Vrede,” University “Peace Day” Lecture (Groningen, the NL: Polemologische Instituut van de Rijksuniversiteit, 1984/2), 1-24.
Initiatives for this debate operate through a clearinghouse, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Originally, Costa Rica, Sweden, and the Netherlands, with support from Cuba, India, and Germany, took the preliminary steps in 1987 toward creating dialogue on this integral approach to international conflict resolution. Unfortunately, few such initiatives yet exist in international relations academic programs where these initiatives are the most exigent: for example, in Laos, Iceland, Angola, Lebanon, Vietnam, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Vanuatu. However, despite slow growth, Costa Rica’s United Nations-affiliated University for Peace has brought us one step closer to the global integration of international conflict resolution.

At the present time, power articulated by war and violence still pervades international approaches to conflict resolution. Reflecting each state’s self-image, a parallel passive-aggressive syndrome — radically different from neutrality and nonalignment — continues to influence national peace movements as a result. Whatever the approach, however, none of the three approaches has succeeded in using power very well to resolve conflict on its own. Only methods and practice that integrate and streamline the goals of these three approaches, whether in national or international contexts, will ensure our interdependent survival, productivity, and creativity for making peace instead of war on local and global levels.

Power, deployed as a consensual process of force, conflict, and coercion, can effect mutual change for mutual benefit through nonviolent cooperation. An ecological rule of law


967 Please refer also to footnote 3 in this chapter. The League of Nations (until 1938) and the U.N. (1945-1990) have attempted to register some arms transfer data; see SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1975), 311. Further exploration by such research could, e.g., develop findings from the Dutch consumer experience for analyzing legalization of soft drugs. Brutalization of the Western Caribbean through violent conflict and poverty, aligned with an arms and drug business, might have been averted if such an enlightened policy had channeled drug use in the USA. Instead such arms and drug businesses have damaged the international relations of states like Cuba and Costa Rica. Other research directions may also permit nonviolent microanalysis for rebuilding family and kinship systems, on issues like state taxes, power, and economic development. See La Donna Harris, “Report for the Van Ameringen Foundation on the American Indian for Opportunity’s Family System’s Project,” Mimeo, Washington, D.C., 23 Dec. 1989, 1-63.
based on nonviolent power and responsibility, superceding militarization and underdevelopment while improving access to human rights and necessities, will provide the simplest way to prevent serial and structural violence. Until more progress is made toward nonviolent conflict resolution for mutual international co-existence, though, militarization complicated by drugs, debt, and omnicidal weapons will continue to obstruct peaceable security and ecologically sustainable development.

Numerous attempts have been made to lessen the violence in the theories and methods with which we resolve international conflict. Common political power and creativity, not economic charity, have been found to be the most viable means over the long term for resolving conflict effectively, above all in the advancement of educational planning for peace.968

The creative power for such a common theory should elicit from us a common meaning of power,969 useful for defense, freedom, justice, security, and democracy. Such a common meaning should enable us to share power in the equitable access of human necessities for development, rather than to violate each other in the abuse of innovative technologies for militarization. The outcomes from such a theory and method will give us the interdependent power and strength we need for common peace, security, and development, as well as the ability to prevent and resolve international conflict with love, well-being, and consensus — that is, peace. The resulting cooperative power and responsibility — rooted in nonviolent force, conflict, and coercion — will be the most surprising of all for creating and encouraging peace, security, and an ecologically sustainable environment.


969From the root meaning of the words for education, the ancient Latin words *edu-care* and *educere*, i.e., to train, elicit, draw out and lead out. See D. A. Kidd, Collins Latin Gem Dictionary (London: Collins, 1964), 113 and 519 [on to lead out].
Sources

Appendix A: An Etymology of the Three Approaches

Understandably, under the pressures for change or violence, terms for the approaches of world order, anti-dependency, and nonviolence may vary in meaning outside of the English or European (Romance) languages. The two main differences that stand out are highlighted with various nuances in the proactive (not passive) nonviolent and anti-dependency approaches. “Nonviolence” in the Dutch language, the world’s language of international law, for example, translates as geweldloosheid — literally meaning a solution free of violence. The Dutch term niet gebonden (for an anti-dependency approach) means not, or no longer bound or shackled. In contrast, the Dutch word for orde or order can also indicate a comprehensive world class (or even global apartheid) system.

In Arabic, as in Spanish, the terminology resonates with biases for or against violence. These biases have been molded by the intensity of wars concentrated historically in the Western Caribbean and the Middle East, as will be discussed above all in Chapters Three and Five. The historical linkage of these two areas has coalesced through the cultural intermixture of the Spanish and Arabic world views over the last 1,500 years in Moorish Spain — as expressed by the common Spanish household words for basic pueblo architectural styles or the very basic meal of beans and rice (Moros y Cristianos). This linkage has emerged characteristically from the

\[970\] Gunther Haensch, et al., eds., *Dictionary of International Relations and Politics: Systematic and Alphabetical in Four Languages: German, English/American, French, Spanish* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1965). See pp. 184-85 (no. 2461) for violence or nonviolence and pp. 202-203 (no. 2738) for world order. However, while terms such as disarmament are listed here, other terms such as development or anti-dependency are not to be found in this 638 page dictionary. Such terms as the latter two will be explored in the dictionary citations to follow.

\[971\] E. Martin and G. A. J. Tops, *Van Dale Grootwoordenboek Engels-Nederlands* (Utrecht-Antwerp: Van Dale Lexicografie, 1984), 852, 854, and 886. For the relevant German word, lö sung, as cited, see Herbert Schöffler, *Schöffler-Weis Englisch-Deutsch* (Stuttgart: Pons-Grosswörterbuch, 1978), 252 and 313. Please note as well that terms from other than the Romantic (English, Russian, or Northern European) script, such as the terms cited throughout the dissertation from the Chinese, Hindi, Arabic, and Japanese languages, are not accessible by the presently-used word processing package (i.e., “WordPerfect 5.1”). The Indian, or Hindi-Jainist-Sanskrit, terms for violence and nonviolence may be more familiar, given the example of Mohandas Gandhi for fighting violence (or himsa) with nonviolence (ahimsa). See Chapter Two for more on the Indian experience.
Moorish-Spanish cities of Grenada, Cordoba (with possibly the largest functioning mosque outside the Arab centers of Mecca, Damascus, and Jerusalem or Al-Quds), and Seville, as well as the provinces of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia (including Barcelona). The intermixture often includes Basque, Muslim, or non-Roman Catholic traditions in northern, mountainous “Gallego” Spain as well.

The Arabic terms *jabr*, *raghm*, and *zawr* mean violence, while *ta’ alluk* and *ittikal* indicate dependency. Likewise, ‘*alam* means the world, and *dunya or ka’ idah*, orderly governance.972 However, *al-nidham al-jadid* indicates the most modern (world) order, and *adam al-ittikal* (or free of oppression), anti-dependency. *La ‘unf* (or “no”-violence) means nonviolence; [*Sabr*, ’patience].973

In Russian, *atkaz ot* (or to refuse) *nasiliye* (or violence) translate loosely as nonviolence. Both English and Russian words for world order take a contextually top-down view of power, where military prowess allegedly guarantees security. But, as might be expected, given notable Soviet war epics, *anti-patchiñeňiye* (or subjugation) — or anti-dependency — means rejection of subjugation.974

The Chinese and Japanese, on the “oriental” side of the planet, share basic Spanish and Arabic insights on nonviolence and anti-dependency. Like the Arabic words for a “modern” world order, for instance, the Chinese words for world order, *zhi xu*, combine the older words of *shi, jia, zhi*, and *xu*. Thus anti-dependency (*fan yi lai*) and nonviolence (*fan bao li*) are also terms

972 Joseph Catafago, *An English and Arabic Dictionary* (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1858), 444, 746, 1035, and 1055. The remarks about Moorish Spain are based on travel experienced by the author in Spain, Northern Africa, and the Middle East, as well as Latin America. One need only think of such travelling seers as Maimonides or Ibn al-Arabi to make this point.

973 The author is grateful to Abdul Aziz Said and to Mubarak Awad for help over these terms in Arabic (particularly nonviolence). See also J. M. Cowan, *Arabic-English Dictionary, The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, 1976), 104 (from *taqil* for heavy, burdensome), 114, 597, 649, 851, and 978. Another term, *sabra*, also indicates nonviolence to a certain degree. Sabra concerns not only the succulent parts of a thorny desert cactus, (which may act as a botanical specific to counter dysentery), but also the patience that only the alkaline desert can teach. However, in modern Hebrew (or Ee’ vreet) “street” slang, *sabra* also denotes those Jewish people born in Israel.

that proactively challenge violent colonial force (bao) and power (li), rooted in the bitter memories of war, famine, and colonization.975

Moreover, the Japanese use two words for the English term nonviolence. The first, *hiboryoku*, means the irresistible resolution of violence, and the second, *muteiko*, means passive obedience — in the context of *dokuritsu jison* (or anti-dependent self-esteem, respect, importance, and independence). Finally, *kokusai chitsujo* indicates an internationally-disciplined world order, ultimately maintained by military force and power.976

**Appendix B: Research Sources**

Please note that the author’s choice of sources has been guided by a search for academically-distinguished research, above all for such research sources as those which have emerged from graduate-level peace and conflict resolution university programs. Such programs would include the doctorate-level programs in international business and sociology (Bradford, England), in international law (Groningen, the Netherlands), and in international political economy (Budapest, Hungary).

Ongoing, but contested information, such as that concerning the ethics of national leaders, for example, George Bush, was omitted from the dissertation, since such material would not be deemed appropriate to this pioneer work. However, there have been many such statements (yet to be proven by a court of law) in the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. In addition, when quoting from sources that may have been conditioned by the past Cold War, every attempt was made to quote from university presses, such as the Nauka (meaning *Science*) or Yazyk (meaning *Cultural Education*) presses linked directly to the


Moscow State (MGU) University. Likewise, citations from apparently obscure periodicals were used only if confirmed by two or three other similar references.

This Appendix on research sources for the dissertation will be divided into two parts. The first part cites the primary sources helpful for special insight, beyond the people already mentioned in the beginning “Acknowledgements.” Then, based on research and interviews with primary sources — to help readers who may want to do similar research on a topic as difficult as Costa Rica (claiming to be without military power) — the second part lists ten helpful books, theses, monographs, and periodical articles for each of the three parts of the dissertation on the theory, method, and outcome of international conflict resolution.

As primary sources for research, I received helpful insight in Costa Rica from John Trostle and Molly Figuerola of the Monteverde Community, as well as Erna Castro, Margaret Metzinger (Professor, Heredia), Patricia Rebolledo and Lezak (Lisa) Shallat — plus Guadalupe Urbina for her songs — from the San José Peace Center. Other helpful conversations took place with Manuel Araya Incera (Director of FLACSO, Costa Rica), Alexander Bonilla (Founder of the Ecological Party), Gerardo Budowski (Ecologist, United Nations University of Peace), Judy Butler (Editor, Envío, Managua), Maralise Hood (Negotiator, United Nations University of Peace), Lucrecia Lozano (Professor, National University of Mexico), Luis Mesa Delmonte (Cuba), Clotilde María Obregon Quesada (Professor, University of Costa Rica, by telephone), Julio Quan (Professor, United Nations University of Peace), and Mattijs Von Bonzel (attaché, the Netherlands Embassy in San José). Forestry officers of the Norwegian Embassy in San José and the Swedish Embassy in Managua were also helpful for identifying issues. In Cuba, Tomás Fidel Castellanos García and Martín Medina Rodríguez also guided me in meeting Marta Terri, director of the National “José Martí” Library.

The information specialists of most help were found at The American University Bender Library, especially Shirley Rosenstock in the “Inter-Library Loan” division, and at the specialized Disarmament Library of the United Nations, linked to the New York City United Nations Dag Hammarskjold Library. Additional help came from the United Nations’ Washington, D.C. Information Center Library; the International Labor Office Library; the United States Library of Congress Main, Law, Maps, Manuscript, and Microfilm divisions; the National Library of Costa Rica in San José; and the university libraries of the University of Costa Rica in San José; the National University of Costa Rica in Heredia; the Historical Institute of the
University of Central America in Managua; and the Graduate Institute of International Relations in Havana. Bruce Sherman, at the Radio/TV Marti (Cuba) Resource Center Library of the United States Information Agency in Washington, D.C., was also helpful.

The expertise of people in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Polemological Institute of the National University at Groningen in the Netherlands, and various Quaker organizations (the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva, the American and Canadian Friends Service Committees, Quaker Peace and Service in London, and the Friends Committee on National Legislation), was helpful also. Finally, the network offered by the International Peace Research Association Newsletter (edited by Elise Boulding and Clovis Brigagão) complemented the following clipping collections: the “Data Center Files” (Oakland, CA) used at the Georgetown University Central American Historical Center, the Center of Economic Research (CIDE, Mexico City) and the Costa Rican International Relations department library in Heredia, Costa Rica.

The following ten examples of books, theses, monographs, and periodical articles of fundamental importance correspond to each of the three parts of the dissertation:

Part I. Theory:


Part II. Method:

**Part III. Outcome:**

Appendix C: Serial Violence Data

Work on some sort of indicator for the intensity of violence and the potential for the resolution of conflict since 1945 began with not much more than amorphous literature on conflict. Much of this literature unfortunately covers conflict regarding the so-called “great powers” more than other conflict, although it is well known that war since 1945 has been concentrated in the Third World. These widely-available “great power” events data bases can be accessed, for example, via: John Jessup, A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945-1985 (NY: Greenwood, 1989) or Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, The Scientific Measurement of International Conflict: Handbook of Datasets on Crises and Wars, 1495-1988 A.D. (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1990).

But there were indications of something quite different in sources such as those cited in Appendix B above, or via André Gunder Frank, “Arms Economy and Warfare in the Third World,” Third World Quarterly, 2 (1980) and “The Impact of Militarization on Development and Human Rights,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 9 (1978). Similar indications of something different were to be found in articles scattered throughout various journals, such as: Greenpeace, Science for the People, Gandhi Marg (Delhi), Middle East Report (MERIP), NACLA’s Report on the Americas, Development and Peace (Budapest), Covert Action Information Bulletin, and the Nordic Journal of Latin American Studies. Please refer to the Select Bibliography.

Progress in initially identifying zones of conflict began by exploring the two separate, independent data sets described below, on the chronological incidence of warfare, by Istvan Kende and Gérard Chaliand. This progress led toward the quantitative indicator of what would be called serial violence. Serial violence, as described also in chapter five, denotes the quantitative indicator used to measure the intensity of condensed, continuous, or periodic conflict, and the potential for conflict resolution. A higher serial violence indicator should mean lower potential for resolution of conflict. The indicator itself is a percentage, derived from total numbers of people killed in war divided by national population totals, for conflict lasting over twenty years, from 1945-1985 for the zones, and for as late as 1989 for the percentages of serial violence. Please see the specific section called Serial Violence in chapter five for further details on the derivation of this indicator.

Appendix C on Serial Violence Data consists of three major tables: 1) A War Intensity From 1945 to 1985 table to indicate how wars have clustered in four major zones of war
(identified as such in chapter three); 2) A War Zones table to summarize the data from the first table; and 3) A Third World Serial Violence Intensity table to depict the serial violence indicator for ten specific countries (as briefly illustrated by a bar graph in chapter five).

The first table, War Intensity From 1945 To 1985, contains comparative data from the two data sets, first from Istvan Kende (1978), the originator of much of this sort of data, who defined war as continuous, although perhaps sporadic, armed clashes with some hierarchical (state) organization at least on one side of the conflict. Kende did this work at the peace and conflict resolution — Third World data — project in Budapest, which is well known for its rather unique data of this nature. Data confirming Kende’s work is provided in a second data set from Gérard Chaliand and others (1985). Kende notes 99 such wars, Chaliand et al. 101 such wars. Each event of serial violence is identified as occurring in a certain war zone: for example, in the Western Caribbean, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or Southern Africa. Therefore, for instance, Kende notes that 16 of the 99 (16%) which he counted took place in the Western Caribbean, while Chaliand et al. note that 12 of the 101 wars (12%) which they counted took place in the Western Caribbean. The “Percentage of war in global war zones” underneath the count and percentage of wars for each zone indicates the percentage of wars fought exclusively within the four war zones.

Both sources count wars considered as such in international relations literature, without reference to who killed who in such wars — dominated by civilian casualties. The definitions of both Kende and Chaliand et al. closely approximate the use of the word war as defined at the end of chapter one, that is, as a condition marked by frequent episodes of armed, hierarchical violence characterized by contention and armed aggression; please see this same place in chapter one for a definition of peace if necessary. The main difference between Kende and Chaliand et al. is that the latter contend that war in the four war zones involves outside intervention (sometimes arms, sometimes soldiers, ...), and thus includes a main agent of intervention — marked in the table by the name of the Third World state, a slash mark, and what they contend was the major outside intervention agent.

The second table, War Zones, compares the percentages of the two data sets from 1945 to 1985. On the left margin, the four zones are listed one by one (to indicate percentages for wars inside the zones, all other wars, and all wars as a whole). The middle column contains percentages of wars enumerated by Kende. On the right hand, another column contains
percentages of wars enumerated by Chaliand et al. The two data sets indicate that somewhere between 63% and 71% all wars since 1945 have been fought in the global war zones.

Finally, the data in the last table, a *War Intensity From 1945 To 1985* table, focuses the information from the first two tables in the indicator of serial violence. The time periods for this serial violence, and the full meaning of this indicator, have already been explained in depth and summarized by a bar graph in chapter five. The four columns in this table list ten states as examples, including data for their body count (people killed in war), their population count (in millions), and their serial violence percentages (as read from left to right by column). Comprehensive footnotes give further references used to compute the value for each serial violence percentage indicator.
**War Intensity From 1945 To 1985**

Data Set One from Istvan Kende (1945-1978)\(^ {977}\)
(The Most Comprehensive Data Set)

### Western Caribbean

16 of 99 war total  
World war percentage total: 16%  
Percentage of war in global war zones: 22%

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### Middle East

35 of 99 war total  
World war percentage total: 35%  
Percentage of war in global war zones: 49%

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-49</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1956-58</td>
<td>Aden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1958-63</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1958-61</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1961-64</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-54</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-62</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1961-64</td>
<td>Iraq/Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-59</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1962-67</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Algeria/Morocco</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Israel-Arab/PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>Somalia/Ethiopia</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>S. Yemen/Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-67</td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Jordan/PLO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-67</td>
<td>Somalia/Kenya</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Yemen/South Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Israel-Arab states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-70</td>
<td>Iraq/Kurds</td>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>Iraq-Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-72</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Southeast Asia

10 of 99 war total  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Brunei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1963-</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-75</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1965-</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-62</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1970-</td>
<td>Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Southern Africa

10 of 99 war total  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-56</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1964-</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Nyasaland</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-69</td>
<td>Zaire/Congo</td>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Uganda/Tanzania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four other authors compiled the second data set initiated by Gérard Chaliand (1945-1985) for 101 international war events from 1945 to 1983. The global war zones account for 64 wars, or 62% of the 101 war events. See Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, Trans. by Tony Berrett, Maps by Catherine Petit, *Strategic Atlas, A Comparative Geopolitics of the World’s Powers* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 48-50, for the second data set (1945-1985) below:
### War Intensity From 1945 To 1985 (Cont.)

**Western Caribbean** (all include U.S. to some degree)

12 of 101 war total  
World war percentage total: 12%  
Percentage of war in global war zones: 19%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Guatemala/Honduras</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>El Salvador/Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-59</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1972-</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1976-</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-68</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1980-</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-67</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Middle East

30 of 101 war total  
World war percentage total: 29%  
Percentage of war in global war zones: 47%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/Region/Other</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/Region/Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Azerbaijan/Irani Kurds</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Jordan/PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-49</td>
<td>Israel/Arab states</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Greece/Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-5</td>
<td>Tunisia/France</td>
<td>1975-78</td>
<td>Lebanon/U.S./Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Suez/French/British</td>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>Djibouti/France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-</td>
<td>Iraq/Kurds/England</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>Somalia/Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Eritrea/U.S.</td>
<td>1978-</td>
<td>Iran/Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-67</td>
<td>Yemen/Egypt</td>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>Iran/U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Algeria/Morocco</td>
<td>1978-</td>
<td>Afghanistan/U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>Cyprus/Turkey/U.S.</td>
<td>1979-</td>
<td>Afghanistan/USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-67</td>
<td>South Yemen/England</td>
<td>1979-</td>
<td>Iran/Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-</td>
<td>Israel/PLO/U.S./USSR</td>
<td>1982-</td>
<td>Lebanon/Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Southeast Asia

12 of 101 war total  
World war percentage total: 12%  
Percentage of war in global war zones: 19%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-54</td>
<td>Vietnam/France</td>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>Sumatra/U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-54</td>
<td>Laos/France</td>
<td>1960-</td>
<td>Laos/U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-49</td>
<td>Indonesia/Netherlands 1960-65 1946-49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Malaysia/England 1965-75 1965-75</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Thailand/U.S. 1965-75 1965-75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-54</td>
<td>Burma/U.S. 1974 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Southern Africa**

10 of 101 war total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-49</td>
<td>Indonesia/NL/U.S. 1946-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-54</td>
<td>Kenya/England 1954-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-64</td>
<td>Zaire/Belgium/U.S. 1965-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-76</td>
<td>Angola/Portugal/U.S. 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>Ruanda/U.S./RSA 1977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of war in global war zones: 16%

**World war percentage total: 10%**

All other wars outside the four global war zones, listed by both the above sources:

Istvan Kende (1945-1978): 28 other wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>Spain 1945-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-49</td>
<td>Greece 1946-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-47</td>
<td>India/Pakistan 1946-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-54</td>
<td>Philippines 1946-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-49</td>
<td>China 1946-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Paraguay 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Bolivia 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-53</td>
<td>Korea 1950-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Bolivia 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-65</td>
<td>Morocco 1952-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>China (Islands) 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-63</td>
<td>Cameroon 1955-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Hungary 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-64</td>
<td>India/Nagas/Nepal/Goa 1961-1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gérard Chaliand (1945-1985): 37 other wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>China/U.S./England 1945-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-49</td>
<td>India/Pakistan 1947-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>India/England 1948-49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


1949-52 Philippines/U.S. 1967-70 Brazil/U.S.
1950-51 China/Taiwan/U.S. 1968 Ireland/England
1950-53 Korea/U.S. 1968 Czechoslovakia/USSR
1953 Morocco/France 1968-82 Chad/France
1955 China/Tibet/India 1969 China/USSR
1956 Hungary/USSR 1971 Bangladesh/India
1957 Cameroon/France 1973-(89) Chile/U.S.
1959 India/China 1973-77 Pakistan/India/U.S.
1961 Goa/India/Portugal 1975 Spain/Basques/U.S.
1961 Mauritania/France 1977- Philippines/U.S.
1961 Tunisia/France 1979 Central Africa/Spain
1962 India/China 1980- Philippines/U.S.
1964 Gabon/France 1980 Chad/Libya
1965 India/Pakistan/U.S. 1980 Gambia/Senegal
1965-82 Peru/U.S.

**War Zones** (A Comparison of Data Set Percentages), By Zones (1945-85)\(^{980}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Caribbean</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Wars</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Wars</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these war dead figures for 1945-1985 may include famine dead. Such figures are considerably less precise or comprehensive than global arms race figures for the cost and number of weapons, even in basic Third World disarmament research literature. These four global conflict zones, with a population between 550,000,000 and 1 billion of the world’s 5 billion people, may well be experiencing a serial violence rate double or triple the 1938-1945 rate of 1% dead.

\(^{980}\) The author is grateful to Steven Arnold for feedback here.
**Third World Serial Violence Intensity**

As Conservatively Measured by Percentages from War Dead (Corpses), Divided by National Population, By Zone and Country (1945-85)**981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Body Count</th>
<th>Population (in millions)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>130,000-260,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5-10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>14,000-24,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.3-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>3,000,000-6,100,000</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>5-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>190,000-380,000</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea</td>
<td>124,000-2,000,000</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2-32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>100,000-396,000</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.3-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>8,000-27,500</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7-2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


982 A 14,000 or 0.3% Israeli war dead figure, which compares with 10% in 1940s wars in Russia, Yugoslavia and Poland, can be extrapolated from Baruch Kimmerling, “Making Conflict a Routine: Cumulative Effects of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Upon Israeli Society,” in Moshe Lissak, ed., *Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment, The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict* (Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass & Co., 1984), p. 17. Joshua Brilliant, [“Defense Source Releases IDF Casualty Data,” *Jerusalem Post*, 22 January 1985, 2], lists 15,632 Israeli war dead from 1948 to 1985, including 986 war dead in Lebanon. These figures may not include Palestinian war dead. Verifiable Syrian, Egyptian, or Palestinian war dead counts are hard to find in the literature. Estimates taking into account differing war technology levels would make Palestinian or Egyptian war dead counts higher than Israeli totals from 1945-85. The Canadian government statistics for Israel cite 24,000 dead, or 0.5%, which may or may not include Palestinian dead.

983 Southeast Asian and Southern African changes since 1975 make it difficult to find reliable data. See “Presidential Visit to Belgium, *ANGOP*, 12 Oct. 1987, 5, giving 60,000 dead to the Canadian government number of 396,000. Cuban war dead totals are another matter. Other percentages not as concentrated as the serial levels of violence shown on the chart above: Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Jordan, Zaire, India, Syria, Costa Rica, South Africa, and Sri Lanka under 0.2%; Iraq and Indonesia about 0.5%; Cyprus, Algeria, Mozambique, and Colombia about 1%; North and South Yemen, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Guinea-Bissau about 1.5%; Iran, Burundi, Algeria, Nigeria, and Afghanistan under 2%; Uganda at 3.7%; and finally, the Sudan and North Korea under 5%. The Canadian figures for Mozambique are 3.2% serial war dead, but whether these figures are comparable to those in Angolan and Namibian histories, or the South African military body counts, is not made clear. Angolan, Namibian, Kampuchean, and Mozambican war dead numbers are difficult to ascertain with politically impartial certainty.

Select Bibliography

Costa Rica, a state without military power, is not easy to research in the literature. The majority of the citations used for the dissertation were useful only as single words or phrases under ten words. Therefore, a full bibliography would be too cumbersome for the reader. In its place, a select bibliography is offered below with the sources found to be most useful, those which contained more than ten words relevant to the topic of the dissertation. Please see the List of Abbreviations for an overview of the most frequently used journals, newspapers, and periodicals.

This Select Bibliography is arranged as follows:

Selected Books, Theses, and Monographs on Costa Rica
Selected Journal or Periodical Articles on Costa Rica
Selected Books, Theses, and Monographs on Conflict Resolution
Selected Journal or Periodical Articles on Conflict Resolution

Selected Books, Theses, and Monographs on Costa Rica


African military 8,000 war dead count also quoted by Lewis. Namibia is not listed in the Canadian government list, which may be using Sivard’s and the South African military’s statistics.


Coronado, Gabriel; Miguel Sobrado, and Leda Trejos, eds. *¿Quién Quiere la Guerra en Costa Rica?* San José and Managua: Instituto Costarricense de Estudios Sociales [ICES] and Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales [CRIES], 1988.


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Carlson, Carl E. “The October Surprise.” Penthouse, November 1984, 68.


“Comandante Carlos ... The Revolution Advances.” (Managua, Census and Statistics Institute Mimeo.) (November 1986), 3-16.


“En Costa Rica Desmantelaron la Red Logistica de ARDE.” *El Día Internacional* [Mexico City], 27 April 1984, 15.


Hall, Bill. “First Meeting in Ten Years, Central Americans Gather to Confront Environmental Crisis.” EPOCA Update (Summer 1987): 96.


“Por Ayuda a Somoza Ataca a Israel.” La Prensa Libre, 6 July 1979, 15.


Selser, Gregorio. “Nuevas Violaciones de la CIA a la Neutralidad de Costa Rica.” *El Día* [Mexico City], 29 April 1984, 12.


“600 Mil No Tiénen Que Comer: Nicaragua.” *La Prensa Libre*, 5 July 1979, 1 and 14.

**Selected Books, Theses, and Monographs on Conflict Resolution**


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Selected Journal or Periodical Articles on Conflict Resolution


“Río San Juan: `Territory Free of Landless Peasants’,” Envío 5 (October 1986): 30-36.


“West Bank Radicals Sweep Local Elections.” Jerusalem Post, 14 April 1976, 1.